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Vertex rejects array schemas without an items field
(GenerateContentRequest.tools[*].function_declarations[*].parameters...items: missing field).
This happened for tool params containing anyOf branches like {"type": "array"}
with no items, including the case where convert_anyof_null_to_nullable
strips an empty items entry. Default missing items to {"type": "object"}
in process_items so the same default applies to bare arrays and
arrays nested inside anyOf.
Managed cntr_... IDs can be encoded with an empty model_id (e.g. streaming
responses without router metadata, or target_model_names=[]). The previous
guard only unwrapped when model_id was truthy, so the raw cntr_... token
leaked to the upstream provider, which rejects it.
Always swap in decoded["response_id"] when it differs from the input, and
keep the model_id check only for deciding whether to fan out via
_ageneric_api_call_with_fallbacks.
Cover the full litellm.rerank()/arerank() path with HTTP mocked, asserting
metadata.requester_metadata reaches the Discovery Engine :rank body as
userLabels (and stays absent when no metadata is set). Catches plumbing
regressions that unit tests on transform_rerank_request alone would miss.
- Introduced optional environment variables `PYROSCOPE_GRAFANA_USER` and `PYROSCOPE_GRAFANA_API_TOKEN` for Grafana Cloud integration.
- Updated documentation to reflect new configuration options for Pyroscope profiling.
- Enhanced error handling to ensure both credentials are provided when using Grafana Cloud.
- Added tests to validate Grafana Cloud authentication scenarios.
CI's license check fails on the new dev dep because liccheck cannot read
the PEP 639 'License-Expression' field that pytest-recording uses. Add
the package to the manually-verified allowlist (MIT, confirmed via PyPI
classifier).
Also addresses greptile P2 review comments:
- Add 'anthropic-version' to the request-header filter list so live and
mock recordings produce structurally identical cassettes.
- Replace the indentation-sensitive regex in
'_strip_nondeterministic_headers' with a YAML parse-and-rewrite so the
helper keeps working if vcrpy ever changes its serialization style.
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
Per Yuneng's feedback, use a single @pytest.mark.vcr marker so one record
sweep populates cassettes for every marked test across all providers,
instead of forcing each test to bind to a hard-coded cassette path.
Changes vs. the initial scaffolding:
- Add 'pytest-recording==0.13.4' on top of vcrpy. Adopt its layout:
cassettes live at 'cassettes/<test_module>/<test_name>.yaml', resolved
automatically. New tests just decorate with '@pytest.mark.vcr' — no
imports or path bookkeeping.
- Move the shared filter/match config into a 'vcr_config' fixture in
'tests/llm_translation/conftest.py' (consumed by pytest-recording for
every marked test in the dir). Drop the standalone 'vcr_config.py'.
- Bulk record / replay via the standard '--record-mode' CLI flag:
'make test-llm-translation-record' now sweeps every '@pytest.mark.vcr'
test under tests/llm_translation in one shot. Optional 'TARGET=' var
scopes to a single file.
- Move existing cassettes to the per-test paths and update the local
in-process Anthropic regenerator to write to the same paths.
- Refresh README + Makefile target docs to match the sweep workflow.
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
The wrapper had no production callers after transform_parsed_response
was refactored to call _resolve_json_mode_non_streaming directly.
Updated the parametrized test to call the underlying method.
Add explicit warnings when Presidio apply_to_output skips masking for mixed/unknown stream event shapes, and add regression coverage for the mixed stream flush path to ensure chunk order is preserved and warnings are emitted.
Made-with: Cursor
Keep Presidio apply-to-output streaming in passthrough mode when responses-style events are emitted, preventing dropped lifecycle events that caused Codex stream disconnects. Add a regression test to assert unknown streaming events are preserved in order.
Made-with: Cursor
The redirect-following added to async_safe_get checks response.is_redirect
on every hop. Two vertex batch tests stub AsyncHTTPHandler.get with a bare
MagicMock, whose default-truthy is_redirect made the redirect path fire,
then crashed in httpx.URL().join() because headers.get('location') was
also a MagicMock instead of a string. Set is_redirect=False explicitly so
the mocked response models a non-redirect terminal response.
Also tighten _extract_redirect_url to raise SSRFError on non-string
Location values (defense-in-depth — a real httpx Response always returns
str|None, but this avoids a confusing TypeError if anything else ever
slips through).
This is an unrelated CI fix piggybacked on the SCIM PR to unblock the
batches test suite.
Root cause: admin_viewer_routes was an explicit allowlist, so every newly-added
GET endpoint anywhere in the codebase silently 403'd for admin viewer until
someone remembered to add it. We had whacked /spend/logs/ui, /customer/list,
/guardrails/list, /policies/attachments/list, /invitation/info, and several
others in serial — but the next round still surfaced /in_product_nudges,
/health/latest, /credentials, /v1/mcp/network/client-ip, /claude-code/plugins,
/policy/templates. This pattern keeps repeating because the model is wrong.
Structural fix in `_check_proxy_admin_viewer_access`:
- Default-allow safe HTTP methods (GET / HEAD / OPTIONS) on any
non-inference route. Admin Viewer's principle is read parity with
Proxy Admin; HTTP semantics already mark GET as side-effect-free, so
using the method as the allow signal is the correct primitive.
- Unsafe methods (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE) still go through the existing
explicit allowlists + the hard-blocked write set
(/user/new, /team/new, /key/generate, …).
- LLM/inference routes still 403 (cost-incurring).
The existing admin_viewer_routes list is retained as a backstop for the
small set of routes implemented as POST but semantically read (e.g.
/spend/calculate). Adding new GET endpoints no longer requires touching
this list.
Models page tab/panel off-by-one (UI bug for Admin Viewer):
Tremor's TabList filters falsy children but TabPanels does not, so
conditionally hiding "Add Model" with `{!shouldHideAddModelTab && ...}`
left a phantom panel slot — clicking "LLM Credentials" showed nothing,
and clicking "Pass-Through Endpoints" showed the credentials panel.
Refactor to a single source-of-truth `visibleTabs` array; tab and
panel indices now can never desync.
Tests:
- 12 parametrized tests covering the 6 user-reported endpoints + 4
hypothetical-future endpoints + 2 already-fixed ones, all asserting
Admin Viewer GET succeeds via the default-allow path (no allowlist
entry needed).
- 5 parametrized tests for POST writes still 403'ing
(random-future-write, /user/new, /team/new, /key/generate, /model/new).
- All 207 existing route_checks tests still pass — backward-compatible.
User reported six more 403s and "still restricts access to keys + models" after
the first round. Root causes:
1. Six read endpoints were missing from admin_viewer_routes:
- /guardrails/list, /v2/guardrails/list (Guardrails page)
- /guardrails/submissions, /guardrails/submissions/{guardrail_id}
- /guardrails/usage/overview (Guardrails Monitor page)
- /policies/attachments/list (Policies page)
- /get/mcp_semantic_filter_settings (Settings page)
2. /guardrails/submissions handler treated admin viewer as non-admin, filtering
them to only their team submissions. Switch to _user_has_admin_view() so
admin viewer sees all submissions (read parity with Proxy Admin).
3. UI Keys page (user_dashboard.tsx) and Models page (ModelsAndEndpointsView.tsx)
each had a hard "Access Denied" block specifically for "Admin Viewer" — a
leftover from the pre-parity era. Remove the blocks; gate the "Create Key"
button on the Keys page so admin viewer can read keys but not mint them.
Also drop the post-login redirect that forced admin viewers to /usage on
sign-in (page.tsx).
Tests:
- Extend ADMIN_VIEWER_SETTINGS_ROUTES parametrize list to cover all 7 new
routes (route-checks layer is now the layer production traffic actually
hits, vs. the dependency-override-bypass that was masking the gap).
The Prisma schema declares LiteLLM_VerificationToken.blocked as a
nullable Boolean with no default, so virtual keys created via the
key management endpoint persist with blocked=NULL. SQL equality
(`blocked = false`) never matches NULL rows, so the previous
`where={'blocked': not blocked}` filter silently skipped virtually
all real keys when SCIM tried to block them. This made SCIM
deprovisioning a no-op — and especially dangerous in DELETE flows
where the user row is removed afterwards, leaving orphaned but
fully-functional keys.
Match both `False` and `None` when blocking, and only `True`
when unblocking, so the state flip (and cache invalidation) actually
fires for the keys it should.
Two Greptile P2s addressed:
1. (security) The audit-log row for an ``add_team_callbacks`` call would
serialize the entire ``callback_vars`` block — including
``langfuse_secret_key``, ``langsmith_api_key``, and the GCS service
account path — verbatim into ``LiteLLM_AuditLogs``. Anyone with read
access to the audit table could harvest team callback credentials.
Same risk for ``disable_team_logging`` when the team's existing row
has populated ``callback_settings.callback_vars``.
Add ``_redact_callback_secrets``: deep-copies the metadata snapshot
and replaces every ``callback_vars`` value with ``***REDACTED***``.
The keys are kept so an auditor can still see *which* fields
changed. Applied to both before and after snapshots.
2. ``asyncio.create_task`` is fire-and-forget; if the audit-log write
raises (transient DB error etc.) the exception is silently
discarded by the event loop and the audit row is just missing —
the exact gap this PR is closing. Attach a ``done_callback`` that
logs the exception at warning level via ``verbose_proxy_logger`` so
the operator sees there's a gap.
Tests assert that callback values are not present in the serialized
audit payload (both for ``add_team_callbacks`` and for
``disable_team_logging`` when the team's existing row has
populated secrets).
