* feat(agents): authoritative permissions
* fix: enforce authoritative managed agent permissions
* fix(agents): only consult the identity store for managed targets
is_agent_allowed entered the identity-store path whenever a prisma client
was configured, so an ordinary agent paired with an internal user returned
503 instead of 200. Classify the target from the registry first and fall
back to the store only when the registry has no entry, so an unmanaged
target never depends on the store being reachable.
* fix(agents): gate the managed path on an admitted policy object
Ten call sites branched on `managed_agent_policy is not None`, which any
MagicMock attribute satisfies, so the managed path fired on unmanaged
subjects and died in Pydantic validation as a 503. Route every check
through a shared helper that requires a real AgentResponse.
* test(mcp): stub the writer replica the fresh-policy reads use
reload_admitted_user now passes check_db_only through to get_user_object,
so the user row is read from writer_db. Point the mocks at the replica the
code actually reads and give each parametrized case its own user id.
* fix(agents): cap a managed agent at the invoking team's agents
resolve_agent_access returned the managed policy's grants before the
agent_caller ceiling was applied, so a managed agent acting on behalf of a
user reached agents that user's team was never granted. Intersect with the
caller ceiling the unmanaged path already honours.
* fix(agents): restore token narrowing and scope the private-access suppressions
The managed-model check lost its valid_token narrowing when it moved to the
shared helper. Make the caller-access resolver public rather than reaching
into it from module scope, and give each remaining private access a reason.
* docs(agents): drop the comment claiming admins skip the A2A permission check
The check has never had an admin bypass on this path, so the comment
described behaviour the code does not implement.
* test(proxy): stub the writer reads and restore the MCP manager singleton
Fresh-policy user lookups read writer_db, so the team and rest-endpoint
mocks stubbed a replica the code no longer reads, and the dashboard
session fake still had the pre-kwarg signature. The manager reload also
rebound global_mcp_server_manager in every MCP module without restoring
it, leaking an empty manager into later files.
* style: sort imports under the litellm package ruff config
* fix(mcp): cap a managed agent's servers and tools at the invoking caller
managed_agent_servers and managed_agent_tools returned the agent's own
grants without the agent_caller ceiling the unmanaged resolvers apply, so
a managed agent reached MCP servers and tools the echoed caller could not.
Call the existing ceiling helpers on both axes.
* refactor(mcp): return the caller-capped tools without an interim list
The ceiling helper already returns a sequence, so materializing it into a
list added a mutable collection for nothing. Sort at the return sites
instead, which also makes the tool order stable across both branches.
* fix(agents): preserve actor ceilings during managed target checks
* fix(agents): keep managed permission ceilings authoritative
* fix(mcp): fail closed on authoritative caller team outages
---------
Co-authored-by: Joshua Valluru <326636767+joshua-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
An agent key that echoes the x-litellm-user-id / x-litellm-team-id headers
forwarded by /a2a is capped at that user's and team's models, MCP servers
and agents, on top of its own grants and access group ceiling. The echoed
ids only narrow, and nested A2A hops forward the original human caller
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Listing agents (GET /v1/agents and MCP agent_search) treated the absence of any
agent grant on the key or team as permission to see every agent. Non-admin keys
now list only the union of explicit grants, and dashboard sessions resolve that
union through the user's real teams and user row instead of the shared
dashboard team. Proxy admins still see everything and direct access to a named
agent is unchanged.
Resolves LIT-6862
Co-authored-by: yassin <yassin@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test: drop the cwd-relative sys.path.insert calls from the test suite
TQ003 stands at 1,077 across 1,058 files, and 1,015 of them are the same shape:
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.abspath("../..")) and its deeper siblings. The
argument resolves against the working directory rather than the file, so from
the repo root, where every job runs pytest, it inserts the directory two levels
above the checkout. It has never pointed at litellm. The package is installed
into the environment anyway, which is what actually makes the import work, and
what the rule's message has said all along.
Removing them leaves 1,634 imports of sys and os with no remaining reference,
and those go too, except where another test module imports the name back out of
the file. The rest of TQ003 is 62 call sites that resolve against __file__ or a
variable, which are a different question and are left alone.
Collection is identical either way: 45,871 tests and the same 51 pre-existing
collection errors before and after, and ruff reports no new undefined name.
* test: drop the duplicate imports the sys.path sweep exposed to F811
* test(pre-call-utils): restore the os import the new bedrock tests need
* fix(proxy): deny when agent grants resolve to nothing
`get_allowed_agents` returned a plain list where the empty value meant both
"this caller was never restricted" and "this caller's grants resolved to
nothing". Downstream read either as allow-all, so a key restricted to one
agent inside a team restricted to another reached every agent on the proxy,
and an access group that resolved to no agents did the same.
Replace it with `resolve_agent_access`, returning a tagged
UnrestrictedAgentAccess | RestrictedAgentAccess. Only a caller with no grant
anywhere is unrestricted; an empty restricted set denies. Access group lookup
failures now propagate to the key/team resolvers so a DB error still fails
open exactly as before, while a group that genuinely resolves to nothing
denies.
* style(proxy): drop redundant comments from the agent access match
* fix(proxy): derive config agent ids from agent_name so grants survive secret rotation
Config-defined A2A agents were identified by a sha256 of the whole resolved
config entry, secrets included, so rotating an os.environ secret re-minted the
agent_id on restart and orphaned every object_permission.agents grant while
grant-less keys kept access (LIT-5144). The id now hashes only agent_name, and
the old full-entry hash is kept as a legacy alias: permission checks,
GET /v1/agents filtering, spend and key attachment, and public_agent_groups all
normalize legacy ids so pre-upgrade grants keep working
* fix(proxy): persist stable agent ids into stored grants at startup
The runtime alias only translates a legacy grant while the current config
still hashes to it, so a secret rotation after upgrading would orphan the
grant, and an orphaned grant intersecting a stable team grant collapses to
an empty list that downstream reads as allow-all. Rewriting the stored ids
once at boot removes both. This cannot be a SQL migration because only the
running proxy can recompute the legacy hash from resolved config secrets
* fix(proxy): make the grant id migration a compare-and-swap
A grant edited between the migration's read and write kept the stale
snapshot. The update now predicates on the agents array read at scan time
via update_many, so a concurrently modified row is skipped and the runtime
alias covers it until the next boot retries
* fix(proxy): retry the grant id migration and stay within the LIT002 ceiling
The one-shot startup task now retries up to three times with a short delay
so a transient DB error at boot cannot leave a legacy grant unmigrated
until an operator's next restart is the rotation itself. The new list
constructions in the migration and the alias-expanded agent id lookups are
tuples now, keeping the branch under the mutable-collection budget
* fix(proxy): count compare-and-swap misses in the grant id migration
migrate_legacy_grant_ids now returns rewritten and missed counts from the
update_many results instead of reporting scanned rows as migrated, and the
startup task retries while any rows remain unmigrated, not just on errors
* fix(lint): clear basedpyright budget breaches in agent id aliasing
* init schema.prisma
* init LiteLLM_ObjectPermissionTable with agents and agent_access_groups
* TestAgentRequestHandler
* refatctor agent list
* add AgentRequestHandler
* fix agent access controls by key/team
* feat - new migration for LiteLLM_AgentsTable
* fix add LiteLLM_ObjectPermissionBase with agent and agent groups
* add agent routes to llm api routes
* add agent routes as llm route
