Reset the policy ID index during policy engine test cleanup so stale policy versions cannot leak between tests.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
The router_code_coverage CI check requires every function in router.py to
be referenced by at least one test under tests/{local_testing,
router_unit_tests,test_litellm} in a file with "router" in its name.
The recently-extracted helper had no direct test, so the check failed
with "0.45% of functions in router.py are not tested".
Add a focused test that exercises the four return paths: model already
in self.model_names, no fallback applies, pattern-router match, and
default_deployment substitution (also asserting the stored default
isn't mutated).
https://claude.ai/code/session_019AVp1XL7RT9RxRe4qRLkay
Mark runtime-created policies and attachments initialized so global policy attachments created from the policy builder apply immediately without requiring a restart.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Many MCP integrations (Zapier, etc.) embed an upstream API key
directly in the server URL, e.g.
``https://actions.zapier.com/mcp/<api-key>/sse``. The list and
single-server endpoints were returning the full URL to any
authenticated user — `_redact_mcp_credentials` only stripped the
explicit ``credentials`` field, and `_sanitize_mcp_server_for_virtual_key`
only ran for restricted virtual keys. Non-admin internal users could
read the dashboard, click the unmask toggle, and exfiltrate the raw
token.
Add `_sanitize_mcp_server_for_non_admin` that runs on top of the
existing credential redaction and clears the credential-bearing
fields:
- ``url`` (the primary leak vector)
- ``spec_path`` (OpenAPI spec URLs that may carry tokens)
- ``static_headers`` / ``extra_headers`` (Authorization)
- ``env`` (arbitrary secrets)
- ``authorization_url`` / ``token_url`` / ``registration_url``
Identity fields (``server_id``, ``alias``, ``mcp_info``, etc.) are
preserved so the UI can still list servers a non-admin's team has
access to.
Apply the new sanitizer in `fetch_all_mcp_servers` and the per-server
fetch path right after the existing virtual-key branch. Update the
existing `test_list_mcp_servers_non_admin_user_filtered` assertions
that previously checked URL visibility.
Frontend defense-in-depth: hide the URL unmask toggle on
`mcp_server_view.tsx` unless the viewer is a proxy admin.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
When _get_all_deployments returns 0 candidates and the litellm-model
fallback branch (_get_deployment_by_litellm_model) finds deployments that
the access-group filter then empties, _access_group_filter_emptied_candidates
remained False (it was captured before that branch ran). The router would
then proceed to default fallbacks; the fallback model could have no
access_groups and short-circuit the filter, silently serving a caller
blocked by access-group restrictions.
Update the flag inside the litellm-model branch when filtering empties a
non-empty candidate set so the default-fallback guard still triggers.
When a team grants /key/list via team_member_permissions, non-admin members
should see all keys for that team — same as a team admin. Previously the
classification in list_keys() only checked admin status, so permitted
members fell into the service-account-only path and could not see other
members' personal keys. Routes those members into the full-visibility set.
Replaces the previous intersect-with-team.access_group_ids check, which
made the override unreachable in practice (the team-gate fallback already
covered every case the intersection allowed). The override now resolves
each of the key's access_group_ids via get_access_object and accepts the
group only if its assigned_team_ids includes the key's team_id, or its
assigned_key_ids includes the key's token. This fulfills the original ask
(a key can extend a team's allow-list via a group the admin granted to
that team or that specific key) while still rejecting foreign groups
referenced by team members of other teams.
`os.path.relpath` with no `start` arg uses the current working
directory, so running pytest from a subdirectory produced a
different Redis key than running from the repo root. CI-recorded
cassettes and locally-replayed runs would silently miss each
other's cache.
Anchor the path to the repo root (derived from `__file__`) so the
key is stable regardless of CWD.
https://claude.ai/code/session_018uCx7pcrkdUJZrCVMaTdPx
Greptile P1: the unsafe-method branch of `_check_proxy_admin_viewer_access`
ended with a blanket `if route in management_routes: return`. That set is a
mix of reads (info/list — handled via the safe-method GET branch above) and
writes. The fallback let Admin Viewer POST to write endpoints not enumerated
in `_ADMIN_VIEWER_BLOCKED_WRITE_ROUTES`, including:
- /team/block, /team/unblock, /team/permissions_update
- /jwt/key/mapping/{new,update,delete}
- /key/bulk_update
- /key/{key_id}/reset_spend
Remove the fallback. The two remaining allow sets (admin_viewer_routes and
global_spend_tracking_routes) are both read-only, so removal does not affect
the legitimate POST-as-read cases (e.g. /spend/calculate, which is in
spend_tracking_routes ⊂ admin_viewer_routes).
Tests:
- 8 new parametrized cases pinning each previously-leaking management write
endpoint to 403 on POST for PROXY_ADMIN_VIEW_ONLY.
The reservation path (PR #26845) atomically pre-fills `spend:user:{user_id}`
and admits at the strict-`<` boundary. The legacy `_PROXY_MaxBudgetLimiter`
pre-call hook re-reads the same counter with `>=`, so a reservation that
fills the counter to exactly `max_budget` (e.g. a request without a
`max_tokens` cap that falls back to reserving the smallest remaining
headroom) is rejected by the hook even though the reservation already
admitted it.
Skip the hook when the request's active `budget_reservation` covers
`spend:user:{user_id}`. The reservation is the source of truth for that
counter cross-pod; the legacy `>=` path remains in place for requests
without a reservation (e.g. paths that bypass the reservation entirely).
Reproduces as `tests/otel_tests/test_prometheus.py::test_user_budget_metrics`
on a fresh user with `max_budget=10` calling `fake-openai-endpoint` without
`max_tokens`. Adds focused unit coverage in
`tests/test_litellm/proxy/hooks/test_max_budget_limiter.py`.
A team member could set any access_group_ids on their key (e.g. a group
assigned only to a different team) and override the team's model
restriction. Intersect the key's access_group_ids with team_object.access_group_ids
in _key_access_group_grants_model so foreign groups are dropped before
model expansion. Adds a regression test that asserts expansion is never
called for foreign groups.
Greptile flagged two follow-ups on the OpenAPI/local-registry pre-call
check:
1. **P1 runtime crash via None proxy_logging_obj.**
`kwargs.get("proxy_logging_obj")` is `None` on the MCP entry path,
and `pre_call_tool_check` calls `proxy_logging_obj._create_mcp_request_object_from_kwargs`
unconditionally after the security checks, which would have crashed
every legitimate call with `AttributeError`. Source the logging
object from `litellm.proxy.proxy_server` the same way
`_handle_managed_mcp_tool` already does.
2. **P2 authorization-bypass window when mcp_server is None.**
Previously the new check was guarded by `if mcp_server is not None`,
so any local tool whose registry entry had no resolvable server (a
startup-race window before `_initialize_tool_name_to_mcp_server_name_mapping`
completes, or an orphaned registry entry) ran without the security
check. Tools registered via openapi_to_mcp_generator are always tied
to a server, so a missing one is a configuration/timing fault — fail
the call with 503 instead of dispatching unguarded.
Tests: existing two pass with an added assertion that
`proxy_logging_obj` is non-None at the call site, plus a new test that
covers the 503 deny branch when the tool→server mapping is missing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The endpoint builder in BedrockCountTokensConfig.get_bedrock_count_tokens_endpoint
percent-encodes the model id as a single path segment (d4dd865b1a, path-traversal
hardening). Update the four endpoint-URL assertions in TestBedrockCountTokensEndpoint
to expect `amazon.nova-lite-v1%3A0` instead of the literal `:0`, matching production
behavior already covered by test_count_tokens_endpoint_encodes_model_id.
Greptile flagged that the new `created_by` fallback in
`/agent/daily/activity` resolves to `WHERE created_by IS NULL` when
`user_api_key_dict.user_id` is `None`, which would expose every
ownerless agent's rows to a service-account-style caller without a
user_id. Skip the fallback query entirely in that case so the caller
is treated as having no permitted agents (empty page, no DB hit).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`execute_mcp_tool` dispatches in two ways: managed MCP servers go
through `_handle_managed_mcp_tool`, which calls
`MCPServerManager.pre_call_tool_check` to enforce allowed/banned tool
lists, key/team `object_permission` tool grants, and parameter
validation. OpenAPI-backed tools, however, were resolved via
`global_mcp_tool_registry` and dispatched directly to
`_handle_local_mcp_tool` — entirely skipping `pre_call_tool_check`.
A caller could invoke any registered OpenAPI tool regardless of their
key/team permissions, including administrative or destructive
operations on the upstream API.
Run `pre_call_tool_check` before the local-registry dispatch whenever
the resolved server is set (the same condition used to surface server
context to the managed path). Honor any guardrail-modified arguments
the hook returns. Errors raised by the hook propagate up before
`_handle_local_mcp_tool` runs.
Tests cover both directions: the pre-call hook fires when the local
tool resolves alongside a server, and a hook-raised HTTPException
prevents the local handler from being invoked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two related cross-tenant leaks in the daily-activity endpoints:
1. `/team/daily/activity` set a single `has_full_team_view` flag that
went True if the caller was admin/perm-holder of ANY one of the
requested teams. An admin of team A could pass `team_ids=A,B` and
read team B's per-API-key breakdown even when they were only a
plain member of team B. Require admin/permission on EVERY requested
team for the unfiltered view; otherwise force fallback to the
caller's own API keys for the whole request. Callers wanting wider
coverage can split into separate requests.
2. `/agent/daily/activity` initialized an empty `where_condition` and
returned every agent's spend/token rows on the proxy when
`agent_ids` was omitted — the dashboard's "Top Agents Driving
Spend" panel triggered this for any authenticated user. For
non-admin callers, scope the query to agents they're permitted to
invoke (`AgentRequestHandler.get_allowed_agents`) or, when their
key/team has no explicit agent allowlist, to agents they created
(`created_by`). Explicit `agent_ids` is intersected with the same
permitted set rather than trusted. When the resolved set is empty,
return an empty paginated page without issuing the query.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`get_daily_spend_from_prometheus` was interpolating the `api_key`
query parameter into a PromQL `hashed_api_key="..."` label matcher
with an f-string. Any caller of `/global/spend/logs` could inject a
bare `"` to terminate the matcher and append arbitrary PromQL
operators or extra metric selectors, exfiltrating cross-tenant
telemetry from the connected Prometheus instance.
Replace the f-string with `_quote_promql_string_literal`, which uses
`json.dumps` to render a complete Go-compatible double-quoted literal.
PromQL string literals follow Go's escape rules per
https://prometheus.io/docs/prometheus/latest/querying/basics/, and
JSON's quoting is a strict subset, so the same escape covers
backslash, embedded quote, and control-character cases without rolling
a bespoke escape table.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Remove explanatory comments that restated what the code already says.
Kept only those that document non-obvious external contracts (the aiohttp
record-path patch's reason for re-feeding the body, and the warning
messages inside save_cassette that reach the user).
Two related authorization gaps in management endpoints:
1. `/project/update` evaluated permission against the team_id supplied in
the request body. By passing `data.team_id` pointing at a team they
admin, a caller could hijack any project — `_check_user_permission_for_project`
was given the attacker's team_object and happily checked admin
membership against that. Drop the team_object kwarg so the helper
re-fetches the existing project's team. Also require admin rights on
the destination team when reassigning a project across teams, so a
team admin cannot shed projects into another team's namespace.
2. `/key/update` accepted any `organization_id` and only checked that
the org existed before applying limits. A caller could thereby point
their key at an arbitrary org. Add `_validate_caller_can_assign_key_org`
which enforces the same membership rule already applied on the
`/key/list` filter path (`validate_key_list_check`); proxy admins and
no-change updates skip the check.
Tests cover both helpers in isolation: existing-team-admin allow,
unrelated-team admin deny, proxy-admin shortcut, org-member allow,
non-member deny, missing user_id deny, no-memberships deny.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Previous attempt wrote to sys.__stderr__ from the test fixture. Under
xdist, fixtures run inside worker subprocesses whose stderr is captured
by the controller and only released to the live log on test failure —
so passing tests' verdicts were silently swallowed.
Round-trip via report.user_properties: the worker-side fixture stashes
the verdict on user_properties, xdist serializes it onto the report,
and a controller-side pytest_runtest_logreport hook writes it via the
TerminalReporter (the same plugin that emits PASSED/FAILED markers).
TerminalReporter is resolved lazily on first hook call because it's
not yet registered when conftest's pytest_configure runs.
Verified locally in both serial and xdist modes.
