diff --git a/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/outbound_credentials/bridge_credentials.py b/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/outbound_credentials/bridge_credentials.py
index c352f3a683e..08115ad3c56 100644
--- a/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/outbound_credentials/bridge_credentials.py
+++ b/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/outbound_credentials/bridge_credentials.py
@@ -167,7 +167,8 @@ class NotBridgeEnvelope(BaseModel):
 
 class BridgeEnvelopeAdmitted(BaseModel):
     """A valid envelope: the identity to admit under and the full upstream ``Authorization``
-    value (``token_type access_token``) to forward to the upstream MCP server."""
+    value (``token_type access_token``, with a case-insensitive bearer type canonicalized to
+    ``Bearer``) to forward to the upstream MCP server."""
 
     model_config = ConfigDict(frozen=True)
     tag: Literal["admitted"] = "admitted"
@@ -193,6 +194,16 @@ def _strip_bearer(value: str) -> str:
     return value
 
 
+def _authorization_scheme(token_type: str) -> str:
+    """Canonicalize the upstream OAuth token type into the scheme to put on the wire.
+
+    RFC 6749 defines ``token_type`` as case insensitive, so an upstream may report ``bearer``,
+    but RFC 6750 spells the HTTP auth scheme ``Bearer`` and strict resource servers reject any
+    other casing with 401 ``invalid_token``. Any non-bearer type is forwarded verbatim.
+    """
+    return "Bearer" if token_type.lower() == "bearer" else token_type
+
+
 def is_bridge_envelope_shaped(authorization_value: str) -> bool:
     """Cheap, keyless test that an ``Authorization`` value carries an envelope of either kind (optional
     ``Bearer`` scheme stripped). The admission edge engages the bridge arm for an access envelope (to
@@ -239,5 +250,5 @@ def resolve_bridge_envelope(
     if opened.identity.server_id != expected_server_id:
         return BridgeEnvelopeInvalid()
     grant = opened.grant
-    upstream_authorization = f"{grant.token_type} {grant.access_token.get_secret_value()}"
+    upstream_authorization = f"{_authorization_scheme(grant.token_type)} {grant.access_token.get_secret_value()}"
     return BridgeEnvelopeAdmitted(identity=opened.identity, upstream_authorization=SecretStr(upstream_authorization))
diff --git a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/outbound_credentials/test_bridge_credentials.py b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/outbound_credentials/test_bridge_credentials.py
index 753a3d6a942..a63ff044d70 100644
--- a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/outbound_credentials/test_bridge_credentials.py
+++ b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/outbound_credentials/test_bridge_credentials.py
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ through the consumer; and no path leaks the upstream token in a repr.
 
 from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
 
+import pytest
 from pydantic import SecretStr
 
 from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.outbound_credentials.bridge_credentials import (
@@ -188,6 +189,29 @@ def test_resolve_strips_optional_bearer_scheme_before_detection():
     assert prefixed.upstream_authorization.get_secret_value() == bare.upstream_authorization.get_secret_value()
 
 
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("upstream_token_type", ["bearer", "BEARER", "Bearer", "beArEr"])
+def test_resolve_canonicalizes_case_insensitive_bearer_token_type_on_egress(upstream_token_type: str):
+    keys = envelope_keys_from_master_key(_MASTER_KEY)
+    grant = UpstreamTokenGrant(
+        access_token=SecretStr(_ACCESS_TOKEN), token_type=upstream_token_type, expires_in=600
+    )
+    sealed = mint_envelope(_IDENTITY, grant, keys, _NOW)
+    assert isinstance(sealed, SealedEnvelope)
+    result = resolve_bridge_envelope(sealed.token.get_secret_value(), keys, _NOW, _SERVER_ID)
+    assert isinstance(result, BridgeEnvelopeAdmitted)
+    assert result.upstream_authorization.get_secret_value() == f"Bearer {_ACCESS_TOKEN}"
+
+
+def test_resolve_forwards_non_bearer_token_type_verbatim():
+    keys = envelope_keys_from_master_key(_MASTER_KEY)
+    grant = UpstreamTokenGrant(access_token=SecretStr(_ACCESS_TOKEN), token_type="DPoP", expires_in=600)
+    sealed = mint_envelope(_IDENTITY, grant, keys, _NOW)
+    assert isinstance(sealed, SealedEnvelope)
+    result = resolve_bridge_envelope(sealed.token.get_secret_value(), keys, _NOW, _SERVER_ID)
+    assert isinstance(result, BridgeEnvelopeAdmitted)
+    assert result.upstream_authorization.get_secret_value() == f"DPoP {_ACCESS_TOKEN}"
+
+
 def test_resolve_expired_envelope_is_invalid_not_admitted():
     keys = envelope_keys_from_master_key(_MASTER_KEY)
     token = _sealed_token(keys, now=_NOW)