* fix(proxy): authorize every Responses API id, not only the ones the proxy issued
The ownership check on the Responses API only ran when the id arrived in the
proxy's own encrypted format. An id in any other shape skipped the check and
was forwarded upstream, so a key that did not own the response could retrieve,
cancel, delete, or chain off it.
Every addressed id now goes through one authorization step shared by retrieve,
cancel, delete, list-input-items, and create's previous_response_id. An id the
proxy did not issue is refused with 403 unless the deployment opts in with
general_settings.allow_unmanaged_response_ids, has responses id security
disabled, has no signing key configured, or the caller is a proxy admin.
* fix(proxy): re-authorize the retained responses id instead of trusting it
Background streaming emits event types with no typed model, which arrive
as GenericEvent holding a plain dict. Only typed events had their nested
response id rewritten, so those frames advertised the raw internal id
while their siblings advertised the encrypted one. The raw shape skips
the ownership check, so any other key could retrieve or cancel that
response.
Rewrite the advertised id wherever an event carries one, whichever shape
it arrives in, so a future event type cannot reopen this.
The streamed-id regression test built a bare BaseLiteLLMOpenAIResponseObject with a
top-level id, hitting the wrong _encrypt_response_id branch. A real streamed create
emits ResponseCompletedEvent, whose client-visible id lives on event.response.id, so
the test now drives that production event shape and reads collected[0].response.id.
Mutating the alias route gate or disabling the .response.id encryption branch both
fail the test.
The streaming security hook only encrypted response ids when request_route
matched "/v1/responses" exactly, so streamed creates on the /openai/v1/responses
and /responses aliases leaked the plain managed id. A second virtual key could
GET, continue, and DELETE another key's response. Normalize the route (strip the
provider prefix, accept the /responses alias) before gating, mirroring the
non-streaming hook which has no route gate.
The _encrypt_response_id method now receives request_cache=None as a
keyword argument from async_post_call_success_hook. Updated the mock
assertion to expect this parameter.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(responses_id_security.py): encrypt response.id - prevent user A from retrieving user B's response
additional security for retrievals on shared accounts
Closes LIT-1307
* feat(responses_id_security.py): allow admin to disable responses id security check
* test: add initial unit testing
* feat(responses_id_security.py): add streaming support
* docs: document new param
* docs: document new param
* feat(responses_id_security.py): add team id checks - ensure it works for service accounts
prevent service accounts keys from different teams from accessing each other's responses
more secure
* test: add unit testing
* fix: fix linting error
