4.17 was picked on the belief that dnspython only became a core pymongo
dependency there, which is wrong: pymongo has declared dnspython>=1.16.0,<3.0.0
as a core requirement since well before that, so mongodb+srv:// URIs resolve at
4.9 too. The real floor is 4.9, the release AsyncMongoClient landed in, and 4.8
has no AsyncMongoClient at all.
Verified against live Atlas on 4.9: sync and async search, list_search_indexes,
same top hit and score as 4.17. Resolution is unchanged, pymongo 4.17.0 either
way, so this only widens what an existing environment is allowed to bring.
GHSA-jp53-mhqp-8xcg (fixed in 6.16.0), GHSA-23w6-3w8w-8484 and
GHSA-763m-79hh-57f2 (fixed in 6.16.1) flag pypdf 6.15.0 in uv.lock and
keep osv-scan red alongside the tornado advisories. The proxy-runtime
extra now requires pypdf>=6.16.1 and the lock resolves 6.16.2.
Atlas Vector Search has no HTTP query API, since the Data API and HTTPS
Endpoints are end-of-life, so this provider extends BaseDirectVectorStoreConfig
and runs the $vectorSearch aggregation through pymongo rather than shaping an
httpx request. That is the same seam Valkey uses for RESP.
vector_store_id names the Atlas Search index, matching Valkey, with the
database and collection supplied through litellm_params.
pymongo lives in a new optional `mongodb` extra and is imported lazily, so the
base install still pulls no MongoDB driver. The floor is 4.17 because that is
where dnspython became a core dependency instead of the `srv` extra, and Atlas
issues mongodb+srv:// URIs that will not resolve without it.
Clients are cached per connection rather than opened per search. Measured
against Atlas, a fresh client costs ~890ms versus ~80ms warm, so copying the
Valkey open-and-close-per-call pattern would have added ~810ms to every query.
ProxyExtrasDBManager.spend_logs_is_partitioned() (#38452) silently returns
False when psycopg can't be imported, and psycopg was never added to the
extra_proxy install, so every production image lacks it. Schema
reconciliation then generates the unfiltered primary-key rewrite against a
genuinely partitioned LiteLLM_SpendLogs and Postgres rejects it, exactly the
failure the fix was meant to prevent. Ships psycopg via extra_proxy and logs
a warning when it's still missing instead of failing silently.
RestrictedPython 8.3 extended its protected-name validation to cover
positional-only parameters, so sandboxed source can no longer bind a
local named _getattr_, _getitem_, _write_ or _print_ that takes
precedence over the hooks the custom-code guardrail sandbox installs.
8.4 and 8.5 continue in the same direction with safer_getattr and the
Python 3.15 syntax audit.
The floor moves rather than the lock alone so downstream installs of
litellm[proxy] pick up the same behaviour.
The MCP client's HTTP transport needs mcp>=1.24.0 for streamable_http_client,
but a base litellm install declares no mcp constraint and no extra existed to
pin one, so environments carrying an older mcp fail at connect time with
'streamable_http_client is not available. Please install mcp with HTTP
support.', which names no version floor and no installable remedy.
Add a litellm[mcp] extra matching the proxy extra's mcp>=1.28.1,<2.0 and
replace the vague ImportError with one naming the required floor, the
installed mcp version, and the pip commands that fix it.
* fix(ci): stop the mutation report publishing a score it never measured
Run 32475268575 was the first dispatch of this workflow since May. Every setup
step passed and mutmut generated all 48 mutant files, so the suspected
zero-mutants bug is not what stops it. It dies in the stats phase, where mutmut
times the configured test set once up front. That set included
tests/proxy_behavior/management/, a behaviour tier that talks to a real
seeded database, so the run ended having mutated nothing.
Narrow tests_dir to the unit tier that maps to paths_to_mutate. Run 32476663383
proved a Postgres service is not enough on its own: with a schema but no seed
rows the same test fails on a foreign key instead, and a mutation score is only
meaningful against the tests that claim to cover the mutated code.
The second half is the one that matters. With no results at all,
mutation_report.py printed "No surviving mutants, the test suite caught every
mutation" and exited 0, so a run that mutated nothing published a perfect score.
It now separates no survivors from no results, says which it got, and exits 1.
* fix(ci): count mutmut's multi-word verdicts as results
The verdict capture was `\w+`, so it matched only single-word statuses. mutmut's
status_by_exit_code table has four that are not: `no tests`, `not checked`,
`caught by type check` and `check was interrupted by user`. A finished run made
entirely of those parsed as zero results, which is exactly the state this script
now treats as an unfinished run, so it would have failed a run that had in fact
completed.
The regression test asserting `reported == 2` on a three-verdict fixture was
codifying that, and now asserts 3. A second test walks all four multi-word
statuses and checks the report does not call the run unfinished.
Caught by Greptile on #37825.
* fix(ci): keep the saml tests out of the mutmut stats phase
Run 32477695014 got past the database blocker and ran 208 of the configured
tests, then ended on one error: test_saml_sso.py builds an x509 certificate in
a fixture, and inside mutmut's mutants/ sandbox cryptography's hash classes are
imported under a second identity, so .sign() rejects the SHA256 instance with
"Algorithm must be a registered hash algorithm".
That is a property of the sandbox, not of the tests or the code being mutated,
and one erroring test ends the stats phase before a single mutant runs.
* fix(ci): only claim a clean sweep when something was shown to be killed
`mutmut results` skips killed mutants by design, so its silence means either
that everything was killed or that nothing ran. Counting the verdicts it does
print cannot tell those apart, which left the report still able to say the suite
caught every mutation on a run whose mutants were all `no tests` or
`not checked`.
The clean-sweep sentence is now gated on mutmut-cicd-stats.json reporting a
non-zero killed count, which is the only signal that positively distinguishes
the two. Without it the report says so in as many words and main returns 1. A
run with zero kills and a stats file says that too.
The test asserting a non-killed run was not called unfinished was codifying the
same confusion; it is replaced by three that pin each branch.
Caught by Greptile on #37825.
* fix(ci): treat stats that count survivors the report never listed as untrusted
clean_sweep_is_provable passed on any positive kill count, so a stats file
reporting 48 killed and 3 survived, next to a `mutmut results` that listed no
survivors, still published a clean sweep. The two sources contradict each other
there, and neither one is worth believing. It now requires the stats file to
agree that nothing survived, and the report says which disagreement it found.
* fix(ci): refuse a clean sweep while mutants never reached the tests
A run can end with kills, no survivors, and a pile of mutants marked no tests,
skipped, suspicious, timeout or segfault. Those never got put in front of the
suite, so "caught every mutation" says more than the run measured. The verdict
now names which of them it found and withholds the pass, and the status list
those five come from is one constant the summary and the verdict share.
* fix(ci): read anything that is not a kill or a survivor as unresolved
The unresolved statuses were a list of five, so a run ending in a status the
reporter had never met, "check was interrupted by user" among them, still
counted as a clean sweep. The rule is now the other way round: killed, survived
and total are the keys with a meaning here, and every other non-zero count is a
mutant that did not reach the tests, whatever mutmut chose to call it.
The comment above the extra named cryptography as one of the heavy imports a
thin install leaves out. That stopped being true when keyring joined the
extra: on Linux it reaches the Secret Service through secretstorage, which
depends on cryptography.
Three ways the credential commands could mislead or hang.
`lite logout` on a machine that never logged in warned that a credential may
be stranded in a keychain it could not check, and told the user to install
keyring to go clear it. There was nothing there. A missing token file is now
read as the evidence it is, because logout keeps a secret-free file behind
whenever the keychain is left unconfirmed, so a later run can tell a machine
with a credential it cannot reach apart from one that never had a login. That
holds on the LITELLM_CLI_DISABLE_KEYRING path too.
`KeyringDiscardsWrites` was handled on the read and erase paths, which cannot
produce it: the null backend returns None from `get_password` rather than
raising, so only a write ever detects it. It now lives on `SecretWrite` alone
and the unreachable arms are gone.
`keyring.set_password` blocks forever under a HOME with no usable login
keychain, which is what containers, CI images, `sudo -H`, and service accounts
run with, and reads answer normally there so nothing cheaper tells them apart.
`lite login` never touched a keychain before this, so a sign-in that simply
never returns would be a new way for it to fail. Writes are pre-flighted with
a throwaway value on a bounded wait, and a keychain that stays silent falls
back to the token file. The real credential is never the thing handed to a
call that might land long after we stopped waiting.
Saving also stages the token file before the keychain is given anything, since
the file is the half a read-only or full directory refuses. A save that cannot
land now leaves both stores as it found them, which matters most when the
login it failed to replace still works.
lite login used to write the minted cli-session key in cleartext to
~/.litellm/token.json. The secret material (key plus any JWT) now goes
to the OS keychain through the optional keyring package, with the 0600
file kept for non-secret metadata and as the fallback on headless boxes.
Legacy plaintext files keep authenticating and are migrated into the
keychain, then scrubbed, on first read. A secret still on disk always
outranks the keychain entry, so a failed keychain write can never
resurrect a stale key. LITELLM_PROXY_API_KEY and --api-key precedence
is unchanged, lite logout clears both stores and warns when the
keychain will not release the entry, and ~/.litellm is created 0700
(tightened from 0755 where an older CLI left it broader).
LITELLM_CLI_DISABLE_KEYRING=1 forces the file fallback.
enterprise/ and litellm-proxy-extras/ both changed between main and staging, so each gets a PATCH bump. The 1.98.0 line already graduated with v1.98.0-rc.1, so this promotion opens the 1.99.0 line and litellm takes its MINOR bump.
uv.lock re-resolved against the three new versions; the exclude-newer timestamp moves because the lock uses a rolling P3D window
* fix(deps): ship boto3 with the base SDK so bedrock works out of the box
* keep boto3 listed in the proxy extra as well
* scrub ambient AWS env vars in the base SDK bedrock smoke check
Moves the proxy extra's cryptography floor from 48.0.1 to 49.0.0 and widens the
ceiling to <51, then holds the lock at 50.0.0 with a uv override
mlflow caps cryptography at <50 even in its newest release, so publishing a
plain >=50.0.0,<51.0 range would make `pip install "litellm[proxy,mlflow]"`
unresolvable for downstream consumers. Publishing >=49.0.0,<51.0 keeps that
combination installable (it resolves to 49.0.0), while the
override-dependencies entry, which is a uv workspace setting and never reaches
published metadata, keeps our own lock and Docker images on 50.0.0
mlflow only uses PBKDF2HMAC, AESGCM, Fernet and InvalidTag from cryptography;
none of those are affected by the 49 or 50 breaking changes, so overriding its
ceiling is safe in practice
Lock delta is cryptography 48.0.1 -> 50.0.0, the mlflow trio 3.14.0 -> 3.15.0
and msal 1.36.0 -> 1.37.0
cryptography 49 dropped its x86_64 macOS and 32-bit Windows wheels. Linux CI
and the Docker images are unaffected; developers on Intel Macs will build from
source
`import litellm` reaches litellm/integrations/otel/model/config.py via
litellm_core_utils/litellm_logging.py, so pydantic-settings is needed at import
time. It was declared only in the `proxy` extra, which left a plain
`pip install litellm` unimportable on every platform.
Adds tests/base_sdk_tests/check_base_sdk_install.py and a base_sdk_install
CircleCI job that builds the wheel, installs it into a clean venv with no extras,
and smoke-checks the import, a mock completion, a mock embedding, the bundled
pricing metadata and the token counter. The check is stdlib-only on purpose;
installing pytest into that venv would add packaging, pluggy and iniconfig and
could mask the class of undeclared dependency it exists to catch.
Previously the Windows job was the only one installing without extras, so this
class of break was caught by accident rather than by design.
aiohttp 3.14.0 and 3.14.1 re-arm the sock_read timer on a keep-alive
connection after it has already been returned to the idle pool. The stray
timer stamps a SocketTimeoutError on the pooled connection without closing
it, so the pool keeps handing it out and the next request to pick it up
fails instantly on an error left behind by an earlier, unrelated request.
Because a single pool is shared across providers, the failures appear
simultaneously across Vertex AI, Bedrock, Anthropic and OpenAI-compatible
deployments as sub-millisecond "Connection timed out" errors.
uv.lock resolved aiohttp 3.14.1 and the published images install via
`uv sync --frozen`, so every image built from that lock shipped the
regression. The wheel's own metadata declared `aiohttp>=3.10,<4.0`, which
also left pip consumers free to resolve into the same broken window, so
both the runtime floor and the uv constraint move to >=3.14.2.
Upstream fixed this in aio-libs/aiohttp#12954, released in aiohttp 3.14.2;
the lock now resolves 3.14.3. Raising the floor rather than capping below
3.14 keeps the advisories that the existing 3.14.1 floor cleared, so no
osv-scanner ignores are needed. litellm requires Python >=3.10 and aiohttp
3.14.2 requires >=3.10, so no supported interpreter loses support.
Both new tests fail on the previous pins and pass on these.
litellm already supports Google, Microsoft and generic OIDC SSO through
fastapi-sso, which has no SAML support; AuthMethod.SAML existed only as an
unused enum value. This adds real SAML 2.0 single sign-on for the admin UI.
A new SAMLAuthHandler validates signed assertions with the OneLogin
python3-saml toolkit and maps them onto a CustomOpenID, then reuses the
shared post-login path every other provider goes through, so provisioning,
role/team mapping and the UI session JWT are unchanged. Both SP-initiated
and IdP-initiated HTTP-POST flows are supported. SP-initiated logins are
bound to the browser that started them via an HttpOnly state cookie plus a
cached AuthnRequest id, and the ACS rejects any response whose InResponseTo
doesn't match; unsolicited (IdP-initiated) responses cannot be browser-bound
so they are rejected unless SAML_ALLOW_UNSOLICITED=true. Replays are rejected
by a consumed-assertion guard whose lifetime tracks each assertion's
NotOnOrAfter, and both the replay guard and the login-state binding go
through the proxy's shared in-memory + Redis cache for multi-instance
deployments. The ACS honors DISABLE_ADMIN_UI and re-applies the
free-SSO-user Enterprise gate after the assertion is validated, so an
unvalidated POST can no longer drive the billable-user count query.
SAML is configurable from the admin UI SSO settings (IdP metadata URL or
inline XML, SP entity ID, and an allow-unsolicited toggle), which persists
the SAML_* environment variables the handler reads, exactly like the Google,
Microsoft and generic OIDC providers.
python3-saml is kept as an optional saml extra; its xmlsec and lxml wheels
bundle the native libraries so no system packages are required, and the
import is guarded so the proxy still starts without the package with the
SAML routes returning a clear 501.
Resolves LIT-4016
CodSpeed benchmarks the SDK with no IO, so it can't catch regressions that
only appear under real concurrent load through the full proxy stack (auth,
routing, logging, spend, Postgres, Redis). This adds a Locust load test under
tests/e2e/load that drives concurrent POST /chat/completions traffic against a
mock deployment (litellm_params.mock_response), so the measured throughput
reflects proxy overhead rather than a provider's latency, and asserts an
aggregate RPS SLO with a failure-ratio guard. The test is marked load and the
parent conftest sorts load-marked items last so it never perturbs
latency-sensitive suites. Covers reliability.perf.throughput.under_slo.
