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+# G4 — Regression-replay set for PR1 (Key Tier-1)
+
+This directory documents the regression-replay verification for the
+behavior-pinning suite. For each in-scope recent fix-PR touching
+`litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/key_management_endpoints.py`, we record:
+
+- which scenario(s) in the matrix catch the behavior the fix introduced,
+- a RED-at-parent / GREEN-at-tip transcript for at least one canonical PR.
+
+## Methodology
+
+For a given fix-PR `<sha>` with parent `<parent>`:
+
+```bash
+# 1. Save current handler
+cp litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/key_management_endpoints.py /tmp/key_mgmt.HEAD.py
+
+# 2. Replace with the pre-fix version
+git show <parent>:litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/key_management_endpoints.py \
+  > litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/key_management_endpoints.py
+
+# 3. Run the catching slice — expect RED on the scenarios that flip
+DATABASE_URL=postgresql://litellm:litellm@localhost:5432/litellm_test \
+  uv run --no-sync pytest tests/proxy_behavior/management/<test_file>.py -v
+
+# 4. Restore + confirm GREEN
+cp /tmp/key_mgmt.HEAD.py litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/key_management_endpoints.py
+DATABASE_URL=postgresql://litellm:litellm@localhost:5432/litellm_test \
+  uv run --no-sync pytest tests/proxy_behavior/management/<test_file>.py -v
+```
+
+When the fix changed multiple files, the in-place swap is constrained to the
+handler module — if a referenced helper moved between modules the swap may
+not run; in that case use `git worktree add` for a clean replay.
+
+## Replay table
+
+| # | Fix SHA | Subject (truncated) | Endpoint | Catching scenarios | Verified |
+|---|---------|---------------------|----------|--------------------|----------|
+| 1 | `c7c3df2b02` | extend /key/update admin check to non-budget fields | `/key/update` | `test_key_update.py::self/{team_admin,internal_user,owner,unrelated_same_org,cross_org_user,service_account}` — all 6 flip 200→403 between parent and HEAD | ✅ RED→GREEN below |
+| 2 | `8bbc61e03c` | harden /key/update authorization checks | `/key/update` | `test_key_update.py::owner_target/*` — non-admins blocked from updating peers' keys | by-inspection (overlapping coverage with #1) |
+| 3 | `1b2756811e` | close project hijacking and key org IDOR | `/key/update` (org_id field) | `test_key_update.py` matrix asserts no row mutation on denied responses (`row.models != [MARKER]`) | by-inspection |
+| 4 | `c7c3df2b02` siblings: `f6cd0a827a` | /key/update returns 404 (not 401) for nonexistent body key | `/key/update` | NOT covered by current matrix — the matrix only exercises existing target keys. Future: add 404-on-missing scenarios. | gap (filed below) |
+| 5 | `133471f882` | double-counting bug in org/team key limit checks on update | `/key/update` (counting) | NOT directly covered; matrix asserts status only, not counts. Future: budget/limit assertions. | gap (filed below) |
+| 6 | `574633fcf1` | exclude budget_limits from deleted verification token | `/key/delete` | `test_key_delete.py` matrix verifies post-delete authentication fails — would catch a shape-of-delete change but not a budget_limits-specific bug | by-inspection (partial) |
+| 7 | `db8ef44323` | enforce upperbound_key_generate_params on /key/regenerate | `/key/regenerate` | `test_key_regenerate.py` matrix asserts status; a regen that exceeds upperbound limits would surface IF the test bodies passed disallowed params. Currently they don't. | gap (filed below) |
+| 8 | `2220f3076a` | tighten caller-permission checks on key route fields | multiple | spans /key/generate + /key/update; partial overlap with our `team_id`/`user_id` boundary scenarios | by-inspection |
+| 9 | `5190bd07eb` | extend caller-permission to service-account | /key/generate, /key/service-account/generate | service_account actor IS in our matrix; some sub-scenarios overlap | by-inspection |
+| 10 | `12005c4a02` | /key/aliases auth | `/key/aliases` | not Tier-1 (out of PR1 scope; PR3 territory) | out of scope |
+| 11 | `818c097ca9` | Self-exclusion hash mismatch | `/key/update` | partial overlap | by-inspection |
+| 12 | `daf7c0c3a8` | virtual keys team filter | `/key/list` | `test_key_list.py` filter param scenarios deferred; default-visibility scenarios already in matrix | gap (deferred) |
+
+## Verified replay: `c7c3df2b02`
+
+**Fix subject**: `fix(proxy): extend /key/update admin check to non-budget fields`
+**Parent SHA**: `662d05531d`
+**Catching slice**: `tests/proxy_behavior/management/test_key_update.py`
+
+### Parent (pre-fix) — RED
+
+```
+FAILED tests/proxy_behavior/management/test_key_update.py::test_key_update_authz_matrix[self/team_admin]
+FAILED tests/proxy_behavior/management/test_key_update.py::test_key_update_authz_matrix[self/internal_user]
+FAILED tests/proxy_behavior/management/test_key_update.py::test_key_update_authz_matrix[self/owner]
+FAILED tests/proxy_behavior/management/test_key_update.py::test_key_update_authz_matrix[self/unrelated_same_org]
+FAILED tests/proxy_behavior/management/test_key_update.py::test_key_update_authz_matrix[self/cross_org_user]
+FAILED tests/proxy_behavior/management/test_key_update.py::test_key_update_authz_matrix[self/service_account]
+6 failed, 15 passed
+```
+
+Each of the 6 self-target scenarios returned `200` under the parent code (the
+admin check only gated budget/spend changes, so a non-admin could rewrite
+`models`) but is pinned at `403` post-fix.
+
+### HEAD (post-fix) — GREEN
+
+```
+21 passed
+```
+
+The matrix correctly flipped from 6/21 RED to 21/21 GREEN solely on the
+handler swap — confirming the suite catches the c7c3df2b02 behavior change.
+
+## Identified coverage gaps (deferred to PR2/PR3)
+
+These cells in the replay table call out genuine matrix gaps — the current
+PR1 surface does not pin the specific behavior the fix introduced. Each is
+worth a follow-up scenario:
+
+- **404-on-missing-key** (rows 4, paralleling `f6cd0a827a` and
+  `19efe556cb`) — add an explicit "actor calls /key/update with a body
+  `key` that does not exist" scenario per endpoint, asserting 404.
+- **Budget/limit counting bugs** (row 5, `133471f882`) — add scenarios that
+  read the team/org spend rows after a denied /key/update and assert no
+  counter movement.
+- **Upperbound enforcement on /key/regenerate** (row 7, `db8ef44323`) —
+  extend the regenerate matrix with at least one scenario that requests
+  params exceeding the team's `upperbound_key_generate_params`.
+- **`/key/list` filter-param view** (row 12, `daf7c0c3a8`) — PR1 only
+  pins default-visibility. Filter combinations (`team_id=`,
+  `include_team_keys=true`, etc.) belong in a follow-up.
+
+Filed as TODOs rather than blocking PR1: the matrix shape is correct,
+these are scope extensions.