diff --git a/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/outbound_credentials/token_cache_codec.py b/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/outbound_credentials/token_cache_codec.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..8bacfced6b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/outbound_credentials/token_cache_codec.py
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+"""Serialize + encrypt boundary for caching an OAuth token in a shared (Redis) cache.
+
+A cross-replica cache must serialize the token, and a plaintext bearer in Redis is a leak, so this
+encrypts the value (NaCl in production via the injected ``encrypt``, identity in tests). It caches
+**only** the ``access_token``: the hot path needs just the bearer, expiry is carried by the cache
+entry's TTL (set from the token's ``expires_at`` by the cache), and the long-lived refresh_token stays
+in the DB - the refresh path is always a cache miss that re-reads it - so it never reaches Redis. A
+decoded token therefore carries only the bearer (``expires_at`` and ``refresh_token`` both None); the
+TTL, not the value, bounds its life. An empty/undecryptable blob (e.g. master-key rotation) is a miss.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from collections.abc import Callable
+
+from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.outbound_credentials.oauth_token_store import (
+    OAuthToken,
+)
+
+
+class OAuthTokenCacheCodec:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        encrypt: Callable[[str], str],
+        decrypt: Callable[[str], str | None],
+    ) -> None:
+        self._encrypt = encrypt
+        self._decrypt = decrypt
+
+    def encode(self, token: OAuthToken) -> str:
+        return self._encrypt(token.access_token)
+
+    def decode(self, blob: str) -> OAuthToken | None:
+        access_token = self._decrypt(blob)
+        if not access_token:
+            return None
+        return OAuthToken(access_token=access_token, refresh_token=None)
diff --git a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/outbound_credentials/test_token_cache_codec.py b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/outbound_credentials/test_token_cache_codec.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..17a7e13af03
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/outbound_credentials/test_token_cache_codec.py
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+"""Tests for the cache codec: encrypt on encode, drop the refresh_token, round-trip the bearer."""
+
+from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.outbound_credentials.oauth_token_store import (
+    OAuthToken,
+)
+from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.outbound_credentials.token_cache_codec import (
+    OAuthTokenCacheCodec,
+)
+
+
+def _wrapping_codec():
+    # A reversible stand-in for NaCl: proves encode() encrypts (output is wrapped) and decode()
+    # decrypts, without needing a salt key.
+    return OAuthTokenCacheCodec(
+        encrypt=lambda s: f"enc:{s}",
+        decrypt=lambda b: b[4:] if b.startswith("enc:") else None,
+    )
+
+
+def test_round_trips_the_access_token():
+    codec = _wrapping_codec()
+    token = codec.decode(
+        codec.encode(OAuthToken(access_token="at-123", expires_at=1234.5))
+    )
+    assert token is not None
+    assert token.access_token == "at-123"
+
+
+def test_encode_encrypts_and_omits_the_refresh_token():
+    codec = _wrapping_codec()
+    blob = codec.encode(OAuthToken(access_token="at", refresh_token="super-secret-rt"))
+    assert blob.startswith("enc:")  # encryption was applied
+    assert (
+        "super-secret-rt" not in blob
+    )  # the long-lived secret never reaches the cache
+    decoded = codec.decode(blob)
+    assert decoded is not None and decoded.refresh_token is None
+
+
+def test_decoded_token_defers_expiry_to_the_cache_ttl():
+    codec = _wrapping_codec()
+    token = codec.decode(codec.encode(OAuthToken(access_token="at", expires_at=999.0)))
+    # The value carries no expiry; the cache entry's TTL bounds its life instead.
+    assert token is not None and token.expires_at is None
+
+
+def test_undecryptable_blob_is_a_miss():
+    # e.g. master-key rotation makes an old entry unreadable -> treat as a miss, not a crash.
+    assert _wrapping_codec().decode("not-our-prefix") is None
+
+
+def test_empty_plaintext_is_a_miss():
+    codec = OAuthTokenCacheCodec(encrypt=lambda s: s, decrypt=lambda b: b)
+    assert codec.decode("") is None