fix: address CodeQL realtime auth findings

litellm/proxy/_types.py

@@ -264,8 +264,8 @@ class Litellm_EntityType(enum.Enum):
 def hash_token(token: str):
     import hashlib
 
-    # Hash the string using SHA-256
-    hashed_token: Final = hashlib.sha256(token.encode()).hexdigest()
+    # This digest is an opaque lookup identifier, not a password hash.
+    hashed_token: Final = hashlib.sha256(token.encode(), usedforsecurity=False).hexdigest()
 
     return hashed_token
 

litellm/proxy/auth/auth_checks.py

@@ -6024,7 +6024,9 @@ def is_model_allowed_by_pattern(model: str, allowed_model_pattern: str) -> bool:
         bool: True if model matches the pattern, False otherwise
     """
     if "*" in allowed_model_pattern:
-        pattern: Final = f"^{allowed_model_pattern.replace('*', '.*')}$"
+        # Treat the configured model pattern as a glob; only '*' is special.
+        escaped_pattern: Final = re.escape(allowed_model_pattern)
+        pattern: Final = "^" + escaped_pattern.replace("\\*", ".*") + "$"
         return bool(re.match(pattern, model))
 
     return False

litellm/proxy/realtime_endpoints/call_sessions.py

@@ -218,7 +218,10 @@ def decode_call(token: str, authorization: str) -> CodexRealtimeCall:
         call: Final = CodexRealtimeCall.model_validate_json(plaintext or "")
     except (ValueError, TypeError, UnicodeError) as exc:
         raise HTTPException(403, "Invalid realtime call") from exc
-    if call.expires_at < time.time() or call.owner != hashlib.sha256(authorization.encode()).hexdigest():
+    if (
+        call.expires_at < time.time()
+        or call.owner != hashlib.sha256(authorization.encode(), usedforsecurity=False).hexdigest()
+    ):
         raise HTTPException(403, "Invalid or expired realtime call")
     return call
 
@@ -231,6 +234,7 @@ async def _cache_bounded_offer_body(request: Request) -> None:
         if int(request.headers.get("content-length", "")) > MAX_REALTIME_OFFER_BYTES:
             raise HTTPException(413, "Realtime offer exceeds the 8 MiB limit")
     except ValueError:
+        # A missing or non-numeric content length is checked while streaming below.
         pass
     if hasattr(request, "_body"):
         if len(request._body) > MAX_REALTIME_OFFER_BYTES:  # pyright: ignore[reportPrivateUsage]  # validate Starlette's cached body without consuming it again
@@ -396,7 +400,9 @@ async def _create_codex_realtime_call(request: Request) -> Response:
             call: Final = parse_call_response(
                 response,
                 alias=model,
-                owner=hashlib.sha256(f"Bearer {owner_key}".encode()).hexdigest(),
+                owner=hashlib.sha256(
+                    f"Bearer {owner_key}".encode(), usedforsecurity=False
+                ).hexdigest(),
                 expires_at=time.time() + 3600,
             )
         except ValueError as exc:

litellm/proxy/realtime_endpoints/live.py

@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ def rewrite_session_ids(value: JsonValue | Mapping[str, JsonValue], raw_id: str,
 def _owner(auth: UserAPIKeyAuth) -> str:
     if not auth.api_key:
         raise HTTPException(403, "Live sessions require an authenticated API key")
-    return hashlib.sha256(auth.api_key.encode()).hexdigest()
+    return hashlib.sha256(auth.api_key.encode(), usedforsecurity=False).hexdigest()
 
 
 async def _auth(request: Request) -> UserAPIKeyAuth:
@@ -1475,11 +1475,13 @@ async def websocket_live_session(websocket: WebSocket, session_id: str | None =
         try:
             await websocket.close(code=1008, reason="Live session rejected")
         except RuntimeError:
+            # The peer may have closed the socket before the rejection response.
             pass
     except Exception:
         try:
             await websocket.close(code=1011, reason="Live upstream connection failed")
         except RuntimeError:
+            # The peer may have closed the socket before the failure response.
             pass
     finally:
         if state.connection is not None:

litellm/proxy/utils.py

@@ -4291,7 +4291,7 @@ class PrismaClient:
 
     def hash_token(self, token: str):
         # Hash the string using SHA-256
-        hashed_token: Final = hashlib.sha256(token.encode()).hexdigest()
+        hashed_token: Final = hashlib.sha256(token.encode(), usedforsecurity=False).hexdigest()
 
         return hashed_token
 
@@ -6718,7 +6718,7 @@ def hash_token(token: str):
     import hashlib
 
     # Hash the string using SHA-256
-    hashed_token: Final = hashlib.sha256(token.encode()).hexdigest()
+    hashed_token: Final = hashlib.sha256(token.encode(), usedforsecurity=False).hexdigest()
 
     return hashed_token
 

tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_auth_checks.py

@@ -547,6 +547,8 @@ async def test_virtual_key_max_budget_check(
             False,
         ),  # don't match on pattern
         ("openai/gpt-4o", ["openai/*"], True),  # openai wildcard access
+        ("openai/gpt+4", ["openai/gpt+*"], True),  # regex metacharacters stay literal
+        ("openai/gpttt4", ["openai/gpt+*"], False),  # regex metacharacters do not overmatch
         ("gpt-4", ["gpt-3.5-turbo"], False),  # model not in allowed list
         ("claude-3", [], True),  # empty model list (allows all)
     ],