fix(auth): screen bulk-update passwords concurrently before any db write

/user/bulk_update awaited a separate HIBP lookup for each user in the
batch, so a degraded-slow HIBP (5s timeout per lookup) could stretch a
500-user batch to ~2500s and time out the request after some updates
had already persisted.

validate_passwords_bulk dedupes the batch's passwords, strength-checks
first, then fires every needed HIBP lookup concurrently, bounding the
worst case at one 5s timeout window. bulk_update_processed_users now
screens the whole batch before the serial update loop, so a rejected
password fails only its own entry and validation failures precede any
persistence.

litellm/constants.py

@@ -2005,4 +2005,4 @@ BATCH_ENQUEUED_TOKEN_LIMIT_METADATA_KEY: Final = "batch_enqueued_token_limit"
 EMPTY_MAPPING: Final = MappingProxyType({})
 
 # API endpoint for breached password k-anonymity search
-HIBP_RANGE_API_BASE: Final = "https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range"
+HIBP_RANGE_API_BASE: Final = "https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range"

litellm/proxy/auth/password_policy.py

@@ -11,9 +11,11 @@ of the password's SHA-1 hash ever leave the proxy, and the check fails open
 (allows the password) when HIBP is unreachable.
 """
 
+import asyncio
 import hashlib
-from collections.abc import Mapping
+from collections.abc import Mapping, Sequence
 from dataclasses import dataclass
+from types import MappingProxyType
 from typing import Final
 
 from litellm._logging import verbose_proxy_logger
@@ -136,6 +138,33 @@ async def _is_password_breached(password: str, client: AsyncHTTPHandler) -> bool
     return breached
 
 
+def is_breach_check_enabled(general_settings: Mapping[str, object]) -> bool:
+    return general_settings.get("password_policy_check_breached_passwords", True) is not False
+
+
+async def is_password_breached(
+    password: str,
+    general_settings: Mapping[str, object],
+    client: AsyncHTTPHandler | None = None,
+) -> bool:
+    """False when the check is disabled, the password is absent from the HIBP
+    corpus, or HIBP is unreachable (fail open)."""
+    if not is_breach_check_enabled(general_settings):
+        return False
+    return await _is_password_breached(password, client if client is not None else _hibp_client())
+
+
+def breached_password_error() -> ProxyException:
+    return ProxyException(
+        message=(
+            "This password appears in known data breaches and cannot be used. Please choose a different password."
+        ),
+        type=ProxyErrorTypes.validation_error,
+        param="password",
+        code=400,
+    )
+
+
 async def validate_password_not_breached(
     password: str,
     general_settings: Mapping[str, object],
@@ -144,16 +173,42 @@ async def validate_password_not_breached(
     """Raise ``ProxyException`` (400) if ``password`` appears in a known data breach.
 
     Fails open: an unreachable or misbehaving HIBP allows the password."""
-    check_enabled: Final = general_settings.get("password_policy_check_breached_passwords", True) is not False
-    if not check_enabled:
+    if not await is_password_breached(password, general_settings, client):
         return
-    if not await _is_password_breached(password, client if client is not None else _hibp_client()):
-        return
-    raise ProxyException(
-        message=(
-            "This password appears in known data breaches and cannot be used. Please choose a different password."
-        ),
-        type=ProxyErrorTypes.validation_error,
-        param="password",
-        code=400,
+    raise breached_password_error()
+
+
+def _strength_verdict(password: str, general_settings: Mapping[str, object]) -> ProxyException | None:
+    try:
+        validate_password_policy(password, general_settings)
+    except ProxyException as e:
+        return e
+    return None
+
+
+async def validate_passwords_bulk(
+    passwords: Sequence[str],
+    general_settings: Mapping[str, object],
+    client: AsyncHTTPHandler | None = None,
+) -> Mapping[str, ProxyException | None]:
+    """Per-unique-password policy verdicts for a batch: the ProxyException to
+    surface, or None when the password is acceptable.
+
+    Deduplicates first, then issues every needed HIBP lookup concurrently, so a
+    batch caller pays one HIBP timeout window in the worst case instead of one
+    per password (each lookup still fails open independently)."""
+    unique_passwords: Final = tuple(dict.fromkeys(passwords))
+    strength_verdicts: Final[Mapping[str, ProxyException | None]] = MappingProxyType(
+        {password: _strength_verdict(password, general_settings) for password in unique_passwords}
+    )
+    to_screen: Final = tuple(password for password in unique_passwords if strength_verdicts[password] is None)
+    breached_flags: Final = await asyncio.gather(
+        *(is_password_breached(password, general_settings, client) for password in to_screen)
+    )
+    breached_passwords: Final = frozenset(password for password, breached in zip(to_screen, breached_flags) if breached)
+    return MappingProxyType(
+        {
+            password: breached_password_error() if password in breached_passwords else strength_verdicts[password]
+            for password in unique_passwords
+        }
     )

litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/internal_user_endpoints.py

@@ -26,9 +26,14 @@ from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Header, HTTPException, Request, status
 import litellm
 from litellm._logging import verbose_proxy_logger
 from litellm._uuid import uuid
+from litellm.llms.custom_httpx.http_handler import AsyncHTTPHandler
 from litellm.proxy._types import *
 from litellm.proxy.auth.auth_checks import get_team_object, get_user_object
-from litellm.proxy.auth.password_policy import validate_password_not_breached, validate_password_policy
+from litellm.proxy.auth.password_policy import (
+    validate_password_not_breached,
+    validate_password_policy,
+    validate_passwords_bulk,
+)
 from litellm.proxy.auth.user_api_key_auth import user_api_key_auth
 from litellm.proxy.common_utils.user_api_key_cache import (
     object_permission_cache_key,
@@ -157,11 +162,17 @@ def _team_membership_table(
     return team_membership_table
 
 
-async def _hash_password_in_dict(data: dict, general_settings: Mapping[str, object]) -> None:
-    """Validate and hash password field in-place if present."""
+async def _hash_password_in_dict(
+    data: dict, general_settings: Mapping[str, object], password_prevalidated: bool = False
+) -> None:
+    """Validate and hash password field in-place if present.
+
+    ``password_prevalidated`` skips the policy checks for callers that already
+    validated the password (the bulk path screens its whole batch upfront)."""
     if "password" in data and data["password"] is not None:
-        validate_password_policy(data["password"], general_settings)
-        await validate_password_not_breached(data["password"], general_settings)
+        if not password_prevalidated:
+            validate_password_policy(data["password"], general_settings)
+            await validate_password_not_breached(data["password"], general_settings)
         data["password"] = hash_password(data["password"])
 
 
@@ -1416,6 +1427,7 @@ async def _update_single_user_helper(
     user_request: UpdateUserRequest,
     user_api_key_dict: UserAPIKeyAuth,
     litellm_changed_by: str | None = None,
+    password_prevalidated: bool = False,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
     """
     Helper function to update a single user.
@@ -1438,7 +1450,7 @@ async def _update_single_user_helper(
 
     data_json: Final[dict] = user_request.model_dump(exclude_unset=True)
     non_default_values = _update_internal_user_params(data_json=data_json, data=user_request)
-    await _hash_password_in_dict(non_default_values, general_settings)
+    await _hash_password_in_dict(non_default_values, general_settings, password_prevalidated=password_prevalidated)
 
     existing_user_row: BaseModel | None = None
     if user_request.user_id:
@@ -1682,19 +1694,38 @@ async def bulk_update_processed_users(
     users_to_update: list[UpdateUserRequest],
     user_api_key_dict: UserAPIKeyAuth,
     litellm_changed_by: str | None = None,
+    hibp_client: AsyncHTTPHandler | None = None,
 ) -> BulkUpdateUserResponse:
+    from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import general_settings
+
     results: Final[list[UserUpdateResult]] = []
     successful_updates = 0
     failed_updates = 0
 
+    # Screen the batch's passwords upfront and concurrently: done per-user
+    # inside the loop below, each HIBP lookup would be awaited serially and a
+    # degraded-slow HIBP could stretch a full batch to minutes, timing out the
+    # request after some updates already persisted.
+    password_verdicts: Final = await validate_passwords_bulk(
+        tuple(u.password for u in users_to_update if u.password is not None),
+        general_settings,
+        client=hibp_client,
+    )
+
     # Process each user update independently
     try:
         for user_request in users_to_update:
             try:
+                if (
+                    user_request.password is not None
+                    and (password_error := password_verdicts.get(user_request.password)) is not None
+                ):
+                    raise password_error
                 response = await _update_single_user_helper(
                     user_request=user_request,
                     user_api_key_dict=user_api_key_dict,
                     litellm_changed_by=litellm_changed_by,
+                    password_prevalidated=True,
                 )
                 # Record success
                 results.append(

tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/test_password_policy.py

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ The breach-check (HIBP) tests inject a real AsyncHTTPHandler wrapping an
 httpx.MockTransport, so no network is touched and nothing is monkeypatched.
 """
 
+import asyncio
 import hashlib
 
 import httpx
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ from litellm.proxy.auth.password_policy import (
     get_password_policy,
     validate_password_not_breached,
     validate_password_policy,
+    validate_passwords_bulk,
 )
 
 STRONG_PASSWORD = "Str0ng!Passw0rd"
@@ -268,3 +270,76 @@ async def test_breach_check_fails_open_on_malformed_response_body():
         client=_client_returning(f"{_sha1_upper('password12345')[5:]}:not-a-number"),
     )
     assert result is None
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_validate_passwords_bulk_screens_concurrently():
+    """All HIBP lookups for a batch must be in flight at once: each handler
+    call stalls until every expected request has arrived, and a handler that
+    gives up waiting reports the password as breached. Serial awaiting (the
+    old per-user behavior) leaves each earlier request waiting forever for the
+    later ones, so every verdict comes back as a breach and the test fails."""
+    passwords = ("Uniqu3!Passw0rd-a", "Uniqu3!Passw0rd-b", "Uniqu3!Passw0rd-c")
+    suffix_by_prefix = {_sha1_upper(p)[:5]: _sha1_upper(p)[5:] for p in passwords}
+    all_arrived = asyncio.Event()
+    arrivals: list[str] = []
+
+    async def handler(request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
+        arrivals.append(request.url.path)
+        if len(arrivals) == len(passwords):
+            all_arrived.set()
+        try:
+            await asyncio.wait_for(all_arrived.wait(), timeout=5)
+        except TimeoutError:
+            return httpx.Response(200, text=f"{suffix_by_prefix[request.url.path.rsplit('/', 1)[-1]]}:1")
+        return httpx.Response(200, text="0000000000000000000000000000000000A:1")
+
+    verdicts = await validate_passwords_bulk(passwords, {}, client=_client_with_transport(handler))
+    assert set(arrivals) == {f"/range/{prefix}" for prefix in suffix_by_prefix}
+    assert all(verdicts[p] is None for p in passwords)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_validate_passwords_bulk_deduplicates_lookups():
+    """500 users sharing one password must cost exactly one HIBP lookup."""
+    password = "Sh@red-Passw0rd!"
+    request_count = 0
+
+    def handler(request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
+        nonlocal request_count
+        request_count += 1
+        return httpx.Response(200, text="0000000000000000000000000000000000A:1")
+
+    verdicts = await validate_passwords_bulk((password,) * 500, {}, client=_client_with_transport(handler))
+    assert request_count == 1
+    assert verdicts == {password: None}
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_validate_passwords_bulk_mixed_verdicts():
+    """Weak passwords are rejected without an HIBP lookup; breached ones get
+    the breach error; acceptable ones map to None."""
+    breached = "Br3ached!Passw0rd"
+    clean = "Cl3an!!Passw0rd42"
+    weak = "short1!"
+    breached_sha1 = _sha1_upper(breached)
+    looked_up_prefixes: list[str] = []
+
+    def handler(request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
+        looked_up_prefixes.append(request.url.path.rsplit("/", 1)[-1])
+        if request.url.path == f"/range/{breached_sha1[:5]}":
+            return httpx.Response(200, text=f"{breached_sha1[5:]}:99")
+        return httpx.Response(200, text="0000000000000000000000000000000000A:1")
+
+    verdicts = await validate_passwords_bulk((breached, clean, weak), {}, client=_client_with_transport(handler))
+    assert _sha1_upper(weak)[:5] not in looked_up_prefixes
+    assert verdicts[clean] is None
+    assert "data breaches" in verdicts[breached].message
+    assert verdicts[breached].code == "400"
+    assert "12 characters" in verdicts[weak].message
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_validate_passwords_bulk_empty_batch_makes_no_lookups():
+    verdicts = await validate_passwords_bulk((), {}, client=_client_never_called())
+    assert verdicts == {}