The MCP sub-app is attached with app.mount("/mcp", ...) and a Starlette
mount never matches its bare prefix, so POST /mcp fell through to the
router's redirect_slashes 307. Behind a TLS-terminating ingress whose
peer address is not in uvicorn's forwarded-allow-ips (default: loopback
only) the redirect Location is built from the socket scheme as http://,
and MCP clients strip the Authorization header on the cross-origin
follow, so reconnects fail with ECONNRESET right after a successful
OAuth flow. The redirect also fires before auth, so the bare spelling
never returns the RFC 9728 WWW-Authenticate challenge that OAuth
clients need to start the flow.
Add an explicit /mcp route beside the existing /toolset/{name}/mcp and
/{name}/mcp spellings, forwarding to handle_streamable_http_mcp with
the same scope rewrite those routes already use (path=/mcp,
_original_path preserved for OAuth challenge URL selection). When the
mcp package is unavailable the route 404s, matching what the bare
sub-app serves on /mcp/ in that state. /mcp/, /mcp/{server},
/{server}/mcp and /toolset/{name}/mcp spellings are unchanged; the
exact-match route and the mount have disjoint match sets so
registration order cannot matter.
Move the blocked-usage mapping for /v1/responses next to
blocked_response_usage in guardrail_translation utils, map bridged chat
prompt/completion tokens to Responses API input/output tokens, and let
raise_passthrough_exception attach the blocked response so post-call
guardrail blocks report real usage
Anthropic's Models API declares max_input_tokens and max_tokens as nullable, not
optional, and the live vendor endpoint returns both keys on every entry. The
merged Anthropic-native listing dropped either key whenever LiteLLM could not
resolve a limit, so a client validating against a nullable-but-required schema
saw a malformed entry for any model the cost map does not know.
This reverts commit ab2333b6c4.
Every Admin UI login mints its session key against the sentinel team_id
`litellm-dashboard`, and no LiteLLM_TeamTable row is ever created for it.
That lookup is therefore a provably-absent row on every UI request, which
#36837 turned into a hard refusal with no override, so the whole dashboard
404s.
Reverting restores the token-derived fallback. The model-access widening
#36837 closed is reopened and needs a re-land that exempts the UI sentinel
team.
`_query_first_with_cached_plan_fallback` recovers from Postgres's "cached
plan must not change result type" by recreating the Prisma client, which
drops both the server-side plans and the engine's client-side statement-name
cache. Since #30183 the shared reconnect path probes the writer with
`SELECT 1` first and skips the recreate when it answers, which is right for
the IAM token refresh it was added for and wrong here: the connection is
healthy, it is the session's prepared statements that are stale, so the probe
always passes and always vetoes the recreate. Callers now pass
`force_recreate` to skip that probe, and only the cached-plan fallback does.
Getting past the probe is not enough on its own. Both cooldown checks would
still skip the recreate for 15 seconds after any earlier reconnect, which
outlives the 10 second auth retry window, so a migration landing in that
window kept 503ing. `force=True` would fix that but would also let every
concurrent caller of the same burst kill the engine the first one just built.
The caller instead names the engine it observed before the query, and the
cooldown is waived only while that engine is still the live one, so the first
caller repairs the pool and the rest fall back to the normal cooldown.
That engine has to be the one the query actually ran on. `query_first` is a
top-level read, so with a read replica configured it is dispatched to the
reader and it is the reader's prepared statements that go stale, while
`writer_db` names a different engine with its own counter. The observation
and the cooldown comparison both go through `read_db`, added alongside
`writer_db` and backed by a `read_target` property on the routing wrapper
that `__getattr__` now dispatches through so the two cannot drift.
The observation carries the wrapper, not just its generation. `read_db`
resolves to the reader while it is available and to the writer once it is
not, and those counters are independent and both start at zero, so comparing
a bare number across that switch pits one engine's counter against another's.
Equal by coincidence waives the cooldown for an engine already replaced;
unequal gates a caller that needs the recreate. Identity settles it, and is
sound because the engine object is never re-pointed without the generation
also moving.
Three smaller holes on the way out. The waiver is withdrawn once a repair of
that same engine has been tried and failed, so a burst collapses onto one
attempt instead of each caller running its own recreate serially; the record
is keyed per engine rather than counted globally, so an unrelated reconnect
failure cannot suppress a stale reader's recovery and a writer failure cannot
evict the reader's record. And a forced recreate that the optimistic-lock
guard declines is no longer reported as a success on either the direct or the
heavy path, since the routing wrapper leaves the reader untouched in that
case; a decline is deliberately not counted as a failure, so the caller's own
backoff still gets its waiver on the next attempt.
A decline on the heavy path clears the dead-engine flag before raising. The
clear after the cycle is skipped by any raise, which is right for a failure
and wrong here, and the non-forced path already clears it on a decline, so
this restores that policy rather than inventing one. Stranding the flag would
route the next cycle back down the probe-free heavy branch, where the
refreshed generation matches and the recreate kills the healthy engine a
refresh just spawned, which is #29176.
Clearing that flag is necessary and not sufficient. The escalation check
re-arms it whenever the consecutive-failure count sits at the threshold, so a
decline that left the count alone sent the very next attempt back down the
same path. A decline is raised only at the generation guard, and the
generation moves only after a replacement connects, so a decline is proof
that a replacement succeeded and the count is reset on it.
Fixes#36418
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
MCP tool calls run their guardrails against a throwaway LLM-shaped dict
built by `ProxyLogging._convert_mcp_to_llm_format`, not against the dict
the tool call is logged from. `@log_guardrail_information` therefore
appended `standard_logging_guardrail_information` to that throwaway
dict's metadata bucket, where `get_standard_logging_object_payload`
never saw it, so the Guardrails Monitor reported zero evaluations and
zero blocks for all MCP traffic.
Thread the request's `litellm_logging_obj` into `pre_call_tool_check`
and `_create_during_hook_task` and bridge the guardrail records onto it:
- Seed `data["litellm_logging_obj"]`, which unified guardrails read and
pass into `apply_guardrail`.
- Call `_sync_guardrail_info_to_logging_obj` in a `finally`, which is
what native guardrails need and what makes the block path work: a
blocked call raises straight out of `pre_call_tool_check`, so the
record has to be attached before the exception leaves the frame.
Only the guardrail evaluation records are copied. The synthetic
request's messages and tool arguments are deliberately left behind --
they can carry end-user data and nothing in the monitor needs them.
In `call_mcp_tool`, flush the failure handlers before
`post_call_failure_hook` so the `status="failure"` standard logging
object exists when `_ProxyDBLogger.async_post_call_failure_hook` writes
the spend-log row the monitor's "Total Blocked" counts. Both handlers
gate on `should_run_logging("sync_failure")` / `("async_failure")` and
then mark it, so the `@client` wrapper's own post-raise logging is a
no-op and nothing is double-counted -- the same pattern
`_fire_mcp_tool_call_logging` already uses for `isError=True`.
Threaded through every MCP tool entry point: the managed-server path,
the local-OpenAPI registry path, the legacy registry fallback, and the
Responses API's `_execute_tool_calls`.
- Extract input_cost, output_cost, cache_read_cost, cache_creation_cost, reasoning_cost, and tool_usage_cost from logging object cost breakdown
- Populate x-litellm-response-cost-* component headers in ProxyBaseLLMRequestProcessing.get_custom_headers
- Ensure headers are omitted when cost breakdown is absent or values are None
- Add comprehensive test suite covering component headers, math invariants, caching, reasoning, and discounts/margins
* feat(proxy): serve Anthropic-native /v1/models for Claude Code gateway discovery
* refactor(proxy): move Anthropic model-list formatter into llms/anthropic/common_utils
* fix(proxy): make model_list request param optional for direct callers
* style: apply ruff format to changed lines
* style: satisfy ruff strict-rule budget (UP006, I001)
* style: satisfy type-discipline budget (LIT002 mutable-ok, LIT009 pyright ignore)
* style: satisfy LIT001/LIT010 and drop explanatory comment per contributor rules
* fix(proxy): translate team model names in the Anthropic /v1/models response
* ci: trigger buildkite status report
* feat(proxy): carry token limits into the Anthropic-native /v1/models entries
* fix(proxy): cast the injected request so the anthropic-version guard is a real comparison
* fix(proxy): explain the model listing casts so the type-discipline gate passes
---------
Co-authored-by: yuneng-jiang <yuneng@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
The connection-level pre-call hook only ran once per WebSocket
connection, so a project caller could send unlimited high-token
response.create frames after a single minimal reservation. Adds
enforce_project_io_token_quota_for_frame to the v3 rate limiter and
wires it into both the native and managed WebSocket handlers via a
duck-typed litellm.callbacks lookup, so the SDK layer stays free of
proxy imports. A rejected frame gets an error event; the connection
stays open for the client to retry.
Also fixes the RET504 and BLE001 strict-lint-budget violations the
litellm_internal_staging merge introduced in
parallel_request_limiter_v3.py, which were failing the lint check.
The ownership question was asked twice for one retrieve: once before the provider
call to decide whether to suppress inline accounting, and again afterwards to
decide whether to mark the batch accounted. Between those two points the poller
can complete its first successful filtered query and become usable, so the two
answers disagree. The retrieve then accounts for the batch inline, having decided
the poller was unusable, while the later check sees a usable poller and leaves the
marker unset, so the poller accounts for the same batch again and its spend is
counted twice.
The retrieve now decides once and passes that decision to
update_batch_in_database, which prefers it over re-deriving one. Callers that
record no cost of their own leave it unset and keep deriving it as before, so the
cancel path is unchanged.
The handoff asked whether the poller was running, when what matters is whether it
will actually account for the batch. Those differ on a schema without the
batch_processed column: the poller cannot filter on it, so it falls back to a
query that excludes complete and completed rows, and it cannot set it either. A
caller retrieving a provider-completed batch before the poller saw it therefore
suppressed inline accounting, then marked the row complete, and the fallback query
could never find it again. Nobody accounted for that batch, so its cost escaped
the caller's budget entirely.
The poller now publishes batch_processed_support_confirmed, set only once a
filtered query has actually succeeded, and the handoff requires it. Defaulting to
unconfirmed keeps accounting on the retrieve path in exactly the cases the poller
would drop the batch, including the window before the poller's first cycle. All
four combinations account exactly once: unconfirmed leaves the retrieve
accounting and setting the marker, whether or not the column exists, and
confirmed is only reachable when the column is present, where the poller accounts
and sets it.
A scheduler that hands back something other than a bound method leaves no poller
to interrogate, which reads as unconfirmed rather than as working.
Two components computed a managed batch's cost and each assumed it was the only
one. Retrieving a batch computed it through the @client decorator's success
callback, and CheckBatchCost computed it on its own schedule. Whichever observed
completion first decided the outcome, so cost was either counted once per
retrieve or not at all.
The lockout is the worse half. Retrieving a batch that had reached completion set
batch_processed=True, which is what takes a batch out of CheckBatchCost's queue,
since it selects batch_processed=False. That write claimed the cost had been
accounted for on behalf of a callback that had not run yet and was not awaited.
When the callback then failed the cost was gone permanently, with the poller
already retired and no retry left. Observed on a live proxy: two completed
batches whose callbacks raised inside the logging worker, one on a provider
output path that did not resolve and one on a batch whose output file id was
still None, both left marked processed with no spend row and no way to recover
them. Nothing logged at error level for the batches themselves.
The over-count is the other half. Nothing suppressed recomputation, so each
retrieve of an already-completed batch recorded that batch's full cost again. A
caller polling its own batch to see whether it had finished inflated spend by
however many times it looked.
The flag now means what its name says, and only the component that actually
recorded the cost sets it. When the poller is running it owns accounting, so
retrieving a managed batch records no cost and leaves the flag alone; the poller
computes once and sets it. When the poller cannot be relied on, either because
polling is disabled by config or because the enterprise job never registered,
the retrieve path is the only accountant and behaves exactly as before. Batches
with no managed object row are untouched either way, since neither the flag nor
the poller queue applies to them.
The helper that carries the credential snapshot into litellm_params lived private
in files/main.py, and the batch retrieve needed it too. It now sits beside
get_litellm_params, which is what it augments, so neither caller reaches into the
other's private surface. Typed as Mapping/MutableMapping of object rather than
Any, which the strict import rules ban.
The file-content route builds the snapshot through the same helper as the batch
route instead of assembling a conditional mapping inline, which drops two mutable
constructions and leaves one way to attach it. Its name loses the batch suffix now
that both routes use it.
A third path reads a completed batch's output file, and it could not resolve the
bucket either. When cost is accounted from the retrieve itself rather than from
the poller, the batch success handler calls _handle_completed_batch, which fetches
the output file through _extract_file_access_credentials. That helper forwarded a
whitelist covering Azure and Vertex, gcs_bucket_name included, but nothing for
Bedrock, and retrieve_batch built its litellm_params through get_litellm_params,
whose fixed signature drops the trusted credential snapshot. So the snapshot never
reached the file read and it failed with "S3 bucket_name is required" for a bucket
the deployment had configured, leaving the batch's cost unrecorded.
Adding s3_bucket_name to that whitelist would not have worked. The Bedrock file
config deliberately resolves the bucket only from the immutable server-side
snapshot or the environment, never from a request param, because the bucket is
what managed file ids are validated against. The snapshot is therefore what has to
flow, exactly as it already does for the model-routed and cost-poller paths.
retrieve_batch now re-adds the snapshot after get_litellm_params, the same way the
file operations already do, the whitelist forwards it, and the proxy attaches it
for router-routed managed batches from the deployment behind the unified id.
Verified against a live proxy reading a real completed Bedrock batch: the cost row
appears within seconds of the retrieve carrying the batch's real spend and usage,
where before the read raised and no row was written.
Resolving those credentials is best effort. A batch whose deployment no longer
resolves, which happens when a model group is removed while batches are in
flight, still serves its status instead of failing the request on the lookup.
This matters for the OSS and polling-disabled configurations, where the retrieve
path is the only thing that accounts for a batch at all.
The mock merged every call into one shared dict, so a second routed retrieval would
overwrite the first and the assertions would still pass. Keep one frozen snapshot per
call and assert exactly one call, which also makes an unintended second retrieval a
failure rather than something the merge hides
get_configured_s3_bucket_name accepts the output bucket only from the immutable
_litellm_internal_model_credentials snapshot or AWS_S3_BUCKET_NAME. That refusal to read
litellm_params is deliberate: the bucket is what validate_managed_cloud_file_id checks a
file id against, so trusting a request-supplied value would let a caller redirect reads
to a bucket of their choosing
Two live entry points reach the Bedrock file-content transformation without ever building
that snapshot. The managed-files pre-call hook sets data["model"] for any id carrying
llm_output_file_id, which is every batch output, so get_file_content always takes the
model-routed branch; that branch called llm_router.afile_content directly, and
managed_files_obj.afile_content, the only caller that built the snapshot, is therefore
unreachable for batch output. CheckBatchCost spread the deployment credentials as plain
kwargs, and get_litellm_params does not carry s3_bucket_name across (gcs_bucket_name is
listed for exactly this reason, its S3 counterpart is not), so the poller lost the bucket
the same way
The result was that every completed Bedrock managed batch failed files.content with
"S3 bucket_name is required" and never had its cost tracked, leaving the row to be
re-polled every cycle. Both paths now resolve the deployment credentials and pass the
same MappingProxyType snapshot the managed-files hook already builds
request_id is the primary key of LiteLLM_SpendLogs and the flush inserts with
skip_duplicates, so a spend log whose id already exists is dropped with no error
raised and a "processed 1 spend log" line still logged. Batch cost accounting
produced exactly such an id twice over, and on a proxy with message redaction
enabled no batch cost row could be written at all.
get_spend_logs_id derived the id by md5-hashing the response for two call types,
aretrieve_batch and acreate_file. Redaction makes that hash a constant:
perform_redaction returns the fixed {"text": "redacted-by-litellm"} placeholder
for any shape it cannot redact, which is what a batch object and a file body both
become, so every such row hashed to md5('{"text": "redacted-by-litellm"}') =
00fcbef15a3b0097e14b0ca016ed30a0 regardless of provider, user, or amount. The
first row to claim that id owned it and every later row was discarded. Verified
against a live proxy: four payloads spanning two providers and three distinct
spend values all computed that id, and the table held one acreate_file row dating
to 2025-05-25, the row that had claimed it.
Keying off the batch's own identity instead is necessary but not sufficient,
because creating a batch already writes an acreate_batch row under exactly that
id, so the cost row becomes a duplicate of the batch's own creation row. Also
verified live: after the hash was removed the poller computed and flushed a
batch's cost, and the only row carrying that id was the acreate_batch row from
when the batch was submitted.
The id now comes from the response's own id, then the standard logging payload's
id, then litellm_call_id, and a batch cost row is namespaced with a _batch_cost
suffix so it cannot collide with the creation row. The middle term is what keeps
this correct under redaction: that payload is built from the unredacted response,
so it still carries the batch id after redaction has flattened the body. Keying
the cost row to the batch rather than to the call also keeps accounting the same
batch twice collapsing to one row instead of billing it twice. Every other call
type still derives its key exactly as before.
Cost and usage themselves are unaffected by redaction: the token columns fall back
to the standard logging payload and spend comes from its response_cost, neither of
which redaction touches. generate_hash_from_response had no other caller and is
removed with it.
* fix(proxy): track spend for OpenAI passthrough /v1/embeddings
OpenAI passthrough embeddings returned 200 but wrote no spend because the
route was unsupported and Cohere's /v1/embed prefix stole the match.
* fix(proxy): clear embeddings lint and Greptile comment nits
Inline embeddings cost tracking to avoid new LIT001/002 hits, trim
redundant doc comments, and cover the Cohere /v1/embeddings collision.
* fix(proxy): drop unreachable embeddings TypeError guard
convert_to_model_response_object with response_type=embedding already
returns EmbeddingResponse; the isinstance check was dead patch coverage.
A deployment with PTU flat-cost attribution also billed every request per
token, so a team paid for reserved capacity and again for the traffic that
capacity serves. Nothing set the per-token price and an unset price falls
back to the public cost map, which made the double charge the default.
/model/new and /model/{id}/update now store zero for every pricing field the
cost map could otherwise fill, refuse a price the caller supplies alongside
PTU config with a 400 naming the field, zero a price already on the row
rather than rejecting later edits of unrelated fields, and drop the zeros
again when the PTU config goes.
A PTU deployment is no longer read as a free model by the budget checks,
which would have waived every budget for it.
* fix(mcp): expose client HTTP headers to logging callbacks and hooks
MCP protocol tool calls built a synthetic Request with only content-type, so metadata.headers reaching logging callbacks and guardrails was empty while /mcp-rest/tools/call exposed the full set. Rebuild the synthetic request from the connection's raw headers (shared with the sampling path), and pass sanitized headers to the pre-call hook, the MCP to LLM guardrail bridge and the Responses API MCP bridge. Credential headers stay masked and proxy key headers stripped.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(mcp): strip custom proxy key and upstream MCP credential headers from logging copies
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(mcp): make client side auth header name accessor public
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(mcp): strip custom proxy key and client redaction opt-out from mcp headers
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(mcp): drop custom proxy key header in the synthetic request builder
Strips general_settings.litellm_key_header_name in build_synthetic_mcp_request so every caller, including sampling, is covered, and reverts passing general_settings into add_litellm_data_to_request on the tool call path since that also switches on enforced_params.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: shivam <shivam@berri.ai>
Spend-update transactions increment non-idempotent counters
(spend = spend + x) inside prisma interactive transactions. Every retry
loop only caught DB_RETRY_SAFE_ERROR_TYPES (httpx.ConnectError); a
Postgres deadlock (SQLSTATE 40P01, surfaced by prisma as transaction
conflict code P2034) fell through to a bare except that re-raised
immediately, so on multi-pod / high-concurrency deployments any pod that
lost a deadlock silently dropped its increment.
A deadlock is replay-safe even though the increment is non-idempotent:
Postgres aborts and fully rolls back the victim transaction, so no
partial spend is committed. Add PrismaDBExceptionHandler.is_deadlock_error
and route every spend path (user, end-user/key, team, team_member, org,
tag/agent via _update_entity_spend_in_db, and the daily-spend upsert)
through a shared _handle_spend_update_failure that retries connection
errors and deadlocks with randomized jitter backoff and re-raises
everything else or on exhaustion.
The Admin UI's Authorize & Fetch Token flow stored its pending server in a
module-level dict, so /register, /authorize and /token only succeeded when
every leg happened to land on the process that served /session. On a proxy
with NUM_WORKERS greater than 1, or more than one replica, each click was an
independent draw and failed with a bare 404, which reads as intermittent.
Persist the pending server as a short-lived draft row instead, so any worker
resolves it. The in-memory cache is kept as the fallback for proxies with no
database configured, which keeps single-process deployments working as before.
A session runs under a caller-supplied id only when that id names a server
that really exists, which is the edit form re-authorizing a saved server.
Anything else gets a fresh id, so two concurrent sessions can never share one
draft and silently adopt each other's URL or client credentials. Drafts past
their lifetime are swept on each write so abandoned sessions do not
accumulate, and a lost create race adopts the winner rather than failing a
caller whose session is ready.
Drafts are excluded from listings and never enter the runtime registry. The
exclusion keeps rows whose approval status is NULL, which both short spellings
of the filter drop, silently hiding every server predating the approval
workflow.
Measured on a two-worker proxy against the live GitHub MCP server, 120
concurrent authorize calls per leg: staging 56/120 failures, this branch
0/120, staging again 65/120 as a positive control.
* fix(team): sweep dangling team references and cache on team delete
delete_team drove all of its cleanup off the team's members_with_roles roster, so any
user row referencing the team by another route kept a dangling team id forever and the
deleted team stayed visible on /user/info. Nothing swept LiteLLM_UserTable.teams or
LiteLLM_TeamMembership by team id, schema.prisma declares no relation between the
membership table and the team table so there is no cascade to fall back on, and the
cached team object was never invalidated on delete.
Adds a sweep that runs before the team rows are dropped: it strips the deleted ids from
every user row that still lists them and removes every membership row for those teams.
Adds _delete_cache_team_object in auth_checks and calls it per deleted team so the
team_id:{team_id} entry cannot outlive the team.
The sweep is targeted, not indiscriminate: only the deleted ids are removed and the
other teams on a user record are left intact.
* fix(team): fail member_add when the team is deleted under the row lock
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(team): correct the post-delete sweep note for the member_add lock path
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(cli): hide codex and opencode from the lite command listings
They stay registered and invokable, so existing `lite codex` users keep
working; they just no longer show up in `lite --help` or the interactive
shell's command list.
* feat(cli): make the hidden lite command list configurable
codex and opencode are supported, so hardcoding them as hidden was wrong. Let deployments curate their own listing with `lite config set hidden_commands codex,opencode` instead; nothing is hidden by default and hidden commands stay invokable.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
os.exec* has no process-replacement semantics on Windows, so `lite claude`
printed its routing line and returned to the prompt while Claude Code was left
detached without a usable console. Windows now spawns the agent, waits for it,
and exits with the child's status. Batch shims such as the npm-installed
claude.cmd go through cmd.exe because CreateProcess cannot run them directly,
and that command line is emitted verbatim with every token quoted so a spaced
path or an argument holding a shell metacharacter cannot be re-parsed by the
command processor. POSIX keeps using os.execvpe unchanged.
/team/member_delete dropped the roster entry by matching user_email against
members_with_roles, then built its user-row lookup from that same raw email
instead of from the user_id the roster entry already carries. An email the user
row does not literally hold matched nothing, so the team id stayed in the user's
teams array and the team-membership row was left orphaned while the call still
returned 200.
/team/member_add resolves an email to a user case-insensitively but stores the
caller's casing on the roster, so inviting "Alice@Example.com" for a row holding
"alice@example.com" and removing by that same string is enough to reach it.
_cleanup_members_with_roles now returns the roster entries it removed, and both
the user-row update and the membership delete run against their user ids.
When get_team_object fails, the centralized auth gate rebuilds the team
from the token's own fields. A token whose team row was missing when the
key was read carries team_models=[] and team_blocked=False, and the
model-access check reads an empty model list as every model, so the
rebuilt team grants more than the real team ever did.
get_team_object reported a deleted team and a database that would not
answer as the same 404, so the fallback could not tell a definitive
answer from a degraded read. Raise a TeamNotFoundError subclass, still a
404 with the same detail so every other caller is unaffected, only when
the database answers and the row is absent.
A team that is provably gone now refuses, and no setting overrides that.
Otherwise the grant is merely unknown: a token carrying one may vouch,
since replaying a recorded grant cannot widen it, and a token carrying
none may not. allow_requests_on_db_unavailable still opts back out there,
and is only consulted once the failure is known to be a degraded read.
CLI session tokens minted by /sso/cli/poll set team_id and team_alias but
never team_models or team_model_aliases, so the token carried a team with
none of that team's grants. /v1/models bails out to "unrestricted" when both
key_models and team_models are empty and listed the whole proxy, and team
model aliases never resolved because both can_team_access_model and the
pre-call rewrite read team_model_aliases off the token.
The team data was not close at hand: _fetch_cli_sso_team_details projected
full team rows down to team_id and team_alias before they reached the mint.
Widen that projection to include the team's models and its joined alias
table, and populate both fields at mint time.
Also stop writing the user's personal allowlist into the key models slot
when a team is bound, matching virtual-key semantics where a team-bound
credential is governed by the team grant.
Because an empty team grant is itself a real value meaning unrestricted, a
team whose grants cannot be resolved must not be minted as empty: that is
the same "unrestricted" bail-out this fix exists to close. The poll now
refuses to mint when the selected team has no complete cached detail.
That refusal is only safe because a login can no longer be pinned to a team
whose grants will never resolve. Deleting an organization drops its team
rows but leaves the memberships behind, so the login now offers only teams
whose rows still exist, and a lookup that fails outright fails the login
rather than caching a session that silently drops every team.
