Adds a configurable password-strength policy (default: min 12 chars,
upper/lower/number/special, all individually toggleable, floored at 8
so a misconfigured minimum cannot disable the length check, and
unicode-aware so an accented letter cannot satisfy the special-
character requirement) enforced on every path that sets a local
user's password: /user/update, /user/bulk_update, and the invitation
onboarding claim flow.
Adds general_settings.disable_password_login_when_sso_enabled, which
rejects username/password login on /login, /v2/login and /v3/login
(including the UI_USERNAME/UI_PASSWORD admin fallback) once ANY
configured SSO provider is FULLY ready: every companion secret/
endpoint an OAuth provider needs, checked independently per provider
so a stray leftover client id for an unused provider can't mask a
different, fully configured one; and for SAML, the optional
python3-saml runtime being importable, checked without letting a
fully-missing package's ModuleNotFoundError take down password login
itself. SSO becomes the enforced boundary for interactive UI access
without an incomplete, mixed, or half-installed SSO setup locking
every admin out or breaking login outright. Master-key API access is
untouched, and unsetting the setting plus a restart restores password
login as the documented recovery path.
Introduce a single, typed caller identity that is resolved once at the auth
boundary and read by reference downstream, instead of being re-derived from a
50-field key object or rebuilt from request metadata.
What this adds (litellm/proxy/auth/resolvers/), organized by responsibility:
- Principal: a small, frozen, identity-only value type (user / organization /
teams / project / end-user / roles / scopes / network), with its sub-models
and the role mapping. No budget or policy state; those stay on the key object.
- DbIdentityStore: the auth flow's resolver, owning both halves of resolving a
caller. resolve_key does the one combined_view lookup (cache, then DB via the
shared lower-level helpers, then write-back) and returns the key object, which
still flows for budget / rate-limit / policy unchanged. principal_from_key
projects the identity slice of that key object into a Principal, issuing no
lookup. user_api_key_auth resolves every key through the store rather than
calling get_key_object directly; auth_checks.get_key_object stays as the legacy
entrypoint for its other callers until they migrate.
- network: the X-Forwarded-For / trusted-proxy CIDR primitives live here in one
place. trusted_proxy_utils now imports them rather than keeping a second copy.
At the seam, user_api_key_auth projects one per-request Principal off the
resolved key object and stamps the request network context onto it once
(X-Forwarded-For is trusted only when trusted_proxy_ranges is configured). It is
attached to request.state.principal for the downstream consumers later phases
add. The projection is additive and defensive: a failure never rejects an
already-authenticated request, and a missing principal must be treated as deny
by any future reader. The Principal is always identifiable (credential_ref and a
stable subject off the token), never anonymous.
This is additive and changes no behavior today; it is the identity foundation
the spend-attribution and authorization phases build on.
Moves is_accepted=True from GET /onboarding/get_token to POST /onboarding/claim_token,
so the flag accurately reflects that a password has been set. Both endpoints now reject
already-used links, with get_token rejecting before any user data is returned.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
