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5 commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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devin-ai-integration[bot]
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8477fe4108
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fix(proxy): list key and team model aliases in GET /v1/models (#42908)
* fix(proxy): list key and team model aliases in GET /v1/models
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): keep alias listing helpers within the type discipline budget
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): cover alias rows on GET /v1/models and /v1/models/{id}
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): apply team then key aliases like chat completions and keep the alias as the retrieved id
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): apply key aliases twice like chat completions and skip only malformed alias entries
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): apply the global model_alias_map between the key alias passes like chat completions
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): list only the caller's own aliases and never rewrite a listed model id on retrieval
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* style(proxy): ruff format model_info alias lookup
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): hide undiscoverable names from model retrieval so an alias named like one resolves to its target
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): keep undiscoverable models retrievable by id while excluding them from the alias guard
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(proxy): pass an immutable name sequence into the model_info alias guard
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): type the model list alias test helpers
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): annotate the new alias listing test fixtures and helpers
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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devin-ai-integration[bot]
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071cb49d32
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fix(jwt): accept a team alias in x-litellm-team-id (#42445)
* fix(jwt): accept a team alias in x-litellm-team-id The header only matched canonical team ids, so a JWT caller selecting one of their teams by its alias got a 403 even though they belonged to it. The header value is now resolved through the existing alias lookup before the JWT allowed-team check and the DB membership fallback, while a value that is already a team id never costs an alias lookup and denials keep naming the value the caller sent Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(jwt): only alias a header team id the database provably lacks Under fallback_to_db_teams a header value whose team row read fails for any reason other than TeamNotFoundError now keeps the membership denial instead of falling through to the alias lookup, so a degraded read cannot select a different team that carries the value as an alias. Drops the HeaderTeam docstring that only restated its fields Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: ryan <ryan@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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ryan-crabbe-berri
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2085a37b82 |
test(e2e): issue the JWT suite's tokens from a real Keycloak realm
The suite used to mint its own RS256 tokens from a stand-in issuer, which could only ever prove the proxy agreed with the tests: the claims were whatever the tests chose to sign. Every JWT bug worth catching lives in the shape of what an identity provider really emits, so the suite now runs against Keycloak (realm in idp_realm.json), provisions a group and a user per test through its admin API, and signs in through the direct-access grant. That changes what the tokens look like: sub is Keycloak's opaque user uuid rather than a friendly name, groups arrives from a protocol mapper, aud is the IdP's own audience, and the JWKS carries an encryption key beside the signing key so the proxy has to select on kid. The expiry case now takes a one-second token from a second client in the realm and waits for it to lapse instead of forging a stale exp. The proxy config the suite needs is unchanged. CI runs it against a Keycloak deployed beside the ephemeral stack, which lives in the releaser repo. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EX13mWex6RaBo9PYnkAtFW |
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ryan-crabbe-berri
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90ac77e58e |
test(e2e): add JWT issuer harness and first live JWT auth tests
Add tests/e2e/jwt_issuer.py, a test-only RS256 issuer that serves a JWKS document and signs arbitrary claims over an open loopback-only /token endpoint, so e2e tests can mint tokens without ever holding a signing key. One key per process keeps the proxy's cached JWKS valid for the whole run. Add the first five live JWT auth tests in tests/e2e/other: a valid token for an existing team is accepted and its spend row carries the claimed team and user, a tampered signature and an expired token are refused with 401, a token naming a team that does not exist is refused with 403, and a plain sk- virtual key keeps working with enable_jwt_auth on. Harness unit tests cover the issuer itself. Team and user create/delete land on the shared ProxyClient (warn-only teardown, /user/delete typed as the int it returns) instead of a fourth per-suite copy. Document the issuer command, the E2E_JWT_ISSUER_PORT convention (default 4190), JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_URL and the litellm_jwtauth config block in tests/e2e/CONTRIBUTING.md, and register the new cells in other.yaml. |
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mubashir1osmani
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ac5b51253a
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test(e2e): add Other suite and Guardrails coverage incl. an MCP tool-call guardrail (#34149)
* test(e2e): add other suite covering master-key auth and health lifecycle Covers the other.* holding-pen cells that were uncovered: master-key valid_allows/invalid_denied on the admin /user/list gate, and the lifecycle probes liveness.ping, readiness.public_probe, readiness.reports_db_status, and readiness_details.authenticated_diagnostics. New tests/e2e/other/ suite on the shared ProxyClient; the health probes send no auth header to prove the public routes need no credential, and the details route is asserted to reject an anonymous caller while exposing version/db diagnostics to the master key. * test(e2e): cover block_code_execution and openai_moderation guardrails Extends the guardrails suite with two built-in guardrails registered per request (default_on=False, opted in via the chat body's guardrails selector) so neither intercepts unrelated traffic on the shared proxy. block_code_execution.pre_call.blocks: a python code block plus a run-this request is intercepted with the canned content-blocked message and the model never runs, while the same code block asked about with don't-run-it reaches the model. Verified live. openai_moderations.pre_call.blocks: a flagged prompt is rejected 400 naming the moderation policy while a benign prompt passes. The guardrail calls OpenAI's moderation API; verifying it needs an OpenAI key with moderation quota (this account currently 429s the moderation endpoint). Adds a shared create_backend_model helper and a generic register() plus per-request guardrails/max_tokens on the client so more built-ins can reuse the same path. * test(e2e): cover presidio PII masking (pre_call + post_call) Registers a presidio guardrail per request (default_on=False) with the analyzer/anonymizer bases supplied in the registration params, so the test controls its own dependency and needs no proxy restart. presidio.pre_call.masks: a repeat-verbatim request comes back with the <EMAIL_ADDRESS> placeholder and never the raw email, proving the prompt was anonymized before the model saw it. presidio.post_call.masks: with apply_to_output the model's own emitted email is masked on the way out, so the caller never receives the raw value. Both verified live against real presidio analyzer + anonymizer containers. logging_only is intentionally not covered: /spend/logs exposes no prompt messages to read back the masked log, and a logging_only run also masked the response, contradicting its contract; noted in the module docstring for a follow-up. * test(e2e): cover presidio logging_only masking via OTEL read-back Adds the third presidio cell, guardrail.presidio.logging_only.masks. The logging_only contract (mask what is logged, do not block) is verified by reading the request's gen-AI span back from the real OTEL destination: the span's gen_ai.input.messages attribute carries the <EMAIL_ADDRESS> placeholder, never the raw email, and the call itself is not blocked. Reads the trace via the shared OtelReader, promoted from logging/ to the suite root so both suites use it. The masked prompt is polled to a deadline because logging_only masks the payload asynchronously and the span can briefly export before the mask lands. Drops the throwaway chat_send in favor of the existing transport.send for the call-id capture. * fix(e2e): tolerate cross-pod guardrail sync delay in team-opt-out test Stage runs multiple gateway pods behind the shared key. POST /guardrails registers a new default-on guardrail in-process immediately only on the pod that served the create call; every other pod picks it up on its next periodic DB sync (proxy_server.py, every 30s), so the very next chat call can race a pod that has not synced yet. Poll to a 40s deadline instead of asserting on the first response, matching the existing pattern in test_budget_reset_advances_e2e.py. * test(e2e): cover a guardrail on the MCP tool-call path (content_filter pre_mcp_call) Adds guardrail.litellm_content_filter.pre_mcp_call.blocks: against the real Datadog MCP server, a content_filter guardrail configured mode=pre_mcp_call blocks a banned keyword in an MCP tool call's arguments with HTTP 400 attributed to the pre_mcp_call hook, and lets a clean argument reach the upstream server. The guardrail attaches with default_on because per-key/request guardrail selection is dropped from the synthetic MCP request the hook sees; the banned keyword is unique per run so default_on only intercepts this test's own call. mode must be pre_mcp_call - a pre_call config silently no-ops on tools/call because the event type is rewritten for call_mcp_tool. Drives the tool directly via /mcp-rest/tools/call for a deterministic check of the same pre_mcp_call enforcement the OpenAI-SDK chat path hits when a model invokes an MCP tool. * fix(e2e): mid-conversation messages test uses client.proxy not client.gateway EndpointsClient exposes .proxy after the Gateway->ProxyClient rename; the mid-conversation system test still referenced .gateway, which fails the e2e basedpyright gate. Aligns it with the rest of the harness. * test(e2e): address review on the guardrail coverage MCP tool-call guardrail: poll the banned call until the guardrail is enforced instead of asserting on the first call, so the control-plane -> data-plane guardrail sync cannot race the check into a false pass-through; add a repeat banned call after enforcement to guard against a partial-propagation state. OpenAI moderation: distinguish a moderation-endpoint 429 (rate limit / no moderation quota) from a guardrail failure, so an account-capability gap reads as such rather than as "did not block". Runs green with a moderation-capable key. * test(e2e): close partial-propagation false-pass in MCP guardrail block test The single post-block repeat call could be load-balanced back to the same already-synced data-plane pod, so the test could pass while another pod still lacked the guardrail and let the banned MCP call reach Datadog. Anchor a wait to the guardrail create time (every pod is guaranteed to have DB-synced only after a full ~30s sync interval), then require the banned call to stay blocked across several attempts; a pass-through after that window is a real leak, not a race. * test(e2e): drop xfail-style rate-limit branch from openai_moderation test OpenAI's /v1/moderations is free and returns 200 with the env key (verified directly), so the RateLimitedError branch mislabeled the failure: a 429 there is insufficient_quota (no account billing), not throttling. The branch also only printed a softer message before failing anyway, an xfail-in-disguise the e2e rules forbid. A 429 now falls through and fails loudly with the full result. |