update_in_memory_guardrail now goes through reinitialize_guardrail, the same
delete-and-construct path the DB poller and PATCH already use, whenever the
row name or litellm_params changed. Patching raw DB values over constructor
derived state clobbered normalized URLs, derived api_base values, and resolved
secrets, which 500d the serving worker in the earlier revision. An unchanged
config only refreshes the cached row, and a row the constructor rejects keeps
the previous instance enforcing and raises
A connection string whose password holds an unescaped '/' makes pymongo's URI
parser raise a plain ValueError, not a PyMongoError, and a URI with no
credentials at all makes Atlas close the connection, which surfaces as
AutoReconnect. Neither was handled, so both fell through to litellm's generic
wrapper and were served as 500s with a traceback for what are routine typos.
Both now return a 400 naming the cause. The ConnectionFailure branch sits after
the ServerSelectionTimeoutError and NetworkTimeout branches, which subclass it,
and two ordering tests pin that.
Adds a required-check candidate that selects the tests/e2e test files a PR added or
modified, boots a stage-mirror stack on the runner (migrations, backend, two gateway
processes behind nginx, Postgres, Jaeger, TLS cluster Valkey), and runs those files
three times with retries off. The run job sits behind the e2e-changed GitHub
environment, so a reviewer approves each run before the OIDC token that reads the
provider keys from AWS Secrets Manager exists. Supersedes #34981
* fix(agents): redact secret litellm_params fields from all /v1/agents responses
Secret-bearing litellm_params fields (aws_secret_access_key, api_key, and
similar) are now write-only: list, get, create, update, and patch
responses always replace them with a fixed marker, regardless of caller
role. Editing an agent no longer requires resending a real credential --
an update that omits a sensitive field, or echoes the marker back,
preserves the stored value; a real value still rotates it.
* fix(agents): redact secrets nested inside dicts/lists in litellm_params too
Greptile found that a secret nested one level down under a
non-sensitively-named key, or inside a list of per-provider configs, was
neither redacted on read nor restored symmetrically on write (the marker
string could get persisted as the real value). Recurse into lists on the
read side, and mirror that recursion on the write side so restoration
isn't limited to top-level keys. Also fixes a regression the redact
rewrite introduced (a plain string leaf like a model name was being
misinterpreted as a JSON blob and redacted), and suppresses 3 new
test-quality-gate findings on an established repo-wide mocking pattern
this PR's new tests also use.
* fix(agents): guard list-position credential restore against misassignment
Two more real gaps Greptile/veria found in the recursive redact/restore
mechanism, verified directly against the exact reported shape
(litellm_params.model_list, each entry carrying its own nested
litellm_params.api_key/aws_secret_access_key) before fixing:
- Positional restoration inside a list could attach one entry's stored
credential to a different entry if the list were reordered or resized
between GET and PUT/PATCH. Restoration by index now only fires when the
incoming and existing entries match on every non-secret field; otherwise
the caller's own value is used (never a guessed cross-entry secret).
- A subtree collapsed to the flat REDACTED_BY_LITELM marker by the
read-side recursion depth cap couldn't be recovered on write (the marker
string itself would get persisted). Restore now recognizes that shape and
recovers the whole existing subtree.
Both covered by regression tests mirroring the exact model_list shape
reported, mutation-verified.
* fix(agents): simplify list-entry credential restore to positional matching
The content-match guard from the previous commit fixed one Greptile
finding (cross-entry misassignment on reorder) but introduced a worse one:
it also rejected restoration whenever an entry's own non-secret fields
changed, which is the common case (rename a model_list entry while
leaving its own secret masked) -- silently dropping the stored credential
on an ordinary edit.
There is no stable per-element identity in a plain dict[str, object]
schema, so no rule can satisfy both 'restore whenever the entry itself
only had its secret masked' and 'never restore across a reorder' at once.
Positional correspondence is what every other part of this restore (and
the endpoints' full-replace-on-PUT semantics) already assumes, so drop
the content-match gate and rely on it here too: this fixes the common
case correctly and accepts cross-entry misassignment on a simultaneous
reorder-plus-masked-echo as a known, narrow, documented limitation (not a
leak between different agents or tenants, since it only reshuffles one
agent's own stored values). Tests updated to pin the accepted trade-off
explicitly rather than asserting it away, and to cover the previously
broken ordinary-edit case.
A deployment authenticating with api_key or AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK still ran
boto3's credential chain before every call, so an unloadable default profile
(a login_session profile without botocore[crt]) made Converse, embeddings,
image generation, image edit, and the Bedrock guardrail hook fail with
MissingDependencyException even though the bearer token alone signs the
request. The chain now runs only when no bearer token is configured
Adds a configurable password-strength policy (default: min 12 chars,
upper/lower/number/special, all individually toggleable, floored at 8
so a misconfigured minimum cannot disable the length check, and
unicode-aware so an accented letter cannot satisfy the special-
character requirement) enforced on every path that sets a local
user's password: /user/update, /user/bulk_update, and the invitation
onboarding claim flow.
Adds general_settings.disable_password_login_when_sso_enabled, which
rejects username/password login on /login, /v2/login and /v3/login
(including the UI_USERNAME/UI_PASSWORD admin fallback) once ANY
configured SSO provider is FULLY ready: every companion secret/
endpoint an OAuth provider needs, checked independently per provider
so a stray leftover client id for an unused provider can't mask a
different, fully configured one; and for SAML, the optional
python3-saml runtime being importable, checked without letting a
fully-missing package's ModuleNotFoundError take down password login
itself. SSO becomes the enforced boundary for interactive UI access
without an incomplete, mixed, or half-installed SSO setup locking
every admin out or breaking login outright. Master-key API access is
untouched, and unsetting the setting plus a restart restores password
login as the documented recovery path.
* fix(security): restrict and validate file uploads at /v1/files and /upload/logo
Extends fast-fail upload validation to every purpose at POST /v1/files,
not just purpose=batch: a configurable max_file_size_mb size cap and a
blocked_file_extensions denylist, plus rejection of filenames carrying a
directory-traversal component before anything is read, stored, or
forwarded to a provider.
Also fixes two concrete gaps found while auditing every upload surface:
the Azure Blob Storage backend derived a blob path's extension with
filename.split(".")[-1], which does not parse path structure and let a
crafted filename embed a directory traversal sequence into the stored
blob path; and POST /upload/logo (the admin UI logo upload) had no
role check at all, so any authenticated API key, not just a proxy
admin, could write a file to the server's disk.
* fix(lint): drop cast()/mutation from settings coercion, sync blocked_file_extensions on reload
Replaces the TypeAdapter+cast() reads of max_file_size_mb and
blocked_file_extensions with small isinstance-based validators, since the
codebase's cast() budget (LIT006) had no headroom left. Also adds the
blocked_file_extensions reload block that was missing from
_update_general_settings: it was registered as an editable setting but
never re-synced into runtime state, so a value set through the DB-backed
settings editor would silently never take effect (Greptile finding).
* fix(security): declare max_file_size_mb and blocked_file_extensions on ConfigGeneralSettings
The DB-backed general-settings update endpoints validate every field
through ConfigGeneralSettings.model_fields before persisting it, so
without these declarations an operator could never actually set either
setting through that path even though both were registered for the
Admin UI's settings editor and reloaded on config refresh (Greptile
finding). blocked_file_extensions is typed as a tuple, not a list, to
stay out of the immutable-collections lint budget; the stored JSON
value is unaffected since the raw request payload, not the validated
model, is what gets persisted.
* chore: regenerate schema.d.ts for the new ConfigGeneralSettings fields
* fix(security): normalize configured blocked_file_extensions casing
check_blocked_extension lowercased the uploaded filename's extension
before comparing but compared it against blocked_extensions verbatim,
so an admin-configured blocked_file_extensions: ['.EXE'] would never
match an uploaded payload.exe (Greptile finding). Normalizes the
configured values the same way at comparison time, and adds the
missing case (mismatched-case config, lowercase upload) as a
regression test, mutation-checked against the unfixed comparison.
* fix(security): restore caller-owned stream position after size inspection
_file_size_bytes unconditionally seeked back to 0 after measuring a
BinaryIO's length, discarding wherever the caller had actually
positioned it (Greptile finding). Saves and restores the original
position instead. Rewrites the existing test that had encoded the
old "always resets to 0" behavior as its expectation, and adds a
sibling case for the under-cap path; both are mutation-checked
against the unfixed always-reset-to-0 behavior.
Databricks Model Serving validates assistant messages with additionalProperties=false, so replaying
a thinking turn translated by the Anthropic Messages adapter 400s with
'messages.N.thinking_blocks: Extra inputs are not permitted'. Drop litellm's internal fields in
DatabricksConfig._transform_messages via a shared common_utils helper.
Resolves LIT-6762
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
filters was already refused, but ranking_options and rewrite_query were
accepted and then dropped. A caller asking for score_threshold 0.9 got results
scoring 0.5 with a 200 and no indication the threshold never ran, which is the
silent-wrong-answer case the filters check exists to prevent. Both now raise
the same 400 naming the parameter and what to do instead.
Milvus REST and Azure AI Search still embedded the query through the SDK, so
a bare Router alias as litellm_embedding_model kept failing after the executor
landed for Valkey. Both now share BaseQueryEmbeddingVectorStoreConfig, which
embeds through the injected executor, drops the empty litellm_embedding_config
requirement, and awaits aembedding on the async path.
The Router executor falls back to the SDK for models the Router does not
serve, so inline provider configs such as azure/text-embedding-3-large with
their own credentials keep working through the proxy.
Tests fake OpenAI and Milvus at the HTTP boundary with respx instead of
patching litellm.embedding.
Carries a mutable-ok suppression on the router session rewrite for the
tightened LIT002 budget, since the realtime callees deep-copy and
JSON-dump the session, and captures the realtime session kwargs through
an async mock in the router tests instead of an untyped dict.
The async client cache is keyed per event loop, and pymongo's AsyncMongoClient
holds a reference to the loop it was built on, so an entry for a closed loop
kept that client and its sockets alive for the life of the process. A script
that calls asyncio.run once per search fills the cache to its cap this way and
then stops caching entirely. Measured live against Atlas over 40 loops: 32
pinned clients and 212 open descriptors before, 1 cached client and no
monotonic descriptor growth after.
parseDynamicAgentForForm recovered a credential field's value from a
stored model string by splitting both the model_template and the model
on "/" and matching by array index. That breaks for any placeholder
value that itself contains "/", such as a Bedrock AgentCore runtime ARN
resource path (runtime/<runtime-id>), silently dropping everything
after the first slash when populating the edit form. Saving without
touching the field then persisted the truncated ARN.
Replace the index-matching split with a non-mutating template parse
(split on the placeholder pattern, escape and rejoin the literal
segments into a regex) so a placeholder captures everything it needs
regardless of embedded slashes. Also add a lightweight ARN-shape
validator for the AgentCore runtime ARN field, guarded against a
malformed pattern string, so a truncated value is rejected client-side
before it reaches the backend.
Resolves LIT-6737
A host-only api_base or MISTRAL_API_BASE (the documented form, https://api.mistral.ai) built
https://api.mistral.ai/audio/speech and 404ed. Match the chat and OCR configs by appending /v1
when the configured base does not already end with it.
litellm.exception_type passes only litellm's own exception types through
untouched, so the NotImplementedError the search-only refusal raised reached
the caller as APIConnectionError. The proxy served that as a 500 with a
traceback in the body for what is a plain client mistake. Raising
BadRequestError gives the caller a 400 and the message on its own.
Sort the chat-tool keys once and number duplicates with groupby instead of
rescanning every preceding key per position, so the guardrail merge stays
O(n log n) on client-supplied tool lists. Drop the comment that restated the
unsupported-tool warning in the Responses-to-chat transformation.
tests/test_litellm/llms/mongodb imports pymongo's exception classes to check the
error translation against the real hierarchy, and the shard that runs it
(tests/test_litellm/llms, per test-unit.yml) synced --extra google, proxy,
semantic-router and saml but not mongodb, so 24 of 109 tests would have errored
with ModuleNotFoundError on the first CI run. CircleCI hid this because it syncs
--all-groups --all-extras.
uv export --frozen ... --extra saml -> no pymongo
uv export --frozen ... --extra saml --extra mongodb -> pymongo==4.17.0
Also close the two gaps a mutation run found in the suite: nothing asserted that
a short request timeout shortens server selection as well as connect, and the
existing code 13 case carried "not authorized", which the message markers match
too, so it could not tell whether the code was still being checked. 28 of 28
mutants now die.
update_in_memory_litellm_params validated mode into GuardrailEventHooks members while __init__ stores the plain strings LitellmParams.mode carries, so readers that stringify event_hook (akto, straiker) saw different values on the serving worker than on re-initialized workers. Presidio forced post_call assignments go through the same shape, and Straiker recomputes configured_modes on every update
* fix(proxy): share per-model budget counters across replicas through the spend counter cache
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): keep the shared fake Redis store immutable
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: yassin <yassin@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Native AgentCore A2A always sent either a fresh generated runtime session id
or the single configured runtimeSessionId, so related turns lost context and
unrelated callers shared one AgentCore microVM. The runtime session id is now
params.message.contextId scoped to the calling key hash, then runtimeSessionId,
then generated, and is length-validated (33-256) before the header is signed.
Invalid ids surface as JSON-RPC -32602 / HTTP 400 instead of a 500.
Co-authored-by: yassin <yassin@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
