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from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Final
import litellm
from litellm.types.guardrails import GuardrailEventHooks, Mode
from ._models import TrendAISettings
from .trendai import GUARDRAIL_NAME, TrendAIGuardrail
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from litellm.types.guardrails import Guardrail, LitellmParams
def _normalize_event_hook(
mode: str | list[str] | Mode, # mutable-ok: guardrail configuration accepts lists of modes
) -> GuardrailEventHooks | list[GuardrailEventHooks] | Mode: # mutable-ok: guardrail event hooks require a list
if isinstance(mode, str):
return GuardrailEventHooks(mode)
if isinstance(mode, list):
return [GuardrailEventHooks(item) for item in mode]
return mode
def initialize_guardrail(litellm_params: "LitellmParams", guardrail: "Guardrail") -> TrendAIGuardrail:
settings: Final = TrendAISettings.model_validate(litellm_params.model_dump(mode="python", exclude_none=True))
guardrail_name: Final = guardrail["guardrail_name"]
callback: Final = TrendAIGuardrail(
api_key=litellm_params.api_key,
api_base=litellm_params.api_base,
app_name=settings.app_name,
fallback_on_error=settings.fallback_on_error,
timeout=settings.timeout,
stream_overlap_size=settings.stream_overlap_size,
response_content_chunk_size_bytes=settings.response_content_chunk_size_bytes,
guardrail_name=guardrail_name,
event_hook=_normalize_event_hook(litellm_params.mode),
default_on=litellm_params.default_on is True,
)
litellm.logging_callback_manager.add_litellm_callback( # pyright: ignore[reportUnknownMemberType] # callback union is partially untyped
callback
)
return callback
guardrail_initializer_registry: Final = {GUARDRAIL_NAME: initialize_guardrail}
guardrail_class_registry: Final = {GUARDRAIL_NAME: TrendAIGuardrail}
__all__ = ("TrendAIGuardrail",)

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# Derived from tm-v1-ai-guard-litellm-plugin revision 6cafc143f62962a98d4eb5abe9f608c61ff194d4.
# This file has been modified for integration into LiteLLM.
from collections.abc import Mapping
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Literal, TypeAlias
from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field
class TrendAISettings(BaseModel, frozen=True):
app_name: str | None = None
fallback_on_error: Literal["block", "allow"] = "block"
timeout: float = 5.0
stream_overlap_size: int = 256
response_content_chunk_size_bytes: int = 49_500
class TrendAIChatMessage(BaseModel, frozen=True):
role: Literal["assistant"] = "assistant"
content: str
class TrendAIChatChoice(BaseModel, frozen=True):
index: int = 0
message: TrendAIChatMessage
finish_reason: Literal["stop"] = "stop"
class TrendAIChatCompletionPayload(BaseModel, frozen=True):
"""The OpenAI chat-completion shape Trend AI Guard scans model output as."""
id: str = "chatcmpl-stream"
object: Literal["chat.completion"] = "chat.completion"
created: int = 0
model: str
choices: tuple[TrendAIChatChoice, ...]
@classmethod
def for_content(cls, content: str, model: str) -> "TrendAIChatCompletionPayload":
return cls(model=model, choices=(TrendAIChatChoice(message=TrendAIChatMessage(content=content)),))
class TrendAIRedactedMessage(BaseModel, frozen=True):
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore")
content: str | None = None
class TrendAIRedactedChoice(BaseModel, frozen=True):
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore")
message: TrendAIRedactedMessage | None = None
class TrendAIRedactedResponse(BaseModel, frozen=True):
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore")
choices: tuple[TrendAIRedactedChoice, ...] = ()
class TrendAIRedactedPrompt(BaseModel, frozen=True):
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore")
prompt: str | None = None
class TrendAISensitiveRule(BaseModel, frozen=True):
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore")
id: str = ""
class TrendAISensitiveInformation(BaseModel, frozen=True):
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore")
has_policy_violation: bool = Field(default=False, alias="hasPolicyViolation")
rules: tuple[TrendAISensitiveRule, ...] = ()
class TrendAIResponse(BaseModel, frozen=True):
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore")
action: str
reasons: tuple[str, ...] = ()
reason: str = ""
redacted_request: Mapping[str, object] | None = Field(default=None, alias="redactedRequest")
sensitive_information: TrendAISensitiveInformation | None = Field(default=None, alias="sensitiveInformation")
@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
class TrendAIAllow:
kind: Literal["allow"] = "allow"
redacted_content: str | None = None
masked_entity_count: tuple[tuple[str, int], ...] = ()
@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
class TrendAIBlock:
reason: str
status_code: int = 400
kind: Literal["block"] = "block"
@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
class TrendAIProviderFailure:
reason: str
status_code: int | None = None
kind: Literal["provider_failure"] = "provider_failure"
TrendAIScanResult: TypeAlias = TrendAIAllow | TrendAIBlock | TrendAIProviderFailure
@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
class TrendAITextWindow:
text: str
start: int
@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
class TrendAIWindowScan:
window: TrendAITextWindow
result: TrendAIScanResult
@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
class TrendAIRequestPrompt:
prompt: str
text_range: tuple[int, int] | None

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# Derived from tm-v1-ai-guard-litellm-plugin revision 6cafc143f62962a98d4eb5abe9f608c61ff194d4.
# This file has been modified for integration into LiteLLM.
from collections.abc import Iterator, Sequence
from itertools import chain
from typing import Final
from litellm.llms.base_llm.guardrail_translation.utils import message_slot_texts, message_text_slot_count
from litellm.types.llms.openai import AllMessageValues
from ._models import TrendAIRequestPrompt, TrendAITextWindow
def utf8_windows(content: str, *, chunk_size_bytes: int, overlap_chars: int) -> tuple[TrendAITextWindow, ...]:
"""Split ``content`` into windows of at most ``chunk_size_bytes`` UTF-8 bytes.
Consecutive windows share their last ``overlap_chars`` characters so a finding that straddles a
window boundary is still seen whole by one scan. The overlap is capped below the window length so
every window makes forward progress.
"""
return tuple(_iter_utf8_windows(content, chunk_size_bytes, overlap_chars))
def _iter_utf8_windows(content: str, chunk_size_bytes: int, overlap_chars: int) -> Iterator[TrendAITextWindow]:
encoded: Final = content.encode("utf-8")
byte_offset = 0 # rebind-ok: window cursor advances across the loop
char_offset = 0 # rebind-ok: window cursor advances across the loop
while byte_offset < len(encoded):
text = (
encoded[byte_offset : byte_offset + chunk_size_bytes].decode("utf-8", errors="ignore")
or content[char_offset]
)
yield TrendAITextWindow(text=text, start=char_offset)
end_byte_offset = byte_offset + len(text.encode("utf-8"))
if end_byte_offset >= len(encoded):
return
overlap = min(max(overlap_chars, 0), len(text) - 1)
byte_offset = end_byte_offset - len(text[len(text) - overlap :].encode("utf-8"))
char_offset += len(text) - overlap
def merge_redaction(original: str, current: str, redacted: str) -> str | None:
"""Apply the masks ``redacted`` adds over ``original`` on top of the masks already in ``current``.
Returns None when the three texts do not line up character for character, since a positional
merge would then scramble the output.
"""
if len(original) != len(current) or len(redacted) != len(original):
return None
return "".join(
redacted_char if redacted_char != original_char else current_char
for original_char, current_char, redacted_char in zip(original, current, redacted, strict=True)
)
def apply_window_redaction(content: str, window: TrendAITextWindow, redacted: str) -> str | None:
end: Final = window.start + len(window.text)
merged: Final = merge_redaction(window.text, content[window.start : end], redacted)
if merged is None:
return None
return f"{content[: window.start]}{merged}{content[end:]}"
def locate_request_prompt(
texts: Sequence[str],
structured_messages: Sequence[AllMessageValues] | None,
) -> TrendAIRequestPrompt | None:
"""Locate the last user turn by message order, never by matching its text.
A different flat-text layout can still be scanned, but cannot be safely rewritten.
"""
messages: Final = tuple(structured_messages or ())
user_index: Final = next(
(index for index in reversed(range(len(messages))) if messages[index]["role"] == "user"), None
)
if messages and user_index is None:
return None
parts: Final = message_slot_texts(messages[user_index]) if user_index is not None else tuple(texts)
prompt: Final = "".join(parts).strip()
if not prompt:
return None
start: Final = sum(map(message_text_slot_count, messages[:user_index])) if user_index is not None else 0
normalized_texts: Final = (
tuple(chain.from_iterable(map(message_slot_texts, messages))) if messages else tuple(texts)
)
text_range: Final = (start, start + len(parts)) if normalized_texts == tuple(texts) else None
return TrendAIRequestPrompt(prompt=prompt, text_range=text_range)
def redact_request_texts(texts: Sequence[str], prompt: TrendAIRequestPrompt, redacted: str) -> tuple[str, ...] | None:
"""Write a redacted prompt back over the ``texts`` entries the prompt was assembled from.
A single-part prompt is replaced outright. A multi-part prompt whose redaction kept its length
is split back into the original parts; otherwise the first part carries the whole redaction and
the rest are blanked, so no original part can leak.
"""
if prompt.text_range is None:
return None
start, end = prompt.text_range
parts: Final = tuple(texts[start:end])
if len(parts) == 1:
return (*texts[:start], redacted, *texts[end:])
joined: Final = "".join(parts)
leading: Final = len(joined) - len(joined.lstrip())
aligned: Final = f"{joined[:leading]}{redacted}{joined[len(joined.rstrip()) :]}"
if len(aligned) != len(joined):
return (*texts[:start], redacted, *("" for _ in parts[1:]), *texts[end:])
offsets: Final = tuple(sum(len(part) for part in parts[:index]) for index in range(len(parts) + 1))
split: Final = tuple(aligned[offsets[index] : offsets[index + 1]] for index in range(len(parts)))
return (*texts[:start], *split, *texts[end:])

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# Derived from tm-v1-ai-guard-litellm-plugin revision 6cafc143f62962a98d4eb5abe9f608c61ff194d4.
# This file has been modified for integration into LiteLLM.
import asyncio
import os
import time
from collections.abc import AsyncIterator, Mapping, Sequence
from itertools import chain
from types import MappingProxyType
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, ClassVar, Final, Literal, NoReturn, Protocol
from urllib.parse import SplitResult, urlsplit, urlunsplit
import httpx
from pydantic import ValidationError
from typing_extensions import assert_never
from litellm._logging import verbose_proxy_logger
from litellm._version import version as litellm_version
from litellm.exceptions import GuardrailRaisedException, Timeout
from litellm.integrations.custom_guardrail import (
CustomGuardrail,
log_guardrail_information, # pyright: ignore[reportUnknownVariableType] # legacy decorator has an untyped signature
)
from litellm.llms.custom_httpx.http_handler import (
get_async_httpx_client, # pyright: ignore[reportUnknownVariableType] # legacy client factory has an untyped params map
httpxSpecialProvider,
)
from litellm.types.guardrails import GuardrailEventHooks, Mode
from litellm.types.utils import GenericGuardrailAPIInputs, GuardrailStatus
from ._models import (
TrendAIAllow,
TrendAIBlock,
TrendAIChatCompletionPayload,
TrendAIProviderFailure,
TrendAIRedactedPrompt,
TrendAIRedactedResponse,
TrendAIResponse,
TrendAIScanResult,
TrendAIWindowScan,
)
from ._text import apply_window_redaction, locate_request_prompt, redact_request_texts, utf8_windows
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from litellm.litellm_core_utils.litellm_logging import Logging as LiteLLMLoggingObj
GUARDRAIL_NAME: Final = "trendai"
OPENAI_CHAT_COMPLETION_RESPONSE_V1: Final = "OpenAIChatCompletionResponseV1"
RESPONSE_CONTENT_CHUNK_SIZE_BYTES: Final = 49_500
TMV1_CLIENT_NAME: Final = "litellm"
PLUGIN_VERSION: Final = "v0.1.3"
PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE_STATUS: Final = 503
_APPLY_GUARDRAILS_PATH: Final = "/applyGuardrails"
_TREND_AI_SECURITY_PATH: Final = "/v3.0/aiSecurity"
_RESPONSE_MODEL: Final = "guardrailed-response"
_REDACTION_FAILED_MESSAGE: Final = "Trend AI Guard could not apply the requested redaction"
_NO_ENTITIES: Final[Mapping[str, int]] = MappingProxyType({})
class _AsyncHTTPClient(Protocol):
async def post(
self,
url: str,
*,
json: dict[str, object] | None = None, # mutable-ok: injected HTTP handler requires dict payloads
headers: dict[str, str] | None = None, # mutable-ok: injected HTTP handler requires dict headers
timeout: float | httpx.Timeout | None = None,
) -> httpx.Response: ...
class TrendAIGuardrail(CustomGuardrail):
records_own_guardrail_information: ClassVar[bool] = True
def __init__(
self,
api_key: str | None = None,
api_base: str | None = None,
app_name: str | None = None,
fallback_on_error: Literal["block", "allow"] = "block",
timeout: float = 5.0,
stream_overlap_size: int = 256,
response_content_chunk_size_bytes: int = RESPONSE_CONTENT_CHUNK_SIZE_BYTES,
async_handler: _AsyncHTTPClient | None = None,
guardrail_name: str | None = None,
event_hook: ( # mutable-ok: CustomGuardrail accepts lists of hooks
GuardrailEventHooks | list[GuardrailEventHooks] | Mode | None
) = None,
default_on: bool = False,
) -> None:
resolved_api_key: Final = api_key or os.environ.get("TMV1_API_KEY")
if not resolved_api_key:
raise ValueError(
"Trend AI Guard requires an API key. Pass api_key or set the TMV1_API_KEY environment variable."
)
resolved_api_base: Final = api_base or os.environ.get("TRENDAI_AI_GUARD_BASE_URL")
if not resolved_api_base:
raise ValueError(
"Trend AI Guard requires an API base URL. Pass api_base or set the "
"TRENDAI_AI_GUARD_BASE_URL environment variable."
)
if fallback_on_error not in ("block", "allow"):
raise ValueError("fallback_on_error must be 'block' or 'allow'")
if timeout <= 0:
raise ValueError("timeout must be greater than zero")
if stream_overlap_size < 0:
raise ValueError("stream_overlap_size must be non-negative")
if response_content_chunk_size_bytes < 1:
raise ValueError("response_content_chunk_size_bytes must be greater than zero")
self.api_key: str = resolved_api_key
self.api_url: str = _build_apply_guardrails_url(resolved_api_base)
self.app_name: str = app_name or os.environ.get("TMV1_APPLICATION_NAME", "litellm")
self.fallback_on_error: Literal["block", "allow"] = fallback_on_error
self.timeout = timeout
self.stream_overlap_size: int = stream_overlap_size
self.response_content_chunk_size_bytes: int = response_content_chunk_size_bytes
self.async_handler: _AsyncHTTPClient = async_handler or get_async_httpx_client(
llm_provider=httpxSpecialProvider.GuardrailCallback
)
super().__init__( # pyright: ignore[reportUnknownMemberType] # base constructor retains untyped extension kwargs
guardrail_name=guardrail_name,
event_hook=event_hook,
default_on=default_on,
supported_event_hooks=self.get_supported_event_hooks(),
)
@classmethod
def get_supported_event_hooks(cls) -> list[GuardrailEventHooks]: # mutable-ok: CustomGuardrail contract
return [
GuardrailEventHooks.pre_call,
GuardrailEventHooks.during_call,
GuardrailEventHooks.post_call,
GuardrailEventHooks.logging_only,
]
def supports_scan_only_tool_results(self) -> bool:
return False
@log_guardrail_information
async def apply_guardrail(
self,
inputs: GenericGuardrailAPIInputs,
request_data: dict[str, object], # mutable-ok: CustomGuardrail hook contract is a plain dict
input_type: Literal["request", "response"],
logging_obj: "LiteLLMLoggingObj | None" = None,
) -> GenericGuardrailAPIInputs:
texts: Final = tuple(inputs.get("texts") or ())
match input_type:
case "request":
return await self._apply_request_guardrail(inputs, texts, request_data)
case "response":
return await self._apply_response_guardrail(inputs, texts, request_data)
case _:
assert_never(input_type)
async def _apply_request_guardrail(
self,
inputs: GenericGuardrailAPIInputs,
texts: tuple[str, ...],
request_data: dict[str, object], # mutable-ok: CustomGuardrail hook contract is a plain dict
) -> GenericGuardrailAPIInputs:
prompt: Final = locate_request_prompt(texts, inputs.get("structured_messages"))
if prompt is None:
verbose_proxy_logger.debug("Trend AI Guard: no user prompt to scan in request inputs")
return inputs
started_at: Final = time.time()
result: Final = await self._scan_payload(MappingProxyType({"prompt": prompt.prompt}))
self._record_scan(result, request_data, started_at, event_type=None)
redacted: Final = self._enforce(result)
if redacted is None:
return inputs
redacted_texts: Final = redact_request_texts(texts, prompt, redacted)
if redacted_texts is None:
self._raise_redaction_failure(request_data, started_at, event_type=None)
redacted_inputs: Final[GenericGuardrailAPIInputs] = {
**inputs,
"texts": list(redacted_texts),
}
return redacted_inputs
async def _apply_response_guardrail(
self,
inputs: GenericGuardrailAPIInputs,
texts: tuple[str, ...],
request_data: dict[str, object], # mutable-ok: CustomGuardrail hook contract is a plain dict
) -> GenericGuardrailAPIInputs:
if not texts:
verbose_proxy_logger.debug("Trend AI Guard: no response text to scan")
return inputs
model: Final = inputs.get("model") or _RESPONSE_MODEL
started_at: Final = time.time()
scans: Final = tuple([await self._scan_response_windows(text, model) for text in texts])
all_scans: Final = tuple(chain.from_iterable(scans))
verdict: Final = _window_verdict(all_scans)
self._record_scan(
verdict,
request_data,
started_at,
event_type=None,
redacted=any(_is_redacting(scan.result) for scan in all_scans),
)
self._enforce(verdict)
redacted_texts: Final = tuple(
_merge_window_redactions(text, text_scans) for text, text_scans in zip(texts, scans, strict=True)
)
merged_texts: Final = tuple(text for text in redacted_texts if text is not None)
if len(merged_texts) != len(texts):
self._raise_redaction_failure(request_data, started_at, event_type=None)
redacted_inputs: Final[GenericGuardrailAPIInputs] = {
**inputs,
"texts": list(merged_texts),
}
return redacted_inputs
async def _scan_response_windows(self, content: str, model: str) -> tuple[TrendAIWindowScan, ...]:
return tuple([scan async for scan in self._iter_response_window_scans(content, model)])
async def _iter_response_window_scans(self, content: str, model: str) -> AsyncIterator[TrendAIWindowScan]:
"""Scan ``content`` window by window, stopping at the first block or provider failure."""
for window in utf8_windows(
content,
chunk_size_bytes=self.response_content_chunk_size_bytes,
overlap_chars=self.stream_overlap_size,
):
result = await self._scan_payload(
_chat_completion_payload(window.text, model),
request_type=OPENAI_CHAT_COMPLETION_RESPONSE_V1,
)
yield TrendAIWindowScan(window=window, result=result)
if not isinstance(result, TrendAIAllow):
return
def _raise_redaction_failure(
self,
request_data: dict[str, object], # mutable-ok: CustomGuardrail hook contract is a plain dict
started_at: float,
*,
event_type: GuardrailEventHooks | None,
) -> NoReturn:
self._record_failure(_REDACTION_FAILED_MESSAGE, request_data, started_at, event_type=event_type)
raise GuardrailRaisedException(
guardrail_name=self.guardrail_name,
message=_REDACTION_FAILED_MESSAGE,
should_wrap_with_default_message=False,
status_code=PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE_STATUS,
)
def _enforce(self, result: TrendAIScanResult) -> str | None:
"""Raise for a block or a fail-closed provider failure; otherwise return any redacted content."""
match result:
case TrendAIAllow(redacted_content=redacted_content):
return redacted_content
case TrendAIBlock(reason=reason, status_code=status_code):
raise GuardrailRaisedException(
guardrail_name=self.guardrail_name,
message=f"Blocked by Trend AI Guard. Security violation: {reason}",
should_wrap_with_default_message=False,
status_code=status_code,
blocked_content=True,
)
case TrendAIProviderFailure(reason=reason, status_code=status_code):
if self.fallback_on_error == "allow":
verbose_proxy_logger.warning(
"Trend AI Guard: %s (status=%s); allowing traffic (fallback_on_error=allow)",
reason,
status_code,
)
return None
verbose_proxy_logger.error(
"Trend AI Guard: %s (status=%s); blocking traffic (fallback_on_error=block)", reason, status_code
)
raise GuardrailRaisedException(
guardrail_name=self.guardrail_name,
message=f"Security Guard Error: {reason}",
should_wrap_with_default_message=False,
status_code=PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE_STATUS,
)
case _:
assert_never(result)
def _record_scan(
self,
result: TrendAIScanResult,
request_data: dict[str, object], # mutable-ok: CustomGuardrail hook contract is a plain dict
started_at: float,
*,
event_type: GuardrailEventHooks | None,
redacted: bool | None = None,
) -> None:
match result:
case TrendAIAllow(redacted_content=redacted_content, masked_entity_count=masked_entity_count):
self._record(
_allow_record(redacted_content is not None if redacted is None else redacted),
"success",
request_data,
started_at,
event_type=event_type,
masked_entity_count=_merge_entity_counts(_NO_ENTITIES, masked_entity_count),
)
case TrendAIBlock(reason=reason):
self._record(
MappingProxyType({"action": "block", "reason": reason}),
"guardrail_intervened",
request_data,
started_at,
event_type=event_type,
)
case TrendAIProviderFailure(reason=reason, status_code=status_code):
self._record(
MappingProxyType(
{"description": reason, "status_code": status_code, "fallback_on_error": self.fallback_on_error}
),
"guardrail_failed_to_respond",
request_data,
started_at,
event_type=event_type,
)
case _:
assert_never(result)
def _record_failure(
self,
description: str,
request_data: dict[str, object], # mutable-ok: CustomGuardrail hook contract is a plain dict
started_at: float,
*,
event_type: GuardrailEventHooks | None,
) -> None:
self._record(
MappingProxyType({"description": description}),
"guardrail_failed_to_respond",
request_data,
started_at,
event_type=event_type,
)
def _record(
self,
guardrail_json_response: Mapping[str, object],
guardrail_status: GuardrailStatus,
request_data: dict[str, object], # mutable-ok: CustomGuardrail hook contract is a plain dict
started_at: float,
*,
event_type: GuardrailEventHooks | None,
masked_entity_count: Mapping[str, int] = _NO_ENTITIES,
) -> None:
ended_at: Final = time.time()
self.add_standard_logging_guardrail_information_to_request_data( # pyright: ignore[reportUnknownMemberType] # base signature takes an untyped dict
guardrail_json_response=dict(guardrail_json_response),
request_data=request_data,
guardrail_status=guardrail_status,
start_time=started_at,
end_time=ended_at,
duration=ended_at - started_at,
event_type=event_type,
masked_entity_count=dict(masked_entity_count) or None,
)
def _build_request_headers(self, request_type: str | None = None) -> Mapping[str, str]:
headers: Final = (
("TMV1-Application-Name", self.app_name),
("Authorization", f"Bearer {self.api_key}"),
("Content-Type", "application/json"),
("TMV1-Client-Name", TMV1_CLIENT_NAME),
("TMV1-Client-Version", litellm_version),
("TMV1-Plugin-Version", PLUGIN_VERSION),
("prefer", "redact-pii,return=representation"),
*_optional_header("TMV1-Request-Type", request_type),
)
return MappingProxyType(dict(headers))
async def _scan_payload(
self,
payload: Mapping[str, object],
request_type: str | None = None,
) -> TrendAIScanResult:
try:
response: Final = await self.async_handler.post(
self.api_url,
json=dict(payload),
headers=dict(self._build_request_headers(request_type)),
timeout=self.timeout,
)
response.raise_for_status()
parsed: Final = TrendAIResponse.model_validate_json(response.content)
except httpx.HTTPStatusError as error:
return TrendAIProviderFailure(
reason="Trend AI Guard returned an HTTP error",
status_code=error.response.status_code,
)
except (httpx.RequestError, Timeout, asyncio.TimeoutError) as error:
return TrendAIProviderFailure(reason=f"Trend AI Guard request failed: {type(error).__name__}")
except ValidationError:
return TrendAIProviderFailure(reason="Trend AI Guard returned an invalid response")
normalized_action: Final = parsed.action.strip().lower()
if normalized_action == "block":
reason: Final = ", ".join(parsed.reasons) or parsed.reason or "Content policy violation"
return TrendAIBlock(reason=reason)
if normalized_action != "allow":
return TrendAIProviderFailure(reason=f"Trend AI Guard returned an unsupported action: {parsed.action!r}")
redacted_content: Final = _extract_redacted_content(request_type, parsed)
if parsed.redacted_request is not None and redacted_content is None:
return TrendAIProviderFailure(reason="Trend AI Guard returned an invalid redacted payload")
entity_counts: Final = (
tuple(
sorted(
(
rule_id,
sum(1 for candidate in parsed.sensitive_information.rules if candidate.id.strip() == rule_id),
)
for rule_id in frozenset(
rule.id.strip() for rule in parsed.sensitive_information.rules if rule.id.strip()
)
)
)
if parsed.sensitive_information is not None and redacted_content is not None
else ()
)
return TrendAIAllow(redacted_content=redacted_content, masked_entity_count=entity_counts)
def _chat_completion_payload(content: str, model: str) -> Mapping[str, object]:
return MappingProxyType(TrendAIChatCompletionPayload.for_content(content, model).model_dump())
def _optional_header(name: str, value: str | None) -> tuple[tuple[str, str], ...]:
return () if value is None else ((name, value),)
def _allow_record(redacted: bool) -> Mapping[str, object]:
return MappingProxyType({"action": "allow", "redacted": redacted})
def _is_redacting(result: TrendAIScanResult) -> bool:
return isinstance(result, TrendAIAllow) and result.redacted_content is not None
def _window_verdict(scans: Sequence[TrendAIWindowScan]) -> TrendAIScanResult:
"""Collapse window scans into one verdict: the first non-allow result, else an allow carrying every entity count."""
terminal: Final = next((scan.result for scan in scans if not isinstance(scan.result, TrendAIAllow)), None)
if terminal is not None:
return terminal
allowed_counts: Final = (scan.result.masked_entity_count for scan in scans if isinstance(scan.result, TrendAIAllow))
counts: Final = tuple(chain.from_iterable(allowed_counts))
return TrendAIAllow(masked_entity_count=tuple(sorted(_merge_entity_counts(_NO_ENTITIES, counts).items())))
def _merge_entity_counts(counts: Mapping[str, int], additions: Sequence[tuple[str, int]]) -> Mapping[str, int]:
"""Per-entity maxima: overlapping scans may report the same entity more than once."""
entities: Final = frozenset(counts) | frozenset(entity for entity, _ in additions)
return MappingProxyType(
{
entity: max((counts.get(entity, 0), *(count for candidate, count in additions if candidate == entity)))
for entity in entities
}
)
def _merge_window_redactions(content: str, scans: Sequence[TrendAIWindowScan]) -> str | None:
"""Fold every window's redaction into ``content``; None if any window cannot be merged positionally."""
merged = content # rebind-ok: folded across the windows
for scan in scans:
if not isinstance(scan.result, TrendAIAllow) or scan.result.redacted_content is None:
continue
merged = apply_window_redaction(merged, scan.window, scan.result.redacted_content)
if merged is None:
return None
return merged
def _build_apply_guardrails_url(api_base: str) -> str:
parsed: Final = urlsplit(api_base.strip())
normalized_path: Final = parsed.path.rstrip("/")
path_with_product: Final = (
f"{normalized_path}{_TREND_AI_SECURITY_PATH}"
if parsed.hostname is not None
and parsed.hostname.lower().endswith(".trendmicro.com")
and "/aiSecurity" not in normalized_path
else normalized_path
)
final_path: Final = (
path_with_product
if path_with_product.endswith(_APPLY_GUARDRAILS_PATH)
else f"{path_with_product}{_APPLY_GUARDRAILS_PATH}"
)
return urlunsplit(SplitResult(parsed.scheme, parsed.netloc, final_path, parsed.query, parsed.fragment))
def _extract_redacted_content(request_type: str | None, response: TrendAIResponse) -> str | None:
payload: Final = response.redacted_request
if payload is None:
return None
try:
if request_type == OPENAI_CHAT_COMPLETION_RESPONSE_V1:
parsed_response: Final = TrendAIRedactedResponse.model_validate(payload)
content: Final = " ".join(
choice.message.content
for choice in parsed_response.choices
if choice.message is not None and choice.message.content
)
return content or None
return TrendAIRedactedPrompt.model_validate(payload).prompt or None
except ValidationError:
return None

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@ -0,0 +1,707 @@
import json
from collections.abc import Callable, Mapping, Sequence
from copy import deepcopy
from functools import reduce
from typing import Final, Literal
import httpx
import pytest
import litellm
from litellm.exceptions import GuardrailRaisedException
from litellm.llms.bedrock.passthrough.guardrail_translation.handler import BedrockPassthroughGuardrailHandler
from litellm.llms.openai.chat.guardrail_translation.handler import OpenAIChatCompletionsHandler
from litellm.proxy.guardrails.guardrail_hooks.trendai import TrendAIGuardrail, initialize_guardrail
from litellm.proxy.guardrails.guardrail_hooks.trendai._models import (
TrendAIAllow,
TrendAIBlock,
TrendAIProviderFailure,
TrendAIScanResult,
)
from litellm.proxy.guardrails.guardrail_hooks.trendai._text import utf8_windows
from litellm.proxy.guardrails.guardrail_hooks.trendai.trendai import (
OPENAI_CHAT_COMPLETION_RESPONSE_V1,
PLUGIN_VERSION,
)
from litellm.proxy.guardrails.guardrail_registry import InMemoryGuardrailHandler
from litellm.types.guardrails import GuardrailEventHooks, LitellmParams
from litellm.types.utils import (
CallTypes,
Choices,
GenericGuardrailAPIInputs,
Message,
ModelResponse,
)
def _guardrail(
*,
app_name: str | None = None,
fallback_on_error: Literal["block", "allow"] = "block",
timeout: float = 5.0,
stream_overlap_size: int = 256,
response_content_chunk_size_bytes: int = 49_500,
async_handler: httpx.AsyncClient | None = None,
api_base: str = "https://guard.example.com/v3.0/aiSecurity",
event_hook: GuardrailEventHooks = GuardrailEventHooks.pre_call,
) -> TrendAIGuardrail:
return TrendAIGuardrail(
api_key="test-key",
api_base=api_base,
app_name=app_name,
fallback_on_error=fallback_on_error,
timeout=timeout,
stream_overlap_size=stream_overlap_size,
response_content_chunk_size_bytes=response_content_chunk_size_bytes,
async_handler=async_handler,
guardrail_name="trendai",
event_hook=event_hook,
)
async def _scan(
guardrail: TrendAIGuardrail,
payload: Mapping[str, object],
request_type: str | None = None,
) -> TrendAIScanResult:
return await guardrail._scan_payload( # pyright: ignore[reportPrivateUsage] # verifies the section 2 transport seam
payload,
request_type=request_type,
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
("api_base", "expected"),
[
(
"https://api.xdr.trendmicro.com",
"https://api.xdr.trendmicro.com/v3.0/aiSecurity/applyGuardrails",
),
(
"https://api.xdr.trendmicro.com/v3.0/aiSecurity/",
"https://api.xdr.trendmicro.com/v3.0/aiSecurity/applyGuardrails",
),
(
"https://self-hosted.example.com/guard/",
"https://self-hosted.example.com/guard/applyGuardrails",
),
(
"https://self-hosted.example.com/guard/applyGuardrails",
"https://self-hosted.example.com/guard/applyGuardrails",
),
],
)
def test_build_apply_guardrails_url(api_base: str, expected: str) -> None:
assert _guardrail(api_base=api_base).api_url == expected
def test_environment_fallbacks(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
monkeypatch.setenv("TMV1_API_KEY", "env-key")
monkeypatch.setenv("TRENDAI_AI_GUARD_BASE_URL", "https://guard.example.com")
monkeypatch.setenv("TMV1_APPLICATION_NAME", "env-app")
guardrail = TrendAIGuardrail(
guardrail_name="trendai",
event_hook=GuardrailEventHooks.pre_call,
)
assert guardrail.api_key == "env-key"
assert guardrail.api_url == "https://guard.example.com/applyGuardrails"
assert guardrail.app_name == "env-app"
def test_explicit_configuration_takes_precedence(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
monkeypatch.setenv("TMV1_API_KEY", "env-key")
monkeypatch.setenv("TRENDAI_AI_GUARD_BASE_URL", "https://env.example.com")
monkeypatch.setenv("TMV1_APPLICATION_NAME", "env-app")
guardrail = _guardrail(app_name="configured-app")
assert guardrail.api_key == "test-key"
assert guardrail.api_url == "https://guard.example.com/v3.0/aiSecurity/applyGuardrails"
assert guardrail.app_name == "configured-app"
def test_negative_stream_overlap_is_rejected() -> None:
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="stream_overlap_size"):
_guardrail(stream_overlap_size=-1)
def test_invalid_timeout_is_rejected() -> None:
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="timeout"):
_guardrail(timeout=0)
def test_pii_masking_is_not_configurable_on_the_guardrail() -> None:
with pytest.raises(TypeError, match="mask_pii"):
TrendAIGuardrail(
api_key="test-key",
api_base="https://guard.example.com/v3.0/aiSecurity",
mask_pii=False,
)
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_scan_uses_injected_client_and_required_headers() -> None:
captured_request: httpx.Request | None = None
async def respond(request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
nonlocal captured_request
captured_request = request
return httpx.Response(200, json={"action": "allow"})
async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=httpx.MockTransport(respond)) as client:
result = await _scan(
_guardrail(async_handler=client, app_name="test-app"),
{"prompt": "hello"},
request_type=OPENAI_CHAT_COMPLETION_RESPONSE_V1,
)
assert isinstance(result, TrendAIAllow)
assert captured_request is not None
assert str(captured_request.url) == "https://guard.example.com/v3.0/aiSecurity/applyGuardrails"
assert captured_request.headers["TMV1-Application-Name"] == "test-app"
assert captured_request.headers["Authorization"] == "Bearer test-key"
assert captured_request.headers["Content-Type"] == "application/json"
assert captured_request.headers["TMV1-Client-Name"] == "litellm"
assert captured_request.headers["TMV1-Plugin-Version"] == PLUGIN_VERSION
assert captured_request.headers["TMV1-Request-Type"] == OPENAI_CHAT_COMPLETION_RESPONSE_V1
assert captured_request.headers["prefer"] == "redact-pii,return=representation"
assert json.loads(captured_request.content) == {"prompt": "hello"}
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_scan_parses_response_redaction_and_entities() -> None:
async def respond(request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
return httpx.Response(
200,
json={
"action": "allow",
"redactedRequest": {"choices": [{"message": {"content": "email: *****"}}]},
"sensitiveInformation": {"rules": [{"id": "EMAIL"}, {"id": "EMAIL"}]},
},
)
async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=httpx.MockTransport(respond)) as client:
result = await _scan(
_guardrail(async_handler=client),
{"choices": []},
request_type=OPENAI_CHAT_COMPLETION_RESPONSE_V1,
)
assert result == TrendAIAllow(redacted_content="email: *****", masked_entity_count=(("EMAIL", 2),))
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_scan_models_block_and_provider_failure_separately() -> None:
responses = iter(
(
httpx.Response(200, json={"action": "block", "reasons": ["malware", "credential theft"]}),
httpx.Response(200, json={"unexpected": True}),
httpx.Response(503, text="unavailable"),
)
)
async def respond(request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
return next(responses)
async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=httpx.MockTransport(respond)) as client:
guardrail = _guardrail(async_handler=client)
blocked = await _scan(guardrail, {"prompt": "blocked"})
malformed = await _scan(guardrail, {"prompt": "malformed"})
unavailable = await _scan(guardrail, {"prompt": "unavailable"})
assert blocked == TrendAIBlock(reason="malware, credential theft")
assert isinstance(malformed, TrendAIProviderFailure)
assert isinstance(unavailable, TrendAIProviderFailure)
assert unavailable.status_code == 503
def test_guardrail_is_discovered_by_global_registries() -> None:
from litellm.proxy.guardrails.guardrail_registry import (
guardrail_class_registry,
guardrail_initializer_registry,
)
assert guardrail_class_registry["trendai"] is TrendAIGuardrail
assert "trendai" in guardrail_initializer_registry
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
("timeout_config", "expected_timeout"),
[({}, 5.0), ({"timeout": None}, 5.0), ({"timeout": 2.5}, 2.5)],
ids=["omitted", "null", "configured"],
)
def test_initializer_defaults_null_timeout_and_preserves_configured_timeout(
timeout_config: Mapping[str, float | None], expected_timeout: float
) -> None:
params: Final = LitellmParams.model_validate(
{
"guardrail": "trendai",
"mode": "pre_call",
"api_key": "test-key",
"api_base": "https://guard.example.com",
**timeout_config,
}
)
callback: Final = initialize_guardrail(params, {"guardrail_name": "trendai-timeout"})
try:
assert callback.timeout == expected_timeout
finally:
litellm.logging_callback_manager.remove_callback_from_all_lists(callback)
def test_registry_rejects_tool_result_only_scanning() -> None:
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="never scans tool results"):
InMemoryGuardrailHandler().initialize_guardrail(
{
"guardrail_name": "trendai-tool-results",
"litellm_params": {
"guardrail": "trendai",
"mode": "pre_call",
"api_key": "test-key",
"api_base": "https://guard.example.com",
"timeout": 5.0,
"scan_only_tool_results": True,
},
}
)
Responder = Callable[[httpx.Request], httpx.Response]
def _engine(
*,
block_on: str | None = None,
redact: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
entity: str = "PII",
fail_on: str | None = None,
) -> tuple[Responder, list[str]]:
scanned: list[str] = []
def respond(request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
body = json.loads(request.content)
text = body["prompt"] if "prompt" in body else body["choices"][0]["message"]["content"]
scanned.append(text)
if fail_on is not None and fail_on in text:
return httpx.Response(503, text="down")
if block_on is not None and block_on in text:
return httpx.Response(200, json={"action": "block", "reasons": ["policy"]})
hits = {needle: mask for needle, mask in (redact or {}).items() if needle in text}
if not hits:
return httpx.Response(200, json={"action": "allow"})
redacted = reduce(lambda value, pair: value.replace(*pair), hits.items(), text)
payload = {"prompt": redacted} if "prompt" in body else {"choices": [{"message": {"content": redacted}}]}
return httpx.Response(
200,
json={
"action": "allow",
"redactedRequest": payload,
"sensitiveInformation": {"rules": [{"id": entity}]},
},
)
return respond, scanned
def _guardrail_records(request_data: Mapping[str, object]) -> list[dict[str, object]]:
metadata = request_data["metadata"]
assert isinstance(metadata, dict)
return list(metadata.get("standard_logging_guardrail_information") or [])
async def _apply(
guardrail: TrendAIGuardrail,
inputs: GenericGuardrailAPIInputs,
input_type: Literal["request", "response"],
) -> tuple[GenericGuardrailAPIInputs, dict[str, object]]:
request_data: dict[str, object] = {"metadata": {}}
result = await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs=inputs, request_data=request_data, input_type=input_type)
return result, request_data
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_request_scans_only_the_last_user_turn_and_writes_redaction_back() -> None:
respond, scanned = _engine(redact={"a@b.com": "[EMAIL]"}, entity="EMAIL")
async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=httpx.MockTransport(respond)) as client:
result, request_data = await _apply(
_guardrail(async_handler=client),
{
"texts": ["system prompt", "first turn a@b.com", "reply", "mail a@b.com now"],
"structured_messages": [
{"role": "system", "content": "system prompt"},
{"role": "user", "content": "first turn a@b.com"},
{"role": "assistant", "content": "reply"},
{"role": "user", "content": "mail a@b.com now"},
],
},
"request",
)
assert scanned == ["mail a@b.com now"]
assert result["texts"] == ["system prompt", "first turn a@b.com", "reply", "mail [EMAIL] now"]
(record,) = _guardrail_records(request_data)
assert record["guardrail_status"] == "success"
assert record["masked_entity_count"] == {"EMAIL": 1}
assert record["guardrail_response"] == {"action": "allow", "redacted": True}
@pytest.mark.asyncio
@pytest.mark.parametrize("repeated_role", ["assistant", "tool"])
@pytest.mark.parametrize("multipart", [False, True], ids=["string", "multipart"])
async def test_request_redaction_targets_the_last_user_even_when_later_messages_repeat_it(
repeated_role: Literal["assistant", "tool"], multipart: bool
) -> None:
respond, scanned = _engine(redact={"a@b.com": "[EMAIL]"})
user_content: Final = (
[
{"type": "text", "text": "mail "},
{"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": ""}},
{"type": "text", "text": "a@b.com"},
]
if multipart
else "mail a@b.com"
)
repeated_message: Final = {
"role": repeated_role,
"content": (
[{"type": "text", "text": "mail "}, {"type": "text", "text": "a@b.com"}] if multipart else "mail a@b.com"
),
**({"tool_call_id": "call-1"} if repeated_role == "tool" else {}),
}
expected_repeated_message: Final = deepcopy(repeated_message)
expected_content: Final = (
[
{"type": "text", "text": "mail "},
{"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": ""}},
{"type": "text", "text": "[EMAIL]"},
]
if multipart
else "mail [EMAIL]"
)
async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=httpx.MockTransport(respond)) as client:
out: Final = await OpenAIChatCompletionsHandler().process_input_messages(
data={
"messages": [
{"role": "user", "content": "mail a@b.com"},
{"role": "assistant", "content": "previous reply"},
{"role": "user", "content": user_content},
repeated_message,
],
"metadata": {},
},
guardrail_to_apply=_guardrail(async_handler=client),
)
assert scanned == ["mail a@b.com"]
assert out["messages"] == [
{"role": "user", "content": "mail a@b.com"},
{"role": "assistant", "content": "previous reply"},
{"role": "user", "content": expected_content},
expected_repeated_message,
]
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_converse_redaction_with_unaligned_text_slots_fails_closed() -> None:
respond, scanned = _engine(redact={"a@b.com": "[EMAIL]"})
body: Final = {
"messages": [
{"role": "user", "content": [{"text": "lookup"}]},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": [{"toolUse": {"toolUseId": "call-1", "name": "lookup", "input": {}}}],
},
{
"role": "user",
"content": [
{"text": "mail a@b.com"},
{"toolResult": {"toolUseId": "call-1", "content": [{"text": "found"}]}},
],
},
],
"additionalModelRequestFields": {"system": "extra"},
}
original_body: Final = deepcopy(body)
request_data: Final[dict[str, object]] = {
"endpoint": "/model/test-model/converse",
"data": body,
"metadata": {},
}
async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=httpx.MockTransport(respond)) as client:
with pytest.raises(GuardrailRaisedException, match="could not apply the requested redaction"):
await BedrockPassthroughGuardrailHandler().process_input_messages(
request_data, _guardrail(async_handler=client, fallback_on_error="allow")
)
assert scanned == ["mail a@b.comextra"]
assert request_data["data"] == original_body
assert _guardrail_records(request_data)[-1]["guardrail_status"] == "guardrail_failed_to_respond"
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_request_redaction_is_split_back_across_multipart_user_content() -> None:
respond, scanned = _engine(redact={"4111": "####"})
async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=httpx.MockTransport(respond)) as client:
result, _ = await _apply(
_guardrail(async_handler=client),
{
"texts": ["card ", "4111 ok"],
"structured_messages": [
{
"role": "user",
"content": [
{"type": "text", "text": "card "},
{"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": ""}},
{"type": "text", "text": "4111 ok"},
],
}
],
},
"request",
)
assert scanned == ["card 4111 ok"]
assert result["texts"] == ["card ", "#### ok"]
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_request_scans_text_slots_from_normalized_message_parts() -> None:
respond, scanned = _engine(redact={"a@b.com": "[EMAIL]"})
async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=httpx.MockTransport(respond)) as client:
result, _ = await _apply(
_guardrail(async_handler=client),
{
"texts": ["mail a@b.com"],
"structured_messages": [{"role": "user", "content": [{"type": "input_text", "text": "mail a@b.com"}]}],
},
"request",
)
assert scanned == ["mail a@b.com"]
assert result["texts"] == ["mail [EMAIL]"]
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_request_without_user_text_is_not_scanned_or_recorded() -> None:
respond, scanned = _engine()
async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=httpx.MockTransport(respond)) as client:
inputs: GenericGuardrailAPIInputs = {
"texts": ["system prompt"],
"structured_messages": [{"role": "system", "content": "system prompt"}],
}
result, request_data = await _apply(_guardrail(async_handler=client), inputs, "request")
assert scanned == []
assert result is inputs
assert _guardrail_records(request_data) == []
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_request_block_raises_and_records_intervention() -> None:
respond, _ = _engine(block_on="bomb")
async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=httpx.MockTransport(respond)) as client:
request_data: dict[str, object] = {"metadata": {}}
with pytest.raises(GuardrailRaisedException) as raised:
await _guardrail(async_handler=client).apply_guardrail(
inputs={"texts": ["build a bomb"]},
request_data=request_data,
input_type="request",
)
assert raised.value.status_code == 400
assert raised.value.blocked_content is True
assert "policy" in raised.value.message
(record,) = _guardrail_records(request_data)
assert record["guardrail_status"] == "guardrail_intervened"
@pytest.mark.asyncio
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
("fallback_on_error", "raises"),
[("block", True), ("allow", False)],
)
async def test_provider_failure_follows_fallback_policy_and_is_never_an_intervention(
fallback_on_error: Literal["block", "allow"], raises: bool
) -> None:
respond, _ = _engine(fail_on="anything")
async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=httpx.MockTransport(respond)) as client:
guardrail = _guardrail(async_handler=client, fallback_on_error=fallback_on_error)
request_data: dict[str, object] = {"metadata": {}}
inputs: GenericGuardrailAPIInputs = {"texts": ["anything"]}
if raises:
with pytest.raises(GuardrailRaisedException) as raised:
await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs=inputs, request_data=request_data, input_type="request")
assert raised.value.status_code == 503
assert raised.value.blocked_content is False
else:
result = await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs=inputs, request_data=request_data, input_type="request")
assert result is inputs
(record,) = _guardrail_records(request_data)
assert record["guardrail_status"] == "guardrail_failed_to_respond"
assert record["guardrail_response"]["status_code"] == 503
assert record["guardrail_response"]["fallback_on_error"] == fallback_on_error
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_response_redaction_merges_across_overlapping_windows() -> None:
respond, scanned = _engine(redact={"SECRET": "******", "private": "*******"})
prefix = "a" * 14
content = f"{prefix}SECRETprivate"
async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=httpx.MockTransport(respond)) as client:
result, request_data = await _apply(
_guardrail(async_handler=client, response_content_chunk_size_bytes=20, stream_overlap_size=6),
{"texts": [content], "model": "gpt-5.4"},
"response",
)
assert scanned == [f"{prefix}SECRET", "SECRETprivate"]
assert result["texts"] == [f"{prefix}*************"]
(record,) = _guardrail_records(request_data)
assert record["guardrail_status"] == "success"
assert record["masked_entity_count"] == {"PII": 1}
def _redacted_choice(content: str) -> httpx.Response:
return httpx.Response(
200, json={"action": "allow", "redactedRequest": {"choices": [{"message": {"content": content}}]}}
)
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_later_overlap_scan_cannot_undo_an_earlier_redaction() -> None:
"""Window two sees ``SECRET`` in its overlap unmasked, flags only ``tail``, and must not restore ``SECRET``."""
responses = iter((_redacted_choice("aaaaa******"), _redacted_choice("SECRET####")))
async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=httpx.MockTransport(lambda request: next(responses))) as client:
result, _ = await _apply(
_guardrail(async_handler=client, response_content_chunk_size_bytes=11, stream_overlap_size=6),
{"texts": ["aaaaaSECRETtail"]},
"response",
)
assert result["texts"] == ["aaaaa******####"]
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_response_block_in_a_later_window_stops_scanning() -> None:
respond, scanned = _engine(block_on="zzz")
async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=httpx.MockTransport(respond)) as client:
request_data: dict[str, object] = {"metadata": {}}
with pytest.raises(GuardrailRaisedException, match="policy"):
await _guardrail(
async_handler=client, response_content_chunk_size_bytes=5, stream_overlap_size=0
).apply_guardrail(
inputs={"texts": ["aaaaabbbbbzzzzzccccc"]},
request_data=request_data,
input_type="response",
)
assert scanned == ["aaaaa", "bbbbb", "zzzzz"]
assert _guardrail_records(request_data)[0]["guardrail_status"] == "guardrail_intervened"
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_response_scans_every_choice() -> None:
respond, scanned = _engine(redact={"SECRET": "******"})
async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=httpx.MockTransport(respond)) as client:
result, _ = await _apply(
_guardrail(async_handler=client),
{"texts": ["first SECRET", "second SECRET"]},
"response",
)
assert scanned == ["first SECRET", "second SECRET"]
assert result["texts"] == ["first ******", "second ******"]
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_unmergeable_response_redaction_blocks_instead_of_leaking() -> None:
def respond(request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
return httpx.Response(
200,
json={"action": "allow", "redactedRequest": {"choices": [{"message": {"content": "short"}}]}},
)
async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=httpx.MockTransport(respond)) as client:
request_data: dict[str, object] = {"metadata": {}}
with pytest.raises(GuardrailRaisedException, match="redaction"):
await _guardrail(async_handler=client, fallback_on_error="allow").apply_guardrail(
inputs={"texts": ["a much longer sensitive response"]},
request_data=request_data,
input_type="response",
)
assert _guardrail_records(request_data)[-1]["guardrail_status"] == "guardrail_failed_to_respond"
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_request_redaction_flows_through_the_chat_completions_handler() -> None:
respond, _ = _engine(redact={"a@b.com": "[EMAIL]"})
async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=httpx.MockTransport(respond)) as client:
data: dict[str, object] = {
"model": "gpt-5.4",
"messages": [
{"role": "system", "content": "be terse"},
{"role": "user", "content": [{"type": "text", "text": "mail a@b.com"}]},
],
"metadata": {},
}
out = await OpenAIChatCompletionsHandler().process_input_messages(
data=data, guardrail_to_apply=_guardrail(async_handler=client)
)
assert out["messages"][0]["content"] == "be terse"
assert out["messages"][1]["content"][0]["text"] == "mail [EMAIL]"
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
("content", "chunk_size_bytes", "overlap", "expected"),
[
("abcdéX", 5, 0, ["abcd", "éX"]),
("abcéX", 5, 0, ["abcé", "X"]),
("abcdéXYZ", 5, 2, ["abcd", "cdéX", "éXYZ"]),
("abcdef", 5, 100, ["abcde", "bcdef"]),
("", 5, 2, []),
("é", 1, 0, ["é"]),
],
)
def test_utf8_windows_respect_byte_limits_and_character_overlap(
content: str, chunk_size_bytes: int, overlap: int, expected: Sequence[str]
) -> None:
windows = utf8_windows(content, chunk_size_bytes=chunk_size_bytes, overlap_chars=overlap)
assert [window.text for window in windows] == list(expected)
assert all(content[window.start : window.start + len(window.text)] == window.text for window in windows)
def _logged_call(user_text: str, assistant_text: str) -> tuple[dict[str, object], ModelResponse]:
response = ModelResponse(choices=[Choices(message=Message(role="assistant", content=assistant_text))])
kwargs: dict[str, object] = {
"model": "gpt-5.4",
"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": user_text}],
"litellm_call_id": "call-1",
"litellm_params": {"metadata": {}},
"optional_params": {},
"standard_logging_object": {"guardrail_information": None},
}
return kwargs, response
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_logging_only_scans_both_sides_without_modifying_them() -> None:
respond, scanned = _engine(redact={"a@b.com": "[EMAIL]", "SECRET": "******"})
async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=httpx.MockTransport(respond)) as client:
guardrail = _guardrail(async_handler=client, event_hook=GuardrailEventHooks.logging_only)
kwargs, response = _logged_call("user a@b.com", "assistant SECRET")
out_kwargs, out_response = await guardrail.async_logging_hook(kwargs, response, CallTypes.acompletion.value)
assert scanned == ["user a@b.com", "assistant SECRET"]
assert out_kwargs["messages"] == [{"role": "user", "content": "user a@b.com"}]
assert out_response is response
assert response.choices[0].message.content == "assistant SECRET"
entries = out_kwargs["standard_logging_object"]["guardrail_information"]
assert [entry["guardrail_status"] for entry in entries] == ["success", "success"]
assert all(entry["guardrail_mode"] == "logging_only" for entry in entries)