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Compute supports_reasoning once per non-wildcard health-check resolution path and update the stale default-max-tokens test docstring.
Made-with: Cursor
Apply reasoning-first precedence for background health-check max tokens, parse reasoning env as optional, and raise non-wildcard fallback max_tokens from 1 to 5 for better reliability.
Made-with: Cursor
Gemini tool call ids embed thought signatures as call_*__thought__*; the
Anthropic /v1/messages SSE adapter now exposes a clean id and moves the
signature to provider_specific_fields.signature for round-trip.
Fixes#25836.
Made-with: Cursor
- Set --ifm-pre-padding to 1.25rem for consistent code block inset
- Restore horizontal padding for line-numbered Docusaurus blocks
- Scope pre/code resets via article .markdown so blog chip styles
no longer strip CodeBlock inner padding on Prism fences
Made-with: Cursor
* Add capability to override default GitHub Copilot authentication endpoints
This feature adds support for GitHub Enterprise subsriptions with custom domain/data ownership (which use a different URL compared to standard accounts)
* Update documentation with new parameters
* Move access token URL and Client ID retrieval outside for loop
Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* Fix spurious comment from Greptile review
* Align api_base retrieval behavior across chat and embedding transformations
* Add missing GitHub Copilot client ID parameter in docs
* Update website documentation with newer options for GitHub Enterprise Copilot
* Fix default value for Copilot client ID in docs
Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Use any() instead of all() for bool check so lists like [True, 1, 2]
raise ValueError; bool is a subclass of int so all(int) alone was insufficient.
Made-with: Cursor
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Audit-B #7 and #8.
1. /organization/member_delete was not in org_admin_only_routes, so it
fell through to management_routes/self_managed_routes and let any
caller that reached the route delete arbitrary org memberships
without the organization_role_based_access_check that member_add
and member_update trigger. Adding it to org_admin_only_routes
applies the same ORG_ADMIN-of-target-org gate.
2. /organization/member_update had no validation that the target user
was not a global PROXY_ADMIN. An org-admin of any org could alter
a PROXY_ADMIN user's per-org role. Reject this unless the caller
is PROXY_ADMIN.
Extends the prior moonshot mocking to cover every inherited
BaseLLMChatTest test that still made a live AWS Bedrock call. Adds
request-body assertions for each override.
New overrides:
- test_content_list_handling: verifies the outgoing body round-trips
user content in list-of-text form; asserts response.choices[0].
message.content parses back from the canned response.
- test_pydantic_model_input: verifies a pydantic Message input does
not raise and produces a parseable response.
- test_response_format_type_text_with_tool_calls_no_tool_choice:
verifies tools are forwarded and response_format + drop_params do
not break the call.
- test_streaming: verifies stream=True routes to the
invoke-with-response-stream endpoint. Bedrock invoke streaming is
intercepted at the make_sync_call import site rather than via the
caller-supplied client, because CustomStreamWrapper.fetch_sync_stream
invokes the stored make_call partial with
client=litellm.module_level_client, overriding any client passed by
the caller.
Extracts a shared _make_moonshot_response helper and a
_invoke_with_mocked_post harness so all the sync mocks share one
canned response body.
After this change TestBedrockMoonshotInvoke runs 23 passed, 29
skipped, 0 live-callers, all in under 1s locally.
Audit-B #2. _check_key_admin_access was gated on max_budget/spend
changes only, which meant a non-admin caller could blanket-rewrite
any OTHER field on any key (key_alias, models, tpm_limit, rpm_limit,
metadata, tags, allowed_routes, guardrails, blocked, duration,
permissions, auto_rotate, access_group_ids, object_permission, …)
as long as they avoided budget/spend. Example attack:
POST /key/update {
key: sk-victim-in-org-B,
models: [],
blocked: true,
organization_id: org-A,
}
The caller is org-admin of org-A, which satisfies the route gate;
the handler then wipes models and blocks the victim's key.
Policy after this fix:
- PROXY_ADMIN: always allowed.
- Key OWNER (matching user_id): allowed for non-budget fields;
budget/spend changes still require team/org admin.
- Everyone else: must pass _check_key_admin_access (PROXY_ADMIN /
key-owner / team-admin / org-admin of the key).
Regression test confirms a non-owner INTERNAL_USER cannot rewrite
key_alias/blocked on someone else's key; existing test covers the
owner-can-update-alias case; existing test covers
internal-user-cannot-modify-max-budget.
Continuation of Veria E3NpkuAd / Audit-B hardening. All three are the
same anti-pattern PR #25904 already addressed for _user_is_org_admin
and /user/delete: route-level gate trusts a caller-supplied scope
field, handler operates on a different scope.
1. /user/update no longer silently creates a user when the target
email doesn't exist. Pre-fix, an org admin could supply a fresh
email + caller-chosen budget/models/metadata; the INSERT path
created the user with no org attachment, bypassing /user/new's
org/team authorization. Now require PROXY_ADMIN for the create
branch; return 404 otherwise. Also fixes /user/bulk_update because
it dispatches through the same _update_single_user_helper.
2. /team/bulk_member_add with all_users=true restricted to PROXY_ADMIN.
The flag pulls every user in the database into the target team,
ignoring org scope — any team admin could use it to capture every
user across every org into their team.
3. /team/update now verifies destination-org admin rights. When the
request carries an organization_id that differs from the team's
current org, an org admin of the caller's current org could
previously relocate the team into any other org (draining their
resources, or capturing a team they once administered). Require
PROXY_ADMIN or org-admin of the DESTINATION org for the relocation.
Regression tests for #1 and #3; #2 covered by the existing bulk_add
suite after the gate addition.
TogetherAIConfig.get_supported_openai_params called get_model_info(),
whose first line calls litellm.get_supported_openai_params() — which for
together_ai routes straight back into this method. The recursion only
terminated when Python's recursion limit was hit or when
_get_model_info_helper raised "not mapped" at the deepest level. Either
way the try/except caught it, so the bug stayed silent — but the cycle
ran ~332 deep every time, emitting hundreds of DEBUG log lines per
call. Surfaced as "infinite loop" in CI when the success_handler thread
emitted that log spam against an already-closed stderr during test
teardown.
Replace the get_model_info() call with supports_function_calling(),
which uses _get_model_info_helper directly and does not call
get_supported_openai_params. Measured drop from 332 to 2
_get_model_info_helper calls per first uncached lookup.
Also swap the test model from Qwen/Qwen3.5-9B (not in model_cost map)
back to a mapped serverless model, Qwen/Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct-Turbo. The
mapping gap is what made the recursion's tail end raise up into the
success handler during teardown in the first place.
Greptile P2. The admin-inject gate only removed tags from data['metadata']
and data['litellm_metadata']; and the
policy engine read directly, so a caller without
allow_client_tags could still drive tag-based policy decisions by moving
tags to the body root. Also strip the root key in the same branch.
Greptile P1 on the /user/delete fix. Per CLAUDE.md 'No N+1 queries',
move the find_many inside the per-user loop to a single batched
fetch with {'user_id': {'in': data.user_ids}} before the loop, then
distribute to a per-user set in memory.
Veria admin-queue finding E3NpkuAd, Audit-B #1. The route-level gate
accepts this call when the caller is PROXY_ADMIN or ORG_ADMIN of any
org named in request_data["organization_id"]/["organizations"]. The
handler processes data.user_ids without cross-checking whether those
users belong to the caller's administered orgs, so an org-admin of
org-A could delete users in org-B via:
{"user_ids": ["victim_in_org_B"], "organization_id": "org-A"}
Add per-target authorization: org-admins may only delete users whose
entire org membership is within their admin scope; targets with any
org outside scope (or no org at all) require PROXY_ADMIN.
Regression test confirms an ORG_ADMIN call fails with 403 and no
cascade delete_many runs.
Post-merge audit found 6 adjacent variants of the VERIA-28 class. All
fixed here with regression tests:
1. Strip widened from 3 named keys to the full user_api_key_* prefix.
The proxy writes a dozen user_api_key_* fields (user_id, alias,
spend, team_id, request_route, end_user_id, …) into
data[_metadata_variable_name]; the 3-key strip left the rest
exploitable for identity/spend forgery in audit logs and guardrails.
2. proxy_server_request['body'] snapshot moved to AFTER the strip.
Was captured at line ~990 before the strip ran, so
standard_logging_object, lago, and spend_tracking readers saw the
attacker-forged payload even though the live data dict was clean.
3. get_tags_from_request_body (auth-time) now coerces JSON-string
metadata via safe_json_loads. Previously crashed with
AttributeError on string metadata (DoS; potential RBAC bypass if
a caller swallowed the exception).
4. get_end_user_id_from_request_body coerces JSON-string
metadata/litellm_metadata. Previously isinstance(dict) guard
caused end-user budget attribution to be silently skipped when
the caller sent metadata as a JSON string.
5. Four hand-rolled 'if data.get("metadata") is None: data["metadata"] = {}'
blocks in proxy_server.py (7160, 7341, 7590, 11375) now guard on
isinstance(dict). They crashed with TypeError when metadata was a
JSON string (DoS).
6. _get_admin_metadata defensively guards with isinstance(dict);
previously AttributeError'd on any leaked string metadata.
Also hoists the inline safe_json_loads import in _guardrail_modification_check
to module level per CLAUDE.md style.
Three tests inherited by TestBedrockMoonshotInvoke from BaseLLMChatTest
make live AWS Bedrock completion calls: test_developer_role_translation,
test_message_with_name, and test_completion_cost. These have been
crashing llm_translation_testing CI workers (reported as "failed on
setup with worker 'gwN' crashed").
Replace each with a mocked override that intercepts the outgoing
request via HTTPHandler.post / AsyncHTTPHandler.post patching:
- test_developer_role_translation asserts the outgoing body maps the
developer role to system (LiteLLM's translation for non-OpenAI
providers).
- test_message_with_name asserts the outgoing body preserves the user
message.
- test_completion_cost returns a canned moonshot-shaped response body
with usage and asserts response_cost > 0 against the local model
cost map.
Follows the existing HTTPHandler + patch.object(client, "post") pattern
used in test_bedrock_gpt_oss.py and test_bedrock_completion.py. No
network traffic; the three tests now complete in ~0.3s.
Close three variant bypasses adjacent to VERIA-28 found during post-fix
variant audit:
1. _guardrail_modification_check had the same isinstance(dict) bypass
Veria-AI just flagged on the pre-call strip. A caller sending
`{"metadata": "{…}"}` as a JSON-encoded string (multipart/form-data
or extra_body) skipped the guard, got parsed to dict downstream, and
reached guardrail logic with bypass flags intact. Coerce strings via
safe_json_loads before evaluating.
2. The allow_client_tags strip only covered body metadata.tags and
litellm_metadata.tags — caller-supplied tags arriving via the
x-litellm-tags header or root-level data["tags"] bypassed it. Gate
add_request_tag_to_metadata's result on the same flag.
3. requester_metadata was deepcopied BEFORE the strip, so attacker
injections (user_api_key_metadata shadows, disallowed tags,
_pipeline_managed_guardrails) persisted in the snapshot. The PANW
guardrail (and any future consumer) trusting requester_metadata
would see forged values. Move the deepcopy to after the strip.
Regression tests added for each.
Per VERIA-28's secondary recommendation. The existing check only gated
metadata.guardrails. User-supplied values for disable_global_guardrails
(plural and the original singular typo variant) and opted_out_global_guardrails
are already silently ignored by _get_admin_metadata at read time, but the
silent-ignore makes diagnosis confusing and relies on one specific read
site catching them.
Reject at auth time with a 403 when any of:
- guardrails list (existing)
- disable_global_guardrails (new)
- disable_global_guardrail (new — historical singular-key variant)
- opted_out_global_guardrails (new)
are present in metadata, litellm_metadata, or at the request root, and the
caller's team lacks can_modify_guardrails. Defense in depth: the strip at
the pre-call layer still runs; this check fails loudly one layer earlier
so operators see an explicit 403 rather than a silent-ignore.
