* fix(rerank): emit latency and cost headers on /rerank
Thread the logging object into the rerank httpx calls and pass hidden_params through to get_custom_headers, so x-litellm-overhead-duration-ms, x-litellm-response-duration-ms, x-litellm-response-cost, x-litellm-call-id and the LITELLM_DETAILED_TIMING x-litellm-timing-* headers show up on rerank like they do on chat completions
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(rerank): keep zero response cost in the /rerank cost header
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* ci: assign the new rerank endpoint tests to the proxy-endpoints shard
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test: suppress TQ008 on the rerank header tests with reasons
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: milan <milan@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: yassin <yassin@berri.ai>
* fix(proxy): make /team/member_delete's four cleanups atomic
The team roster update, the user.teams update, the team membership
delete, and the team-scoped verification token delete ran as four
sequential writes with no transaction around them, so a failure
between any two left the removal half applied. Thread a single
prisma transaction through all four writes, following the same
tx.<table> pattern /team/member_add and /team/member_update already
use, so either all four land or none do.
* fix(team): serialize member_add, member_delete, and delete under the team's advisory lock
/team/member_add validated a team exists and then wrote the user's teams array and
a membership row without holding anything across that gap, so a /team/delete could
commit its reference sweeps in between and leave a member pointing at a team id that
no longer exists. The write path already re-read members_with_roles under a row lock
before this change, but SELECT ... FOR UPDATE can deadlock with the access-group
endpoints, which lock an access group and then a team.
member_add now takes pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtext(team_id)) before re-reading the
team and only writes if it is still there, so a delete that already committed is
visible before any write happens. delete_team takes the same lock around its own
row delete and reference sweep, so the two requests can never interleave: whichever
acquires the lock first runs to completion before the other's read can proceed.
Dropping the row lock from member_add's read also dropped the incidental protection
it gave against a concurrent member_delete, which still wrote from the snapshot it
validated against, unlocked, and could silently overwrite whatever member_add had
just committed. member_delete now takes the same advisory lock and re-reads the
roster under it before computing its own write, so it can never resurrect a member
by overwriting from stale data.
Resolves LIT-5544
* fix(team): run member writes on the advisory lock's transaction
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(team): keep member writes on the lock holder's connection after merge
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(team): keep the transactional member create an upsert on user_id
The transaction path was creating the email-identified user row outright, where the
regular client path upserts on user_id. Share one upsert helper between both member
paths so the create stays idempotent on the lock holder's connection.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(team): read member_delete's user and key rows on the lock-holding transaction
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(scim): return user_id as Group members[].value on transformed group responses
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* style: format scim transformation tests per ruff
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test: drop redundant assertion comment
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore: retrigger ci
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: yassin <yassin@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(dashboard): don't show a stale provider prompt-cache chip on a response-cache hit
The playground's non-streaming chat completion and responses paths replayed a cache hit's original usage payload verbatim, so ResponseMetrics kept rendering the provider's prompt-cache-write/read chips using token counts from the original request. Detect the hit via the x-litellm-cache-key response header and render a Response Cache indicator instead.
* fix(dashboard): expose x-litellm-cache-key through CORS for the playground cache-hit indicator
* fix(proxy): stop expected 4xx responses from saturating worker CPU on failure logging
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): keep threaded sync failure handler so CustomLogger sync callbacks still run
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore: remove redundant comments per review
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: yassin <yassin@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
The model Azure Model Router served was recovered by checking whether the text
"model_router" or "model-router" appeared in a model string. Spend logs applied that
check to the litellm model path, where the route prefix guarantees a match, but the
proxy applied it to the client's model group alias, which carries no prefix. A model
group named anything else therefore lost the selected model in both the response and
the spend row.
AzureModelRouterConfig now stamps the served model onto _hidden_params, and the spend
log payload and the proxy's response restamping read that stamp. The name heuristic
survives as a fallback for callers with no response in hand, routed through
get_azure_ai_route so it lives in one place.
`requests` has no default timeout, so a host that accepts the connection and
never answers blocks the calling thread forever.
The one on the request path is the HiddenLayer guardrail's `_get_jwt`. It runs
synchronously inside `_call_hiddenlayer` whenever the hour-long JWT expires and
the API answers 401, so a stalled auth host parked the worker's whole event
loop, not just the guarded request. The other eight are the teams and users CLI
clients, which pin the operator's terminal instead.
`TeamsManagementClient` and `UsersManagementClient` now take the same
`timeout: int = 30` their `HTTPClient` sibling already had, and `Client` threads
its own timeout down to teams. `_poll_for_ready_data` already passed a timeout
through a TypedDict that ruff could not see into; passing the argument directly
retires both the TypedDict and the suppression it would have needed.
Graduate S113 into ruff.toml so the next `requests` call without a timeout fails
the lint step.
* fix(proxy): reset a stuck team member's budget
A per-team-member budget check reads a cross-pod spend counter that
nothing ever invalidates. Once a member exceeds their per-member
budget, resetting the key's spend, raising the user's or the team's
own budget, or issuing a new key all leave the member stuck, because
none of them touch this counter or its cached membership object.
Add POST /team/{team_id}/member/{user_id}/reset_spend to reset a
member's tracked spend, and invalidate the same cached state from
/team/member_update when it raises a member's own budget, so that
path also takes effect immediately instead of waiting on the
membership cache's TTL. Name the entity in the check's error message
so a stuck member is diagnosable from the 429 body alone.
* fix(proxy): close reset-vs-floor-read race and surface double Redis write failure on member spend reset
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): broadcast spend reset as a SET so the handler's self-delivered message cannot erase the reset guard
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): omit null fields from the invalidation message so plain evictions keep the old wire format
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Every repository handed its `.table` back untyped, so a dozen modules had
each grown a private `_PrismaTableActions` Protocol to paper over it. They
had drifted: some declared `update` as returning the row, others the row or
None, and none agreed on whether `find_many` was covariant
Replace all of them with a single `TableActions[RowT_co]` in
`litellm/repositories/prisma_protocols.py`, keyed to the prisma row each
repository is bound to. Query inputs stay `Mapping[str, object]` so callers
keep passing plain dicts, and `find_many` returns `Sequence` so the row type
stays covariant
Typing the nullable returns honestly surfaced paths that were already
crashing. A team admin could never edit or delete a memory entry owned by
their team: the write-auth check fed a raw prisma row to a helper that
expects the domain model, so `members_with_roles` arrived as plain dicts and
the request died as a 500 instead of applying the edit. Non-admin members hit
the same 500 in place of the 403 they were owed, so refusal and breakage were
indistinguishable. `/v2/model/info?user_models_only=true` dereferenced a
missing user row rather than returning the 400 the route already had, three
team routes dereferenced a team deleted between the read and the write, and
the agent registry dereferenced a missing agent instead of naming it
basedpyright drops 2,132 errors, 1,454 of them reportAny and 73
reportExplicitAny. The dashboard's generated types pick up `string[]` where
they had `unknown[]` for a team's members, admins and models
Staging split batch output-line costing into _safe_output_line_stats /
_compute_output_line_stats / _output_line_cost so one uncostable line can no
longer zero a whole batch, and added _provider_output_file_id so model-encoded
output file ids decode before the fetch. This branch's pass/fail counting was
written against the pre-split shape, where every None line meant a provider
failure.
Keep staging's structure and layer the counts on a three-way classification: a
provider-reported failure yields PROVIDER_FAILED, a provider-successful line
litellm cannot price yields UNCOSTABLE and stays in successful_requests billed
at $0. Without that split a litellm-side pricing gap would be reported to the
customer as a failed request and the counts would stop reconciling with the
provider's own request_counts.
Route the error-file fetch through _provider_output_file_id too, and carry the
new dataclass return through the callers staging added after this branch
forked.
/global/activity/cache_hits now returns an error_breakdown: failed spend
logs bucketed per call_type by error code and error class, read from
metadata->error_information. Clicking a red failed-requests segment on
the cache activity chart opens a per-code bar chart; hovering a bar
lists the error classes behind that code.
The video edit endpoint parsed the multipart body but dropped the uploaded
source video, only normalizing it to an id. When a raw file is uploaded it now
flows through videos.main -> the http handler -> the provider transform, which
emits multipart/form-data with the source video as a file part, matching the
official OpenAI SDK's videos.edit wire format. Edit-by-id still egresses JSON.
On mapped pass-through routes, of which /vertex_ai is one,
user_api_key_auth accepts the caller key from a header literally named
litellm_user_api_key and applies it last, so it overrides every other source.
The credential-less filter neither dropped it nor resolved the caller key from
it, so a virtual key there reached Google past a real x-goog-api-key, and a
bring-your-own Authorization could be stripped when auth actually came from that
header. Drop it by name and resolve it at highest precedence.
The resolver placed both operator-configured key headers at the top of its
precedence, but user_api_key_auth only overrides with litellm_key_header_name;
a pass_through_endpoints litellm_user_api_key is checked last. So a request that
authenticated via Authorization while also sending a pass-through header could
have the wrong value chosen, leaving the authenticated Authorization key
forwarded. Order the resolver exactly like get_api_key: override first, built-in
headers next, pass-through header last.
user_api_key_auth also accepts the caller key from a pass_through_endpoints
entry's headers.litellm_user_api_key, not just litellm_key_header_name. Drop
every operator-configured caller-key header by name and treat them as
top-precedence caller-key sources, so a virtual key sent through one is never
forwarded to Google.
The LIT-4761 streaming-classification tests passed only the bring-your-own
Google OAuth token in Authorization and mocked get_litellm_virtual_key, a shape
that cannot authenticate in production. The credential-less filter now resolves
the caller key by auth precedence, so a lone Authorization value reads as the
key and is stripped. Send the virtual key in x-litellm-api-key, matching a real
request, so Authorization is preserved and the classification assertions run.
The filter's own Bearer-only stripping missed the other schemes
user_api_key_auth accepts, so a virtual key echoed as `Authorization: Basic
<key>` alongside a higher-precedence auth header did not match the caller key
and was forwarded to Google. Reuse the auth module's _get_bearer_token so the
comparison strips exactly what authentication does (Bearer / bearer / Basic /
AWS4-HMAC-SHA256), falling back to the raw value for a bare token.
The credential-less filter derived the caller key only from x-litellm-api-key,
Authorization, and the custom header, but the route authenticates through
Depends(user_api_key_auth), which also accepts the key from x-goog-api-key. A
virtual key sent only in x-goog-api-key therefore authenticated yet was kept as
a preserved upstream header and forwarded to Google. Resolve the caller key by
the same precedence get_api_key uses and value-strip exactly that, so a key in
x-goog-api-key is stripped while a real Google key alongside a higher-precedence
virtual key is preserved.
The hand-rolled drop set missed Ocp-Apim-Subscription-Key, so a caller
Azure APIM secret in that header was forwarded to Google on the
credential-less branch. Derive the name-drop set from the canonical
SpecialHeaders.litellm_credential_header_names(), minus Authorization and
x-goog-api-key which double as real Google credentials and are value-stripped
instead. New credential headers added there are now dropped automatically.
Uploaded files reaching the RAG ingest path were trusted by client
filename and content-type, so archives and executable scripts were
ingested and malicious content was never screened. Enforce controls at
the upload boundary before the file leaves the proxy:
- classify content by magic bytes and a strict UTF-8 decode, never by
the client filename or content-type
- allowlist PDF and UTF-8 text; reject archives and executables/scripts
- cap upload size (512MB) via a bounded read
- run every accepted upload through a dependency-injected malware
scanner, failing closed on scan error; the default scanner flags the
EICAR test file so the hook is validated end to end
- give accepted uploads a server-generated filename so the client name
never reaches storage
- set Content-Disposition attachment and X-Content-Type-Options nosniff
on vector-store file downloads
The router hop _ageneric_api_call_with_fallbacks canonicalises the passthrough
call type onto litellm_metadata, and the cost callback reads spend attribution
from that bucket while only backfilling user_api_key* keys from metadata. The
helper was building on metadata, so agent_id and user_api_end_user_max_budget
were silently dropped before the callback ever saw them. Build and pass the
attribution under litellm_metadata so every field survives.
user_api_key_auth also authenticates a caller from the operator-configured
general_settings.litellm_key_header_name, reading that header straight off
the request, so a virtual key sent there survived the credential-less Vertex
forwarding filter and reached Google alongside a real bring-your-own
credential. Value-strip every header whose value matches the caller's key
from any accepted source, including that custom header.
On the credential-less Vertex passthrough branch, drop every header that
can only carry LiteLLM caller auth (x-litellm-api-key, api-key, x-api-key)
by name, since Google never consumes them, and strip the virtual key by
value from Authorization / x-goog-api-key, which may instead hold a genuine
bring-your-own Google credential. This closes the residual leak where a
distinct caller secret in api-key or x-api-key still reached upstream.
Adds a regression asserting the value-based strip also drops the caller's
virtual key when it is duplicated into the api-key and x-api-key headers,
while a genuine bring-your-own Google credential still forwards.
Add an endpoint-level regression test asserting can_user_make_model_call
receives the litellm_params after health_check_params are merged in, so the
merge-before-auth ordering cannot silently regress and let a request smuggle
a field past authorization.
