Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/litellm_internal_staging' into litellm_fix_pricing_auto_update_action

.github/CODEOWNERS

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+/ui/ @yuneng-jiang @ryan-crabbe-berri
+/litellm/proxy/_experimental/out/ @yuneng-jiang @ryan-crabbe-berri

.github/actions/setup-uv-with-retries/action.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+name: "Set up uv with retries"
+description: >-
+  Install uv via astral-sh/setup-uv, retrying on transient failures. Even with
+  an exact pinned version, the action resolves the artifact URL by fetching
+  https://raw.githubusercontent.com/astral-sh/versions/main/v1/uv.ndjson in a
+  single request with no retry, timeout, or fallback, so one connection-level
+  network error ("fetch failed") fails the whole job before any test runs.
+  Retrying the full step covers the manifest fetch and the binary download.
+
+inputs:
+  version:
+    description: "uv version to install"
+    required: true
+
+runs:
+  using: composite
+  steps:
+    - name: Set up uv (attempt 1)
+      id: attempt-1
+      continue-on-error: true
+      uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@37802adc94f370d6bfd71619e3f0bf239e1f3b78 # v7.6.0
+      with:
+        version: ${{ inputs.version }}
+
+    - name: Wait before attempt 2
+      if: steps.attempt-1.outcome == 'failure'
+      shell: bash
+      run: sleep 15
+
+    - name: Set up uv (attempt 2)
+      id: attempt-2
+      if: steps.attempt-1.outcome == 'failure'
+      continue-on-error: true
+      uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@37802adc94f370d6bfd71619e3f0bf239e1f3b78 # v7.6.0
+      with:
+        version: ${{ inputs.version }}
+
+    - name: Wait before attempt 3
+      if: steps.attempt-2.outcome == 'failure'
+      shell: bash
+      run: sleep 30
+
+    - name: Set up uv (attempt 3)
+      if: steps.attempt-2.outcome == 'failure'
+      uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@37802adc94f370d6bfd71619e3f0bf239e1f3b78 # v7.6.0
+      with:
+        version: ${{ inputs.version }}

.github/workflows/_test-unit-base.yml

@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ jobs:
           python-version: "3.12"
 
       - name: Set up uv
-        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@37802adc94f370d6bfd71619e3f0bf239e1f3b78 # v7
+        uses: ./.github/actions/setup-uv-with-retries
         with:
           version: "0.10.9"
 

.github/workflows/auto_update_price_and_context_window.yml

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ jobs:
         with:
           persist-credentials: false
       - name: Set up uv
-        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@37802adc94f370d6bfd71619e3f0bf239e1f3b78 # v7
+        uses: ./.github/actions/setup-uv-with-retries
         with:
           version: "0.10.9"
       - name: Create Pull Request

.github/workflows/check-ui-api-types.yml

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ jobs:
           python-version: "3.12"
 
       - name: Set up uv
-        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@37802adc94f370d6bfd71619e3f0bf239e1f3b78 # v7
+        uses: ./.github/actions/setup-uv-with-retries
         with:
           version: "0.10.9"
 

.github/workflows/codspeed.yml

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ jobs:
           python-version: "3.12"
 
       - name: Set up uv
-        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@37802adc94f370d6bfd71619e3f0bf239e1f3b78 # v7
+        uses: ./.github/actions/setup-uv-with-retries
         with:
           version: "0.10.9"
 

.github/workflows/mutation-test.yml

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ jobs:
           python-version: "3.12"
 
       - name: Set up uv
-        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@37802adc94f370d6bfd71619e3f0bf239e1f3b78 # v7
+        uses: ./.github/actions/setup-uv-with-retries
         with:
           version: "0.10.9"
 

.github/workflows/oss_daily_guardrails.yml

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ jobs:
           python-version: "3.12"
 
       - name: Set up uv
-        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@37802adc94f370d6bfd71619e3f0bf239e1f3b78 # v7
+        uses: ./.github/actions/setup-uv-with-retries
         with:
           version: "0.10.9"
 

.github/workflows/test-code-quality.yml

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ jobs:
           python-version: "3.12"
 
       - name: Set up uv
-        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@37802adc94f370d6bfd71619e3f0bf239e1f3b78 # v7
+        uses: ./.github/actions/setup-uv-with-retries
         with:
           version: "0.10.9"
 

.github/workflows/test-linting.yml

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ jobs:
           python-version: "3.12"
 
       - name: Set up uv
-        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@37802adc94f370d6bfd71619e3f0bf239e1f3b78 # v7
+        uses: ./.github/actions/setup-uv-with-retries
         with:
           version: "0.10.9"
 
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ jobs:
           python-version: "3.12"
 
       - name: Set up uv
-        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@37802adc94f370d6bfd71619e3f0bf239e1f3b78 # v7
+        uses: ./.github/actions/setup-uv-with-retries
         with:
           version: "0.10.9"
 

.github/workflows/test-mcp.yml

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ jobs:
           python-version: "3.12"
 
       - name: Set up uv
-        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@37802adc94f370d6bfd71619e3f0bf239e1f3b78 # v7
+        uses: ./.github/actions/setup-uv-with-retries
         with:
           version: "0.10.9"
 

.github/workflows/test-semgrep.yml

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ jobs:
           python-version: "3.12"
 
       - name: Set up uv
-        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@37802adc94f370d6bfd71619e3f0bf239e1f3b78 # v7
+        uses: ./.github/actions/setup-uv-with-retries
         with:
           version: "0.10.9"
 

.github/workflows/test-terraform-provider.yml

@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ jobs:
           python-version: "3.12"
 
       - name: Set up uv
-        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@37802adc94f370d6bfd71619e3f0bf239e1f3b78 # v7
+        uses: ./.github/actions/setup-uv-with-retries
         with:
           version: "0.10.9"
 

.github/workflows/test-unit-documentation.yml

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ jobs:
           python-version: "3.12"
 
       - name: Set up uv
-        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@37802adc94f370d6bfd71619e3f0bf239e1f3b78 # v7
+        uses: ./.github/actions/setup-uv-with-retries
         with:
           version: "0.10.9"
 

.github/workflows/test-unit-proxy-legacy.yml

@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ jobs:
           python-version: "3.12"
 
       - name: Set up uv
-        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@37802adc94f370d6bfd71619e3f0bf239e1f3b78 # v7
+        uses: ./.github/actions/setup-uv-with-retries
         with:
           version: "0.10.9"
 

enterprise/pyproject.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [project]
 name = "litellm-enterprise"
-version = "0.1.49"
+version = "0.1.50"
 description = "Package for LiteLLM Enterprise features"
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.9"
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ required-version = ">=0.10.9"
 module-root = ""
 
 [tool.commitizen]
-version = "0.1.49"
+version = "0.1.50"
 version_files = [
     "pyproject.toml:^version",
     "../pyproject.toml:litellm-enterprise==",

litellm-proxy-extras/litellm_proxy_extras/migrations/20260713230852_add_key_type_to_litellm_verification_token/migration.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+-- AlterTable
+ALTER TABLE "LiteLLM_DeletedVerificationToken" ADD COLUMN     "key_type" TEXT;
+
+-- AlterTable
+ALTER TABLE "LiteLLM_VerificationToken" ADD COLUMN     "key_type" TEXT;
+

litellm-proxy-extras/litellm_proxy_extras/schema.prisma

@@ -422,6 +422,7 @@ model LiteLLM_VerificationToken {
     budget_reset_at DateTime?
     allowed_cache_controls String[] @default([])
     allowed_routes   String[] @default([])
+    key_type         String?
     policies         String[] @default([])
     access_group_ids String[] @default([])
     model_spend      Json @default("{}")
@@ -516,6 +517,7 @@ model LiteLLM_DeletedVerificationToken {
     budget_reset_at         DateTime?
     allowed_cache_controls  String[] @default([])
     allowed_routes          String[] @default([])
+    key_type                String?
     policies                String[] @default([])
     access_group_ids String[] @default([])
     model_spend             Json     @default("{}")

litellm-proxy-extras/pyproject.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [project]
 name = "litellm-proxy-extras"
-version = "0.4.76"
+version = "0.4.77"
 description = "Additional files for the LiteLLM Proxy. Reduces the size of the main litellm package."
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.9"
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ required-version = ">=0.10.9"
 module-root = ""
 
 [tool.commitizen]
-version = "0.4.76"
+version = "0.4.77"
 version_files = [
     "pyproject.toml:^version",
     "../pyproject.toml:litellm-proxy-extras==",

litellm/integrations/custom_guardrail.py

@@ -515,6 +515,22 @@ class CustomGuardrail(CustomLogger):
                     return True
         return False
 
+    def uses_apply_guardrail_interface(self) -> bool:
+        return type(self).apply_guardrail is not CustomGuardrail.apply_guardrail
+
+    def _deployment_pre_call_target(self) -> "CustomLogger":
+        if not self.uses_apply_guardrail_interface():
+            return self
+        try:
+            from litellm.proxy.utils import unified_guardrail
+        except ImportError as e:
+            raise ImportError(
+                f"Guardrail {self.guardrail_name or type(self).__name__} implements apply_guardrail, which needs "
+                "the litellm proxy dependencies to run at the deployment level. "
+                "Install them with: pip install 'litellm[proxy]'"
+            ) from e
+        return unified_guardrail
+
     async def async_pre_call_deployment_hook(
         self, kwargs: Dict[str, Any], call_type: Optional[CallTypes]
     ) -> Optional[dict]:
@@ -533,7 +549,10 @@ class CustomGuardrail(CustomLogger):
 
         # CHECK IF GUARDRAIL REJECTS THE REQUEST
         if call_type == CallTypes.completion or call_type == CallTypes.acompletion:
-            result = await self.async_pre_call_hook(
+            target = self._deployment_pre_call_target()
+            if target is not self:
+                kwargs["guardrail_to_apply"] = self
+            result = await target.async_pre_call_hook(
                 user_api_key_dict=UserAPIKeyAuth(
                     user_id=kwargs.get("user_api_key_user_id"),
                     team_id=kwargs.get("user_api_key_team_id"),
@@ -543,7 +562,7 @@ class CustomGuardrail(CustomLogger):
                 ),
                 cache=dc,
                 data=kwargs,
-                call_type=call_type.value or "acompletion",  # type: ignore
+                call_type="completion" if call_type == CallTypes.completion else "acompletion",
             )
 
             if result is not None and isinstance(result, dict):

litellm/integrations/prometheus.py

@@ -239,6 +239,18 @@ class PrometheusLogger(CustomLogger):
                 labelnames=self.get_labels_for_metric("litellm_output_audio_tokens_metric"),
             )
 
+            self.litellm_video_duration_seconds_metric = self._counter_factory(
+                "litellm_video_duration_seconds_metric",
+                "Seconds of video generated, from usage.duration_seconds on video generation calls",
+                labelnames=self.get_labels_for_metric("litellm_video_duration_seconds_metric"),
+            )
+
+            self.litellm_images_generated_metric = self._counter_factory(
+                "litellm_images_generated_metric",
+                "Number of images generated, from the image generation response",
+                labelnames=self.get_labels_for_metric("litellm_images_generated_metric"),
+            )
+
             # Remaining Budget for Team
             self.litellm_remaining_team_budget_metric = self._gauge_factory(
                 "litellm_remaining_team_budget_metric",
@@ -1336,6 +1348,12 @@ class PrometheusLogger(CustomLogger):
             label_context=label_context,
         )
 
+        self._increment_media_generation_metrics(
+            standard_logging_payload=standard_logging_payload,
+            enum_values=enum_values,
+            label_context=label_context,
+        )
+
         # MCP tool call metrics
         self._increment_mcp_tool_call_metrics(
             standard_logging_payload=standard_logging_payload,
@@ -1459,8 +1477,65 @@ class PrometheusLogger(CustomLogger):
             ),
         ]
 
-        for counter, metric_name, value in detail_metrics:
-            if not isinstance(value, (int, float)) or value <= 0:
+        PrometheusLogger._inc_sparse_usage_counters(
+            self,
+            detail_metrics,
+            enum_values=enum_values,
+            label_context=label_context,
+        )
+
+    def _increment_media_generation_metrics(
+        self,
+        standard_logging_payload: StandardLoggingPayload,
+        enum_values: UserAPIKeyLabelValues,
+        label_context: PrometheusLabelFactoryContext | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        """
+        Increment video-seconds and images-generated counters from
+        ``standard_logging_payload["metadata"]["usage_object"]``. Video
+        providers report ``duration_seconds`` there; image generation calls
+        report ``output_image_count``. Both are sparse: only emitted when the
+        value is present and > 0, so token-only call types are unaffected.
+        """
+        metadata = standard_logging_payload.get("metadata") or {}
+        usage_object = metadata.get("usage_object") if isinstance(metadata, dict) else None
+        if not isinstance(usage_object, dict):
+            return
+
+        media_metrics: list[tuple[Any, DEFINED_PROMETHEUS_METRICS, Any]] = [
+            (
+                self.litellm_video_duration_seconds_metric,
+                "litellm_video_duration_seconds_metric",
+                usage_object.get("duration_seconds"),
+            ),
+            (
+                self.litellm_images_generated_metric,
+                "litellm_images_generated_metric",
+                usage_object.get("output_image_count"),
+            ),
+        ]
+
+        PrometheusLogger._inc_sparse_usage_counters(
+            self,
+            media_metrics,
+            enum_values=enum_values,
+            label_context=label_context,
+        )
+
+    def _inc_sparse_usage_counters(
+        self,
+        counters_with_values: list[tuple[Any, DEFINED_PROMETHEUS_METRICS, Any]],
+        enum_values: UserAPIKeyLabelValues,
+        label_context: PrometheusLabelFactoryContext | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        """
+        Increment each ``(counter, metric_name, value)`` entry whose value is
+        a positive number. Non-numeric values (including booleans from
+        malformed provider usage dicts) and values <= 0 are skipped, keeping
+        scrape output sparse.
+        """
+        for counter, metric_name, value in counters_with_values:
+            if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, (int, float)) or value <= 0:
                 continue
             PrometheusLogger._inc_labeled_counter(
                 self,
@@ -1716,6 +1791,35 @@ class PrometheusLogger(CustomLogger):
             amount=float(response_cost),
         )
 
+    @staticmethod
+    def _get_remaining_from_v3_rate_limit_headers(
+        standard_logging_payload: StandardLoggingPayload | None,
+        rate_limit_type: Literal["requests", "tokens"],
+    ) -> int | None:
+        """
+        Read the per-(key, model) remaining value emitted by the v3 rate
+        limiter (``parallel_request_limiter_v3.py``), which writes
+        ``x-ratelimit-model_per_key-remaining-{requests,tokens}`` into
+        ``standard_logging_object.hidden_params.additional_headers`` instead
+        of the ``litellm-key-remaining-*`` metadata keys the legacy limiter
+        sets. The header carries no model group; it always refers to this
+        request's model group, which is what the gauges are labeled with.
+        Values are written in-process as plain ints (never HTTP-serialized
+        strings), so anything else is rejected rather than coerced.
+        """
+        if standard_logging_payload is None:
+            return None
+        hidden_params = standard_logging_payload.get("hidden_params")
+        if hidden_params is None:
+            return None
+        additional_headers = hidden_params.get("additional_headers")
+        if additional_headers is None:
+            return None
+        value = dict(additional_headers).get(f"x-ratelimit-model_per_key-remaining-{rate_limit_type}")
+        if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, int):
+            return None
+        return value
+
     def _set_virtual_key_rate_limit_metrics(
         self,
         user_api_key: Optional[str],
@@ -1733,11 +1837,20 @@ class PrometheusLogger(CustomLogger):
         model_group = get_model_group_from_litellm_kwargs(kwargs)
         remaining_requests_variable_name = f"litellm-key-remaining-requests-{model_group}"
         remaining_tokens_variable_name = f"litellm-key-remaining-tokens-{model_group}"
+        standard_logging_payload: StandardLoggingPayload | None = kwargs.get("standard_logging_object")
 
         remaining_requests = metadata.get(remaining_requests_variable_name)
+        if remaining_requests is None:
+            remaining_requests = self._get_remaining_from_v3_rate_limit_headers(
+                standard_logging_payload=standard_logging_payload, rate_limit_type="requests"
+            )
         if remaining_requests is None:
             remaining_requests = sys.maxsize
         remaining_tokens = metadata.get(remaining_tokens_variable_name)
+        if remaining_tokens is None:
+            remaining_tokens = self._get_remaining_from_v3_rate_limit_headers(
+                standard_logging_payload=standard_logging_payload, rate_limit_type="tokens"
+            )
         if remaining_tokens is None:
             remaining_tokens = sys.maxsize
 

litellm/litellm_core_utils/get_litellm_params.py

@@ -2,26 +2,8 @@ from typing import Optional
 
 from litellm.llms.openai.data_residency import infer_openai_data_residency
 
-# Pre-define optional kwargs keys as frozenset for O(1) lookups
-# These are extracted from kwargs only if present, avoiding unnecessary .get() calls
-OPTIONAL_KWARGS_KEYS = frozenset(
+AWS_CREDENTIAL_KWARGS_KEYS = frozenset(
     {
-        "azure_ad_token",
-        "tenant_id",
-        "client_id",
-        "client_secret",
-        "azure_username",
-        "azure_password",
-        "azure_scope",
-        "timeout",
-        "gcs_bucket_name",
-        "bucket_name",
-        "vertex_credentials",
-        "vertex_project",
-        "vertex_location",
-        "vertex_ai_project",
-        "vertex_ai_location",
-        "vertex_ai_credentials",
         "aws_region_name",
         "aws_access_key_id",
         "aws_secret_access_key",
@@ -34,14 +16,40 @@ OPTIONAL_KWARGS_KEYS = frozenset(
         "aws_external_id",
         "aws_bedrock_runtime_endpoint",
         "aws_bedrock_project_id",
-        "tpm",
-        "rpm",
-        "itpm",
-        "otpm",
-        "use_xai_oauth",
     }
 )
 
+# Pre-define optional kwargs keys as frozenset for O(1) lookups
+# These are extracted from kwargs only if present, avoiding unnecessary .get() calls
+OPTIONAL_KWARGS_KEYS = (
+    frozenset(
+        {
+            "azure_ad_token",
+            "tenant_id",
+            "client_id",
+            "client_secret",
+            "azure_username",
+            "azure_password",
+            "azure_scope",
+            "timeout",
+            "gcs_bucket_name",
+            "bucket_name",
+            "vertex_credentials",
+            "vertex_project",
+            "vertex_location",
+            "vertex_ai_project",
+            "vertex_ai_location",
+            "vertex_ai_credentials",
+            "tpm",
+            "rpm",
+            "itpm",
+            "otpm",
+            "use_xai_oauth",
+        }
+    )
+    | AWS_CREDENTIAL_KWARGS_KEYS
+)
+
 # Backward-compatible alias for existing imports/tests.
 _OPTIONAL_KWARGS_KEYS = OPTIONAL_KWARGS_KEYS
 

litellm/litellm_core_utils/litellm_logging.py

@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ from litellm.litellm_core_utils.model_param_helper import ModelParamHelper
 from litellm.litellm_core_utils.redact_messages import (
     redact_message_input_output_from_custom_logger,
     redact_message_input_output_from_logging,
+    redact_streaming_responses_for_custom_logger,
 )
 from litellm.llms.base_llm.ocr.transformation import OCRResponse
 from litellm.llms.base_llm.search.transformation import SearchResponse
@@ -2576,6 +2577,9 @@ class Logging(LiteLLMLoggingBaseClass):
                     model_call_details = callback.redact_standard_logging_payload_from_model_call_details(
                         model_call_details=model_call_details
                     )
+                    model_call_details = redact_streaming_responses_for_custom_logger(
+                        model_call_details=model_call_details, custom_logger=callback
+                    )
                     ##################################
                     if self.stream is True:
                         if "async_complete_streaming_response" in model_call_details:
@@ -5208,10 +5212,15 @@ def get_standard_logging_object_payload(
         call_type = kwargs.get("call_type")
         cache_hit = kwargs.get("cache_hit", False)
         # Extract usage as a plain dict, avoiding Pydantic round-trip
-        usage_dict = StandardLoggingPayloadSetup.get_usage_as_dict(
+        raw_usage_dict = StandardLoggingPayloadSetup.get_usage_as_dict(
             response_obj=response_obj,
             combined_usage_object=cast(Optional[Usage], kwargs.get("combined_usage_object")),
         )
+        usage_dict = (
+            {**raw_usage_dict, "output_image_count": len(init_response_obj.data)}
+            if isinstance(init_response_obj, ImageResponse) and init_response_obj.data
+            else raw_usage_dict
+        )
 
         id = response_obj.get("id", kwargs.get("litellm_call_id"))
 

litellm/litellm_core_utils/redact_messages.py

@@ -38,10 +38,45 @@ def redact_message_input_output_from_custom_logger(
     litellm_logging_obj: LiteLLMLoggingObject, result, custom_logger: CustomLogger
 ):
     if hasattr(custom_logger, "message_logging") and custom_logger.message_logging is not True:
-        return perform_redaction(litellm_logging_obj.model_call_details, result)
+        return perform_redaction(litellm_logging_obj.model_call_details, result, redact_streaming_responses=False)
     return result
 
 
+def redact_streaming_responses_for_custom_logger(model_call_details: dict, custom_logger: CustomLogger) -> dict:
+    """
+    Returns a copy of model_call_details whose streaming response entries are redacted deepcopies
+    when the custom logger has opted out of message logging. The shared model_call_details is left
+    untouched so other callbacks still receive the unredacted response.
+    """
+    if not (hasattr(custom_logger, "message_logging") and custom_logger.message_logging is not True):
+        return model_call_details
+    redacted_entries = {
+        streaming_key: _redacted_streaming_response_copy(model_call_details[streaming_key])
+        for streaming_key in ("complete_streaming_response", "async_complete_streaming_response")
+        if model_call_details.get(streaming_key) is not None
+    }
+    if not redacted_entries:
+        return model_call_details
+    return {**model_call_details, **redacted_entries}
+
+
+def _redacted_streaming_response_copy(streaming_response):
+    redacted_response = copy.deepcopy(streaming_response)
+    _redact_streaming_response(redacted_response)
+    return redacted_response
+
+
+def _redact_streaming_response(streaming_response):
+    if hasattr(streaming_response, "choices"):
+        for choice in streaming_response.choices:
+            _redact_choice_content(choice)
+        redact_vertex_ai_metadata_from_logged_object(streaming_response)
+    elif hasattr(streaming_response, "output"):
+        _redact_responses_api_output(streaming_response.output)
+        if hasattr(streaming_response, "reasoning") and streaming_response.reasoning is not None:
+            streaming_response.reasoning = None
+
+
 def _redact_choice_content(choice):
     """Helper to redact content in a choice (message or delta)."""
     if isinstance(choice, litellm.Choices):
@@ -150,9 +185,13 @@ def _redact_model_response_dict_choices(choices, redacted_str: str):
             _redact_choice_content(choice)
 
 
-def perform_redaction(model_call_details: dict, result):
+def perform_redaction(model_call_details: dict, result, redact_streaming_responses: bool = True):
     """
     Performs the actual redaction on the logging object and result.
+
+    redact_streaming_responses=False skips the in-place redaction of the shared streaming
+    response entries; per-callback redaction hands each opted-out callback its own redacted
+    copy via redact_streaming_responses_for_custom_logger instead.
     """
     # Redact model_call_details
     model_call_details["messages"] = [{"role": "user", "content": "redacted-by-litellm"}]
@@ -162,17 +201,9 @@ def perform_redaction(model_call_details: dict, result):
     redact_vertex_ai_metadata_from_litellm_params(model_call_details)
 
     # Redact streaming response
-    if model_call_details.get("stream", False) is True and "complete_streaming_response" in model_call_details:
-        _streaming_response = model_call_details["complete_streaming_response"]
-        if hasattr(_streaming_response, "choices"):
-            for choice in _streaming_response.choices:
-                _redact_choice_content(choice)
-            redact_vertex_ai_metadata_from_logged_object(_streaming_response)
-        elif hasattr(_streaming_response, "output"):
-            _redact_responses_api_output(_streaming_response.output)
-            # Redact reasoning field in ResponsesAPIResponse
-            if hasattr(_streaming_response, "reasoning") and _streaming_response.reasoning is not None:
-                _streaming_response.reasoning = None
+    if redact_streaming_responses and model_call_details.get("stream", False) is True:
+        for _streaming_key in ("complete_streaming_response", "async_complete_streaming_response"):
+            _redact_streaming_response(model_call_details.get(_streaming_key))
 
     # Redact result
     if result is not None:

litellm/llms/anthropic/chat/transformation.py

@@ -1441,24 +1441,10 @@ class AnthropicConfig(AnthropicModelInfo, BaseConfig):
                     output_key=param,
                 )
             elif param == "response_format" and isinstance(value, dict):
-                if any(
-                    substring in model
-                    for substring in {
-                        "sonnet-4.5",
-                        "sonnet-4-5",
-                        "opus-4.1",
-                        "opus-4-1",
-                        "opus-4.5",
-                        "opus-4-5",
-                        "opus-4.6",
-                        "opus-4-6",
-                        "opus-4.7",
-                        "opus-4-7",
-                        "sonnet-4.6",
-                        "sonnet-4-6",
-                        "sonnet_4.6",
-                        "sonnet_4_6",
-                    }
+                if AnthropicConfig._supports_model_capability(
+                    model,
+                    "supports_native_structured_output",
+                    self._resolved_provider,
                 ):
                     _output_format = self.map_response_format_to_anthropic_output_format(value)
                     if _output_format is not None:

litellm/llms/anthropic/common_utils.py

@@ -340,11 +340,15 @@ class AnthropicModelInfo(BaseLLMModelInfo):
     def _get_model_capability(model: str, key: str) -> Optional[bool]:
         """Read boolean capability ``key`` from the model map, or None when
         no entry declares it."""
+        from litellm.utils import _get_bundled_model_cost_map
+
         try:
-            for cand in AnthropicModelInfo._model_map_lookup_candidates(model):
-                value = litellm.model_cost.get(cand, {}).get(key)
-                if isinstance(value, bool):
-                    return value
+            candidates = AnthropicModelInfo._model_map_lookup_candidates(model)
+            for model_cost in (litellm.model_cost, _get_bundled_model_cost_map()):
+                for cand in candidates:
+                    value = model_cost.get(cand, {}).get(key)
+                    if isinstance(value, bool):
+                        return value
         except Exception:
             pass
         return None

litellm/llms/anthropic/experimental_pass_through/messages/transformation.py

@@ -375,6 +375,36 @@ class AnthropicMessagesConfig(BaseAnthropicMessagesConfig):
             else:
                 optional_params.pop("output_config", None)
 
+    @staticmethod
+    def _drop_incompatible_temperature_for_thinking(
+        model: str, optional_params: dict, custom_llm_provider: str
+    ) -> None:
+        """Anthropic rejects any ``temperature`` other than 1 while extended thinking
+        is enabled ("temperature may only be set to 1 when thinking is enabled").
+
+        Clients like Claude Code send ``thinking``/``output_config.effort`` together
+        with a pinned ``temperature`` (e.g. the safety classifier uses ``temperature=0``
+        for determinism). When the request lands on a non-adaptive model, the effort
+        interface is reshaped above into legacy ``thinking={type: enabled}`` (or kept
+        as ``output_config.effort`` on Opus 4.5), and the leftover ``temperature`` would
+        400. Preserving the thinking the caller asked for wins over an unhonorable
+        sampling value (Anthropic forces ``temperature=1`` under thinking regardless),
+        so drop it and let the API default apply.
+
+        Adaptive models (4.6+) own this natively and are left untouched.
+        """
+        if AnthropicModelInfo._is_adaptive_thinking_model(model, custom_llm_provider):
+            return
+        temperature = optional_params.get("temperature")
+        if temperature is None or temperature == 1:
+            return
+        thinking = optional_params.get("thinking")
+        output_config = optional_params.get("output_config")
+        thinking_enabled = isinstance(thinking, dict) and thinking.get("type") == "enabled"
+        effort_enabled = isinstance(output_config, dict) and output_config.get("effort") is not None
+        if thinking_enabled or effort_enabled:
+            optional_params.pop("temperature", None)
+
     def transform_anthropic_messages_request(
         self,
         model: str,
@@ -415,6 +445,12 @@ class AnthropicMessagesConfig(BaseAnthropicMessagesConfig):
             custom_llm_provider=self._resolved_provider,
         )
 
+        self._drop_incompatible_temperature_for_thinking(
+            model=model,
+            optional_params=anthropic_messages_optional_request_params,
+            custom_llm_provider=self._resolved_provider,
+        )
+
         system_param = anthropic_messages_optional_request_params.get("system")
         if self.should_strip_billing_metadata() and system_param is not None:
             filtered_system = self._filter_billing_headers_from_system(system_param)

litellm/llms/anthropic/experimental_pass_through/responses_adapters/transformation.py

@@ -198,14 +198,16 @@ class LiteLLMAnthropicToResponsesAPIAdapter:
     @staticmethod
     def translate_tool_choice_to_responses_api(
         tool_choice: AnthropicMessagesToolChoice,
-    ) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+    ) -> Union[str, dict[str, Any]]:
         """Convert Anthropic tool_choice to Responses API tool_choice."""
         tc_type = tool_choice.get("type")
         if tc_type == "any":
-            return {"type": "required"}
+            return "required"
         elif tc_type == "tool":
             return {"type": "function", "name": tool_choice.get("name", "")}
-        return {"type": "auto"}
+        elif tc_type == "none":
+            return "none"
+        return "auto"
 
     @staticmethod
     def translate_context_management_to_responses_api(

litellm/llms/bedrock/base_aws_llm.py

@@ -877,6 +877,15 @@ class BaseAWSLLM:
                     "Resource": "*",
                     "Condition": {"Bool": {"aws:SecureTransport": "true"}},
                 },
+                {
+                    "Sid": "BedrockMantleLiteLLM",
+                    "Effect": "Allow",
+                    "Action": [
+                        "bedrock-mantle:CreateInference",
+                    ],
+                    "Resource": "*",
+                    "Condition": {"Bool": {"aws:SecureTransport": "true"}},
+                },
             ],
         }
         assume_role_params = {

litellm/llms/openai/responses/transformation.py

@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ from litellm.types.utils import LlmProviders
 
 from ..common_utils import OpenAIError
 
+OPENAI_RESPONSES_API_MIN_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS = 16
+
 if TYPE_CHECKING:
     from litellm.litellm_core_utils.litellm_logging import Logging as _LiteLLMLoggingObj
 
@@ -59,6 +61,19 @@ class OpenAIResponsesAPIConfig(BaseResponsesAPIConfig):
             key="supports_none_reasoning_effort",
         )
 
+    @staticmethod
+    def _enforce_min_max_output_tokens(max_output_tokens: "int | None") -> "int | None":
+        """Raise sub-minimum max_output_tokens up to the OpenAI Responses API minimum.
+
+        OpenAI's Responses API rejects max_output_tokens below 16 for every model
+        (not gpt-5 specific), so a client like Claude Code that sends a max_tokens=1
+        warmup probe on model switch would otherwise 400. Values that are None or
+        already at/above the minimum are returned unchanged.
+        """
+        if isinstance(max_output_tokens, int) and max_output_tokens < OPENAI_RESPONSES_API_MIN_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS:
+            return OPENAI_RESPONSES_API_MIN_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS
+        return max_output_tokens
+
     def get_supported_openai_params(self, model: str) -> list:
         """
         All OpenAI Responses API params are supported
@@ -92,6 +107,9 @@ class OpenAIResponsesAPIConfig(BaseResponsesAPIConfig):
         """
         params = dict(response_api_optional_params)
 
+        if "max_output_tokens" in params:
+            params["max_output_tokens"] = self._enforce_min_max_output_tokens(params.get("max_output_tokens"))
+
         if self._is_gpt_5_model(model=model):
             temperature = params.get("temperature")
             if temperature is not None and temperature != 1:

litellm/main.py

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ from litellm.litellm_core_utils.completion_timeout import CompletionTimeout
 from litellm.litellm_core_utils.request_timeout_resolver import (
     get_configured_request_timeout,
 )
-from litellm.litellm_core_utils.get_litellm_params import OPTIONAL_KWARGS_KEYS
+from litellm.litellm_core_utils.get_litellm_params import (
+    AWS_CREDENTIAL_KWARGS_KEYS,
+    OPTIONAL_KWARGS_KEYS,
+)
 from litellm.litellm_core_utils.dd_tracing import tracer
 from litellm.litellm_core_utils.get_provider_specific_headers import (
     ProviderSpecificHeaderUtils,
@@ -5322,7 +5325,7 @@ def completion(  # type: ignore
             tpm=kwargs.get("tpm"),
             rpm=kwargs.get("rpm"),
             use_xai_oauth=kwargs.get("use_xai_oauth", False),
-            aws_bedrock_project_id=kwargs.get("aws_bedrock_project_id"),
+            **{key: kwargs[key] for key in AWS_CREDENTIAL_KWARGS_KEYS if key in kwargs},
         )
         cast(LiteLLMLoggingObj, logging).update_environment_variables(
             model=model,

litellm/model_prices_and_context_window_backup.json

@@ -11331,6 +11331,7 @@
         "supports_prompt_caching": true,
         "supports_reasoning": true,
         "supports_response_schema": true,
+        "supports_native_structured_output": true,
         "supports_tool_choice": true,
         "supports_vision": true
     },
@@ -11362,6 +11363,7 @@
         "supports_prompt_caching": true,
         "supports_reasoning": true,
         "supports_response_schema": true,
+        "supports_native_structured_output": true,
         "supports_tool_choice": true,
         "supports_vision": true,
         "supports_web_search": true
@@ -11424,6 +11426,7 @@
         "supports_prompt_caching": true,
         "supports_reasoning": true,
         "supports_response_schema": true,
+        "supports_native_structured_output": true,
         "supports_max_reasoning_effort": true,
         "supports_tool_choice": true,
         "supports_vision": true,
@@ -11479,6 +11482,7 @@
         "supports_prompt_caching": true,
         "supports_reasoning": true,
         "supports_response_schema": true,
+        "supports_native_structured_output": true,
         "supports_tool_choice": true,
         "supports_vision": true
     },
@@ -11506,6 +11510,7 @@
         "supports_prompt_caching": true,
         "supports_reasoning": true,
         "supports_response_schema": true,
+        "supports_native_structured_output": true,
         "supports_tool_choice": true,
         "supports_vision": true
     },
@@ -11559,6 +11564,7 @@
         "supports_prompt_caching": true,
         "supports_reasoning": true,
         "supports_response_schema": true,
+        "supports_native_structured_output": true,
         "supports_tool_choice": true,
         "supports_vision": true,
         "supports_output_config": true
@@ -11586,6 +11592,7 @@
         "supports_prompt_caching": true,
         "supports_reasoning": true,
         "supports_response_schema": true,
+        "supports_native_structured_output": true,
         "supports_tool_choice": true,
         "supports_vision": true,
         "supports_output_config": true
@@ -11614,6 +11621,7 @@
         "supports_prompt_caching": true,
         "supports_reasoning": true,
         "supports_response_schema": true,
+        "supports_native_structured_output": true,
         "supports_tool_choice": true,
         "supports_vision": true,
         "provider_specific_entry": {
@@ -11648,6 +11656,7 @@
         "supports_prompt_caching": true,
         "supports_reasoning": true,
         "supports_response_schema": true,
+        "supports_native_structured_output": true,
         "supports_tool_choice": true,
         "supports_vision": true,
         "provider_specific_entry": {
@@ -11682,6 +11691,7 @@
         "supports_prompt_caching": true,
         "supports_reasoning": true,
         "supports_response_schema": true,
+        "supports_native_structured_output": true,
         "supports_sampling_params": false,
         "supports_tool_choice": true,
         "supports_vision": true,
@@ -11718,6 +11728,7 @@
         "supports_prompt_caching": true,
         "supports_reasoning": true,
         "supports_response_schema": true,
+        "supports_native_structured_output": true,
         "supports_sampling_params": false,
         "supports_tool_choice": true,
         "supports_vision": true,
@@ -11788,6 +11799,7 @@
         "supports_prompt_caching": true,
         "supports_reasoning": true,
         "supports_response_schema": true,
+        "supports_native_structured_output": true,
         "supports_sampling_params": false,
         "supports_tool_choice": true,
         "supports_vision": true,

litellm/models/verification_token.py

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ class LiteLLM_VerificationToken(LiteLLMPydanticObjectBase):
     budget_reset_at: Optional[datetime] = None
     allowed_cache_controls: Optional[list] = []
     allowed_routes: Optional[list] = []
+    key_type: str | None = None
     permissions: Dict = {}
     model_spend: Dict = {}
     model_max_budget: Dict = {}

litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/auth/user_api_key_auth_mcp.py

@@ -18,6 +18,9 @@ from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.outbound_credentials.bridge_credenti
     is_bridge_envelope_shaped,
     resolve_bridge_envelope,
 )
+from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.outbound_credentials.envelope import (
+    EnvelopeIdentity,
+)
 from litellm.proxy._types import (
     UI_TEAM_ID,
     LiteLLM_TeamTable,
@@ -543,7 +546,7 @@ class MCPRequestHandler:
                 header_key = server.alias or server.server_name
                 if header_key is None:
                     raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Server misconfigured: MCP server has no routable name")
-                admitted = await MCPRequestHandler._reload_admitted_key(result.identity.key_hash)
+                admitted = await MCPRequestHandler._reload_admitted_principal(result.identity)
                 await MCPRequestHandler._enforce_admitted_live_policy(admitted=admitted, request=request, route=route)
                 injected = {header_key: {"Authorization": result.upstream_authorization.get_secret_value()}}
                 new_headers = {**(mcp_server_auth_headers or {}), **injected}
@@ -572,6 +575,89 @@ class MCPRequestHandler:
             route=route,
         )
 
+    @staticmethod
+    async def _reload_admitted_principal(identity: EnvelopeIdentity) -> UserAPIKeyAuth:
+        """Reload the live litellm record the envelope's subject references.
+
+        Dispatches on the sealed subject type: a ``key_hash`` reloads the virtual key that
+        minted the envelope (the scripted two-header client that presents a litellm key at the
+        token endpoint), a ``user_id`` reloads the user that authenticated interactively (the
+        DCR client, whose SSO login at the bridged authorize yields a user, not a key). Both
+        return a ``UserAPIKeyAuth`` the caller runs through the centralized policy gate, so
+        team/project/org/budget/SCIM enforcement is identical to the principal presenting
+        itself directly."""
+        match identity.subject_type:
+            case "key_hash":
+                return await MCPRequestHandler._reload_admitted_key(identity.subject)
+            case "user_id":
+                return await MCPRequestHandler._reload_admitted_user(identity.subject)
+            case _:
+                assert_never(identity.subject_type)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    async def _reload_admitted_user(user_id: str) -> UserAPIKeyAuth:
+        """Reload the live user an interactively-minted envelope references and admit them as
+        themselves.
+
+        The DCR client authenticates via SSO at the bridged authorize, which yields a user
+        subject rather than a virtual key, so the envelope admits under the user's own
+        identity: the reloaded ``user_id`` and the user's own MCP object permission ride on the
+        returned ``UserAPIKeyAuth``, and the SAME ``get_allowed_mcp_servers`` the key path uses then
+        computes which servers the user may reach, so the user's litellm MCP grants and access groups
+        gate the request exactly as a key's do. Only the user's OWN object permission is bound: a
+        ``UserAPIKeyAuth`` carries a single ``team_id`` while a user may belong to many teams, so
+        team-inherited MCP grants for a user are a follow-up (they need a many-teams union
+        ``get_allowed_mcp_servers`` does not do off one auth object). The caller's centralized policy
+        gate enforces the user's live budget and org state, and a SCIM-deactivated owner fails closed.
+
+        Error handling mirrors the key path's retryable-503 contract, but ``get_user_object`` defeats a
+        type-based check: where ``get_key_object`` raises a typed ``ProxyException`` for a missing key
+        and lets a DB outage propagate raw, ``get_user_object`` catches every DB failure and re-raises a
+        bare ``ValueError``, so a missing user and a real outage look identical and the original error
+        survives only as ``__context__``. ``_raise_503_if_db_unavailable`` therefore walks the cause
+        chain: a transient DB outage still surfaces as a retryable 503, while a missing user, or any
+        other non-outage resolution failure, fails closed as a 401 rather than an opaque 500. The
+        object-permission load shares this one boundary, so an outage there is classified the same
+        way (``get_object_permission`` itself swallows a failed load to ``None``, matching how
+        ``get_key_object`` best-effort-loads a key's object permission)."""
+        from litellm.proxy.auth.auth_checks import get_object_permission, get_user_object
+        from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import prisma_client, user_api_key_cache
+
+        if prisma_client is None:
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Server misconfigured: no database connection")
+        try:
+            user_object = await get_user_object(
+                user_id=user_id,
+                prisma_client=prisma_client,
+                user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache,
+                user_id_upsert=False,
+            )
+            # Resolve the user's own MCP object permission (get_user_object does not load it) so the shared
+            # get_allowed_mcp_servers can grant the user their litellm-granted servers. Reuses the same
+            # get_object_permission resolver the key and team paths use; no permission logic is duplicated.
+            object_permission = user_object.object_permission if user_object is not None else None
+            if user_object is not None and object_permission is None and user_object.object_permission_id:
+                object_permission = await get_object_permission(
+                    object_permission_id=user_object.object_permission_id,
+                    prisma_client=prisma_client,
+                    user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache,
+                )
+        except (ProxyException, HTTPException):
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid or expired credential") from None
+        except Exception as e:  # noqa: BLE001  # a DB outage anywhere in the resolution is a retryable 503, not an opaque 500; anything else fails closed as 401
+            MCPRequestHandler._raise_503_if_db_unavailable(e)
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid or expired credential") from None
+        if user_object is None:
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid or expired credential")
+        if isinstance(user_object.metadata, dict) and user_object.metadata.get("scim_active") is False:
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid or expired credential")
+        return UserAPIKeyAuth(
+            user_id=user_object.user_id,
+            user_role=user_object.user_role,
+            object_permission=object_permission,
+            object_permission_id=user_object.object_permission_id,
+        )
+
     @staticmethod
     async def _reload_admitted_key(key_hash: str) -> UserAPIKeyAuth:
         """Reload the live key record an admitted envelope references and re-check live policy.
@@ -615,10 +701,14 @@ class MCPRequestHandler:
         """Raise a retryable 503 when ``e`` means the auth database is unreachable, else return so the
         caller applies its own fail-closed mapping. A DB outage must not masquerade as an auth failure
         (401) or surface as an opaque 500; the caller retries. Mirrors ``UserAPIKeyAuthExceptionHandler``,
-        which renders a service-unavailable database error as 503 on the standard pipeline."""
+        which renders a service-unavailable database error as 503 on the standard pipeline.
+
+        Classifies across the ``__cause__``/``__context__`` chain, not just ``e`` itself: ``get_user_object``
+        re-raises every DB failure as a bare ``ValueError``, so a type-based check on the top exception
+        would miss a real outage wrapped inside it."""
         from litellm.proxy.db.exception_handler import PrismaDBExceptionHandler
 
-        if PrismaDBExceptionHandler.is_database_service_unavailable_error(e):
+        if PrismaDBExceptionHandler.is_database_service_unavailable_error_in_chain(e):
             raise HTTPException(
                 status_code=503,
                 detail="Service Unavailable, the authentication database is temporarily unreachable. Please retry shortly.",

litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/bridge_token_flow.py

@@ -0,0 +1,694 @@
+"""Bridge token flow: litellm identity resolution and the DCR-bridge oauth_delegate mint/refresh pipeline."""
+
+import math
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Literal, Optional
+
+from fastapi import HTTPException, Request
+from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
+from pydantic import SecretStr
+from typing_extensions import assert_never
+
+from litellm._logging import verbose_logger
+from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.oauth_utils import TOKEN_NO_CACHE_HEADERS
+from litellm.types.mcp_server.mcp_server_manager import MCPServer
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.discoverable_endpoints import _BridgeAuthorizationCode
+    from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.outbound_credentials.envelope import (
+        EnvelopeIdentity,
+        EnvelopeKeys,
+        RefreshCredential,
+        UpstreamTokenGrant,
+    )
+    from litellm.proxy._types import UserAPIKeyAuth
+
+
+def _litellm_key_from_request(request: Request) -> Optional[str]:
+    """Return the LiteLLM API key presented on the request, or ``None``.
+
+    Accepts the key from ``x-litellm-api-key`` (what MCP clients such as Claude Desktop/Code
+    send) as well as ``Authorization``; either may carry a bare token or ``Bearer <token>``.
+    ``x-litellm-api-key`` wins when both are present, since ``Authorization`` may instead carry
+    an OAuth/upstream bearer.
+    """
+    for header_value in (
+        request.headers.get("x-litellm-api-key"),
+        request.headers.get("Authorization") or request.headers.get("authorization"),
+    ):
+        if not header_value:
+            continue
+        value = header_value.strip()
+        if value.lower().startswith("bearer "):
+            value = value[7:].strip()
+        if value:
+            return value
+    return None
+
+
+def _key_is_active(key_obj: "UserAPIKeyAuth") -> bool:
+    """``True`` when the presented key is neither blocked nor past its expiry.
+
+    The OAuth token endpoint is unauthenticated, so the presented key is validated here before it is
+    trusted; a revoked or expired key must not mint a bridge envelope or write a stored credential.
+    ``get_key_object`` resolves a row without these checks (the main ``user_api_key_auth`` pipeline
+    enforces them downstream, which this endpoint bypasses), so they are applied here. Deleted keys
+    are already rejected upstream, where ``get_key_object`` raises on a row that no longer exists.
+
+    This is an active-state gate only; it deliberately does not require a ``user_id``. A valid
+    team-scoped or service-account key has no ``user_id`` yet is a legitimate credential, so gating
+    on ``user_id`` presence would wrongly reject it. Callers that need the user (the per-user token
+    store) derive it separately via :func:`_active_key_user_id`.
+
+    Total by design: ``expires`` is typed ``str | datetime``, and an unparseable string would make
+    ``datetime.fromisoformat`` raise. Since the callers run this outside their key-resolution
+    ``try``, an uncaught parse error would surface as a 500 instead of the endpoint's fail-closed
+    behavior, so a malformed expiry is treated as inactive (return ``False``) rather than raising.
+    """
+    if key_obj.blocked is True:
+        return False
+    expires = key_obj.expires
+    if expires is not None:
+        if isinstance(expires, datetime):
+            expiry = expires
+        else:
+            try:
+                expiry = datetime.fromisoformat(expires)
+            except (ValueError, TypeError):
+                return False
+        if expiry.tzinfo is None or expiry.tzinfo.utcoffset(expiry) is None:
+            expiry = expiry.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+        if expiry < datetime.now(timezone.utc):
+            return False
+    return True
+
+
+def _active_key_user_id(key_obj: "UserAPIKeyAuth") -> str | None:
+    """The active key's ``user_id``, or ``None`` when the key is blocked/expired or simply has no
+    ``user_id`` (a team-scoped or service-account key). Used only by the per-user token store, which
+    needs a user to key the stored credential; the bridge mint uses the key hash and does not."""
+    return key_obj.user_id if _key_is_active(key_obj) else None
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class _ResolvedKey:
+    """An active litellm key resolved from the token request: its hash (the value ``get_key_object``
+    and the cache/DB layer key the record by) and the live record."""
+
+    key_hash: str
+    key: "UserAPIKeyAuth"
+
+
+_KeyResolutionFailure = Literal["no_active_key", "unavailable", "unresolvable"]
+"""Why a token request yielded no active litellm key, kept distinct so a caller statuses each truthfully
+instead of blaming the client for a gateway problem:
+- ``no_active_key``: none was presented, or the presented key is unknown / blocked / expired (the
+  caller's request is at fault)
+- ``unavailable``: the auth database was transiently unreachable while resolving (retryable)
+- ``unresolvable``: the gateway cannot resolve identity right now (no DB connection, or an unexpected
+  error) -- a gateway fault, not the caller's
+The classification mirrors admission's ``_reload_admitted_key`` so the mint (ingress) and admission
+(egress) never disagree on the status of the same outage."""
+
+
+async def _resolve_active_litellm_key(request: Request) -> "_ResolvedKey | _KeyResolutionFailure":
+    """Resolve the presented litellm key to an active key record, or say precisely why not.
+
+    Single resolution path the OAuth token endpoint reuses, resolving authoritatively via
+    ``get_key_object`` (cache first, then DB). The failure is a value, not a bare ``None``, so a caller
+    can tell "the client sent no usable credential" (a request error) apart from "the gateway could not
+    check" (an infrastructure error) and status each truthfully; collapsing both to ``None`` is what let
+    a DB outage read as a 400. A resolved key is still gated by ``_key_is_active``, so a blocked or
+    expired key is ``no_active_key`` while a valid team-scoped or service-account key (no ``user_id``)
+    resolves. Classification mirrors admission's ``_reload_admitted_key``: no DB connection is a gateway
+    fault, a ``ProxyException`` / ``HTTPException`` from ``get_key_object`` is an unknown or invalid key,
+    a database-service-unavailable error is a retryable outage, and anything else is an unexpected
+    gateway fault."""
+    token = _litellm_key_from_request(request)
+    if not token:
+        return "no_active_key"
+    from litellm.proxy._types import hash_token  # noqa: PLC0415  # inline import avoids a module-load circular import
+
+    return await _reload_active_key_by_hash(hash_token(token))
+
+
+async def _reload_active_key_by_hash(key_hash: str) -> "_ResolvedKey | _KeyResolutionFailure":
+    """Reload the live key record for ``key_hash`` (cache first, then DB) and gate it on active state,
+    returning the resolved key or a precise failure. Shared by the token request's presented-key
+    resolution (:func:`_resolve_active_litellm_key`, which hashes the presented key) and the refresh
+    path (which already holds the hash sealed in the refresh envelope), so both re-validate identity
+    through one active-key gate and one failure classification. Classification mirrors admission's
+    ``_reload_admitted_key``: no DB connection is a gateway fault, a ``ProxyException`` / ``HTTPException``
+    from ``get_key_object`` is an unknown or invalid key, a database-service-unavailable error is a
+    retryable outage, and anything else is an unexpected gateway fault. A blocked or expired key is
+    ``no_active_key``, so a revoked key can neither mint nor refresh a bridge envelope."""
+    from litellm.proxy._types import (
+        ProxyException,  # noqa: PLC0415  # inline import avoids a module-load circular import
+    )
+    from litellm.proxy.auth.auth_checks import (  # noqa: PLC0415  # inline import avoids a module-load circular import
+        get_key_object,
+    )
+    from litellm.proxy.db.exception_handler import (  # noqa: PLC0415  # inline import avoids a module-load circular import
+        PrismaDBExceptionHandler,
+    )
+    from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import (  # noqa: PLC0415  # inline import avoids a module-load circular import
+        prisma_client,
+        user_api_key_cache,
+    )
+
+    if prisma_client is None:
+        return "unresolvable"
+    try:
+        key_obj = await get_key_object(
+            hashed_token=key_hash,
+            prisma_client=prisma_client,
+            user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache,
+        )
+    except (ProxyException, HTTPException):
+        return "no_active_key"
+    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001  # classify: a DB outage is retryable, anything else is an opaque gateway fault
+        if PrismaDBExceptionHandler.is_database_service_unavailable_error(exc):
+            return "unavailable"
+        verbose_logger.debug(
+            "_reload_active_key_by_hash: unexpected key-resolution error (%s)",
+            type(exc).__name__,
+        )
+        return "unresolvable"
+    if not _key_is_active(key_obj):
+        return "no_active_key"
+    return _ResolvedKey(key_hash=key_hash, key=key_obj)
+
+
+async def _reload_active_user_by_id(user_id: str) -> "_KeyResolutionFailure | None":
+    """Re-validate a live litellm user by id, returning ``None`` when the user is active or a precise
+    failure otherwise. The interactive DCR client authenticates via SSO, so its refresh envelope seals a
+    user subject; renewing it must re-check the user is still live (present and not SCIM-deactivated) so a
+    deactivated user cannot keep refreshing, mirroring how admission re-validates the same user subject on
+    the egress side. No DB connection is a gateway fault (``unresolvable``) and a
+    database-service-unavailable error is a retryable outage (``unavailable``). Everything else fails
+    closed as ``no_active_key`` (the caller maps it to invalid_grant): a ``ProxyException`` /
+    ``HTTPException``, a SCIM-deactivated user, and, unlike the key path, a missing user. ``get_user_object``
+    catches every DB failure and re-raises a bare ``ValueError`` (a deleted user and a real outage look
+    identical, the original error surviving only as ``__context__``), so the outage check walks the cause
+    chain, and a missing user falls through to ``no_active_key`` rather than an opaque gateway fault."""
+    from litellm.proxy._types import (
+        ProxyException,  # noqa: PLC0415  # inline import avoids a module-load circular import
+    )
+    from litellm.proxy.auth.auth_checks import (  # noqa: PLC0415  # inline import avoids a module-load circular import
+        get_user_object,
+    )
+    from litellm.proxy.db.exception_handler import (  # noqa: PLC0415  # inline import avoids a module-load circular import
+        PrismaDBExceptionHandler,
+    )
+    from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import (  # noqa: PLC0415  # inline import avoids a module-load circular import
+        prisma_client,
+        user_api_key_cache,
+    )
+
+    if prisma_client is None:
+        return "unresolvable"
+    try:
+        user_object = await get_user_object(
+            user_id=user_id,
+            prisma_client=prisma_client,
+            user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache,
+            user_id_upsert=False,
+        )
+    except (ProxyException, HTTPException):
+        return "no_active_key"
+    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001  # a DB outage is retryable; a missing user (get_user_object's wrapped ValueError) or any other resolution failure fails closed as no_active_key, never a 500
+        if PrismaDBExceptionHandler.is_database_service_unavailable_error_in_chain(exc):
+            return "unavailable"
+        verbose_logger.debug("_reload_active_user_by_id: user-resolution error (%s)", type(exc).__name__)
+        return "no_active_key"
+    if user_object is None:
+        return "no_active_key"
+    if isinstance(user_object.metadata, dict) and user_object.metadata.get("scim_active") is False:
+        return "no_active_key"
+    return None
+
+
+async def _key_owner_scim_deactivated(key: "UserAPIKeyAuth") -> bool:
+    """True only when the key's owning user was explicitly SCIM-deactivated, so a refresh revokes an
+    offboarded owner's key exactly as admission does via ``_reject_if_admitted_owner_scim_deactivated``.
+    A key with no owner, a missing owner record, or a failed lookup fails OPEN (returns ``False``),
+    matching admission and the standard builder: a key may outlive its owner record, and a transient DB
+    blip must not revoke a live key. Only an explicit ``scim_active`` of ``False`` gates renewal."""
+    if key.user_id is None:
+        return False
+    from litellm.proxy.auth.auth_checks import (  # noqa: PLC0415  # inline import avoids a module-load circular import
+        get_user_object,
+    )
+    from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import (  # noqa: PLC0415  # inline import avoids a module-load circular import
+        prisma_client,
+        user_api_key_cache,
+    )
+
+    if prisma_client is None:
+        return False
+    try:
+        owner = await get_user_object(
+            user_id=key.user_id,
+            prisma_client=prisma_client,
+            user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache,
+            user_id_upsert=False,
+        )
+    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001  # fail open: a missing owner (get_user_object's wrapped ValueError) or a DB blip must not revoke a live key
+        verbose_logger.debug("refresh: key-owner SCIM lookup failed, not revoking (%s)", type(exc).__name__)
+        return False
+    return owner is not None and isinstance(owner.metadata, dict) and owner.metadata.get("scim_active") is False
+
+
+async def _revalidate_active_subject(identity: "EnvelopeIdentity") -> "_KeyResolutionFailure | None":
+    """Re-validate that the subject sealed in a refresh envelope is still live, dispatching on its type:
+    a key_hash reloads the virtual key, a user_id reloads the user. Returns ``None`` when the subject is
+    active or a precise failure otherwise, so revocation gates renewal for either identity source the same
+    way admission gates the egress: a blocked or expired key, a SCIM-deactivated key owner (mirroring
+    admission's owner check, so an offboarded user cannot keep renewing a still-active key), and a
+    deactivated or deleted user all fail closed to ``no_active_key``."""
+    match identity.subject_type:
+        case "key_hash":
+            reloaded = await _reload_active_key_by_hash(identity.subject)
+            if not isinstance(reloaded, _ResolvedKey):
+                return reloaded
+            if await _key_owner_scim_deactivated(reloaded.key):
+                return "no_active_key"
+            return None
+        case "user_id":
+            return await _reload_active_user_by_id(identity.subject)
+        case _:
+            assert_never(identity.subject_type)
+
+
+async def _extract_user_id_from_request(request: Request) -> str | None:
+    """The litellm ``user_id`` for the token request, so a per-user token is stored under the same
+    identity the egress later reads it by. Storage is best-effort, so every non-resolved outcome
+    (including a transient DB outage) collapses to ``None`` here and the caller simply skips the store;
+    the bridge mint, which must status those outcomes differently, consumes
+    :func:`_resolve_active_litellm_key` directly."""
+    resolved = await _resolve_active_litellm_key(request)
+    if not isinstance(resolved, _ResolvedKey):
+        return None
+    return _active_key_user_id(resolved.key)
+
+
+_UpstreamGrantRejection = Literal["no_access_token", "expired_lifetime"]
+"""Why an upstream token response cannot back a bridge envelope:
+- ``no_access_token``: the response carries no usable ``access_token``
+- ``expired_lifetime``: the response reports a parseable, non-positive ``expires_in``, i.e. an upstream
+  token that is already dead, so sealing it would forward a bearer the edge cannot use
+An absent or unparseable ``expires_in`` is NOT a rejection; the lifetime is merely unknown and the
+envelope caps it, the by-design behaviour for an upstream that omits the field."""
+
+
+def _classify_upstream_lifetime(raw_expires_in: object) -> "int | Literal['unspecified', 'expired']":
+    """Classify an upstream ``expires_in`` into a positive number of seconds, ``"unspecified"`` (absent
+    or unparseable, so the envelope caps it), or ``"expired"`` (a non-positive value the upstream reports
+    as already elapsed). Telling "we do not know the lifetime" apart from "the upstream says it is
+    already dead" is what stops an explicitly-expired token from silently receiving the envelope's 1h
+    cap. The expired decision is made on the parsed numeric value, not on ``int(...)`` of it, so a
+    positive sub-second lifetime in ``(0, 1)`` is not truncated to ``0`` and misread as elapsed; the
+    envelope works in whole seconds, so such a lifetime clamps up to its 1s floor. ``bool`` is excluded
+    (an ``int`` subclass but never a real lifetime), and the conversions can raise on ``NaN`` /
+    ``Infinity`` / oversized input, which reads as unparseable rather than surfacing as a 500."""
+    if raw_expires_in is None or isinstance(raw_expires_in, bool) or not isinstance(raw_expires_in, (int, float, str)):
+        return "unspecified"
+    try:
+        numeric = float(raw_expires_in)
+        seconds = int(numeric)
+    except (ValueError, TypeError, OverflowError):
+        return "unspecified"
+    if numeric <= 0:
+        return "expired"
+    return max(1, seconds)
+
+
+def _bridge_grant_from_token_response(token_response: object) -> "UpstreamTokenGrant | _UpstreamGrantRejection":
+    """Validate an upstream OAuth token response into a typed grant, or say why it cannot back an
+    envelope. Each field is isinstance-checked so nothing untyped from ``response.json()`` reaches the
+    grant. ``expires_in`` is read three ways (see :func:`_classify_upstream_lifetime`): an unknown
+    lifetime leaves the grant ``expires_in`` ``None`` for the envelope to cap, a positive value is
+    honoured, and an explicit already-elapsed value is a rejection rather than a silent fall-through to
+    the cap."""
+    from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.outbound_credentials.envelope import (  # noqa: PLC0415  # inline import avoids a module-load circular import
+        UpstreamTokenGrant,
+    )
+
+    if not isinstance(token_response, dict):
+        return "no_access_token"
+    access = token_response.get("access_token")
+    if not isinstance(access, str) or not access:
+        return "no_access_token"
+    lifetime = _classify_upstream_lifetime(token_response.get("expires_in"))
+    if lifetime == "expired":
+        return "expired_lifetime"
+    token_type = token_response.get("token_type")
+    scope = token_response.get("scope")
+    return UpstreamTokenGrant(
+        access_token=SecretStr(access),
+        token_type=token_type if isinstance(token_type, str) and token_type else "Bearer",
+        # The upstream refresh_token is deliberately NOT sealed: the edge never consumes it (it forwards
+        # only token_type + access_token), so it would be dead weight embedding a long-lived upstream
+        # credential in the client-held bearer, and it enlarges the envelope. Refresh support is a
+        # follow-up (a dedicated refresh-envelope); the client re-runs authorization_code at the cap.
+        refresh_token=None,
+        scope=scope if isinstance(scope, str) and scope else None,
+        expires_in=lifetime if isinstance(lifetime, int) else None,
+    )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# DCR-bridge oauth_delegate mint: a three-phase pipeline whose failures are values.
+#
+#   prepare  (before the upstream exchange) -> validate every precondition and resolve identity+keys
+#   exchange (the single-use upstream code is consumed here, in exchange_token_with_server)
+#   finish   (after the exchange)           -> seal the upstream grant into the client-held envelope
+#
+# Every precondition lives in ``prepare``, which runs BEFORE the exchange, so no failure can burn the
+# single-use code or rotate a refresh token, for either grant type -- that whole class of bug is gone
+# by construction rather than guarded case by case. Failures are values mapped to an OAuth-shaped
+# response in one place (``_bridge_mint_error_response``), so status codes and the RFC 6749 §5.2 body
+# shape are uniform. Adding a failure mode is a new literal plus a match arm the type checker forces.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+_BridgeMintError = Literal[
+    "no_identity",
+    "invalid_refresh",
+    "identity_unavailable",
+    "identity_unresolvable",
+    "not_configured",
+    "no_upstream_token",
+    "upstream_token_expired",
+    "too_large",
+]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class _BridgeMintReady:
+    """Everything the seal needs, resolved once before the exchange: the identity to bind the envelope
+    to and the master-key-derived envelope keys. The identity is a key_hash subject for the scripted
+    two-header client (resolved from the litellm key it presents) or a user_id subject for the
+    interactive SSO client (the user recovered from the gateway authorization code), so one phase-3 seal
+    serves both. Resolving identity here means ``_finish_bridge_mint`` has no preconditions left to
+    fail."""
+
+    identity: "EnvelopeIdentity"
+    keys: "EnvelopeKeys"
+
+
+def _bridge_mint_error_response(error: _BridgeMintError) -> JSONResponse:
+    """Map a bridge-mint failure value to its token-endpoint response: one place, RFC 6749 §5.2 shape
+    (top-level ``error``, no-store headers) for every case, with a status truthful about where the
+    failure is. The caller's request is 400, a transient gateway outage is 503, a gateway
+    misconfiguration is 500, and an upstream problem is 502. The identity-resolution statuses match how
+    admission statuses the same conditions on the egress side, so mint and admit never disagree under
+    one outage."""
+    match error:
+        case "no_identity":
+            status, code, desc = (
+                400,
+                "invalid_request",
+                "this server issues a gateway-bound credential; complete the interactive sign-in, or "
+                "send a litellm credential (x-litellm-api-key or Authorization) on the token request",
+            )
+        case "invalid_refresh":
+            status, code, desc = (
+                400,
+                "invalid_grant",
+                "the refresh credential is not a valid, live refresh envelope for this server; "
+                "re-run authorization_code to obtain a new one",
+            )
+        case "identity_unavailable":
+            status, code, desc = (
+                503,
+                "temporarily_unavailable",
+                "the authentication database is temporarily unreachable; retry shortly",
+            )
+        case "identity_unresolvable":
+            status, code, desc = (
+                500,
+                "server_error",
+                "the gateway could not resolve the litellm identity for this request",
+            )
+        case "not_configured":
+            status, code, desc = (
+                500,
+                "server_error",
+                "the gateway is not configured to mint a gateway-bound credential (master_key is not set)",
+            )
+        case "no_upstream_token":
+            status, code, desc = (
+                502,
+                "server_error",
+                "the upstream token response has no usable access_token",
+            )
+        case "upstream_token_expired":
+            status, code, desc = (
+                502,
+                "server_error",
+                "the upstream token response reports an already-expired lifetime",
+            )
+        case "too_large":
+            status, code, desc = (
+                502,
+                "server_error",
+                "the upstream token is too large to seal into a gateway-bound credential",
+            )
+        case _:
+            assert_never(error)
+    return JSONResponse(
+        status_code=status, content={"error": code, "error_description": desc}, headers=TOKEN_NO_CACHE_HEADERS
+    )
+
+
+def _key_resolution_failure_to_mint_error(failure: _KeyResolutionFailure) -> _BridgeMintError:
+    """Lift an identity-resolution failure into the mint taxonomy, preserving origin so the status stays
+    truthful: the caller's missing credential is 400, a transient DB outage is 503, and a gateway that
+    cannot resolve identity is 500."""
+    match failure:
+        case "no_active_key":
+            return "no_identity"
+        case "unavailable":
+            return "identity_unavailable"
+        case "unresolvable":
+            return "identity_unresolvable"
+        case _:
+            assert_never(failure)
+
+
+def _upstream_rejection_to_mint_error(rejection: _UpstreamGrantRejection) -> _BridgeMintError:
+    """Lift an upstream-response rejection into the mint taxonomy; both are upstream faults (502)."""
+    match rejection:
+        case "no_access_token":
+            return "no_upstream_token"
+        case "expired_lifetime":
+            return "upstream_token_expired"
+        case _:
+            assert_never(rejection)
+
+
+async def _prepare_bridge_mint(
+    request: Request,
+    mcp_server: MCPServer,
+    bridge_identity: "_BridgeAuthorizationCode | None" = None,
+) -> "_BridgeMintReady | _BridgeMintError":
+    """Phase 1 for the authorization_code grant, BEFORE the upstream exchange: confirm the gateway can
+    mint (master_key set), resolve the litellm identity, and derive the envelope keys. Returns a ready
+    context or a precise failure value. Running before the exchange is what makes every failure here fail
+    closed without consuming the single-use code.
+
+    Two identity sources, one envelope. The interactive DCR client authenticates via SSO at the bridged
+    authorize, so its identity arrives as ``bridge_identity`` (the user recovered from the gateway
+    authorization code) and mints a user subject. The scripted two-header client presents a litellm key
+    on the token request instead, so its identity is the active key's hash and mints a key_hash subject.
+    A missing or invalid presented key keeps its resolution origin so the mapper statuses it truthfully;
+    neither source present is ``no_identity``. The refresh_token grant has its own phase-1
+    (:func:`_prepare_bridge_refresh`), which recovers identity from the presented refresh envelope."""
+    from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.outbound_credentials.bridge_credentials import (  # noqa: PLC0415  # inline import avoids a module-load circular import
+        envelope_keys_from_master_key,
+    )
+    from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.outbound_credentials.envelope import (  # noqa: PLC0415  # inline import avoids a module-load circular import
+        key_hash_identity,
+        user_identity,
+    )
+    from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import (  # noqa: PLC0415  # inline import avoids a module-load circular import
+        master_key,
+    )
+
+    if not master_key:
+        return "not_configured"
+    keys = envelope_keys_from_master_key(master_key)
+    if bridge_identity is not None:
+        identity = user_identity(server_id=mcp_server.server_id, user_id=bridge_identity.litellm_user_id)
+        return _BridgeMintReady(identity=identity, keys=keys)
+    resolved = await _resolve_active_litellm_key(request)
+    if not isinstance(resolved, _ResolvedKey):
+        return _key_resolution_failure_to_mint_error(resolved)
+    identity = key_hash_identity(server_id=mcp_server.server_id, key_hash=resolved.key_hash)
+    return _BridgeMintReady(identity=identity, keys=keys)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class _BridgeRefreshReady:
+    """A validated refresh request: the identity+keys to mint the renewed pair under, the upstream refresh
+    token (unwrapped from the client's refresh envelope) to exchange with the upstream IdP, and the scope
+    sealed alongside it at mint. The upstream refresh token is a ``SecretStr`` like every other credential
+    in this layer, so a repr or a traceback that captures this value never exposes the raw upstream refresh
+    token in plaintext. ``upstream_scope`` carries the originally-granted scope so the renewal re-requests
+    it when the client (a DCR/MCP client that typically omits scope on refresh) sends none, keeping the
+    renewed token's scope stable against an upstream that would otherwise narrow or drop it."""
+
+    ready: "_BridgeMintReady"
+    upstream_refresh_token: SecretStr
+    upstream_scope: str | None = None
+
+
+def _refresh_key_failure_to_mint_error(failure: _KeyResolutionFailure) -> _BridgeMintError:
+    """Lift an identity-resolution failure on the refresh path into the mint taxonomy. Unlike the mint
+    path, a resolved-but-inactive (or unknown) key is ``invalid_grant`` rather than ``invalid_request``:
+    the client did present an identity (sealed in the refresh envelope), but it is no longer live, so the
+    refresh is invalid and the client must re-authenticate. A transient outage is still 503 and a gateway
+    fault still 500, matching the mint path and admission."""
+    match failure:
+        case "no_active_key":
+            return "invalid_refresh"
+        case "unavailable":
+            return "identity_unavailable"
+        case "unresolvable":
+            return "identity_unresolvable"
+        case _:
+            assert_never(failure)
+
+
+async def _prepare_bridge_refresh(
+    mcp_server: MCPServer, refresh_value: str | None
+) -> "_BridgeRefreshReady | _BridgeMintError":
+    """Phase 1 for the refresh_token grant, BEFORE the upstream exchange: open the client's refresh
+    envelope, re-validate the sealed litellm identity so a revoked key cannot keep refreshing, and
+    recover the upstream refresh token to exchange. Identity comes entirely from the sealed envelope, not
+    the HTTP request, so the request object is not needed here. The client presents a refresh envelope,
+    never a raw upstream refresh token, so a missing value, a non-envelope, an unopenable envelope, or one
+    minted for another server is ``invalid_grant``. Running before the exchange means a rejected refresh
+    never consumes or rotates the upstream refresh token."""
+    from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.outbound_credentials.bridge_credentials import (  # noqa: PLC0415  # inline import avoids a module-load circular import
+        BridgeRefreshOpened,
+        envelope_keys_from_master_key,
+        open_bridge_refresh_envelope,
+    )
+    from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import (  # noqa: PLC0415  # inline import avoids a module-load circular import
+        master_key,
+    )
+
+    if not master_key:
+        return "not_configured"
+    if not refresh_value:
+        return "invalid_refresh"
+    keys = envelope_keys_from_master_key(master_key)
+    opened = open_bridge_refresh_envelope(refresh_value, keys, datetime.now(timezone.utc), mcp_server.server_id)
+    if not isinstance(opened, BridgeRefreshOpened):
+        return "invalid_refresh"
+    failure = await _revalidate_active_subject(opened.identity)
+    if failure is not None:
+        return _refresh_key_failure_to_mint_error(failure)
+    return _BridgeRefreshReady(
+        ready=_BridgeMintReady(identity=opened.identity, keys=keys),
+        upstream_refresh_token=opened.refresh.refresh_token,
+        upstream_scope=opened.refresh.scope,
+    )
+
+
+def _finish_bridge_mint(
+    ready: "_BridgeMintReady", mcp_server: MCPServer, token_response: object, now: datetime
+) -> "JSONResponse | _BridgeMintError":
+    """Phase 3, AFTER the upstream exchange: seal the upstream grant into the client-held access envelope
+    using the pre-resolved identity and keys, and, when the upstream returned a refresh token, seal a
+    long-lived refresh envelope alongside it so the client can renew without re-authenticating. Shared by
+    the authorization_code and refresh_token paths, so a renewal that the upstream rotates re-issues a
+    fresh refresh envelope. The only hard failures here are properties of the upstream access token (no
+    usable token, an already-expired lifetime, or a token too large to seal); a refresh token that cannot
+    be sealed degrades to an access-only response rather than failing the whole exchange."""
+    from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.outbound_credentials.bridge_credentials import (  # noqa: PLC0415  # inline import avoids a module-load circular import
+        build_bridge_token_response,
+    )
+    from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.outbound_credentials.envelope import (  # noqa: PLC0415  # inline import avoids a module-load circular import
+        SealedEnvelope,
+        UpstreamTokenGrant,
+    )
+
+    grant = _bridge_grant_from_token_response(token_response)
+    if not isinstance(grant, UpstreamTokenGrant):
+        return _upstream_rejection_to_mint_error(grant)
+    sealed = build_bridge_token_response(ready.identity, grant, ready.keys, now)
+    if not isinstance(sealed, SealedEnvelope):
+        return "too_large"
+    # Report expires_in from the JWT's own second-truncated exp, rounding the elapsed portion up, so the
+    # client is never told the bearer lives past the point admission (which uses that exp) rejects it.
+    expires_in = max(0, int(sealed.expires_at.timestamp()) - math.ceil(now.timestamp()))
+    refresh_envelope = _mint_refresh_envelope_value(ready.identity, token_response, ready.keys, now, mcp_server)
+    body = {
+        "access_token": sealed.token.get_secret_value(),
+        "token_type": "Bearer",
+        "expires_in": expires_in,
+        # A refresh envelope rides along only when the upstream returned a refresh token to seal; when it
+        # rotates on renewal, the client receives the new one and the old envelope's upstream token dies.
+        **({"refresh_token": refresh_envelope} if refresh_envelope is not None else {}),
+    }
+    return JSONResponse(body, headers=TOKEN_NO_CACHE_HEADERS)
+
+
+def _upstream_refresh_credential(token_response: object) -> "RefreshCredential | None":
+    """Extract the upstream refresh grant from a token response, or ``None`` when there is none to seal.
+    Each field is isinstance-checked so nothing untyped reaches the refresh envelope; ``refresh_expires_in``
+    (the refresh token's own lifetime, when the upstream reports it) is classified like ``expires_in`` and
+    bounds the refresh envelope's TTL. An upstream that reports the refresh token itself as already elapsed
+    (``refresh_expires_in`` non-positive) yields ``None`` rather than a refresh envelope: sealing a dead
+    token would hand the client a full-TTL-capped envelope the IdP will reject, so the exchange degrades to
+    an access-only response (the client re-authenticates at access expiry), mirroring how
+    :func:`_bridge_grant_from_token_response` refuses an already-elapsed access token instead of capping it."""
+    from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.outbound_credentials.envelope import (  # noqa: PLC0415  # inline import avoids a module-load circular import
+        RefreshCredential,
+    )
+
+    if not isinstance(token_response, dict):
+        return None
+    refresh = token_response.get("refresh_token")
+    if not isinstance(refresh, str) or not refresh:
+        return None
+    lifetime = _classify_upstream_lifetime(token_response.get("refresh_expires_in"))
+    if lifetime == "expired":
+        return None
+    scope = token_response.get("scope")
+    return RefreshCredential(
+        refresh_token=SecretStr(refresh),
+        scope=scope if isinstance(scope, str) and scope else None,
+        expires_in=lifetime if isinstance(lifetime, int) else None,
+    )
+
+
+def _mint_refresh_envelope_value(
+    identity: "EnvelopeIdentity", token_response: object, keys: "EnvelopeKeys", now: datetime, mcp_server: MCPServer
+) -> str | None:
+    """Seal the upstream refresh grant (if any) into a refresh envelope and return its bearer string, or
+    ``None`` when the upstream returned no refresh token or the refresh token is too large to seal. A
+    too-large refresh token degrades to an access-only response (logged) rather than failing an exchange
+    that already succeeded upstream: the client simply re-authenticates when the access envelope expires."""
+    from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.outbound_credentials.bridge_credentials import (  # noqa: PLC0415  # inline import avoids a module-load circular import
+        build_bridge_refresh_token_response,
+    )
+    from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.outbound_credentials.envelope import (  # noqa: PLC0415  # inline import avoids a module-load circular import
+        SealedEnvelope,
+    )
+
+    refresh_credential = _upstream_refresh_credential(token_response)
+    if refresh_credential is None:
+        return None
+    sealed = build_bridge_refresh_token_response(identity, refresh_credential, keys, now)
+    if isinstance(sealed, SealedEnvelope):
+        return sealed.token.get_secret_value()
+    verbose_logger.warning(
+        "bridge mint: the upstream refresh token is too large to seal into a refresh envelope for "
+        "server=%s; issuing an access-only response, so the client re-authenticates at access expiry",
+        mcp_server.server_id,
+    )
+    return None

litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/discoverable_endpoints.py

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ from urllib.parse import parse_qsl, urlencode, urlparse, urlunparse
 import httpx
 from fastapi import APIRouter, Form, HTTPException, Request
 from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse, JSONResponse, RedirectResponse, Response
-from pydantic import BaseModel, ValidationError
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field, SecretStr, ValidationError
 
 from litellm._logging import verbose_logger
 from litellm.llms.custom_httpx.http_handler import (
@@ -21,6 +21,24 @@ from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.auth.token_endpoint_auth import (
     TokenEndpointAuthConfigError,
     build_token_endpoint_client_auth,
 )
+from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.bridge_token_flow import (
+    _bridge_mint_error_response,
+    _BridgeMintReady,
+    _BridgeRefreshReady,
+    _extract_user_id_from_request,
+    _finish_bridge_mint,
+    _prepare_bridge_mint,
+    _prepare_bridge_refresh,
+)
+from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.faults import (
+    CallerRejected,
+    CredentialSource,
+    UpstreamProtocolFault,
+    classify_upstream_dcr_rejection,
+    classify_upstream_token_rejection,
+    dcr_fault_detail,
+    render_token_fault,
+)
 from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.oauth_utils import (
     TOKEN_NO_CACHE_HEADERS,
     get_request_base_url,
@@ -37,7 +55,7 @@ from litellm.types.mcp import MCPAuth, MCPCredentials
 from litellm.types.mcp_server.mcp_server_manager import MCPServer
 
 if TYPE_CHECKING:
-    from litellm.proxy._types import LiteLLM_MCPServerTable, UserAPIKeyAuth
+    from litellm.proxy._types import LiteLLM_MCPServerTable
 
 # TTL cache for upstream OAuth metadata fetched from pass-through MCP servers.
 # Keeps us from hammering the upstream IdP on each discovery request.
@@ -91,6 +109,8 @@ def encode_state_with_base_url(
     code_challenge: Optional[str] = None,
     code_challenge_method: Optional[str] = None,
     client_redirect_uri: Optional[str] = None,
+    litellm_user_id: str | None = None,
+    mcp_server_id: str | None = None,
 ) -> str:
     """
     Encode the base_url, original state, and PKCE parameters using encryption.
@@ -101,6 +121,11 @@ def encode_state_with_base_url(
         code_challenge: PKCE code challenge from client
         code_challenge_method: PKCE code challenge method from client
         client_redirect_uri: Original redirect_uri from client
+        litellm_user_id: The SSO-authenticated litellm user captured at the bridge authorize
+            (interactive dcr_bridge oauth_delegate only); the callback seals it into the gateway
+            authorization code so the token mint can bind the envelope to this user
+        mcp_server_id: The bridge server the interactive flow targets, sealed alongside
+            litellm_user_id so the gateway code cannot be replayed against another server
 
     Returns:
         An encrypted string that encodes all values
@@ -111,6 +136,8 @@ def encode_state_with_base_url(
         "code_challenge": code_challenge,
         "code_challenge_method": code_challenge_method,
         "client_redirect_uri": client_redirect_uri,
+        "litellm_user_id": litellm_user_id,
+        "mcp_server_id": mcp_server_id,
     }
     state_json = json.dumps(state_data, sort_keys=True)
     encrypted_state = encrypt_value_helper(state_json)
@@ -138,6 +165,68 @@ def decode_state_hash(encrypted_state: str) -> dict:
     return state_data
 
 
+_BRIDGE_AUTH_CODE_PREFIX = "llm_bcode_"
+
+
+class _BridgeAuthorizationCode(BaseModel):
+    """The identity and upstream code the gateway seals into the authorization code it hands a DCR
+    client for an interactive dcr_bridge oauth_delegate sign-in, recovered at the token endpoint."""
+
+    model_config = ConfigDict(frozen=True)
+    upstream_code: str = Field(min_length=1)
+    litellm_user_id: str = Field(min_length=1)
+    mcp_server_id: str = Field(min_length=1)
+
+
+def is_bridge_authorization_code(code: str) -> bool:
+    """Cheap prefix check that ``code`` is a gateway-sealed bridge authorization code rather than a
+    raw upstream code, so the token endpoint can route without decrypting."""
+    return code.startswith(_BRIDGE_AUTH_CODE_PREFIX)
+
+
+def seal_bridge_authorization_code(upstream_code: str, litellm_user_id: str, mcp_server_id: str) -> str:
+    """Seal the upstream authorization code and the SSO-captured litellm user into a gateway
+    authorization code. The DCR client only echoes this opaque value back at the token endpoint; the
+    gateway decrypts it there to recover the user (to bind the envelope) and the upstream code (to
+    exchange with the upstream), so a litellm identity captured in the browser at authorize survives
+    to the back-channel token call with nothing stored server-side. Encrypted with the repo's
+    authenticated symmetric helper (the same family the OAuth state uses), so the client can neither
+    read nor forge it."""
+    payload = json.dumps(
+        {"upstream_code": upstream_code, "litellm_user_id": litellm_user_id, "mcp_server_id": mcp_server_id},
+        sort_keys=True,
+    )
+    return _BRIDGE_AUTH_CODE_PREFIX + encrypt_value_helper(payload)
+
+
+def open_bridge_authorization_code(code: str) -> _BridgeAuthorizationCode | None:
+    """Recover the sealed identity and upstream code, or ``None`` when ``code`` is not a gateway
+    bridge code or does not decrypt / validate. Total over hostile input: a raw upstream code (the
+    scripted two-header path) returns ``None`` and the caller falls through to the existing
+    behavior."""
+    if not is_bridge_authorization_code(code):
+        return None
+    decrypted = decrypt_value_helper(
+        code[len(_BRIDGE_AUTH_CODE_PREFIX) :], "bridge_authorization_code", return_original_value=False
+    )
+    if not isinstance(decrypted, str):
+        return None
+    try:
+        return _BridgeAuthorizationCode.model_validate_json(decrypted)
+    except ValidationError:
+        return None
+
+
+def _redirect_to_litellm_login(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse:
+    """Send an unauthenticated browser through litellm login before the interactive bridge authorize
+    can capture its identity. The bridge oauth_delegate flow seals the SSO user into the gateway code,
+    so a session is required; without one there is nothing to bind. After login the user re-initiates
+    the connection, which then finds the session cookie (the seamless return-to round-trip, which is
+    origin-validated against the control-plane URL, is a follow-up)."""
+    base_url = get_request_base_url(request)
+    return RedirectResponse(f"{base_url}/sso/key/generate")
+
+
 # LIT-4197: some upstream authorization servers reject an over-long ``state``
 # (the encrypted OAuth session blob routinely exceeds their limit). The upstream
 # only needs an opaque value it echoes back on ``/callback``, so we forward a
@@ -304,90 +393,6 @@ def _validate_token_response(
             )
 
 
-def _litellm_key_from_request(request: Request) -> Optional[str]:
-    """Return the LiteLLM API key presented on the request, or ``None``.
-
-    Accepts the key from ``x-litellm-api-key`` (what MCP clients such as Claude Desktop/Code
-    send) as well as ``Authorization``; either may carry a bare token or ``Bearer <token>``.
-    ``x-litellm-api-key`` wins when both are present, since ``Authorization`` may instead carry
-    an OAuth/upstream bearer.
-    """
-    for header_value in (
-        request.headers.get("x-litellm-api-key"),
-        request.headers.get("Authorization") or request.headers.get("authorization"),
-    ):
-        if not header_value:
-            continue
-        value = header_value.strip()
-        if value.lower().startswith("bearer "):
-            value = value[7:].strip()
-        if value:
-            return value
-    return None
-
-
-def _active_key_user_id(key_obj: "UserAPIKeyAuth") -> Optional[str]:
-    """The key's ``user_id``, or ``None`` if the key is blocked or expired.
-
-    The OAuth token endpoint is unauthenticated, so the presented key is validated here before its
-    identity is trusted to key a stored credential; a revoked or expired key must not be able to
-    write or overwrite the per-user OAuth token. ``get_key_object`` resolves a row without these
-    checks (the main ``user_api_key_auth`` pipeline enforces them downstream, which this endpoint
-    bypasses), so they are applied here. Deleted keys are already rejected upstream, where
-    ``get_key_object`` raises on a row that no longer exists.
-    """
-    if key_obj.blocked is True:
-        return None
-    expires = key_obj.expires
-    if expires is not None:
-        expiry = expires if isinstance(expires, datetime) else datetime.fromisoformat(expires)
-        if expiry.tzinfo is None or expiry.tzinfo.utcoffset(expiry) is None:
-            expiry = expiry.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        if expiry < datetime.now(timezone.utc):
-            return None
-    return key_obj.user_id
-
-
-async def _extract_user_id_from_request(request: Request) -> Optional[str]:
-    """Resolve the LiteLLM ``user_id`` at the OAuth token endpoint so a per-user token is stored
-    under the same identity the egress later reads it by (``user_api_key_auth.user_id``).
-
-    Resolves authoritatively via ``get_key_object`` (cache first, then DB) instead of a raw cache
-    peek. On a multi-replica gateway the token-exchange request can land on a worker whose in-memory
-    cache never saw the key, and a cross-replica Redis hit deserializes to a plain ``dict`` rather
-    than a ``UserAPIKeyAuth``; the previous code read only ``Authorization`` and did
-    ``getattr(cached, "user_id")`` with no ``model_type`` rehydration and no DB fallback, so it
-    silently returned ``None`` and the token was never persisted, which makes the egress 401 on every
-    reconnect. The resolved key is validated (``_active_key_user_id``) before its identity is trusted,
-    so a blocked or expired key cannot write. Returns ``None`` when no key is present, the key cannot
-    be resolved, or it is blocked/expired.
-    """
-    token = _litellm_key_from_request(request)
-    if not token:
-        return None
-    try:
-        from litellm.proxy._types import hash_token  # noqa: PLC0415
-        from litellm.proxy.auth.auth_checks import get_key_object  # noqa: PLC0415
-        from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import (  # noqa: PLC0415
-            prisma_client,
-            user_api_key_cache,
-        )
-
-        key_obj = await get_key_object(
-            hashed_token=hash_token(token),
-            prisma_client=prisma_client,
-            user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache,
-        )
-        return _active_key_user_id(key_obj)
-    except Exception as exc:
-        verbose_logger.debug(
-            "_extract_user_id_from_request: could not resolve a LiteLLM user_id for the presented "
-            "key (%s); per-user token will not be stored server-side.",
-            type(exc).__name__,
-        )
-        return None
-
-
 async def _store_per_user_token_server_side(
     server: MCPServer,
     user_id: str,
@@ -620,12 +625,31 @@ async def authorize_with_server(
     parsed = urlparse(redirect_uri)
     base_url = urlunparse(parsed._replace(query=""))
     request_base_url = get_request_base_url(request)
+
+    # Interactive dcr_bridge oauth_delegate sign-in: this arm runs the gateway /callback and /token in
+    # the loop, so the gateway can capture the litellm user here (from the browser's UI session) and
+    # carry it to the back-channel token mint. Seal the SSO user and the target server into the state;
+    # the callback reads them back to mint the gateway authorization code. A DCR client cannot present a
+    # litellm key, so the browser session is the only identity source; without one there is nothing to
+    # bind, so send the user through login first. Every other oauth2 server keeps the identity-less state.
+    litellm_user_id: str | None = None
+    if mcp_server.is_dcr_bridge and mcp_server.is_oauth_delegate:
+        from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.byok_oauth_endpoints import (  # noqa: PLC0415  # inline import avoids a module-load circular import
+            _user_id_from_session_cookie,
+        )
+
+        litellm_user_id = _user_id_from_session_cookie(request)
+        if litellm_user_id is None:
+            return _redirect_to_litellm_login(request)
+
     encoded_state = encode_state_with_base_url(
         base_url=base_url,
         original_state=state,
         code_challenge=code_challenge,
         code_challenge_method=code_challenge_method,
         client_redirect_uri=redirect_uri,
+        litellm_user_id=litellm_user_id,
+        mcp_server_id=mcp_server.server_id if litellm_user_id else None,
     )
     relay_state = secrets.token_urlsafe(_OAUTH_STATE_HANDLE_BYTES)
 
@@ -654,6 +678,13 @@ async def authorize_with_server(
     return response
 
 
+def _token_credential_source(mcp_server: MCPServer) -> CredentialSource:
+    """Mirrors the resolved-client rule in :func:`exchange_token_with_server`: when the server has a
+    stored client_id the gateway presents its own credentials upstream, so a credential rejection is
+    the operator's fault, not the caller's."""
+    return "gateway_stored" if mcp_server.client_id else "caller_supplied"
+
+
 async def exchange_token_with_server(
     request: Request,
     mcp_server: MCPServer,
@@ -688,25 +719,61 @@ async def exchange_token_with_server(
     except TokenEndpointAuthConfigError as exc:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc)) from exc
 
+    bridge_identity: _BridgeAuthorizationCode | None = None
+    bridge_mint_ready: _BridgeMintReady | None = None
+    bridge_upstream_refresh: SecretStr | None = None
+    bridge_upstream_scope: str | None = None
+    refresh_request_scope: str | None = None
+    is_bridge = mcp_server.is_oauth_delegate and mcp_server.is_dcr_bridge
+
     if grant_type == "refresh_token":
-        if not refresh_token:
+        # Phase 1 for a bridge refresh: open the client's refresh envelope, re-validate the sealed
+        # identity, and unwrap the real upstream refresh token BEFORE building token_data, so the exchange
+        # sends the upstream token and never the envelope. A failure returns without touching the upstream.
+        if is_bridge:
+            prepared_refresh = await _prepare_bridge_refresh(mcp_server, refresh_token)
+            if not isinstance(prepared_refresh, _BridgeRefreshReady):
+                return _bridge_mint_error_response(prepared_refresh)
+            bridge_mint_ready = prepared_refresh.ready
+            bridge_upstream_refresh = prepared_refresh.upstream_refresh_token
+            bridge_upstream_scope = prepared_refresh.upstream_scope
+        # A bridge server sends the unwrapped upstream refresh token recovered from the client's refresh
+        # envelope above; every other server sends the client's own refresh token verbatim.
+        upstream_refresh_token = (
+            bridge_upstream_refresh.get_secret_value() if bridge_upstream_refresh is not None else refresh_token
+        )
+        if not upstream_refresh_token:
             raise HTTPException(
                 status_code=400,
                 detail="refresh_token is required for refresh_token grant",
             )
         token_data: dict = {
             "grant_type": "refresh_token",
-            "refresh_token": refresh_token,
+            "refresh_token": upstream_refresh_token,
             **client_auth.body,
         }
-        if scope:
-            token_data["scope"] = scope
+        refresh_request_scope = scope or bridge_upstream_scope
+        if refresh_request_scope:
+            token_data["scope"] = refresh_request_scope
     else:
         if not code:
             raise HTTPException(
                 status_code=400,
                 detail="code is required for authorization_code grant",
             )
+        # Interactive dcr_bridge oauth_delegate: the client presents the gateway authorization code the
+        # callback sealed. Recover the SSO user and the real upstream code from it; the upstream exchange
+        # below uses the upstream code, and the mint binds the envelope to the recovered user. Bind the
+        # sealed server to this request so a code minted for one bridge server cannot be spent at another.
+        # A raw upstream code (scripted path) opens to None and the code is used as-is.
+        bridge_identity = open_bridge_authorization_code(code)
+        if bridge_identity is not None:
+            if bridge_identity.mcp_server_id != mcp_server.server_id:
+                raise HTTPException(
+                    status_code=400,
+                    detail="Authorization code was issued for a different MCP server",
+                )
+            code = bridge_identity.upstream_code
         bridge_token_relay = _dcr_bridge_relays_client_registration(mcp_server)
         if bridge_token_relay and not redirect_uri:
             raise HTTPException(
@@ -726,32 +793,49 @@ async def exchange_token_with_server(
         }
         if code_verifier:
             token_data["code_verifier"] = code_verifier
-
+        # Phase 1 for a bridge authorization_code mint: resolve identity (the SSO user recovered above, or
+        # the presented litellm key) and the envelope keys BEFORE the exchange consumes the single-use code.
+        if is_bridge:
+            prepared = await _prepare_bridge_mint(request, mcp_server, bridge_identity)
+            if not isinstance(prepared, _BridgeMintReady):
+                return _bridge_mint_error_response(prepared)
+            bridge_mint_ready = prepared
     async_client = get_async_httpx_client(llm_provider=httpxSpecialProvider.Oauth2Check)
-    response = await async_client.post(
-        mcp_server.token_url,
-        headers={"Accept": "application/json", **client_auth.headers},
-        data=token_data,
-    )
+    try:
+        response = await async_client.post(
+            mcp_server.token_url,
+            headers={"Accept": "application/json", **client_auth.headers},
+            data=token_data,
+        )
+        if response is not None:
+            response.raise_for_status()
+    except httpx.HTTPStatusError as exc:
+        fault = classify_upstream_token_rejection(
+            exc.response,
+            credential_source=_token_credential_source(mcp_server),
+            log_context=mcp_server.server_id,
+        )
+        upstream_rejected_bridge_refresh = (
+            is_bridge
+            and grant_type == "refresh_token"
+            and isinstance(fault, CallerRejected)
+            and fault.code == "invalid_grant"
+        )
+        if upstream_rejected_bridge_refresh:
+            verbose_logger.info(
+                "bridge refresh: the upstream rejected the sealed refresh token for server=%s with "
+                "invalid_grant (revoked or expired at the IdP); returning invalid_grant so the client "
+                "re-runs authorization_code rather than an opaque upstream error",
+                mcp_server.server_id,
+            )
+            return _bridge_mint_error_response("invalid_refresh")
+        return render_token_fault(fault)
     if response is None:
         raise HTTPException(
             status_code=502,
             detail="MCP upstream token endpoint returned no response",
         )
-
-    try:
-        response.raise_for_status()
-    except httpx.HTTPStatusError as exc:
-        if "invalid_target" in exc.response.text:
-            verbose_logger.warning(
-                "MCP server %s: the upstream authorization server rejected the token request with "
-                "invalid_target; it may require RFC 8707 resource indicators, which the gateway "
-                "does not send yet (tracked as LIT-4339)",
-                mcp_server.server_id,
-            )
-        raise
     token_response = response.json()
-    access_token = token_response["access_token"]
 
     # Validate token response against server-configured rules before any storage.
     # This rejects tokens from wrong Slack workspaces, Atlassian orgs, etc.
@@ -791,8 +875,23 @@ async def exchange_token_with_server(
                 mcp_server.server_id,
             )
 
+    # A DCR-bridge oauth_delegate server hands the client a gateway-bound envelope (identity plus the
+    # upstream token) instead of the raw upstream token, so the one bearer both admits the caller and
+    # forwards the upstream credential. Only this mode mints; every other server returns the raw token.
+    if bridge_mint_ready is not None:
+        if refresh_request_scope and isinstance(token_response, dict) and not token_response.get("scope"):
+            token_response = {**token_response, "scope": refresh_request_scope}
+        # Phase 3: seal the upstream grant into the client-held envelope; failures map through the same
+        # OAuth-shaped response as the phase-1 preconditions.
+        minted = _finish_bridge_mint(bridge_mint_ready, mcp_server, token_response, datetime.now(timezone.utc))
+        return minted if isinstance(minted, JSONResponse) else _bridge_mint_error_response(minted)
+
+    raw_access_token = token_response.get("access_token") if isinstance(token_response, dict) else None
+    if not isinstance(raw_access_token, str) or not raw_access_token:
+        return render_token_fault(UpstreamProtocolFault(note="the upstream token response has no usable access_token"))
+
     result = {
-        "access_token": access_token,
+        "access_token": raw_access_token,
         "token_type": token_response.get("token_type", "Bearer"),
     }
 
@@ -1048,21 +1147,6 @@ async def _persist_dcr_client_registration(
         return "failed"
 
 
-_MAX_UPSTREAM_ERROR_CHARS = 500
-
-
-def _safe_upstream_error_detail(response: httpx.Response) -> str:
-    """Bounded plaintext summary of an upstream registration failure for the client.
-
-    RFC 7591 error bodies are small JSON objects (``error`` / ``error_description``); relaying the
-    text lets the client read the real reason instead of a bare 500, and the length bound keeps a
-    hostile or oversized upstream body from bloating the gateway response."""
-    body = response.text
-    if not body:
-        return response.reason_phrase or "upstream registration failed"
-    return body[:_MAX_UPSTREAM_ERROR_CHARS]
-
-
 async def register_client_with_server(
     request: Request,
     mcp_server: MCPServer,
@@ -1122,19 +1206,24 @@ async def register_client_with_server(
     }
 
     async_client = get_async_httpx_client(llm_provider=httpxSpecialProvider.Oauth2Register)
-    response = await async_client.post(
-        mcp_server.registration_url,
-        headers=headers,
-        json=register_data,
-    )
+    try:
+        response = await async_client.post(
+            mcp_server.registration_url,
+            headers=headers,
+            json=register_data,
+        )
+        if response is not None:
+            response.raise_for_status()
+    except httpx.HTTPStatusError as exc:
+        status_code, detail = dcr_fault_detail(
+            classify_upstream_dcr_rejection(exc.response, log_context=mcp_server.server_id)
+        )
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=status_code, detail=detail) from exc
     if response is None:
         raise HTTPException(
             status_code=502,
             detail="MCP upstream registration endpoint returned no response",
         )
-    if bridge_relay and response.status_code >= 400:
-        raise HTTPException(status_code=response.status_code, detail=_safe_upstream_error_detail(response))
-    response.raise_for_status()
 
     token_response = response.json()
 
@@ -1362,7 +1451,20 @@ async def callback(
         # states while permitting same-origin / allowlisted clients.
         redirect_uri = _get_validated_client_redirect_uri(request, state_data)
 
-        params = {"code": code, "state": original_state}
+        # Interactive dcr_bridge oauth_delegate: the state carries the litellm user the authorize step
+        # captured. Instead of forwarding the raw upstream code (which the client would present at the
+        # token endpoint with no way to prove who signed in), seal the user and the upstream code into a
+        # gateway authorization code and forward THAT. The token endpoint decrypts it to bind the
+        # envelope to this user. Every other flow forwards the raw code unchanged.
+        litellm_user_id = state_data.get("litellm_user_id")
+        mcp_server_id = state_data.get("mcp_server_id")
+        forwarded_code = code
+        if isinstance(litellm_user_id, str) and litellm_user_id and isinstance(mcp_server_id, str) and mcp_server_id:
+            forwarded_code = seal_bridge_authorization_code(
+                upstream_code=code, litellm_user_id=litellm_user_id, mcp_server_id=mcp_server_id
+            )
+
+        params = {"code": forwarded_code, "state": original_state}
         complete_returned_url = _append_query_params(redirect_uri, params)
         response = RedirectResponse(url=complete_returned_url, status_code=302)
         _clear_oauth_state_cookie(response, request, state)

litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/faults/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+"""Typed fault values for upstream OAuth/DCR failures (phase 1 of the MCP error-handling framework).
+
+The invariant this package exists to enforce: an upstream failure is classified ONCE into a single
+fault value, and the response status, wire error code, and prose are all derived from that value.
+Deriving all three from one classification makes contradictory pairings (a caller-fault error code on
+a server-fault status) unrepresentable, and gives the trust-boundary rule one enforcement point:
+spec-defined machine fields may cross to callers, upstream prose and raw bodies go to server logs.
+"""
+
+from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.faults.classify import (
+    classify_upstream_dcr_rejection,
+    classify_upstream_token_rejection,
+)
+from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.faults.render_oauth import (
+    dcr_fault_detail,
+    render_token_fault,
+)
+from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.faults.types import (
+    CallerRejected,
+    CredentialSource,
+    GatewayRejected,
+    UpstreamOAuthFault,
+    UpstreamProtocolFault,
+    UpstreamReportedFault,
+)
+
+__all__ = [
+    "CallerRejected",
+    "CredentialSource",
+    "GatewayRejected",
+    "UpstreamOAuthFault",
+    "UpstreamProtocolFault",
+    "UpstreamReportedFault",
+    "classify_upstream_dcr_rejection",
+    "classify_upstream_token_rejection",
+    "dcr_fault_detail",
+    "render_token_fault",
+]

litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/faults/classify.py

@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+"""The single place that reads upstream OAuth/DCR failure responses.
+
+Every accessor here is total: an upstream that lies about its content encoding, sends an undecodable
+body, or omits the spec fields yields a classified fault, never an exception. Nothing outside this
+module should touch a failed upstream response's body.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import httpx
+
+from litellm._logging import verbose_logger
+from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.faults.types import (
+    GATEWAY_CAPABILITY_CODES,
+    GATEWAY_CREDENTIAL_CODES,
+    MAX_WIRE_FIELD_CHARS,
+    CallerRejected,
+    CredentialSource,
+    GatewayRejected,
+    UpstreamOAuthFault,
+    UpstreamProtocolFault,
+    UpstreamReportedFault,
+)
+
+
+def _safe_text(response: httpx.Response) -> str:
+    try:
+        return response.text
+    except Exception:
+        return ""
+
+
+def _safe_json(response: httpx.Response) -> object:
+    try:
+        return response.json()
+    except Exception:
+        return None
+
+
+def _bounded_field(value: object) -> str | None:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value:
+        return None
+    return value[:MAX_WIRE_FIELD_CHARS]
+
+
+def _log_out_of_contract(endpoint_kind: str, response: httpx.Response, log_context: str) -> None:
+    verbose_logger.warning(
+        "MCP upstream %s endpoint (%s) returned HTTP %s outside the OAuth error contract (first %s chars): %s",
+        endpoint_kind,
+        log_context,
+        response.status_code,
+        MAX_WIRE_FIELD_CHARS,
+        _safe_text(response)[:MAX_WIRE_FIELD_CHARS],
+    )
+
+
+def _classify_oauth_error_code(
+    code: str,
+    description: str | None,
+    error_uri: str | None,
+    credential_source: CredentialSource,
+    log_context: str,
+) -> UpstreamOAuthFault:
+    """Blame assignment for a contract-conformant OAuth error code, shared by the token and DCR
+    classifiers. Codes by which the upstream blames itself keep that blame; ``invalid_target`` is a
+    gateway capability gap (RFC 8707 resource indicators, LIT-4339) no matter whose credentials were
+    presented; credential-indicting codes follow the credential source; everything else, including
+    codes we do not recognize, is the caller's to act on. The upstream's HTTP status is deliberately
+    never consulted: status derives from this classification at render time, which is what keeps
+    status and code from contradicting each other."""
+    if code == "server_error" or code == "temporarily_unavailable":
+        return UpstreamReportedFault(code=code)
+    if code in GATEWAY_CAPABILITY_CODES:
+        verbose_logger.warning(
+            "MCP server %s: the upstream authorization server rejected the request with "
+            "invalid_target; it may require RFC 8707 resource indicators, which the gateway "
+            "does not send yet (tracked as LIT-4339)",
+            log_context,
+        )
+        return GatewayRejected(code=code)
+    if credential_source == "gateway_stored" and code in GATEWAY_CREDENTIAL_CODES:
+        verbose_logger.warning(
+            "MCP server %s: upstream authorization server rejected the gateway's configured client "
+            "credentials (%s): %s",
+            log_context,
+            code,
+            description or "<no description>",
+        )
+        return GatewayRejected(code=code)
+    return CallerRejected(code=code, description=description, error_uri=error_uri)
+
+
+def classify_upstream_token_rejection(
+    response: httpx.Response,
+    credential_source: CredentialSource,
+    log_context: str,
+) -> UpstreamOAuthFault:
+    """Classify a token-endpoint rejection into exactly one fault: a body with an RFC 6749 §5.2
+    ``error`` field goes through blame assignment (:func:`_classify_oauth_error_code`); anything
+    without a usable ``error`` field is an upstream protocol fault."""
+    parsed = _safe_json(response)
+    fields = parsed if isinstance(parsed, dict) else {}
+    code = _bounded_field(fields.get("error"))
+    if code is None:
+        _log_out_of_contract("token", response, log_context)
+        return UpstreamProtocolFault(note=f"upstream token endpoint returned HTTP {response.status_code}")
+    return _classify_oauth_error_code(
+        code,
+        description=_bounded_field(fields.get("error_description")),
+        error_uri=_bounded_field(fields.get("error_uri")),
+        credential_source=credential_source,
+        log_context=log_context,
+    )
+
+
+def classify_upstream_dcr_rejection(response: httpx.Response, log_context: str) -> UpstreamOAuthFault:
+    """Classify a dynamic-client-registration rejection. RFC 7591 §3.2.2 errors carry
+    ``error`` / ``error_description`` and go through the same blame assignment as token errors
+    (registration sends no client credentials, so credential codes stay caller-actionable); anything
+    without a usable ``error`` field is an upstream protocol fault."""
+    parsed = _safe_json(response)
+    fields = parsed if isinstance(parsed, dict) else {}
+    code = _bounded_field(fields.get("error"))
+    if code is None:
+        _log_out_of_contract("registration", response, log_context)
+        return UpstreamProtocolFault(note=f"upstream registration failed with HTTP {response.status_code}")
+    return _classify_oauth_error_code(
+        code,
+        description=_bounded_field(fields.get("error_description")),
+        error_uri=None,
+        credential_source="caller_supplied",
+        log_context=log_context,
+    )

litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/faults/render_oauth.py

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+"""Render upstream OAuth/DCR faults onto the wire. The only place that chooses statuses and bodies
+for these faults, so every consumer emits the same contract: RFC 6749 §5.2-shaped JSON with the §5.1
+no-store headers on token endpoints, HTTPException details on registration. Status, code, and prose
+all derive from the fault tag; exhaustive matches keep a new fault arm from shipping unrendered.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
+from typing_extensions import assert_never
+
+from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.faults.types import UpstreamOAuthFault
+from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.oauth_utils import TOKEN_NO_CACHE_HEADERS
+
+
+def _gateway_rejected_description(code: str) -> str:
+    if code == "invalid_target":
+        return (
+            "the upstream authorization server rejected the request (invalid_target); "
+            "it may require RFC 8707 resource indicators, which the gateway does not send yet"
+        )
+    return (
+        f"the upstream authorization server rejected the gateway's configured client credentials "
+        f"({code}); verify the MCP server's client_id and client_secret"
+    )
+
+
+def _upstream_reported_status_and_description(code: str) -> tuple[int, str]:
+    if code == "temporarily_unavailable":
+        return 503, "the upstream authorization server is temporarily unavailable; retry shortly"
+    return 502, "the upstream authorization server reported an internal error"
+
+
+def render_token_fault(fault: UpstreamOAuthFault) -> JSONResponse:
+    """RFC 6749 §5.2 response for a token-endpoint fault. Caller-actionable rejections relay the
+    upstream's code on the status that code implies (401 for invalid_client per §5.2, else 400);
+    gateway-side faults are 502 ``server_error`` with gateway-authored prose so a caller is never
+    blamed for, or shown the internals of, a failure only the operator can fix."""
+    match fault.tag:
+        case "caller_rejected":
+            content = {
+                "error": fault.code,
+                **({"error_description": fault.description} if fault.description else {}),
+                **({"error_uri": fault.error_uri} if fault.error_uri else {}),
+            }
+            status_code = 401 if fault.code == "invalid_client" else 400
+            return JSONResponse(status_code=status_code, content=content, headers=TOKEN_NO_CACHE_HEADERS)
+        case "gateway_rejected":
+            return JSONResponse(
+                status_code=502,
+                content={
+                    "error": "server_error",
+                    "error_description": _gateway_rejected_description(fault.code),
+                },
+                headers=TOKEN_NO_CACHE_HEADERS,
+            )
+        case "upstream_reported_fault":
+            status_code, description = _upstream_reported_status_and_description(fault.code)
+            return JSONResponse(
+                status_code=status_code,
+                content={"error": fault.code, "error_description": description},
+                headers=TOKEN_NO_CACHE_HEADERS,
+            )
+        case "upstream_protocol_fault":
+            return JSONResponse(
+                status_code=502,
+                content={"error": "server_error", "error_description": fault.note},
+                headers=TOKEN_NO_CACHE_HEADERS,
+            )
+        case _:
+            assert_never(fault.tag)
+
+
+def dcr_fault_detail(fault: UpstreamOAuthFault) -> tuple[int, str]:
+    """Status and detail string for a registration fault, raised as HTTPException by the caller.
+    RFC 7591 §3.2.2 defines registration errors as 400, so a contract-conformant rejection is 400
+    regardless of the status the upstream chose; everything else is a 502 upstream fault."""
+    match fault.tag:
+        case "caller_rejected":
+            detail = f"{fault.code}: {fault.description}" if fault.description else fault.code
+            return 400, detail
+        case "gateway_rejected":
+            return 502, _gateway_rejected_description(fault.code)
+        case "upstream_reported_fault":
+            return _upstream_reported_status_and_description(fault.code)
+        case "upstream_protocol_fault":
+            return 502, fault.note
+        case _:
+            assert_never(fault.tag)

litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/faults/types.py

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+"""Fault taxonomy for upstream OAuth token and DCR registration failures.
+
+Each fault is a frozen model on a ``tag`` literal. The tag alone decides the HTTP status, the wire
+error code, and whose prose the caller sees, so those three facts can never disagree the way they can
+when an upstream's status and error code are relayed independently.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Literal, TypeAlias
+
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict
+
+MAX_WIRE_FIELD_CHARS = 500
+"""Bound on every upstream-derived string that crosses to a caller or into a log line."""
+
+CredentialSource: TypeAlias = Literal["gateway_stored", "caller_supplied"]
+"""Whose client credentials the gateway presented upstream: the MCP server's stored configuration or
+credentials the caller supplied on the request. Decides whether a credential rejection is the
+caller's problem to fix or the gateway operator's."""
+
+GATEWAY_CREDENTIAL_CODES: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"invalid_client", "unauthorized_client"})
+"""RFC 6749 error codes that indict the OAuth client's credentials or grant authorization. When the
+gateway presented its own stored credentials, these are gateway-side faults the caller cannot act on;
+when the caller supplied the credentials, they are the caller's to fix."""
+
+GATEWAY_CAPABILITY_CODES: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"invalid_target"})
+"""Codes that indict a gateway capability regardless of whose credentials were presented:
+``invalid_target`` means the upstream wants RFC 8707 resource indicators, which the gateway does not
+send yet (LIT-4339). Never the caller's fault."""
+
+UPSTREAM_FAULT_CODES: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"server_error", "temporarily_unavailable"})
+"""Codes by which the upstream blames itself. Relaying them as caller faults would invert blame, so
+they classify as upstream-reported faults and render on the 5xx their meaning implies."""
+
+
+class CallerRejected(BaseModel):
+    """The upstream spoke the OAuth error contract and the failure is actionable by our caller
+    (e.g. ``invalid_grant``: re-run authorization). The code and its bounded prose relay on the
+    4xx status the code itself implies."""
+
+    model_config = ConfigDict(frozen=True)
+    tag: Literal["caller_rejected"] = "caller_rejected"
+    code: str
+    description: str | None = None
+    error_uri: str | None = None
+
+
+class GatewayRejected(BaseModel):
+    """The upstream rejected the request for a cause only the gateway operator can address: the
+    server's stored client credentials or a gateway capability gap. Not actionable by the caller:
+    rendered as 502 with gateway-authored prose naming the code; the upstream's prose goes to
+    server logs only."""
+
+    model_config = ConfigDict(frozen=True)
+    tag: Literal["gateway_rejected"] = "gateway_rejected"
+    code: str
+
+
+class UpstreamReportedFault(BaseModel):
+    """The upstream blamed itself in the OAuth vocabulary. Rendered on the 5xx the code implies
+    (``server_error`` 502, ``temporarily_unavailable`` 503) so blame and status agree."""
+
+    model_config = ConfigDict(frozen=True)
+    tag: Literal["upstream_reported_fault"] = "upstream_reported_fault"
+    code: Literal["server_error", "temporarily_unavailable"]
+
+
+class UpstreamProtocolFault(BaseModel):
+    """The upstream broke the error contract: no JSON ``error`` field, an undecodable body, or a
+    success response without a usable token. Rendered as 502 with a gateway-authored note; the
+    upstream body never crosses to the caller."""
+
+    model_config = ConfigDict(frozen=True)
+    tag: Literal["upstream_protocol_fault"] = "upstream_protocol_fault"
+    note: str
+
+
+UpstreamOAuthFault: TypeAlias = CallerRejected | GatewayRejected | UpstreamReportedFault | UpstreamProtocolFault

litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/outbound_credentials/bridge_credentials.py

@@ -21,11 +21,16 @@ from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.outbound_credentials.envelope import
     EnvelopeKeys,
     EnvelopeMintError,
     OpenedEnvelope,
+    OpenedRefreshEnvelope,
+    RefreshCredential,
     SealedEnvelope,
     UpstreamTokenGrant,
     is_envelope,
+    is_refresh_envelope,
     mint_envelope,
+    mint_refresh_envelope,
     open_envelope,
+    open_refresh_envelope,
 )
 
 _SIGNING_KEY_DOMAIN = b"litellm-mcp-bridge:envelope-signing:"
@@ -92,6 +97,67 @@ def build_bridge_token_response(
     return mint_envelope(identity, grant, keys, now)
 
 
+def build_bridge_refresh_token_response(
+    identity: EnvelopeIdentity,
+    refresh: RefreshCredential,
+    keys: EnvelopeKeys,
+    now: datetime,
+) -> SealedEnvelope | EnvelopeMintError:
+    """Seal ``refresh`` for ``identity`` into the long-lived refresh envelope the token endpoint returns
+    alongside the access envelope, so the client can renew without re-authenticating. A thin, pure
+    wrapper over :func:`mint_refresh_envelope`; returns the mint error as a value for the caller to map.
+    """
+    return mint_refresh_envelope(identity, refresh, keys, now)
+
+
+class BridgeRefreshOpened(BaseModel):
+    """A valid refresh envelope presented to the token endpoint: the identity to re-validate and renew
+    under, and the upstream refresh grant to exchange."""
+
+    model_config = ConfigDict(frozen=True)
+    tag: Literal["opened"] = "opened"
+    identity: EnvelopeIdentity
+    refresh: RefreshCredential
+
+
+class BridgeRefreshInvalid(BaseModel):
+    """The presented refresh grant is not a valid refresh envelope for this server (not refresh-shaped,
+    will not open, or minted for a different server); the token endpoint fails the refresh closed."""
+
+    model_config = ConfigDict(frozen=True)
+    tag: Literal["invalid"] = "invalid"
+
+
+BridgeRefreshResult: TypeAlias = BridgeRefreshOpened | BridgeRefreshInvalid
+
+
+def open_bridge_refresh_envelope(
+    refresh_value: str,
+    keys: EnvelopeKeys,
+    now: datetime,
+    expected_server_id: str,
+) -> BridgeRefreshResult:
+    """Open a refresh envelope a bridge ``oauth_delegate`` client presented on a refresh_token grant.
+
+    The token-endpoint mirror of :func:`resolve_bridge_envelope`: strips an optional ``Bearer`` scheme,
+    then returns ``BridgeRefreshOpened`` with the recovered identity and upstream refresh grant, or
+    ``BridgeRefreshInvalid`` for anything that is not a valid refresh envelope for this server. Never
+    raises; total over hostile input via :func:`open_refresh_envelope`. ``expected_server_id`` binds the
+    envelope to the server the request targets, so a refresh envelope minted for one server cannot renew
+    against another. A raw upstream refresh token (not envelope-shaped) is ``BridgeRefreshInvalid``: this
+    mode never hands the client a bare upstream refresh token, so it must never accept one.
+    """
+    candidate = _strip_bearer(refresh_value)
+    if not is_refresh_envelope(candidate):
+        return BridgeRefreshInvalid()
+    opened = open_refresh_envelope(candidate, keys, now)
+    if not isinstance(opened, OpenedRefreshEnvelope):
+        return BridgeRefreshInvalid()
+    if opened.identity.server_id != expected_server_id:
+        return BridgeRefreshInvalid()
+    return BridgeRefreshOpened(identity=opened.identity, refresh=opened.refresh)
+
+
 class NotBridgeEnvelope(BaseModel):
     """The bearer is not an envelope; admission continues on its normal path."""
 
@@ -128,10 +194,12 @@ def _strip_bearer(value: str) -> str:
 
 
 def is_bridge_envelope_shaped(authorization_value: str) -> bool:
-    """Cheap, keyless test that an ``Authorization`` value carries an envelope (optional
-    ``Bearer`` scheme stripped). The admission edge engages the bridge arm only for an
-    envelope, so a plain upstream bearer falls through to normal oauth2 admission."""
-    return is_envelope(_strip_bearer(authorization_value))
+    """Cheap, keyless test that an ``Authorization`` value carries an envelope of either kind (optional
+    ``Bearer`` scheme stripped). The admission edge engages the bridge arm for an access envelope (to
+    admit) and for a refresh envelope (to reject it explicitly, since a refresh credential is never
+    usable at the tool-call edge); a plain upstream bearer falls through to normal oauth2 admission."""
+    candidate = _strip_bearer(authorization_value)
+    return is_envelope(candidate) or is_refresh_envelope(candidate)
 
 
 def resolve_bridge_envelope(
@@ -148,6 +216,10 @@ def resolve_bridge_envelope(
     envelope, and ``BridgeEnvelopeInvalid`` for an envelope-shaped bearer that will not
     open. Never raises: it is total over hostile input via :func:`open_envelope`.
 
+    A refresh envelope is ``BridgeEnvelopeInvalid`` here: it is a valid gateway credential but only ever
+    presented back to the token endpoint, never usable to authenticate a tool call, so admission must
+    fail it closed rather than let it fall through to another arm.
+
     ``expected_server_id`` is the ``server_id`` of the MCP server the request targets; an
     opened envelope whose sealed ``server_id`` does not match is rejected as
     ``BridgeEnvelopeInvalid``. Binding here (rather than leaving it to the caller) prevents
@@ -157,6 +229,8 @@ def resolve_bridge_envelope(
     unlike ``hmac.compare_digest`` on ``str``, does not raise on a non-ASCII server_id.
     """
     candidate = _strip_bearer(authorization_value)
+    if is_refresh_envelope(candidate):
+        return BridgeEnvelopeInvalid()
     if not is_envelope(candidate):
         return NotBridgeEnvelope()
     opened = open_envelope(candidate, keys, now)

litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/outbound_credentials/envelope.py

@@ -44,18 +44,33 @@ from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field, SecretStr, ValidationError
 from litellm.proxy.common_utils.encrypt_decrypt_utils import decrypt_value, encrypt_value
 
 ENVELOPE_PREFIX = "llm_env_"
-"""Marker prefix on every serialized envelope so the edge can cheaply tell an envelope
+"""Marker prefix on every serialized ACCESS envelope so the edge can cheaply tell an envelope
 from a raw upstream token before doing any cryptography."""
 
+REFRESH_ENVELOPE_PREFIX = "llm_refresh_"
+"""Marker prefix on every serialized REFRESH envelope. A distinct prefix keeps the two credentials
+routable without crypto and, together with the signed ``kind`` claim, stops one from being presented
+where the other is expected: a refresh envelope carries a long-lived upstream refresh token and is only
+ever presented back to the token endpoint, never forwarded upstream on a tool call."""
+
 ENVELOPE_ISSUER = "litellm-mcp-bridge"
 """``iss`` claim stamped into every envelope and required back on open."""
 
 MAX_ENVELOPE_TTL_SECONDS = 3600
-"""Hard ceiling on envelope lifetime. ``exp`` is ``min(upstream expires_in, this cap)``
+"""Hard ceiling on ACCESS envelope lifetime. ``exp`` is ``min(upstream expires_in, this cap)``
 (the cap alone when the upstream omits ``expires_in``), matching the 1h lifetime of the
 BYOK session bearer this module's signing approach is borrowed from: a client-held
 credential should never outlive a bounded window even when the upstream token does."""
 
+MAX_REFRESH_ENVELOPE_TTL_SECONDS = 1209600
+"""Hard ceiling on REFRESH envelope lifetime (14 days). A refresh envelope only renews the short-lived
+access envelope, and each renewal re-validates the sealed litellm key (revocation gates it) and is
+re-minted with a fresh window, so the practical bound is idle time, not a fixed session. ``exp`` is
+``min(upstream refresh_expires_in, this cap)`` (the cap alone when the upstream omits it); if the
+upstream refresh token dies first, the next renewal simply fails at the upstream and the client
+re-authenticates. The value is deliberately far shorter than a typical upstream refresh-token lifetime
+so a leaked refresh envelope is bounded even if the upstream would have honoured it for longer."""
+
 MAX_ENVELOPE_BYTES = 12288
 """Size cap on the final serialized envelope (prefix + JWT, in bytes). Upstream JWTs
 commonly run 2-4KB; base64 plus encryption overhead roughly doubles that inside the
@@ -66,21 +81,48 @@ typed error, never truncated."""
 
 _ENVELOPE_JWT_ALGORITHM = "HS256"
 
+EnvelopeKind = Literal["access", "refresh"]
+"""Which credential an envelope is. Stamped into the signed claims and required to match on open, so a
+signature-valid envelope of one kind cannot be replayed as the other even if its wire prefix is swapped
+(the prefix is not part of the signed payload; this claim is)."""
+
+
+EnvelopeSubjectType: TypeAlias = Literal["key_hash", "user_id"]
+"""Discriminator for what litellm principal the envelope binds the grant to.
+
+``key_hash`` is a hashed virtual key (the scripted two-header client mints under the key it
+presents at the token endpoint); ``user_id`` is a litellm user subject (the interactive DCR
+client mints under the SSO-authenticated user, which is the only identity that browser login
+yields). Admission reloads a key record for the first and a user record for the second, then
+runs both through the same live-policy gate, so team/org/budget/revocation enforcement is
+identical either way."""
+
 
 class EnvelopeIdentity(BaseModel):
-    """The litellm identity the envelope binds the inner grant to.
+    """The litellm principal the envelope binds the inner grant to.
 
-    ``key_hash`` is the hashed litellm key that authorized the mint, never a raw
-    credential (and the edge rejects a bare hash presented as a bearer). Admission
-    reloads the live key record by it, so the key's current team/org/object-permission
-    restrictions and its revocation state are enforced at use time rather than frozen at
-    mint time. ``server_id`` binds the envelope to one MCP server so it cannot be replayed
-    across a server boundary.
+    ``subject`` is the principal identifier and ``subject_type`` says how to resolve it: a
+    hashed litellm key (``key_hash``) or a litellm user id (``user_id``), never a raw
+    credential (and the edge rejects a bare hash or id presented as a bearer). Admission
+    reloads the live record by it, so the principal's current team/org restrictions and its
+    revocation state are enforced at use time rather than frozen at mint time. ``server_id``
+    binds the envelope to one MCP server so it cannot be replayed across a server boundary.
     """
 
     model_config = ConfigDict(frozen=True)
     server_id: str = Field(min_length=1)
-    key_hash: str = Field(min_length=1)
+    subject_type: EnvelopeSubjectType
+    subject: str = Field(min_length=1)
+
+
+def key_hash_identity(server_id: str, key_hash: str) -> EnvelopeIdentity:
+    """The identity for the scripted client that mints under a presented virtual key."""
+    return EnvelopeIdentity(server_id=server_id, subject_type="key_hash", subject=key_hash)
+
+
+def user_identity(server_id: str, user_id: str) -> EnvelopeIdentity:
+    """The identity for the interactive DCR client that mints under its SSO user subject."""
+    return EnvelopeIdentity(server_id=server_id, subject_type="user_id", subject=user_id)
 
 
 class UpstreamTokenGrant(BaseModel):
@@ -99,6 +141,21 @@ class UpstreamTokenGrant(BaseModel):
     expires_in: int | None = Field(default=None, gt=0)
 
 
+class RefreshCredential(BaseModel):
+    """The upstream refresh grant sealed inside a refresh envelope.
+
+    Only the refresh token (plus the scope to re-request and the refresh token's own lifetime, when the
+    upstream reports it) is sealed; the access token is never in a refresh envelope. ``refresh_token`` is
+    a ``SecretStr`` so reprs never leak it, and ``expires_in`` (the refresh token's lifetime, not the
+    access token's) must be positive when present.
+    """
+
+    model_config = ConfigDict(frozen=True)
+    refresh_token: SecretStr = Field(min_length=1)
+    scope: str | None = None
+    expires_in: int | None = Field(default=None, gt=0)
+
+
 class EnvelopeKeys(BaseModel):
     """Injected key material: the HS256 signing key and the symmetric encryption key.
 
@@ -121,13 +178,21 @@ class SealedEnvelope(BaseModel):
 
 
 class OpenedEnvelope(BaseModel):
-    """A validated envelope: the identity it was minted for and the recovered grant."""
+    """A validated access envelope: the identity it was minted for and the recovered grant."""
 
     model_config = ConfigDict(frozen=True)
     identity: EnvelopeIdentity
     grant: UpstreamTokenGrant
 
 
+class OpenedRefreshEnvelope(BaseModel):
+    """A validated refresh envelope: the identity it was minted for and the recovered refresh grant."""
+
+    model_config = ConfigDict(frozen=True)
+    identity: EnvelopeIdentity
+    refresh: RefreshCredential
+
+
 class EnvelopeTooLarge(BaseModel):
     """The serialized envelope exceeded ``MAX_ENVELOPE_BYTES``; carries sizes only."""
 
@@ -199,8 +264,10 @@ class _EnvelopeClaims(BaseModel):
     iss: str
     iat: int
     exp: int
+    kind: EnvelopeKind
     server_id: str = Field(min_length=1)
-    key_hash: str = Field(min_length=1)
+    subject_type: EnvelopeSubjectType
+    subject: str = Field(min_length=1)
     grant: str = Field(min_length=1)
 
 
@@ -213,11 +280,25 @@ class _GrantWire(BaseModel):
     expires_in: int | None = None
 
 
+class _RefreshWire(BaseModel):
+    model_config = ConfigDict(frozen=True)
+    refresh_token: str
+    scope: str | None = None
+    expires_in: int | None = None
+
+
 def is_envelope(candidate: str) -> bool:
-    """Cheap prefix check so the edge can route envelopes vs raw tokens without crypto."""
+    """Cheap prefix check for an ACCESS envelope so the edge can route envelopes vs raw tokens without
+    crypto. A refresh envelope has a different prefix and is not an access envelope."""
     return candidate.startswith(ENVELOPE_PREFIX)
 
 
+def is_refresh_envelope(candidate: str) -> bool:
+    """Cheap prefix check for a REFRESH envelope so the token endpoint can route a refresh grant that
+    carries an envelope vs a raw upstream refresh token without crypto."""
+    return candidate.startswith(REFRESH_ENVELOPE_PREFIX)
+
+
 def mint_envelope(
     identity: EnvelopeIdentity,
     grant: UpstreamTokenGrant,
@@ -231,23 +312,15 @@ def mint_envelope(
     serialized envelope exceeds ``MAX_ENVELOPE_BYTES``.
     """
     expires_at = now + timedelta(seconds=_envelope_ttl_seconds(grant.expires_in))
-    claims = _EnvelopeClaims(
-        iss=ENVELOPE_ISSUER,
-        iat=int(now.timestamp()),
-        exp=int(expires_at.timestamp()),
-        server_id=identity.server_id,
-        key_hash=identity.key_hash,
-        grant=_encrypt_grant_blob(_grant_plaintext(grant), keys.encryption_key),
+    return _seal(
+        kind="access",
+        prefix=ENVELOPE_PREFIX,
+        identity=identity,
+        grant_blob=_encrypt_grant_blob(_grant_plaintext(grant), keys.encryption_key),
+        expires_at=expires_at,
+        signing_key=keys.signing_key,
+        now=now,
     )
-    token = ENVELOPE_PREFIX + jwt.encode(
-        claims.model_dump(),
-        keys.signing_key.get_secret_value(),
-        algorithm=_ENVELOPE_JWT_ALGORITHM,
-    )
-    size_bytes = len(token.encode("utf-8"))
-    if size_bytes > MAX_ENVELOPE_BYTES:
-        return EnvelopeTooLarge(size_bytes=size_bytes, max_bytes=MAX_ENVELOPE_BYTES)
-    return SealedEnvelope(token=SecretStr(token), expires_at=expires_at)
 
 
 def open_envelope(
@@ -263,35 +336,136 @@ def open_envelope(
     re-derived, so it is stale by up to the envelope's lifetime; callers that need a
     live remaining lifetime should use ``now`` against the upstream, not this field.
     """
-    if not is_envelope(candidate):
-        return NotAnEnvelope()
-    # UTF-8 byte length is never below character length, so a character count already over the
-    # cap rejects an oversize candidate in O(1) without encoding it; the exact byte check then
-    # runs only on candidates already bounded to <= MAX_ENVELOPE_BYTES characters.
-    if len(candidate) > MAX_ENVELOPE_BYTES:
-        return MalformedPayload()
-    if len(candidate.encode("utf-8", "surrogatepass")) > MAX_ENVELOPE_BYTES:
-        return MalformedPayload()
-    claims = _decode_claims(candidate.removeprefix(ENVELOPE_PREFIX), keys.signing_key)
+    claims = _open_claims(candidate, prefix=ENVELOPE_PREFIX, expected_kind="access", keys=keys, now=now)
     if not isinstance(claims, _EnvelopeClaims):
         return claims
-    if now.timestamp() >= claims.exp:
-        return Expired()
     grant = _decrypt_grant(claims.grant, keys.encryption_key)
     if not isinstance(grant, UpstreamTokenGrant):
         return grant
     return OpenedEnvelope(
-        identity=EnvelopeIdentity(server_id=claims.server_id, key_hash=claims.key_hash),
+        identity=EnvelopeIdentity(server_id=claims.server_id, subject_type=claims.subject_type, subject=claims.subject),
         grant=grant,
     )
 
 
+def mint_refresh_envelope(
+    identity: EnvelopeIdentity,
+    refresh: RefreshCredential,
+    keys: EnvelopeKeys,
+    now: datetime,
+) -> SealedEnvelope | EnvelopeMintError:
+    """Seal ``refresh`` for ``identity`` into a long-lived, client-held refresh envelope.
+
+    ``exp`` is ``min(refresh.expires_in, MAX_REFRESH_ENVELOPE_TTL_SECONDS)`` seconds from ``now`` (the
+    cap alone when the upstream omits the refresh lifetime). Sealing a distinct ``kind="refresh"`` claim
+    is what keeps a refresh envelope from ever opening as an access credential at the MCP edge. Returns
+    ``EnvelopeTooLarge`` when the serialized envelope exceeds ``MAX_ENVELOPE_BYTES``.
+    """
+    expires_at = now + timedelta(seconds=_refresh_ttl_seconds(refresh.expires_in))
+    return _seal(
+        kind="refresh",
+        prefix=REFRESH_ENVELOPE_PREFIX,
+        identity=identity,
+        grant_blob=_encrypt_grant_blob(_refresh_plaintext(refresh), keys.encryption_key),
+        expires_at=expires_at,
+        signing_key=keys.signing_key,
+        now=now,
+    )
+
+
+def open_refresh_envelope(
+    candidate: str,
+    keys: EnvelopeKeys,
+    now: datetime,
+) -> OpenedRefreshEnvelope | EnvelopeOpenError:
+    """Validate a refresh ``candidate`` and recover the identity and inner refresh grant.
+
+    Total over hostile input exactly like :func:`open_envelope`: every invalid, expired, tampered,
+    wrong-kind, or undecryptable candidate maps to a distinct ``EnvelopeOpenError`` variant, never a
+    raise. The ``kind="refresh"`` claim is required, so an access envelope re-prefixed as a refresh one
+    is rejected as ``MalformedPayload``.
+    """
+    claims = _open_claims(candidate, prefix=REFRESH_ENVELOPE_PREFIX, expected_kind="refresh", keys=keys, now=now)
+    if not isinstance(claims, _EnvelopeClaims):
+        return claims
+    refresh = _decrypt_refresh(claims.grant, keys.encryption_key)
+    if not isinstance(refresh, RefreshCredential):
+        return refresh
+    return OpenedRefreshEnvelope(
+        identity=EnvelopeIdentity(server_id=claims.server_id, subject_type=claims.subject_type, subject=claims.subject),
+        refresh=refresh,
+    )
+
+
+def _seal(
+    kind: EnvelopeKind,
+    prefix: str,
+    identity: EnvelopeIdentity,
+    grant_blob: str,
+    expires_at: datetime,
+    signing_key: SecretStr,
+    now: datetime,
+) -> SealedEnvelope | EnvelopeTooLarge:
+    """Sign the claims for either envelope kind and enforce the size cap. Shared by both mints so the
+    JWT shape, issuer, and size guard cannot drift between access and refresh envelopes."""
+    claims = _EnvelopeClaims(
+        iss=ENVELOPE_ISSUER,
+        iat=int(now.timestamp()),
+        exp=int(expires_at.timestamp()),
+        kind=kind,
+        server_id=identity.server_id,
+        subject_type=identity.subject_type,
+        subject=identity.subject,
+        grant=grant_blob,
+    )
+    token = prefix + jwt.encode(claims.model_dump(), signing_key.get_secret_value(), algorithm=_ENVELOPE_JWT_ALGORITHM)
+    size_bytes = len(token.encode("utf-8"))
+    if size_bytes > MAX_ENVELOPE_BYTES:
+        return EnvelopeTooLarge(size_bytes=size_bytes, max_bytes=MAX_ENVELOPE_BYTES)
+    return SealedEnvelope(token=SecretStr(token), expires_at=expires_at)
+
+
+def _open_claims(
+    candidate: str,
+    prefix: str,
+    expected_kind: EnvelopeKind,
+    keys: EnvelopeKeys,
+    now: datetime,
+) -> _EnvelopeClaims | EnvelopeOpenError:
+    """Prefix-route, size-bound, signature-verify, kind-check, and expiry-check an attacker-controlled
+    candidate, shared by both openers so the security gate is identical for access and refresh. Returns
+    the validated claims or a distinct ``EnvelopeOpenError``; never raises."""
+    if not candidate.startswith(prefix):
+        return NotAnEnvelope()
+    # UTF-8 byte length is never below character length, so a character count already over the cap
+    # rejects an oversize candidate in O(1) without encoding it; the exact byte check then runs only on
+    # candidates already bounded to <= MAX_ENVELOPE_BYTES characters.
+    if len(candidate) > MAX_ENVELOPE_BYTES:
+        return MalformedPayload()
+    if len(candidate.encode("utf-8", "surrogatepass")) > MAX_ENVELOPE_BYTES:
+        return MalformedPayload()
+    claims = _decode_claims(candidate.removeprefix(prefix), keys.signing_key)
+    if not isinstance(claims, _EnvelopeClaims):
+        return claims
+    if claims.kind != expected_kind:
+        return MalformedPayload()
+    if now.timestamp() >= claims.exp:
+        return Expired()
+    return claims
+
+
 def _envelope_ttl_seconds(upstream_expires_in: int | None) -> int:
     if upstream_expires_in is None:
         return MAX_ENVELOPE_TTL_SECONDS
     return min(upstream_expires_in, MAX_ENVELOPE_TTL_SECONDS)
 
 
+def _refresh_ttl_seconds(upstream_refresh_expires_in: int | None) -> int:
+    if upstream_refresh_expires_in is None:
+        return MAX_REFRESH_ENVELOPE_TTL_SECONDS
+    return min(upstream_refresh_expires_in, MAX_REFRESH_ENVELOPE_TTL_SECONDS)
+
+
 def _grant_plaintext(grant: UpstreamTokenGrant) -> str:
     wire = _GrantWire(
         access_token=grant.access_token.get_secret_value(),
@@ -303,6 +477,15 @@ def _grant_plaintext(grant: UpstreamTokenGrant) -> str:
     return wire.model_dump_json(exclude_none=True)
 
 
+def _refresh_plaintext(refresh: RefreshCredential) -> str:
+    wire = _RefreshWire(
+        refresh_token=refresh.refresh_token.get_secret_value(),
+        scope=refresh.scope,
+        expires_in=refresh.expires_in,
+    )
+    return wire.model_dump_json(exclude_none=True)
+
+
 def _decode_claims(
     compact: str,
     signing_key: SecretStr,
@@ -364,3 +547,22 @@ def _decrypt_grant(
         return UpstreamTokenGrant.model_validate_json(plaintext)
     except ValidationError:
         return MalformedPayload()
+
+
+def _decrypt_refresh(
+    blob: str,
+    encryption_key: SecretStr,
+) -> RefreshCredential | DecryptFailed | MalformedPayload:
+    from nacl.exceptions import CryptoError
+
+    try:
+        plaintext = decrypt_value(
+            value=base64.urlsafe_b64decode(blob),
+            signing_key=encryption_key.get_secret_value(),
+        )
+    except (CryptoError, ValueError):
+        return DecryptFailed()
+    try:
+        return RefreshCredential.model_validate_json(plaintext)
+    except ValidationError:
+        return MalformedPayload()

litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/server.py

@@ -3719,8 +3719,15 @@ if MCP_AVAILABLE:
                         headers={"www-authenticate": upstream_www_authenticate},
                     )
 
+    def _get_authorization_header_from_scope(scope: Scope) -> Optional[str]:
+        """First ``Authorization`` header value in the ASGI scope, or None."""
+        for key, value in scope.get("headers", []):
+            if key.lower() == b"authorization":
+                return value.decode("latin-1")
+        return None
+
     def _scope_has_authorization_header(scope: Scope) -> bool:
-        return any(key.lower() == b"authorization" for key, _ in scope.get("headers", []))
+        return _get_authorization_header_from_scope(scope) is not None
 
     def _get_forwarded_auth_from_scope(scope: Scope) -> Optional[str]:
         """Return the upstream-bound ``Authorization`` header value, or None.
@@ -3733,17 +3740,24 @@ if MCP_AVAILABLE:
         ``MCPRequestHandler.process_mcp_request``), and forwarding it upstream
         would leak the proxy key to a third-party MCP server.
         """
-        authorization = None
-        has_litellm_key_header = False
-        for key, value in scope.get("headers", []):
-            key_lower = key.lower()
-            if key_lower == b"authorization":
-                authorization = value.decode("latin-1")
-            elif key_lower == b"x-litellm-api-key":
-                has_litellm_key_header = True
+        has_litellm_key_header = any(key.lower() == b"x-litellm-api-key" for key, _ in scope.get("headers", []))
         if not has_litellm_key_header:
             return None
-        return authorization
+        return _get_authorization_header_from_scope(scope)
+
+    def _is_delegate_upstream_probe_target(server: MCPServer) -> bool:
+        """Whether ``server`` is an interactive delegate-auth server whose client-supplied
+        token should be preflighted upstream.
+
+        Mirrors the anonymous-delegate gate in ``get_allowed_mcp_servers``: the flow is
+        resolved via ``effective_oauth2_flow`` so an unstamped M2M-shape row fails closed
+        (its stored client credentials drive egress; the caller's bearer is irrelevant).
+        """
+        return (
+            server.auth_type == MCPAuth.oauth2
+            and server.delegate_auth_to_upstream is True
+            and MCPServerManager.effective_oauth2_flow(server) != "client_credentials"
+        )
 
     async def _probe_upstream_auth(
         url: str,
@@ -3805,7 +3819,7 @@ if MCP_AVAILABLE:
         mcp_servers: Optional[List[str]],
         client_ip: Optional[str],
     ) -> None:
-        """Probe pass-through upstream servers in parallel before the MCP session starts.
+        """Probe pass-through and delegate-auth upstream servers in parallel before the MCP session starts.
 
         Only servers the caller's key is already authorized to reach are probed —
         the list is derived from _get_allowed_mcp_servers so that a user cannot
@@ -3813,11 +3827,42 @@ if MCP_AVAILABLE:
 
         The MCP SDK commits HTTP 200 headers before invoking handlers, so a 401
         can only be returned before that point. This function raises HTTPException(401)
-        with a WWW-Authenticate header if any upstream rejects the client token.
+        with a WWW-Authenticate header if any upstream rejects the client token, or 403
+        if the upstream accepts it but forbids the caller.
         Fails-open: network errors are logged and the request is allowed through.
+
+        Delegate-auth servers (``auth_type=oauth2`` + ``delegate_auth_to_upstream``)
+        are probed with the caller's bare ``Authorization`` bearer. That bearer is only
+        an upstream token (never a LiteLLM key) when admission took the delegate bypass,
+        so the delegate target is resolved through ``get_mcp_server_by_name`` -- the same
+        resolver admission used -- rather than the wider allowed-server prefix/access-group
+        matching. A name that only reaches a delegate server via server_id or an access
+        group would have been admitted as a real LiteLLM key, so probing it would leak that
+        key upstream; requiring the admission-resolver match closes that gap. Without the
+        probe a rejected token is absorbed by the tools/list handler and masked as an empty
+        tool list. Gated to single-server routes so one rejected token cannot 401 a
+        multi-server aggregate connect, matching the OBO preflight gating; the challenge
+        echoes the requested name so aliased routes get the same resource_metadata URL as
+        the tokenless preemptive challenge.
         """
         forwarded_auth = _get_forwarded_auth_from_scope(scope)
-        if not forwarded_auth:
+        requested_single_target = mcp_servers[0] if mcp_servers is not None and len(mcp_servers) == 1 else None
+        # The bare Authorization header (no x-litellm-api-key) is a valid upstream token
+        # only when admission classified it as one, i.e. the single requested name resolves
+        # to a delegate server under admission's own resolver. Resolve it the same way here
+        # so a server_id- or access-group-named delegate (which admission would have treated
+        # as a LiteLLM key) is never probed with that key.
+        delegate_server = (
+            global_mcp_server_manager.get_mcp_server_by_name(requested_single_target, client_ip=client_ip)
+            if requested_single_target
+            else None
+        )
+        delegate_auth = (
+            _get_authorization_header_from_scope(scope)
+            if delegate_server is not None and _is_delegate_upstream_probe_target(delegate_server)
+            else None
+        )
+        if not forwarded_auth and not delegate_auth:
             return
 
         # Use the authorized server set, not the raw user-supplied names, so that
@@ -3827,33 +3872,49 @@ if MCP_AVAILABLE:
             mcp_servers=mcp_servers,
             client_ip=client_ip,
         )
-        passthrough_servers = [
-            srv
-            for srv in allowed_servers
-            # Restrict to genuine OAuth pass-through servers (auth_type none +
-            # Authorization in extra_headers). Gateway-managed OAuth2 servers
-            # must not receive the ``resource_metadata=`` challenge emitted
-            # below — they require ``authorization_uri=`` pointing at the
-            # gateway AS metadata. ``is_oauth_passthrough`` already requires
-            # ``auth_type in (None, MCPAuth.none)``, which is mutually
-            # exclusive with ``has_client_credentials`` (oauth2 + M2M flow),
-            # so M2M servers are implicitly excluded here.
-            if srv.is_oauth_passthrough
-        ]
-        if not passthrough_servers:
+        passthrough_targets: Tuple[Tuple[MCPServer, str, str], ...] = (
+            tuple(
+                (srv, forwarded_auth, srv.name)
+                for srv in allowed_servers
+                # Restrict to genuine OAuth pass-through servers (auth_type none +
+                # Authorization in extra_headers). Gateway-managed OAuth2 servers
+                # must not receive the ``resource_metadata=`` challenge emitted
+                # below — they require ``authorization_uri=`` pointing at the
+                # gateway AS metadata. ``is_oauth_passthrough`` already requires
+                # ``auth_type in (None, MCPAuth.none)``, which is mutually
+                # exclusive with ``has_client_credentials`` (oauth2 + M2M flow),
+                # so M2M servers are implicitly excluded here.
+                if srv.is_oauth_passthrough
+            )
+            if forwarded_auth
+            else ()
+        )
+        # Probe the admission-resolved delegate server only when the caller is actually
+        # authorized for it (present in the IP-filtered allowed set), keyed by server_id.
+        delegate_targets: Tuple[Tuple[MCPServer, str, str], ...] = (
+            tuple(
+                (srv, delegate_auth, requested_single_target)
+                for srv in allowed_servers
+                if delegate_server is not None and srv.server_id == delegate_server.server_id
+            )
+            if delegate_auth and requested_single_target
+            else ()
+        )
+        probe_targets = passthrough_targets + delegate_targets
+        if not probe_targets:
             return
 
         probe_results = await asyncio.gather(
-            *[_probe_upstream_auth(srv.url or "", forwarded_auth) for srv in passthrough_servers]
+            *[_probe_upstream_auth(srv.url or "", auth_header) for srv, auth_header, _ in probe_targets]
         )
-        for srv, (probe_status, _) in zip(passthrough_servers, probe_results):
+        for (srv, _, challenge_server_name), (probe_status, _) in zip(probe_targets, probe_results):
             if probe_status == 401:
                 # Token is missing or expired: keep pass-through clients on the
                 # protected-resource discovery flow so they re-authorize against
                 # the upstream IdP metadata proxied by LiteLLM.
                 www_authenticate = _get_passthrough_www_authenticate(
                     scope=scope,
-                    server_name=srv.name,
+                    server_name=challenge_server_name,
                     invalid_token=True,
                 )
                 raise HTTPException(

litellm/proxy/_types.py

@@ -1118,6 +1118,7 @@ class GenerateKeyRequest(KeyRequestBase):
 class GenerateKeyResponse(KeyRequestBase):
     key: str  # type: ignore
     key_name: Optional[str] = None
+    key_type: str | None = None
     expires: Optional[datetime] = None
     user_id: Optional[str] = None
     token_id: Optional[str] = None
@@ -2421,6 +2422,16 @@ class ConfigGeneralSettings(LiteLLMPydanticObjectBase):
             "is active as a reminder that hard enforcement is relaxed."
         ),
     )
+    skip_user_budget_on_team_key: bool | None = Field(
+        None,
+        description=(
+            "If True, restores the legacy behavior where a user's personal "
+            "max_budget is NOT enforced when their key belongs to a team; only "
+            "the team (and team-member) budgets apply. Defaults to False, meaning "
+            "the user's personal max_budget is always enforced regardless of "
+            "whether the key belongs to a team (see GitHub issue #12905)."
+        ),
+    )
     user_url_validation: Optional[bool] = Field(
         None,
         description=(

litellm/proxy/auth/auth_checks.py

@@ -626,26 +626,29 @@ async def common_checks(
             )
 
         async def _user_max_budget_check() -> None:
-            # 4.1 personal budget, if personal key
-            if (
-                (team_object is None or team_object.team_id is None)
-                and user_object is not None
-                and user_object.max_budget is not None
-            ):
-                from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import get_current_spend
+            if user_object is None or user_object.max_budget is None:
+                return
+            skip_for_team = (
+                general_settings.get("skip_user_budget_on_team_key") is True
+                and team_object is not None
+                and team_object.team_id is not None
+            )
+            if skip_for_team:
+                return
+            from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import get_current_spend
 
-                user_budget = user_object.max_budget
-                user_spend = await get_current_spend(
-                    counter_key=f"spend:user:{user_object.user_id}",
-                    fallback_spend=user_object.spend or 0.0,
+            user_budget = user_object.max_budget
+            user_spend = await get_current_spend(
+                counter_key=f"spend:user:{user_object.user_id}",
+                fallback_spend=user_object.spend or 0.0,
+                max_budget=user_budget,
+            )
+            if math.isfinite(user_budget) and user_spend >= user_budget:
+                raise litellm.BudgetExceededError(
+                    current_cost=user_spend,
                     max_budget=user_budget,
+                    message=f"ExceededBudget: User={user_object.user_id} over budget. Spend={user_spend}, Budget={user_budget}",
                 )
-                if math.isfinite(user_budget) and user_spend >= user_budget:
-                    raise litellm.BudgetExceededError(
-                        current_cost=user_spend,
-                        max_budget=user_budget,
-                        message=f"ExceededBudget: User={user_object.user_id} over budget. Spend={user_spend}, Budget={user_budget}",
-                    )
 
         # Each scope reads a distinct counter key with no cross-scope ordering
         # dependency, so the per-scope Redis-first reads run concurrently instead

litellm/proxy/auth/user_api_key_auth.py

@@ -2442,6 +2442,7 @@ async def _reserve_budget_after_common_checks(
         proxy_logging_obj=proxy_logging_obj,
         end_user_id=end_user_id,
         end_user_object=end_user_object,
+        skip_user_budget_on_team_key=general_settings.get("skip_user_budget_on_team_key") is True,
     )
 
 

litellm/proxy/db/exception_handler.py

@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ from litellm.proxy._types import (
 )
 from litellm.secret_managers.main import str_to_bool
 
+# Bounds the __cause__/__context__ walk in is_database_service_unavailable_error_in_chain.
+# Real exception chains are a few links deep; the cap also makes the walk cycle-safe.
+_MAX_EXCEPTION_CHAIN_DEPTH = 20
+
 
 class PrismaDBExceptionHandler:
     """
@@ -218,6 +222,32 @@ class PrismaDBExceptionHandler:
             ),
         )
 
+    @staticmethod
+    def is_database_service_unavailable_error_in_chain(e: BaseException) -> bool:
+        """Like ``is_database_service_unavailable_error`` but also walks the
+        ``__cause__`` / ``__context__`` chain.
+
+        ``is_database_service_unavailable_error`` classifies a single exception
+        by type, which a caller that catches a raw DB failure and re-raises a
+        domain exception of a different type defeats. ``get_user_object`` in
+        ``litellm/proxy/auth/auth_checks.py`` is the concrete case: it wraps
+        every DB error, a genuine outage included, in a bare ``ValueError``
+        whose original error survives only as ``__context__``. A type check on
+        the ``ValueError`` misses the outage, so the caller would mistake an
+        infrastructure fault for an auth failure. Walking the chain recovers the
+        real signal, which is the PEP 3134 way to inspect a wrapped cause.
+
+        The walk is depth-bounded, which also makes it cycle-safe.
+        """
+        current: BaseException | None = e
+        for _ in range(_MAX_EXCEPTION_CHAIN_DEPTH):
+            if not isinstance(current, Exception):
+                return False
+            if PrismaDBExceptionHandler.is_database_service_unavailable_error(current):
+                return True
+            current = current.__cause__ or current.__context__
+        return False
+
     @staticmethod
     def handle_db_exception(e: Exception):
         """

litellm/proxy/guardrails/_content_utils.py

@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ def is_text_content_call_type(call_type: str) -> bool:
 
 TEXT_PART_TYPES: FrozenSet[str] = frozenset({"text", "input_text", "output_text"})
 
+# Responses-API item types whose ``output`` field carries user/tool text
+# that guardrails should inspect.  ``function_call_output`` is the
+# built-in shape; ``custom_tool_call_output`` is the custom-tool
+# counterpart (see ``ChatCompletionCustomToolCallOutput``).
+_OUTPUT_ITEM_TYPES: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"function_call_output", "custom_tool_call_output"})
+
 
 def _iter_text_parts_in_content(content: Any) -> Iterator[str]:
     """Yield text fragments from a ``message.content`` value (string or
@@ -72,7 +78,7 @@ def _coerce_input_to_messages(input_value: Any) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
                 messages.append({"role": item.get("role") or "user", "content": [item]})
             elif "content" in item:
                 messages.append({"role": item.get("role") or "user", "content": item["content"]})
-            elif item.get("type") == "function_call_output" and "output" in item:
+            elif item.get("type") in _OUTPUT_ITEM_TYPES and "output" in item:
                 messages.append({"role": item.get("role") or "tool", "content": item["output"]})
     return messages
 
@@ -157,7 +163,7 @@ def walk_user_text(data: Dict[str, Any], visit: Callable[[str], str]) -> int:
                         input_value[idx] = {**item, "text": visit(item["text"])}
                 elif "content" in item:
                     item["content"] = _rewrite_content(item["content"])
-                elif item.get("type") == "function_call_output" and "output" in item:
+                elif item.get("type") in _OUTPUT_ITEM_TYPES and "output" in item:
                     item["output"] = _rewrite_content(item["output"])
         return visited
 

litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/lasso/lasso.py

@@ -772,7 +772,13 @@ class LassoGuardrail(CustomGuardrail):
             data: Request data (used for conversation_id generation and tools extraction)
             cache: Cache instance for storing conversation_id (optional for post-call)
         """
-        payload: Dict[str, Any] = {"messages": messages, "messageType": message_type}
+        payload: Dict[str, Any] = {
+            "messages": messages,
+            "messageType": message_type,
+            # Drives the "Used By" badge on Lasso Application API Keys: every call from this
+            # integration is attributed as "litellm" on the keys list.
+            "source": {"type": "litellm"},
+        }
 
         # Add optional parameters if available
         if self.user_id:

litellm/proxy/hooks/proxy_track_cost_callback.py

@@ -28,11 +28,20 @@ from litellm.proxy.spend_tracking.spend_tracking_utils import (
 )
 from litellm.proxy.utils import ProxyUpdateSpend
 from litellm.types.utils import (
+    CallTypes,
     StandardLoggingPayload,
     StandardLoggingPayloadErrorInformation,
 )
 from litellm.utils import get_end_user_id_for_cost_tracking
 
+_PASS_THROUGH_CALL_TYPES: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
+    {
+        CallTypes.pass_through.value,
+        CallTypes.llm_passthrough_route.value,
+        CallTypes.allm_passthrough_route.value,
+    }
+)
+
 
 class _ProxyDBLogger(CustomLogger):
     async def async_log_success_event(self, kwargs, response_obj, start_time, end_time):
@@ -219,11 +228,13 @@ class _ProxyDBLogger(CustomLogger):
                 verbose_proxy_logger.debug(
                     f"user_api_key {user_api_key}, user_id {user_id}, team_id {team_id}, end_user_id {end_user_id}"
                 )
+                call_type: Optional[str] = kwargs.get("call_type")
                 if _should_track_cost_callback(
                     user_api_key=user_api_key,
                     user_id=user_id,
                     team_id=team_id,
                     end_user_id=end_user_id,
+                    call_type=call_type,
                 ):
                     ## UPDATE DATABASE
                     await _update_database_and_spend_counters(
@@ -412,9 +423,15 @@ def _should_track_cost_callback(
     user_id: Optional[str],
     team_id: Optional[str],
     end_user_id: Optional[str],
+    call_type: Optional[str] = None,
 ) -> bool:
     """
     Determine if the cost callback should be tracked based on the kwargs
+
+    Pass-through endpoints can be configured with ``auth=false``, which leaves
+    the request with no key/user/team/end-user to attribute spend to. Those
+    requests still forward real provider traffic that operators expect to see
+    in request/usage logs, so they are tracked even when unauthenticated.
     """
 
     # don't run track cost callback if user opted into disabling spend
@@ -423,7 +440,7 @@ def _should_track_cost_callback(
 
     if user_api_key is not None or user_id is not None or team_id is not None or end_user_id is not None:
         return True
-    return False
+    return call_type in _PASS_THROUGH_CALL_TYPES
 
 
 def _get_budget_reservation_from_metadata(metadata: dict) -> Optional[dict]:

litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/key_management_endpoints.py

@@ -468,7 +468,10 @@ def handle_key_type(data: GenerateKeyRequest, data_json: dict) -> dict:
     Handle the key type.
     """
     key_type = data.key_type
-    data_json.pop("key_type", None)
+    if key_type is None:
+        data_json.pop("key_type", None)
+        return data_json
+    data_json["key_type"] = key_type.value
     if key_type == LiteLLMKeyType.LLM_API:
         data_json["allowed_routes"] = ["llm_api_routes"]
     elif key_type == LiteLLMKeyType.MANAGEMENT:
@@ -3566,6 +3569,7 @@ async def generate_key_helper_fn(
     created_by: Optional[str] = None,
     updated_by: Optional[str] = None,
     allowed_routes: Optional[list] = None,
+    key_type: str | None = None,
     sso_user_id: Optional[str] = None,
     object_permission_id: Optional[str] = None,  # object_permission_id <-> LiteLLM_ObjectPermissionTable
     object_permission: Optional[LiteLLM_ObjectPermissionBase] = None,
@@ -3706,6 +3710,7 @@ async def generate_key_helper_fn(
             "created_by": created_by,
             "updated_by": updated_by,
             "allowed_routes": allowed_routes or [],
+            "key_type": key_type,
             "object_permission_id": object_permission_id,
             "router_settings": router_settings_json,
             "access_group_ids": access_group_ids or [],

litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/team_endpoints.py

@@ -3550,7 +3550,7 @@ async def team_info(
         try:
             team_info: Optional[BaseModel] = await TeamRepository(prisma_client).table.find_unique(
                 where={"team_id": team_id},
-                include={"object_permission": True},
+                include={"litellm_model_table": True, "object_permission": True},
             )
             if team_info is None:
                 raise Exception

litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/ui_sso.py

@@ -4034,30 +4034,41 @@ class MicrosoftSSOHandler:
         base_url = MicrosoftSSOHandler.get_graph_api_base_url()
         # Endpoint to get app role assignments for the given service principal
         endpoint = f"/servicePrincipals/{service_principal_id}/appRoleAssignedTo"
-        url = base_url + endpoint
+        next_link: str | None = base_url + endpoint
 
         headers = {
             "Authorization": f"Bearer {access_token}",
             "Content-Type": "application/json",
         }
 
-        response = await async_client.get(url, headers=headers)
-        response_json = response.json()
-        verbose_proxy_logger.debug(f"Response from service principal app role assigned to: {response_json}")
         group_ids: List[str] = []
         service_principal_teams: List[MicrosoftServicePrincipalTeam] = []
+        page_count = 0
 
-        for _object in response_json.get("value", []):
-            if _object.get("principalType") == "Group":
-                # Append the group ID to the list
-                group_ids.append(_object.get("principalId"))
-                # Append the service principal team to the list
-                service_principal_teams.append(
-                    MicrosoftServicePrincipalTeam(
-                        principalDisplayName=_object.get("principalDisplayName"),
-                        principalId=_object.get("principalId"),
+        while next_link is not None and page_count < MicrosoftSSOHandler.MAX_GRAPH_API_PAGES:
+            response = await async_client.get(next_link, headers=headers)
+            response_json = response.json()
+            verbose_proxy_logger.debug(f"Response from service principal app role assigned to: {response_json}")
+
+            for _object in response_json.get("value", []):
+                if _object.get("principalType") == "Group":
+                    # Append the group ID to the list
+                    group_ids.append(_object.get("principalId"))
+                    # Append the service principal team to the list
+                    service_principal_teams.append(
+                        MicrosoftServicePrincipalTeam(
+                            principalDisplayName=_object.get("principalDisplayName"),
+                            principalId=_object.get("principalId"),
+                        )
                     )
-                )
+
+            next_link = response_json.get("@odata.nextLink")
+            page_count += 1
+
+        if next_link is not None and page_count >= MicrosoftSSOHandler.MAX_GRAPH_API_PAGES:
+            verbose_proxy_logger.warning(
+                f"Reached maximum page limit of {MicrosoftSSOHandler.MAX_GRAPH_API_PAGES}. Some service principal group assignments may not be included."
+            )
 
         return group_ids, service_principal_teams
 

litellm/proxy/proxy_server.py

@@ -14805,6 +14805,7 @@ async def get_config_list(
         "forward_client_headers_to_llm_api": {"type": "Boolean"},
         "mcp_required_fields": {"type": "List"},
         "cancel_on_disconnect": {"type": "Boolean"},
+        "skip_user_budget_on_team_key": {"type": "Boolean"},
     }
 
     return_val = []

litellm/proxy/schema.prisma

@@ -422,6 +422,7 @@ model LiteLLM_VerificationToken {
     budget_reset_at DateTime?
     allowed_cache_controls String[] @default([])
     allowed_routes   String[] @default([])
+    key_type         String?
     policies         String[] @default([])
     access_group_ids String[] @default([])
     model_spend      Json @default("{}")
@@ -516,6 +517,7 @@ model LiteLLM_DeletedVerificationToken {
     budget_reset_at         DateTime?
     allowed_cache_controls  String[] @default([])
     allowed_routes          String[] @default([])
+    key_type                String?
     policies                String[] @default([])
     access_group_ids String[] @default([])
     model_spend             Json     @default("{}")

litellm/proxy/spend_tracking/budget_reservation.py

@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ async def reserve_budget_for_request(
     proxy_logging_obj: ProxyLogging,
     end_user_id: Optional[str] = None,
     end_user_object: Optional[Any] = None,
+    skip_user_budget_on_team_key: bool = False,
 ) -> Optional[dict]:
     if valid_token is None or not RouteChecks.is_llm_api_route(route=route):
         return None
@@ -141,6 +142,7 @@ async def reserve_budget_for_request(
         proxy_logging_obj=proxy_logging_obj,
         end_user_id=end_user_id,
         end_user_object=end_user_object,
+        skip_user_budget_on_team_key=skip_user_budget_on_team_key,
     )
     if not counters:
         return None
@@ -296,6 +298,7 @@ async def _get_budget_counters(
     proxy_logging_obj: ProxyLogging,
     end_user_id: Optional[str] = None,
     end_user_object: Optional[Any] = None,
+    skip_user_budget_on_team_key: bool = False,
 ) -> List[_BudgetCounter]:
     counters: List[_BudgetCounter] = []
 
@@ -344,8 +347,9 @@ async def _get_budget_counters(
             )
         )
 
+    is_team_key = team_object is not None and team_object.team_id is not None
     if (
-        (team_object is None or team_object.team_id is None)
+        not (is_team_key and skip_user_budget_on_team_key)
         and user_object is not None
         and user_object.user_id is not None
         and user_object.max_budget is not None

litellm/responses/main.py

@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ async def aresponses_api_with_mcp(
             pre_processed_mcp_tools=original_mcp_tools,
         )
 
-        return LiteLLM_Proxy_MCP_Handler._create_mcp_streaming_response(
+        mcp_streaming_response = LiteLLM_Proxy_MCP_Handler._create_mcp_streaming_response(
             input=input,
             model=model,
             all_tools=all_tools,
@@ -272,6 +272,10 @@ async def aresponses_api_with_mcp(
             tool_server_map=tool_server_map,
             **kwargs,
         )
+        await mcp_streaming_response._create_initial_response_iterator()
+        if mcp_streaming_response._initial_creation_error is not None:
+            raise mcp_streaming_response._initial_creation_error
+        return mcp_streaming_response
 
     # Determine if we should auto-execute tools
     should_auto_execute = bool(mcp_tools_with_litellm_proxy) and LiteLLM_Proxy_MCP_Handler._should_auto_execute_tools(

litellm/responses/mcp/mcp_streaming_iterator.py

@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ from litellm._uuid import uuid
 from litellm.responses.streaming_iterator import BaseResponsesAPIStreamingIterator
 from litellm.types.llms.openai import (
     BaseLiteLLMOpenAIResponseObject,
+    ErrorEvent,
+    ErrorEventError,
     MCPCallArgumentsDeltaEvent,
     MCPCallArgumentsDoneEvent,
     MCPCallCompletedEvent,
@@ -316,6 +318,11 @@ class MCPEnhancedStreamingIterator(BaseResponsesAPIStreamingIterator):
         # Cache the response ID to ensure consistency across all events
         self._cached_response_id: Optional[str] = None
 
+        self._initial_creation_error: Exception | None = None
+        self._stream_error: Exception | None = None
+        self._error_event_emitted = False
+        self._last_sequence_number = 0
+
     def _extract_mcp_headers_from_params(self) -> None:
         """Extract MCP headers from original request params to pass to tool calls"""
         from typing import Dict, Optional
@@ -380,10 +387,31 @@ class MCPEnhancedStreamingIterator(BaseResponsesAPIStreamingIterator):
 
         return LiteLLM_Proxy_MCP_Handler._should_auto_execute_tools(self.mcp_tools_with_litellm_proxy)
 
+    def _make_stream_error_event(self) -> ResponsesAPIStreamingResponse:
+        err = self._stream_error
+        status_code = getattr(err, "status_code", None)
+        return ErrorEvent(
+            type=ResponsesAPIStreamEvents.ERROR,
+            sequence_number=self._last_sequence_number + 1,
+            error=ErrorEventError(
+                type="mcp_gateway_error",
+                code=str(status_code) if status_code is not None else "internal_error",
+                message=str(err) if err is not None else "MCP gateway stream failed",
+                param=None,
+            ),
+        )
+
     def __aiter__(self):
         return self
 
     async def __anext__(self) -> ResponsesAPIStreamingResponse:
+        chunk = await self._anext_impl()
+        sequence_number = getattr(chunk, "sequence_number", None)
+        if isinstance(sequence_number, int) and sequence_number > self._last_sequence_number:
+            self._last_sequence_number = sequence_number
+        return chunk
+
+    async def _anext_impl(self) -> ResponsesAPIStreamingResponse:
         """
         Phase-based streaming:
         1. initial_response - Stream the first LLM response (includes response.created, response.in_progress, response.output_item.added)
@@ -438,10 +466,16 @@ class MCPEnhancedStreamingIterator(BaseResponsesAPIStreamingIterator):
                 self.phase = "continue_initial_response"
                 return await self.__anext__()
             self.phase = "finished"
+            if self._stream_error is not None and not self._error_event_emitted:
+                self._error_event_emitted = True
+                return self._make_stream_error_event()
             raise StopAsyncIteration
 
         # Phase 6: Finished
         if self.phase == "finished":
+            if self._stream_error is not None and not self._error_event_emitted:
+                self._error_event_emitted = True
+                return self._make_stream_error_event()
             raise StopAsyncIteration
 
         # Should not reach here
@@ -530,6 +564,12 @@ class MCPEnhancedStreamingIterator(BaseResponsesAPIStreamingIterator):
 
         chunk = await cast(Any, self.base_iterator).__anext__()  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
 
+        if self._cached_response_id is None and hasattr(chunk, "response"):
+            new_response = getattr(chunk, "response", None)
+            new_response_id = getattr(new_response, "id", None) if new_response is not None else None
+            if new_response_id:
+                self._cached_response_id = new_response_id
+
         # Ensure response ID consistency - update chunk if needed
         if self._cached_response_id and hasattr(chunk, "response"):
             response_obj = getattr(chunk, "response", None)
@@ -589,6 +629,8 @@ class MCPEnhancedStreamingIterator(BaseResponsesAPIStreamingIterator):
 
             traceback.print_exc()
             self.base_iterator = None
+            self._initial_creation_error = e
+            self._stream_error = e
             # Don't set phase to "finished" here — let __anext__ emit any
             # pre-generated MCP discovery events before ending the iteration.
 
@@ -761,6 +803,7 @@ class MCPEnhancedStreamingIterator(BaseResponsesAPIStreamingIterator):
             if hasattr(follow_up_response, "__aiter__"):
                 self.base_iterator = follow_up_response
                 self.collected_response = None
+                self._cached_response_id = None
 
         except Exception as e:
             verbose_logger.error(f"Error creating follow-up iterator: {e}")
@@ -768,6 +811,7 @@ class MCPEnhancedStreamingIterator(BaseResponsesAPIStreamingIterator):
 
             traceback.print_exc()
             self.base_iterator = None
+            self._stream_error = e
 
     def __iter__(self):
         return self

litellm/router.py

@@ -7605,13 +7605,13 @@ class Router:
             model_name = entry.get("model_name") if isinstance(entry, dict) else entry.model_name
             if not model_name or not lp:
                 continue
-            if model_name in self.adaptive_routers:
-                continue
             deployment = Deployment(
                 model_name=model_name,
                 litellm_params=(lp if not isinstance(lp, dict) else LiteLLM_Params(**lp)),
                 model_info=(entry.get("model_info") if isinstance(entry, dict) else entry.model_info),
             )
+            if model_name in self.adaptive_routers:
+                continue
             self.init_adaptive_router_deployment(deployment=deployment)
 
         for model_name, complexity_router in self.complexity_routers.items():
@@ -10707,56 +10707,39 @@ class Router:
         if self.routing_plugins:
             await self._run_routing_plugins(model=model, request_kwargs=request_kwargs, messages=messages)
 
-        #########################################################
-        # Check if any auto-router should be used
-        #########################################################
-        if model in self.auto_routers:
-            return await self.auto_routers[model].async_pre_routing_hook(
-                model=model,
-                request_kwargs=request_kwargs,
-                messages=messages,
-                input=input,
-                specific_deployment=specific_deployment,
-            )
+        router_strategy = (
+            self.auto_routers.get(model)
+            or self.complexity_routers.get(model)
+            or self.adaptive_routers.get(model)
+            or self.quality_routers.get(model)
+        )
+        if router_strategy is None:
+            return None
 
-        #########################################################
-        # Check if any complexity-router should be used
-        #########################################################
-        if model in self.complexity_routers:
-            return await self.complexity_routers[model].async_pre_routing_hook(
-                model=model,
-                request_kwargs=request_kwargs,
-                messages=messages,
-                input=input,
-                specific_deployment=specific_deployment,
-            )
+        pre_routing_hook_response = await router_strategy.async_pre_routing_hook(
+            model=model,
+            request_kwargs=request_kwargs,
+            messages=messages,
+            input=input,
+            specific_deployment=specific_deployment,
+        )
 
-        #########################################################
-        # Check if an adaptive-router should be used
-        #########################################################
-        adaptive_router = self.adaptive_routers.get(model)
-        if adaptive_router is not None:
-            return await adaptive_router.async_pre_routing_hook(
-                model=model,
-                request_kwargs=request_kwargs,
-                messages=messages,
-                input=input,
-                specific_deployment=specific_deployment,
-            )
+        # `model` (the alias, e.g. "smart-router") is never the deployment actually
+        # called - apply the alias's own litellm_params (besides `model` itself,
+        # which is just the alias marker) to the request, since the tier/route
+        # deployment the hook selected won't have them. Router-only fields
+        # (tpm, rpm, weight, complexity_router_config, ...) are excluded from the
+        # actual outbound LLM call downstream by litellm.types.utils.all_litellm_params,
+        # not here.
+        if pre_routing_hook_response is not None:
+            alias_index = self.model_name_to_deployment_indices.get(model, [])
+            if alias_index:
+                alias_litellm_params = self.model_list[alias_index[0]].get("litellm_params", {})
+                for key, value in alias_litellm_params.items():
+                    if key != "model" and value is not None:
+                        request_kwargs.setdefault(key, value)
 
-        #########################################################
-        # Check if any quality-router should be used
-        #########################################################
-        if model in self.quality_routers:
-            return await self.quality_routers[model].async_pre_routing_hook(
-                model=model,
-                request_kwargs=request_kwargs,
-                messages=messages,
-                input=input,
-                specific_deployment=specific_deployment,
-            )
-
-        return None
+        return pre_routing_hook_response
 
     def get_available_deployment(
         self,

litellm/router_strategy/complexity_router/complexity_router.py

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 import asyncio
 import random
 import re
-from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, Literal, Optional, Union, cast
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, Literal, Union, cast
 
 from pydantic import BaseModel
 
@@ -809,6 +809,44 @@ class ComplexityRouter(CustomLogger):
 
         return user_message, system_prompt
 
+    @staticmethod
+    def _iter_metadata_dicts(request_kwargs: dict) -> list[dict]:
+        """Metadata may land on `metadata` or `litellm_metadata` depending on the
+        endpoint, mirroring DeploymentAffinityCheck's precedence."""
+        return [
+            metadata
+            for metadata_key in ("litellm_metadata", "metadata")
+            if isinstance(metadata := request_kwargs.get(metadata_key), dict)
+        ]
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _get_session_id_from_request_kwargs(request_kwargs: dict) -> str | None:
+        """Resolve a client-supplied session_id."""
+        for metadata in ComplexityRouter._iter_metadata_dicts(request_kwargs):
+            session_id = metadata.get("session_id")
+            if session_id is not None:
+                return str(session_id)
+        return None
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _get_user_api_key_hash_from_request_kwargs(request_kwargs: dict) -> str | None:
+        """Resolve the proxy-derived API key hash, the same trust boundary
+        DeploymentAffinityCheck uses for its own key-based affinity (not the
+        client-supplied OpenAI `user` param, which isn't authenticated)."""
+        for metadata in ComplexityRouter._iter_metadata_dicts(request_kwargs):
+            user_key = metadata.get("user_api_key_hash")
+            if user_key is not None:
+                return str(user_key)
+        return None
+
+    def _get_session_affinity_cache_key(self, session_id: str, request_kwargs: dict) -> str:
+        # Namespace by the caller's API key hash so two different callers reusing the
+        # same client-supplied session_id can't poison each other's routing pin. Falls
+        # back to "unscoped" only when there's no authenticated caller to scope by
+        # (e.g. direct Router usage without the proxy layer).
+        caller_scope = self._get_user_api_key_hash_from_request_kwargs(request_kwargs) or "unscoped"
+        return f"complexity_router_session_affinity:v1:{self.model_name}:{caller_scope}:{session_id}"
+
     async def async_pre_routing_hook(
         self,
         model: str,
@@ -816,10 +854,70 @@ class ComplexityRouter(CustomLogger):
         messages: list[dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
         input: Union[str, list] | None = None,
         specific_deployment: bool | None = False,
-    ) -> Optional[PreRoutingHookResponse]:
+    ) -> PreRoutingHookResponse | None:
         """
         Pre-routing hook called before the routing decision.
 
+        When `session_affinity` is enabled and a session_id is resolvable on the request,
+        pins the model chosen on the session's first turn and reuses it for every later
+        turn, skipping classification entirely. Otherwise delegates to `_classify_and_route`.
+        """
+        from litellm.types.router import PreRoutingHookResponse
+
+        session_id = self._get_session_id_from_request_kwargs(request_kwargs) if self.config.session_affinity else None
+        cache_key = self._get_session_affinity_cache_key(session_id, request_kwargs) if session_id is not None else None
+
+        if cache_key is not None:
+            pinned_model = await self.litellm_router_instance.cache.async_get_cache(key=cache_key)
+            if isinstance(pinned_model, str):
+                # Refresh the TTL on every hit so an active session doesn't lose its
+                # pin mid-conversation just because it outlives the original write.
+                await self.litellm_router_instance.cache.async_set_cache(
+                    key=cache_key,
+                    value=pinned_model,
+                    ttl=self.config.session_affinity_ttl_seconds,
+                )
+                if self.config.adaptive:
+                    from litellm.router_strategy.adaptive_router.config import (
+                        ADAPTIVE_ROUTER_CHOSEN_MODEL_KEY,
+                    )
+
+                    kwargs_metadata = request_kwargs.setdefault("metadata", {})
+                    if isinstance(kwargs_metadata, dict):
+                        kwargs_metadata[ADAPTIVE_ROUTER_CHOSEN_MODEL_KEY] = pinned_model
+                verbose_router_logger.info(
+                    f"ComplexityRouter: routing decision cause=session_affinity_pin, routed_model={pinned_model}"
+                )
+                has_original_messages = messages is not None and len(messages) > 0
+                return PreRoutingHookResponse(
+                    model=pinned_model,
+                    messages=messages if has_original_messages else None,
+                )
+
+        response = await self._classify_and_route(
+            model=model,
+            request_kwargs=request_kwargs,
+            messages=messages,
+            input=input,
+            specific_deployment=specific_deployment,
+        )
+        if cache_key is not None and response is not None:
+            await self.litellm_router_instance.cache.async_set_cache(
+                key=cache_key,
+                value=response.model,
+                ttl=self.config.session_affinity_ttl_seconds,
+            )
+        return response
+
+    async def _classify_and_route(
+        self,
+        model: str,
+        request_kwargs: dict,
+        messages: list[dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
+        input: Union[str, list] | None = None,
+        specific_deployment: bool | None = False,
+    ) -> PreRoutingHookResponse | None:
+        """
         Classifies the request by complexity and returns the appropriate model.
         Supports chat completions (messages), Responses API (input), and other
         formats via the guardrail translation handler dispatch.

litellm/router_strategy/complexity_router/config.py

@@ -361,6 +361,20 @@ class ComplexityRouterConfig(BaseModel):
         description="Minimum cosine similarity for a semantic keyword match",
     )
 
+    # Session affinity: pin the first turn's routed model for the rest of the session
+    session_affinity: bool = Field(
+        default=False,
+        description=(
+            "When True and a session_id is resolvable on the request, pin the model chosen on the "
+            "session's first turn and reuse it for every later turn, skipping re-classification."
+        ),
+    )
+    session_affinity_ttl_seconds: int = Field(
+        default=3600,
+        gt=0,
+        description="TTL for the session affinity pin; refreshed on every cache hit",
+    )
+
     model_config = ConfigDict(extra="allow")  # Allow additional fields
 
     @field_validator("tiers", mode="before")

litellm/types/integrations/prometheus.py

@@ -213,6 +213,8 @@ DEFINED_PROMETHEUS_METRICS = Literal[
     "litellm_input_audio_tokens_metric",
     "litellm_output_reasoning_tokens_metric",
     "litellm_output_audio_tokens_metric",
+    "litellm_video_duration_seconds_metric",
+    "litellm_images_generated_metric",
     "litellm_deployment_successful_fallbacks",
     "litellm_deployment_failed_fallbacks",
     "litellm_remaining_team_budget_metric",
@@ -506,6 +508,9 @@ class PrometheusMetricLabels:
     litellm_output_reasoning_tokens_metric = litellm_output_tokens_metric
     litellm_output_audio_tokens_metric = litellm_output_tokens_metric
 
+    litellm_video_duration_seconds_metric = litellm_output_tokens_metric
+    litellm_images_generated_metric = litellm_output_tokens_metric
+
     litellm_deployment_state = [
         UserAPIKeyLabelNames.v2_LITELLM_MODEL_NAME.value,
         UserAPIKeyLabelNames.MODEL_ID.value,
@@ -717,6 +722,8 @@ class PrometheusMetricLabels:
             "litellm_input_tokens_metric",
             "litellm_total_tokens_metric",
             "litellm_output_tokens_metric",
+            "litellm_video_duration_seconds_metric",
+            "litellm_images_generated_metric",
         }
     )
     # Managed batch metrics

litellm/types/utils.py

@@ -3210,6 +3210,16 @@ all_litellm_params = (
         "_litellm_tpm_reserved_model",
         "_litellm_tpm_reserved_scopes",
         "_litellm_tpm_reservation_released",
+        "auto_router_config_path",
+        "auto_router_config",
+        "auto_router_default_model",
+        "auto_router_embedding_model",
+        "complexity_router_config",
+        "complexity_router_default_model",
+        "adaptive_router_config",
+        "adaptive_router_default_model",
+        "quality_router_config",
+        "quality_router_default_model",
     ]
     + list(StandardCallbackDynamicParams.__annotations__.keys())
     + list(CustomPricingLiteLLMParams.model_fields.keys())

model_prices_and_context_window.json

@@ -11331,6 +11331,7 @@
         "supports_prompt_caching": true,
         "supports_reasoning": true,
         "supports_response_schema": true,
+        "supports_native_structured_output": true,
         "supports_tool_choice": true,
         "supports_vision": true
     },
@@ -11362,6 +11363,7 @@
         "supports_prompt_caching": true,
         "supports_reasoning": true,
         "supports_response_schema": true,
+        "supports_native_structured_output": true,
         "supports_tool_choice": true,
         "supports_vision": true,
         "supports_web_search": true
@@ -11424,6 +11426,7 @@
         "supports_prompt_caching": true,
         "supports_reasoning": true,
         "supports_response_schema": true,
+        "supports_native_structured_output": true,
         "supports_max_reasoning_effort": true,
         "supports_tool_choice": true,
         "supports_vision": true,
@@ -11479,6 +11482,7 @@
         "supports_prompt_caching": true,
         "supports_reasoning": true,
         "supports_response_schema": true,
+        "supports_native_structured_output": true,
         "supports_tool_choice": true,
         "supports_vision": true
     },
@@ -11506,6 +11510,7 @@
         "supports_prompt_caching": true,
         "supports_reasoning": true,
         "supports_response_schema": true,
+        "supports_native_structured_output": true,
         "supports_tool_choice": true,
         "supports_vision": true
     },
@@ -11559,6 +11564,7 @@
         "supports_prompt_caching": true,
         "supports_reasoning": true,
         "supports_response_schema": true,
+        "supports_native_structured_output": true,
         "supports_tool_choice": true,
         "supports_vision": true,
         "supports_output_config": true
@@ -11586,6 +11592,7 @@
         "supports_prompt_caching": true,
         "supports_reasoning": true,
         "supports_response_schema": true,
+        "supports_native_structured_output": true,
         "supports_tool_choice": true,
         "supports_vision": true,
         "supports_output_config": true
@@ -11614,6 +11621,7 @@
         "supports_prompt_caching": true,
         "supports_reasoning": true,
         "supports_response_schema": true,
+        "supports_native_structured_output": true,
         "supports_tool_choice": true,
         "supports_vision": true,
         "provider_specific_entry": {
@@ -11648,6 +11656,7 @@
         "supports_prompt_caching": true,
         "supports_reasoning": true,
         "supports_response_schema": true,
+        "supports_native_structured_output": true,
         "supports_tool_choice": true,
         "supports_vision": true,
         "provider_specific_entry": {
@@ -11682,6 +11691,7 @@
         "supports_prompt_caching": true,
         "supports_reasoning": true,
         "supports_response_schema": true,
+        "supports_native_structured_output": true,
         "supports_sampling_params": false,
         "supports_tool_choice": true,
         "supports_vision": true,
@@ -11718,6 +11728,7 @@
         "supports_prompt_caching": true,
         "supports_reasoning": true,
         "supports_response_schema": true,
+        "supports_native_structured_output": true,
         "supports_sampling_params": false,
         "supports_tool_choice": true,
         "supports_vision": true,
@@ -11788,6 +11799,7 @@
         "supports_prompt_caching": true,
         "supports_reasoning": true,
         "supports_response_schema": true,
+        "supports_native_structured_output": true,
         "supports_sampling_params": false,
         "supports_tool_choice": true,
         "supports_vision": true,

pyproject.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [project]
 name = "litellm"
-version = "1.93.0"
+version = "1.94.0"
 description = "Library to easily interface with LLM API providers"
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.10, <3.14"
@@ -62,8 +62,8 @@ proxy = [
     "azure-identity>=1.25.2,<2.0",
     "azure-storage-blob>=12.28.0,<13.0",
     "mcp>=1.26.0,<2.0",
-    "litellm-proxy-extras==0.4.76",
-    "litellm-enterprise==0.1.49",
+    "litellm-proxy-extras==0.4.77",
+    "litellm-enterprise==0.1.50",
     "RestrictedPython>=8.1,<9.0",
     "rich>=13.9.4,<14.0",
     "polars>=1.38.1,<2.0",
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ ci = [
     # protobuf, Pillow is a compiled C extension).
     "tenacity==8.5.0",
     "google-generativeai==0.8.6",
-    "Pillow==12.2.0",
+    "Pillow==12.3.0",
     # Azure batch E2E tests still import psycopg2 directly.
     "psycopg2-binary==2.9.11",
     "pytest-codspeed==4.3.0",
@@ -264,6 +264,8 @@ constraint-dependencies = [
     "aiohttp>=3.14.1,<4.0",
     "packaging>=24.0",
     "soupsieve>=2.8.4",
+    "httplib2>=0.32.0",
+    "setuptools>=83.0.0",
 ]
 override-dependencies = [
     # a2a-sdk 1.x requires packaging>=24.0; lunary 1.4.x still caps at <24.0.
@@ -284,7 +286,7 @@ members = ["enterprise", "litellm-proxy-extras"]
 profile = "black"
 
 [tool.commitizen]
-version = "1.93.0"
+version = "1.94.0"
 version_files = [
     "pyproject.toml:^version",
 ]

schema.prisma

@@ -422,6 +422,7 @@ model LiteLLM_VerificationToken {
     budget_reset_at DateTime?
     allowed_cache_controls String[] @default([])
     allowed_routes   String[] @default([])
+    key_type         String?
     policies         String[] @default([])
     access_group_ids String[] @default([])
     model_spend      Json @default("{}")
@@ -516,6 +517,7 @@ model LiteLLM_DeletedVerificationToken {
     budget_reset_at         DateTime?
     allowed_cache_controls  String[] @default([])
     allowed_routes          String[] @default([])
+    key_type                String?
     policies                String[] @default([])
     access_group_ids String[] @default([])
     model_spend             Json     @default("{}")

tests/e2e/CLAUDE.md

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ Each subdirectory under `tests/e2e/` is one suite, scoped to an endpoint family
 - `embeddings/` - the `/embeddings` endpoint across providers
 - `batches/` - the `/batches` endpoint (placeholder until the first test lands)
 - `realtime/` - realtime websocket sessions, including the pipecat audio path
-- `quota_management/` - quota enforcement and accounting, one subfolder per behavior: `budgets/` (budget definition, enforcement, and reset windows: key, team, tag, soft, multi-window) and `spend_tracking/` (spend logging and cost attribution on `/spend/*`)
+- `quota_management/` - quota enforcement and accounting, one subfolder per behavior: `ratelimit/` (rpm/tpm blocks, window reset, pacing headers on live traffic), `budgets/` (budget definition, enforcement, and reset windows: key, team, tag, soft, multi-window), and `spend_tracking/` (spend logging and cost attribution on `/spend/*`)
 - `management/` - key/team/user/organization management routes: create/update/delete persistence via the info routes, team membership, and llm-only-key route denials; also the dashboard UI behavior on top of them, driven through the proxy-served UI at /ui with playwright (optional dep behind importorskip)
 - `logging/` - logging-integration delivery (datadog and friends)
 - `security/` - secret handling and log-leak protection

tests/e2e/batches/test_batches_e2e.py

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 import json
 import time
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
 from typing import Callable
 
 import pytest
@@ -49,7 +50,7 @@ from e2e_http import (
     unwrap,
 )
 from lifecycle import ResourceManager
-from models import KeyGenerateBody, SpendLogRow, SpendLogsParams
+from models import KeyGenerateBody, SpendLogRow
 
 pytestmark = pytest.mark.e2e
 
@@ -349,6 +350,10 @@ def test_rate_limited_batch_create_leaves_no_unattributed_spend_row(
     the file-read path fires while the batch itself is not blocked.
     ``resources.key()`` cannot set limits, so the key is minted on the gateway
     directly and its delete deferred.
+
+    Snapshots read /spend/logs/v2 over a bounded window around the test instead
+    of the unpaginated /spend/logs whole-table read, which grows with the
+    environment and OOMed the e2e runner on stage.
     """
     user_id = f"e2e-batch-rl-{unique_marker()}"
     key = client.gateway.generate_key(
@@ -356,8 +361,13 @@ def test_rate_limited_batch_create_leaves_no_unattributed_spend_row(
     )
     resources.defer(lambda: client.gateway.delete_key(key))
 
+    window_start = datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(hours=1)
+    window_end = window_start + timedelta(hours=2)
     before = frozenset(
-        row.request_id for row in unattributed_rows(client.gateway.spend_logs(SpendLogsParams()))
+        row.request_id
+        for row in unattributed_rows(
+            client.gateway.spend_logs_window(start=window_start, end=window_end)
+        )
     )
 
     file = unwrap(
@@ -379,7 +389,9 @@ def test_rate_limited_batch_create_leaves_no_unattributed_spend_row(
 
     new_orphans = [
         row
-        for row in unattributed_rows(client.gateway.spend_logs(SpendLogsParams()))
+        for row in unattributed_rows(
+            client.gateway.spend_logs_window(start=window_start, end=window_end)
+        )
         if row.request_id not in before
     ]
     assert not new_orphans, (

tests/e2e/coverage_registry/logging.yaml

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 - {id: logging.datadog.success.exports_metric, module: logging, tier: P0, event: success, assertions: [exports_metric], exercised_on: [chat_completions, messages, embeddings], source: "integrations/datadog/datadog.py", rationale: "Powers dashboards/alerts; cardinality regressions common"}
 - {id: logging.datadog.failure.exports_metric, module: logging, tier: P0, event: failure, assertions: [exports_metric], exercised_on: [chat_completions], source: "integrations/datadog/datadog.py", rationale: "Failure metrics for alerting/SLO"}
 - {id: logging.prometheus.success.exports_metric, module: logging, tier: P0, event: success, assertions: [exports_metric], exercised_on: [chat_completions, messages, embeddings], source: "integrations/prometheus.py", rationale: "Standard OSS metrics; per-key cardinality (existing e2e)"}
-- {id: logging.otel.success.exports_metric, module: logging, tier: P0, event: success, assertions: [exports_metric], exercised_on: [chat_completions, messages, embeddings], source: "integrations/otel/logger.py", rationale: "OTEL spans on every call path"}
+- {id: logging.otel.success.exports_metric, module: logging, tier: P0, event: success, assertions: [exports_metric], exercised_on: [chat_completions, messages, responses, embeddings], source: "integrations/otel/logger.py", rationale: "OTEL spans on every call path"}
 - {id: logging.otel.failure.exports_metric, module: logging, tier: P0, event: failure, assertions: [exports_metric], exercised_on: [chat_completions, messages], source: "integrations/otel/logger.py", rationale: "Error spans for observability continuity"}
 - {id: logging.braintrust.success.logs_spend, module: logging, tier: P1, event: success, assertions: [logs_spend], exercised_on: [chat_completions, messages], source: "integrations/braintrust_logging.py", rationale: "Evals platform spend"}
 - {id: logging.langsmith.success.logs_spend, module: logging, tier: P1, event: success, assertions: [logs_spend], exercised_on: [chat_completions, messages], source: "integrations/langsmith.py", rationale: "LangChain ecosystem"}

tests/e2e/docker-compose.yml

@@ -18,6 +18,12 @@ configs:
           type: redis
           host: redis
           port: 6379
+        # OTEL v2 trace destination for the logging suite's trace-completeness
+        # tests: the arize_phoenix preset is OTLP with a configurable endpoint
+        # (PHOENIX_COLLECTOR_HTTP_ENDPOINT below points it at the jaeger service),
+        # so gen-AI spans export through a preset-owned provider - the code path
+        # where trace splits actually happen - with no cloud credentials needed.
+        callbacks: ["arize_phoenix"]
 
       router_settings:
         routing_strategy: simple-shuffle
@@ -68,9 +74,14 @@ services:
         condition: service_healthy
       redis:
         condition: service_healthy
+      jaeger:
+        condition: service_healthy
     env_file: .env
     environment:
       LITELLM_MASTER_KEY: sk-1234
+      LITELLM_OTEL_V2: "true"
+      PHOENIX_COLLECTOR_HTTP_ENDPOINT: http://jaeger:4318/v1/traces
+      PHOENIX_API_KEY: local-jaeger-noauth
       DATABASE_URL: postgresql://litellm:litellm@db:5432/litellm
       UI_USERNAME: admin
       UI_PASSWORD: sk-1234
@@ -114,3 +125,15 @@ services:
       interval: 3s
       timeout: 3s
       retries: 20
+
+# throwaway OTEL trace destination (OTLP ingest on 4318 inside the network,
+# query API on host 16686 for test read-back; see E2E_OTEL_QUERY_URL)
+  jaeger:
+    image: jaegertracing/all-in-one:1.62.0
+    ports:
+      - "16686:16686"
+    healthcheck:
+      test: ["CMD", "wget", "-qO-", "http://localhost:14269/"]
+      interval: 3s
+      timeout: 3s
+      retries: 20

tests/e2e/e2e_config.py

@@ -24,6 +24,14 @@ CONTROL_PLANE_BASE_URL = os.environ.get(
 UI_USERNAME = os.environ.get("E2E_UI_USERNAME", "admin")
 UI_PASSWORD = os.environ.get("E2E_UI_PASSWORD", MASTER_KEY)
 
+CHEAP_ANTHROPIC_MODEL = os.environ.get("E2E_CHEAP_ANTHROPIC_MODEL", "claude-haiku-4-5")
+CHEAP_OPENAI_MODEL = os.environ.get("E2E_CHEAP_OPENAI_MODEL", "gpt-5.5")
+
+# Jaeger query API of the compose stack's OTEL trace destination (the `jaeger`
+# service in docker-compose.yml maps it to host 16686). Trace-completeness tests
+# read exported spans back through it.
+OTEL_QUERY_URL = os.environ.get("E2E_OTEL_QUERY_URL", "http://localhost:16686").rstrip("/")
+
 # Writes on the proxy are eventually consistent (e.g. spend rows flush on
 # proxy_batch_write_at, ~60s). Read-backs poll to this deadline, never sleep-once.
 POLL_TIMEOUT = float(os.environ.get("E2E_POLL_TIMEOUT", "120"))

tests/e2e/e2e_gateway.py

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import time
 import warnings
 from collections.abc import Callable
 from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime
 
 from e2e_http import (
     NoBody,
@@ -50,6 +51,8 @@ from models import (
     OcrResponse,
     SpendLogRow,
     SpendLogs,
+    SpendLogsPage,
+    SpendLogsPageParams,
     SpendLogsParams,
 )
 from e2e_config import (
@@ -255,6 +258,28 @@ class Gateway:
             case _:
                 return []
 
+    def spend_logs_window(self, *, start: datetime, end: datetime) -> list[SpendLogRow]:
+        def fetch(page: int) -> SpendLogsPage:
+            return unwrap(
+                self.transport.get(
+                    "/spend/logs/v2",
+                    headers=self.transport.master,
+                    params=SpendLogsPageParams(
+                        start_date=start.strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"),
+                        end_date=end.strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"),
+                        page=page,
+                        page_size=100,
+                    ),
+                    response_type=SpendLogsPage,
+                )
+            )
+
+        first = fetch(1)
+        return [
+            *first.data,
+            *(row for page in range(2, first.total_pages + 1) for row in fetch(page).data),
+        ]
+
     def poll_logs_for_key(
         self, key: str, *, min_rows: int = 1, predicate: RowsPredicate | None = None
     ) -> list[SpendLogRow]:

tests/e2e/e2e_http.py

@@ -109,14 +109,16 @@ class StreamingResponse(BaseModel):
     """Raw outcome for calls whose body is provider-native or streamed: status, the
     x-litellm-call-id header, the x-litellm-response-cost header (StandardLogging
     response_cost), the content-type (which tells streaming `text/event-stream` from
-    non-streaming `application/json`), and the body. SpendLogs.request_id is the
-    completion body id, not call_id. Used by passthrough and streaming, where one
-    validated JSON model does not fit."""
+    non-streaming `application/json`), the response headers (lowercased names, e.g.
+    the x-ratelimit-* pacing headers and retry-after on a 429), and the body.
+    SpendLogs.request_id is the completion body id, not call_id. Used by passthrough
+    and streaming, where one validated JSON model does not fit."""
 
     status_code: int
     call_id: str | None = None  # x-litellm-call-id header
     response_cost: float | None = None  # x-litellm-response-cost header
     content_type: str | None = None
+    headers: dict[str, str] = {}
     body: str
     chunks: int = 0  # streamed events (0 for non-streaming)
 
@@ -276,12 +278,14 @@ def _streaming_outcome(resp: requests.Response, stream: bool) -> StreamingRespon
     call_id = _hdr(resp, "x-litellm-call-id")
     response_cost = _parse_response_cost(resp)
     content_type = _hdr(resp, "content-type")
+    headers = {name.lower(): value for name, value in resp.headers.items()}
     if not stream or not (200 <= resp.status_code < 300):
         return StreamingResponse(
             status_code=resp.status_code,
             call_id=call_id,
             response_cost=response_cost,
             content_type=content_type,
+            headers=headers,
             body=resp.text,
         )
     lines = cast("Iterator[bytes]", resp.iter_lines())
@@ -291,6 +295,7 @@ def _streaming_outcome(resp: requests.Response, stream: bool) -> StreamingRespon
         call_id=call_id,
         response_cost=response_cost,
         content_type=content_type,
+        headers=headers,
         body="<streamed>",
         chunks=chunks,
     )

tests/e2e/logging/conftest.py

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import os
 import pytest
 
 from logging_client import LangfuseCreds, LoggingClient, build_logging_client, load_langfuse_creds
+from otel_client import OtelReader, build_otel_reader
 
 
 def pytest_configure(config: pytest.Config) -> None:
@@ -28,6 +29,12 @@ def client() -> LoggingClient:
     return build_logging_client()
 
 
+@pytest.fixture(scope="session")
+def otel_reader() -> OtelReader:
+    """Read-back client for the compose stack's Jaeger trace destination."""
+    return build_otel_reader()
+
+
 @pytest.fixture
 def datadog_creds() -> None:
     """Require Datadog shipping credentials. Hard-fail when absent; never skip."""

tests/e2e/logging/logging_client.py

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ from e2e_http import (
     unwrap,
 )
 from models import (
+    AnthropicMessagesBody,
     ChatBody,
     ChatMessage,
     ChatResponse,
@@ -75,6 +76,14 @@ WEATHER_TOOL = ChatTool(
 )
 
 
+class ResponsesRequestBody(BaseModel):
+    """OpenAI Responses API /v1/responses request (non-streaming)."""
+
+    model: str
+    input: str
+    max_output_tokens: int
+
+
 class TeamCallbackBody(BaseModel):
     callback_name: Literal["langfuse_otel", "langfuse", "langsmith", "gcs"]
     callback_type: Literal["success", "failure", "success_and_failure"]
@@ -455,6 +464,32 @@ class LoggingClient:
             json=body,
         )
 
+    def messages_raw(self, key: str, model: str, text: str, *, max_tokens: int = 16) -> StreamingResponse:
+        """Non-streaming POST /v1/messages (Anthropic-native body): raw outcome
+        judged by status/body/headers, for tests that need x-litellm-call-id."""
+        return self.gateway.transport.send(
+            "/v1/messages",
+            headers=self.gateway.transport.bearer(key),
+            json=AnthropicMessagesBody(
+                model=model,
+                max_tokens=max_tokens,
+                messages=[ChatMessage(role="user", content=text)],
+            ),
+        )
+
+    def responses_raw(
+        self, key: str, model: str, text: str, *, max_output_tokens: int = 64
+    ) -> StreamingResponse:
+        """Non-streaming POST /v1/responses (OpenAI Responses API): raw outcome
+        judged by status/body/headers, for tests that need x-litellm-call-id.
+        max_output_tokens caps reasoning-model output cost; a capped response is
+        still a 200 and still exports the trace."""
+        return self.gateway.transport.send(
+            "/v1/responses",
+            headers=self.gateway.transport.bearer(key),
+            json=ResponsesRequestBody(model=model, input=text, max_output_tokens=max_output_tokens),
+        )
+
     def scrape_metrics(self) -> str:
         return self.gateway.probe("/metrics", params=NoBody()).body
 

tests/e2e/logging/otel_client.py

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+"""Jaeger read-back for the OTEL trace-completeness tests: typed models over the
+Jaeger query API (the destination's own API - completeness is judged on what the
+backend actually holds, never on "export succeeded" proxy-side).
+
+Traces are fetched server-side by the ``litellm.call_id`` tag the gen-AI span
+carries (the request's x-litellm-call-id response header), so read-back is
+immune to the query page filling up with unrelated traffic (background jobs,
+other suites sharing the stack). Jaeger returns every span of a matching trace,
+so the completeness assertions see the whole tree. A failed query is a hard
+failure, never an empty result - an unreachable destination must not read as
+"the trace never arrived".
+
+External reads go through ``e2e_http`` (the only module allowed to call
+``requests.*``).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import time
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+
+import pytest
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field
+
+from e2e_config import OTEL_QUERY_URL, POLL_INTERVAL, POLL_TIMEOUT
+from e2e_http import URL, NoBody, Success, get
+
+#: OTEL resource service.name the proxy exports under (OTEL_SERVICE_NAME default).
+JAEGER_SERVICE = "litellm"
+#: Span tag carrying the request's x-litellm-call-id (stamped on the gen-AI span).
+CALL_ID_TAG = "litellm.call_id"
+
+
+class JaegerTag(BaseModel):
+    model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore")
+
+    key: str
+    value: str | int | float | bool | None = None
+
+
+class JaegerReference(BaseModel):
+    model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore", populate_by_name=True)
+
+    ref_type: str = Field(alias="refType")
+    trace_id: str = Field(alias="traceID")
+    span_id: str = Field(alias="spanID")
+
+
+class JaegerSpan(BaseModel):
+    model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore", populate_by_name=True)
+
+    span_id: str = Field(alias="spanID")
+    operation_name: str = Field(alias="operationName")
+    start_time: int = Field(default=0, alias="startTime")
+    references: list[JaegerReference] = []
+    tags: list[JaegerTag] = []
+
+    @property
+    def kind(self) -> str:
+        for tag in self.tags:
+            if tag.key == "span.kind":
+                return str(tag.value)
+        return ""
+
+
+class JaegerTrace(BaseModel):
+    model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore", populate_by_name=True)
+
+    trace_id: str = Field(alias="traceID")
+    spans: list[JaegerSpan] = []
+
+    def span_names(self) -> list[str]:
+        return sorted(span.operation_name for span in self.spans)
+
+
+class JaegerTracesPage(BaseModel):
+    model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore")
+
+    data: list[JaegerTrace] = []
+
+
+class _TracesQuery(BaseModel):
+    service: str
+    tags: str
+    limit: int = 20
+    lookback: str = "1h"
+
+
+def _settled(trace: JaegerTrace, names: set[str], prefixes: set[str]) -> bool:
+    present = set(trace.span_names())
+    return names.issubset(present) and all(
+        any(name.startswith(prefix) for name in present) for prefix in prefixes
+    )
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class OtelReader:
+    query_url: str
+
+    def traces_for_call(self, call_id: str) -> list[JaegerTrace]:
+        """Every trace holding a span tagged with this call id. Jaeger matches
+        spans server-side and returns their full traces; more than one hit for
+        one call IS the split-trace bug, so this never collapses to one."""
+        result = get(
+            URL(f"{self.query_url}/api/traces"),
+            headers=NoBody(),
+            params=_TracesQuery(service=JAEGER_SERVICE, tags=json.dumps({CALL_ID_TAG: call_id})),
+            response_type=JaegerTracesPage,
+            timeout=30.0,
+        )
+        match result:
+            case Success(data=page):
+                return page.data
+            case failure:
+                pytest.fail(f"Jaeger query API at {self.query_url} failed: {failure}")
+
+    def poll_traces_for_call(
+        self, *, call_id: str, settled_names: set[str], settled_prefixes: set[str]
+    ) -> list[JaegerTrace]:
+        """Poll until exactly one trace holds the call and it carries every span
+        name in ``settled_names`` plus at least one name per prefix in
+        ``settled_prefixes`` (spans flush in batches, the cost write lands after
+        the response), then return the hits. At the deadline the last hits are
+        returned as-is so the caller's assertions report the real final state -
+        on a split trace this never settles and the orphan comes back."""
+        deadline = time.monotonic() + POLL_TIMEOUT
+        hits: list[JaegerTrace] = []
+        while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+            hits = self.traces_for_call(call_id)
+            if len(hits) == 1 and _settled(hits[0], settled_names, settled_prefixes):
+                return hits
+            time.sleep(POLL_INTERVAL)
+        return hits
+
+
+def build_otel_reader() -> OtelReader:
+    return OtelReader(query_url=OTEL_QUERY_URL)

tests/e2e/logging/test_otel_trace_e2e.py

@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
+"""Live e2e: OTEL trace completeness on the admin-owned destination (LIT-3787).
+
+Covers logging.otel.success.exports_metric: a successful non-streaming call must
+land at the OTEL destination as ONE connected trace - a single root SERVER span
+with the auth phase, db lookups, and cost write under it, and the gen-AI CLIENT
+span parented into the same tree. The regression this pins: the proxy publishing
+the global TracerProvider before callbacks init made server spans export through
+a different provider than the preset's gen-AI spans, so the destination received
+the gen-AI span alone, dangling (fixed in #30590; verified failing at its parent
+commit 1bd603d1ac).
+
+Both halves of the contract are asserted: the recorded state (the proxy reports
+the OTEL v2 logger active via /health/readiness/details) and the enforced
+behavior (the complete span tree at the destination, read back through the
+destination's own query API - never proxy-side "export succeeded" logs).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import time
+from collections.abc import Callable
+
+import pytest
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict
+
+from e2e_config import CHEAP_ANTHROPIC_MODEL, CHEAP_OPENAI_MODEL, unique_marker
+from e2e_http import NoBody, StreamingResponse, require_successful_call
+from lifecycle import ResourceManager
+from logging_client import LoggingClient
+from otel_client import JaegerTrace, OtelReader
+
+pytestmark = pytest.mark.e2e
+
+MODEL = CHEAP_ANTHROPIC_MODEL
+COST_SPAN = "batch_write_to_db _PROXY_track_cost_callback"
+DB_SPAN_PREFIX = "postgres "
+#: The active OTEL v2 logger's name in /health/readiness/details success_callbacks.
+OTEL_V2_LOGGER_NAME = "OpenTelemetryV2"
+
+
+class _ReadinessDetails(BaseModel):
+    model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore")
+
+    success_callbacks: list[str] = []
+
+
+def _assert_otel_destination_configured(client: LoggingClient) -> None:
+    """Recorded state: the proxy reports the OTEL v2 logger among its active
+    callbacks, so a missing/failed destination config fails here, before any
+    traffic-based assertion can time out confusingly."""
+    result = client.gateway.probe("/health/readiness/details", params=NoBody())
+    assert result.status_code == 200, (
+        f"/health/readiness/details must answer 200, got {result.status_code}: {result.body[:300]}"
+    )
+    details = _ReadinessDetails.model_validate_json(result.body)
+    assert OTEL_V2_LOGGER_NAME in details.success_callbacks, (
+        f"the proxy must report the {OTEL_V2_LOGGER_NAME} callback active "
+        f"(LITELLM_OTEL_V2 + arize_phoenix preset in the compose config); got: {details.success_callbacks}"
+    )
+
+
+def _first_ok(client: LoggingClient, send: Callable[[], StreamingResponse]) -> StreamingResponse:
+    """First successful call on a fresh key. A fresh key may briefly 401 until
+    the data plane's auth cache picks it up, so retry on 401 to a deadline; a
+    401 is rejected before the LLM call so it exports no gen-AI span and cannot
+    contaminate the trace assertions. Any other failure is behavior under test
+    and fails hard."""
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + client.gateway.poll_timeout
+    while True:
+        outcome = send()
+        if outcome.ok:
+            return outcome
+        if outcome.status_code != 401 or time.monotonic() >= deadline:
+            require_successful_call(outcome)
+        time.sleep(client.gateway.poll_interval)
+
+
+def _parent_ids(span_id: str, trace: JaegerTrace) -> list[str]:
+    span = next(s for s in trace.spans if s.span_id == span_id)
+    return [ref.span_id for ref in span.references if ref.ref_type == "CHILD_OF"]
+
+
+def _chain_reaches(span_id: str, root_id: str, trace: JaegerTrace) -> bool:
+    """Walk parent references (within the trace) from span_id up to root_id."""
+    seen: set[str] = set()
+    in_trace = {s.span_id for s in trace.spans}
+    current = span_id
+    while current not in seen:
+        if current == root_id:
+            return True
+        seen.add(current)
+        parents = [p for p in _parent_ids(current, trace) if p in in_trace]
+        if not parents:
+            return False
+        current = parents[0]
+    return False
+
+
+def _assert_complete_trace(hits: list[JaegerTrace], *, route: str, genai_span: str) -> None:
+    """The enforced behavior: the destination holds exactly one trace for the
+    call, rooted at the SERVER span, with auth/db/cost children and the gen-AI
+    span all connected into that one tree - no dangling parent references."""
+    assert hits, (
+        "no trace for this call arrived at the destination within the deadline "
+        "(nothing tagged with its call id was found)"
+    )
+    assert len(hits) == 1, (
+        f"expected exactly ONE trace for the call, got {len(hits)}: "
+        f"{[(t.trace_id, t.span_names()) for t in hits]} - more than one trace for "
+        "one call is the split-trace bug (gen-AI span exported away from its root)"
+    )
+    trace = hits[0]
+    names = trace.span_names()
+    in_trace = {span.span_id for span in trace.spans}
+
+    dangling = [
+        span.operation_name
+        for span in trace.spans
+        if span.references and not any(ref.span_id in in_trace for ref in span.references)
+    ]
+    assert not dangling, (
+        f"span(s) {dangling} reference a parent that never reached the destination "
+        f"(orphaned trace); spans present: {names}"
+    )
+
+    roots = [span for span in trace.spans if not span.references]
+    assert len(roots) == 1, f"expected exactly one root span, got {[s.operation_name for s in roots]}; spans: {names}"
+    root = roots[0]
+    assert root.operation_name == f"POST {route}", (
+        f"the root must be the SERVER span 'POST {route}', got {root.operation_name!r}"
+    )
+    assert root.kind == "server", f"the root span must have kind=server, got {root.kind!r}"
+
+    assert f"auth {route}" in names, f"auth phase span 'auth {route}' missing; spans: {names}"
+    assert any(name.startswith(DB_SPAN_PREFIX) for name in names), (
+        f"no db ('{DB_SPAN_PREFIX}*') span in the trace; spans: {names}"
+    )
+    assert COST_SPAN in names, f"cost write span {COST_SPAN!r} missing; spans: {names}"
+
+    genai = next((span for span in trace.spans if span.operation_name == genai_span), None)
+    assert genai is not None, f"gen-AI span {genai_span!r} missing; spans: {names}"
+    assert genai.kind == "client", f"gen-AI span must have kind=client, got {genai.kind!r}"
+    assert _chain_reaches(genai.span_id, root.span_id, trace), (
+        f"gen-AI span {genai_span!r} is in the trace but its parent chain does not "
+        f"reach the root SERVER span; spans: {names}"
+    )
+
+
+def _settled_names(*, route: str, genai_span: str) -> set[str]:
+    return {f"POST {route}", f"auth {route}", COST_SPAN, genai_span}
+
+
+class TestOtelTraceCompleteness:
+    @pytest.mark.covers("logging.otel.success.exports_metric", exercised_on=["chat_completions"])
+    def test_chat_completions_exports_complete_trace(
+        self, client: LoggingClient, otel_reader: OtelReader, resources: ResourceManager
+    ) -> None:
+        """This test verifies that a successful non-streaming
+        /chat/completions request produces one complete OTEL trace.
+
+        The trace should have a single server root span for the incoming request, with
+        the authentication, database, and cost-recording work beneath it. The span for
+        the actual model call must also belong to that same trace, rather than being
+        exported separately with a missing parent.
+
+        This matters because a split trace is easy to miss: all of the spans may still
+        arrive, but the model call appears without the surrounding request context.
+        That makes it difficult to understand where time was spent, connect the model
+        cost to the original request, or investigate a slow or failed call.
+
+        /chat/completions is the main OpenAI-compatible route used by most customers,
+        so it is important that trace parenting works correctly on this path.
+        """
+        route = "/chat/completions"
+        _assert_otel_destination_configured(client)
+
+        key = client.key_with_alias(f"otel-trace-chat-{unique_marker()}", models=[MODEL])
+        resources.defer(lambda: client.delete_key(key))
+
+        marker = unique_marker()
+        outcome = _first_ok(
+            client, lambda: client.chat_raw(key, MODEL, f"reply with one word {marker}", max_tokens=16)
+        )
+        assert outcome.call_id is not None, "success response must carry x-litellm-call-id"
+
+        hits = otel_reader.poll_traces_for_call(
+            call_id=outcome.call_id,
+            settled_names=_settled_names(route=route, genai_span=f"chat {MODEL}"),
+            settled_prefixes={DB_SPAN_PREFIX},
+        )
+        _assert_complete_trace(hits, route=route, genai_span=f"chat {MODEL}")
+
+    @pytest.mark.covers("logging.otel.success.exports_metric", exercised_on=["messages"])
+    def test_messages_exports_complete_trace(
+        self, client: LoggingClient, otel_reader: OtelReader, resources: ResourceManager
+    ) -> None:
+        """This test verifies that one successful non-streaming /v1/messages request
+        produces exactly one complete OTEL trace.
+
+        The trace must have a single root span named "POST /v1/messages". The
+        authentication, database, cost-writing, and model-call spans must all belong to
+        the same trace and have valid parent relationships leading back to that root.
+
+        The model-call span is expected to be named "chat <model>". The test fails if
+        the request is split across multiple traces, if any span references a missing
+        parent, or if the model-call span cannot be connected back to the root."""
+        route = "/v1/messages"
+        _assert_otel_destination_configured(client)
+
+        key = client.key_with_alias(f"otel-trace-messages-{unique_marker()}", models=[MODEL])
+        resources.defer(lambda: client.delete_key(key))
+
+        marker = unique_marker()
+        outcome = _first_ok(
+            client, lambda: client.messages_raw(key, MODEL, f"reply with one word {marker}", max_tokens=16)
+        )
+        assert outcome.call_id is not None, "success response must carry x-litellm-call-id"
+
+        hits = otel_reader.poll_traces_for_call(
+            call_id=outcome.call_id,
+            settled_names=_settled_names(route=route, genai_span=f"chat {MODEL}"),
+            settled_prefixes={DB_SPAN_PREFIX},
+        )
+        _assert_complete_trace(hits, route=route, genai_span=f"chat {MODEL}")
+
+    @pytest.mark.covers("logging.otel.success.exports_metric", exercised_on=["responses"])
+    def test_responses_exports_complete_trace(
+        self, client: LoggingClient, otel_reader: OtelReader, resources: ResourceManager
+    ) -> None:
+        """This test verifies that one successful non-streaming /v1/responses request
+        produces exactly one complete OTEL trace.
+
+        The trace must have a single root span named "POST /v1/responses". The
+        authentication, database, cost-writing, and model-call spans must all belong to
+        the same trace and have valid parent relationships leading back to that root.
+
+        The model-call span is expected to be named "chat <model>". The test fails if
+        the request is split across multiple traces, if any span references a missing
+        parent, or if the model-call span cannot be connected back to the root."""
+        route = "/v1/responses"
+        _assert_otel_destination_configured(client)
+
+        key = client.key_with_alias(f"otel-trace-responses-{unique_marker()}", models=[CHEAP_OPENAI_MODEL])
+        resources.defer(lambda: client.delete_key(key))
+
+        marker = unique_marker()
+        outcome = _first_ok(
+            client,
+            lambda: client.responses_raw(key, CHEAP_OPENAI_MODEL, f"reply with one word {marker}"),
+        )
+        assert outcome.call_id is not None, "success response must carry x-litellm-call-id"
+
+        genai_span = f"chat {CHEAP_OPENAI_MODEL}"
+        hits = otel_reader.poll_traces_for_call(
+            call_id=outcome.call_id,
+            settled_names=_settled_names(route=route, genai_span=genai_span),
+            settled_prefixes={DB_SPAN_PREFIX},
+        )
+        _assert_complete_trace(hits, route=route, genai_span=genai_span)

tests/e2e/management/test_management_e2e.py

@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ class TestKeyRoutes:
         key = _generate_key(
             client,
             resources,
-            KeyGenerateBody(models=["gemini-2.5-flash"], key_alias=alias, tpm_limit=424242),
+            KeyGenerateBody(models=["gemini-2.5-flash"], key_alias=alias, tpm_limit=424242, rpm_limit=424243),
         )
 
         info = client.gateway.key_info(key)
@@ -122,6 +122,9 @@ class TestKeyRoutes:
         assert info.tpm_limit == 424242, (
             f"/key/info reports tpm_limit {info.tpm_limit}, configured 424242"
         )
+        assert info.rpm_limit == 424243, (
+            f"/key/info reports rpm_limit {info.rpm_limit}, configured 424243"
+        )
 
         _poll_chat_ok(client, key, "gemini-2.5-flash")
         _assert_model_denied(

tests/e2e/models.py

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 from typing import Literal
 
-from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, RootModel
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, RootModel, model_validator
 
 # ---------- keys ----------
 
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ class KeyInfo(BaseModel):
     key_alias: str | None = None
     models: list[str] = []
     tpm_limit: int | None = None
+    rpm_limit: int | None = None
     team_id: str | None = None
     spend: float | None = None
     max_budget: float | None = None
@@ -255,6 +256,16 @@ class SpendLogsParams(BaseModel):
     request_id: str | None = None
     api_key: str | None = None
 
+    @model_validator(mode="after")
+    def require_filter(self) -> SpendLogsParams:
+        if self.request_id is None and self.api_key is None:
+            raise ValueError(
+                "unfiltered /spend/logs returns the entire spend table and OOMs the "
+                "runner on long-lived environments; filter by request_id or api_key, "
+                "or use Gateway.spend_logs_window for a bounded /spend/logs/v2 read"
+            )
+        return self
+
 
 class SpendLogsPageParams(BaseModel):
     """Query for /spend/logs/v2, which requires an explicit date window and

tests/e2e/quota_management/ratelimit/conftest.py

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+"""Quota-management suite's `client` fixture.
+
+The shared lifecycle (resources/scoped_key), proxy liveness skip, and e2e marker
+live in the parent tests/e2e/conftest.py. QuotaClient holds the shared Gateway,
+so the `resources` fixture cleans up keys through it.
+"""
+
+import pytest
+
+from quota_client import QuotaClient, build_client
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(scope="session")
+def client() -> QuotaClient:
+    return build_client()

tests/e2e/quota_management/ratelimit/quota_client.py

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+"""Client for the quota-management suite: the shared Gateway plus raw chat
+calls judged by HTTP status, body, and headers (a rate-limit block is a 429
+whose body and retry-after header carry the contract, not a typed success
+model)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+
+from e2e_gateway import Gateway, build_gateway
+from e2e_http import StreamingResponse
+from models import ChatBody, ChatMessage
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class QuotaClient:
+    gateway: Gateway
+
+    def chat(self, key: str, model: str, content: str, *, max_tokens: int = 16) -> StreamingResponse:
+        return self.gateway.transport.send(
+            "/chat/completions",
+            headers=self.gateway.transport.bearer(key),
+            json=ChatBody(
+                model=model,
+                messages=[ChatMessage(role="user", content=content)],
+                max_tokens=max_tokens,
+            ),
+        )
+
+
+def build_client() -> QuotaClient:
+    return QuotaClient(gateway=build_gateway())

tests/e2e/quota_management/ratelimit/test_rate_limit_e2e.py

@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+"""Live e2e: key-level rpm/tpm rate limits on the gateway.
+
+Covers quota_management.ratelimit.*: a key generated with rpm_limit/tpm_limit gets a
+429 once the limit is crossed inside one window (blocks_over_limit), serves
+again once the window rolls and no sooner (resets_after_window), and successful responses
+report x-ratelimit-* limit/remaining headers so clients can pace
+(headers_report_remaining). Each test asserts both halves of the contract: the
+recorded state (/key/info echoes the configured limit) and the enforced
+behavior (the 429, the recovery, or the headers on live traffic).
+
+The v3 limiter counts a request against the rpm budget at the pre-call hook,
+before model routing, so every call that clears auth consumes budget whether or
+not it ultimately succeeds. The tpm budget is reserved pre-call from an estimate
+(message chars // 4 + max_tokens) and reconciled to the body's actual
+usage.total_tokens after the call, so a block may legitimately fire before the
+actual spend crosses the limit; the tpm test asserts the exact contract on both
+sides (a 429 only once the blocked call's reservation exceeds the remaining
+budget, and no later than the first call after actual spend reaches the limit).
+All calls of one test must land inside a single window
+(LITELLM_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SIZE, 60s default), which real chat latency
+comfortably allows.
+
+The window opens at the pre-call hook of the first counted call, which happens
+after that call is sent, so the send timestamp of the winning first call is a
+lower bound on the window start. The reset test uses it to reject an early
+reset: recovery must not arrive before the full window has elapsed from that
+send, less a small tolerance for the limiter's integer-second window
+arithmetic.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+import time
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+
+import pytest
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, ValidationError
+
+from e2e_config import CHEAP_ANTHROPIC_MODEL, unique_marker
+from e2e_http import StreamingResponse, require_successful_call
+from lifecycle import ResourceManager
+from models import KeyGenerateBody
+from quota_client import QuotaClient
+
+pytestmark = pytest.mark.e2e
+
+MODEL = CHEAP_ANTHROPIC_MODEL
+TPM_LIMIT = 60
+CHAT_MAX_TOKENS = 16
+RESERVATION_CHARS_PER_TOKEN = 4
+WINDOW_SECONDS = 60
+RESET_TOLERANCE_SECONDS = 5
+LAST_CALL_LATENCY_MARGIN_SECONDS = 10
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class _FirstOk:
+    sent_at: float
+    response: StreamingResponse
+
+
+class _ChatUsage(BaseModel):
+    model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore")
+
+    total_tokens: int
+
+
+class _ChatBodyWithUsage(BaseModel):
+    model_config = ConfigDict(extra="ignore")
+
+    usage: _ChatUsage
+
+
+def _total_tokens(outcome: StreamingResponse) -> int:
+    try:
+        return _ChatBodyWithUsage.model_validate_json(outcome.body).usage.total_tokens
+    except ValidationError:
+        pytest.fail(f"successful chat body must report usage.total_tokens, got: {outcome.body[:300]}")
+
+
+def _reserved_tokens(content: str) -> int:
+    return max(1, len(content) // RESERVATION_CHARS_PER_TOKEN) + CHAT_MAX_TOKENS
+
+
+def _remaining_from_429(body: str) -> int:
+    found = re.search(r"Remaining: (\d+)", body)
+    if found is None:
+        pytest.fail(f"429 body must report the remaining budget, got: {body[:300]}")
+    return int(found.group(1))
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class _BlockedByReservation:
+    outcome: StreamingResponse
+    content: str
+    spent: int
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class _CrossedLimit:
+    spent: int
+
+
+def _spend_until_blocked_or_crossed(
+    client: QuotaClient, key: str, first: _FirstOk
+) -> _BlockedByReservation | _CrossedLimit:
+    """Drive chat traffic, summing each body's actual usage.total_tokens, until
+    the limiter blocks (which the reservation may do before the actual spend
+    crosses the limit) or the actual spend reaches the limit."""
+    window_deadline = first.sent_at + WINDOW_SECONDS - LAST_CALL_LATENCY_MARGIN_SECONDS
+    spent = _total_tokens(first.response)
+    while spent < TPM_LIMIT:
+        assert time.monotonic() < window_deadline, (
+            f"spent only {spent} of {TPM_LIMIT} tokens before the {WINDOW_SECONDS}s window could roll; "
+            "the exact-crossing assertion needs every call inside one window"
+        )
+        content = f"reply with one word {unique_marker()}"
+        outcome = client.chat(key, MODEL, content, max_tokens=CHAT_MAX_TOKENS)
+        if outcome.status_code == 429:
+            return _BlockedByReservation(outcome=outcome, content=content, spent=spent)
+        require_successful_call(outcome)
+        spent += _total_tokens(outcome)
+    return _CrossedLimit(spent=spent)
+
+
+def _limited_key(
+    client: QuotaClient,
+    resources: ResourceManager,
+    *,
+    rpm_limit: int | None = None,
+    tpm_limit: int | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    key = client.gateway.generate_key(KeyGenerateBody(models=[MODEL], rpm_limit=rpm_limit, tpm_limit=tpm_limit))
+    resources.defer(lambda: client.gateway.delete_key(key))
+    return key
+
+
+def _chat(client: QuotaClient, key: str) -> StreamingResponse:
+    return client.chat(key, MODEL, f"reply with one word {unique_marker()}")
+
+
+def _first_ok(client: QuotaClient, key: str) -> _FirstOk:
+    """First successful call on a fresh key, which opens the rate-limit window;
+    `sent_at` is captured just before the winning send, so the window opened no
+    earlier than it. A fresh key may briefly 401 until the data plane's auth
+    cache picks it up, so retry on 401 to a deadline; a 401 never reaches the
+    rate limiter, so only the successful call consumes budget. Any other failure
+    is behavior under test and fails hard."""
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + client.gateway.poll_timeout
+    while True:
+        sent_at = time.monotonic()
+        outcome = _chat(client, key)
+        if outcome.ok:
+            return _FirstOk(sent_at=sent_at, response=outcome)
+        if outcome.status_code != 401 or time.monotonic() >= deadline:
+            require_successful_call(outcome)
+        time.sleep(client.gateway.poll_interval)
+
+
+def _assert_rate_limited(outcome: StreamingResponse, limit_type: str) -> None:
+    assert outcome.status_code == 429, (
+        f"expected a 429 {limit_type} rate-limit block, got {outcome.status_code}: {outcome.body[:300]}"
+    )
+    assert "Rate limit exceeded for api_key" in outcome.body, (
+        f"429 body must name the api_key scope, got: {outcome.body[:300]}"
+    )
+    assert f"Limit type: {limit_type}" in outcome.body, (
+        f"429 body must carry 'Limit type: {limit_type}', got: {outcome.body[:300]}"
+    )
+    retry_after = outcome.headers.get("retry-after")
+    assert retry_after is not None and retry_after.isdigit() and int(retry_after) > 0, (
+        f"429 must carry a positive integer retry-after header, got {retry_after!r}"
+    )
+
+
+class TestKeyRateLimits:
+    @pytest.mark.covers("quota_management.ratelimit.rpm.blocks_over_limit")
+    def test_rpm_limit_blocks_over_limit(self, client: QuotaClient, resources: ResourceManager) -> None:
+        key = _limited_key(client, resources, rpm_limit=3)
+        info = client.gateway.key_info(key)
+        assert info.rpm_limit == 3, f"/key/info reports rpm_limit {info.rpm_limit}, configured 3"
+
+        _ = _first_ok(client, key)
+        for _ in range(2):
+            require_successful_call(_chat(client, key))
+
+        _assert_rate_limited(_chat(client, key), "requests")
+
+    @pytest.mark.covers("quota_management.ratelimit.tpm.blocks_over_limit")
+    def test_tpm_limit_blocks_over_limit(self, client: QuotaClient, resources: ResourceManager) -> None:
+        key = _limited_key(client, resources, tpm_limit=TPM_LIMIT)
+        info = client.gateway.key_info(key)
+        assert info.tpm_limit == TPM_LIMIT, f"/key/info reports tpm_limit {info.tpm_limit}, configured {TPM_LIMIT}"
+
+        first = _first_ok(client, key)
+        match _spend_until_blocked_or_crossed(client, key, first):
+            case _BlockedByReservation(outcome=outcome, content=content, spent=spent):
+                _assert_rate_limited(outcome, "tokens")
+                remaining = _remaining_from_429(outcome.body)
+                reserved = _reserved_tokens(content)
+                assert reserved > remaining, (
+                    f"blocked while the call still fit: {remaining} of {TPM_LIMIT} tokens remained but the call "
+                    f"reserved only {reserved} ({spent} actual tokens spent so far)"
+                )
+            case _CrossedLimit():
+                _assert_rate_limited(_chat(client, key), "tokens")
+
+    @pytest.mark.covers("quota_management.ratelimit.rpm.resets_after_window")
+    def test_rpm_limit_resets_after_window(self, client: QuotaClient, resources: ResourceManager) -> None:
+        key = _limited_key(client, resources, rpm_limit=1)
+
+        first = _first_ok(client, key)
+        _assert_rate_limited(_chat(client, key), "requests")
+
+        deadline = time.monotonic() + client.gateway.poll_timeout
+        while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+            attempt_sent_at = time.monotonic()
+            outcome = _chat(client, key)
+            if outcome.ok:
+                window_age = attempt_sent_at - first.sent_at
+                assert window_age >= WINDOW_SECONDS - RESET_TOLERANCE_SECONDS, (
+                    f"the key recovered {window_age:.1f}s after the window opened, before the "
+                    f"{WINDOW_SECONDS}s window (less {RESET_TOLERANCE_SECONDS}s tolerance) elapsed; "
+                    "the limiter reset early instead of after the window"
+                )
+                return
+            assert outcome.status_code == 429, (
+                f"while the window drains only 429s are acceptable, got {outcome.status_code}: {outcome.body[:300]}"
+            )
+            time.sleep(client.gateway.poll_interval)
+        pytest.fail("a blocked key never recovered after the rate-limit window elapsed")
+
+    @pytest.mark.covers("quota_management.ratelimit.rpm.headers_report_remaining")
+    def test_headers_report_limit_and_remaining(self, client: QuotaClient, resources: ResourceManager) -> None:
+        key = _limited_key(client, resources, rpm_limit=5, tpm_limit=100000)
+
+        first = _first_ok(client, key).response
+        assert first.headers.get("x-ratelimit-api_key-limit-requests") == "5", (
+            f"success response must report the key's request limit, headers: "
+            f"{ {k: v for k, v in first.headers.items() if 'ratelimit' in k} }"
+        )
+        assert first.headers.get("x-ratelimit-api_key-remaining-requests") == str(5 - 1), (
+            f"first call against rpm_limit=5 must leave {5 - 1} remaining, got "
+            f"{first.headers.get('x-ratelimit-api_key-remaining-requests')!r}"
+        )
+        assert first.headers.get("x-ratelimit-api_key-limit-tokens") == "100000", (
+            f"success response must report the key's token limit, got "
+            f"{first.headers.get('x-ratelimit-api_key-limit-tokens')!r}"
+        )
+        remaining_tokens = first.headers.get("x-ratelimit-api_key-remaining-tokens")
+        assert remaining_tokens is not None and remaining_tokens.isdigit() and int(remaining_tokens) < 100000, (
+            f"one call must leave remaining tokens reported and below the limit, got {remaining_tokens!r}"
+        )

tests/e2e/test_e2e_gateway.py

@@ -1,17 +1,23 @@
 """Unit coverage for the Gateway model-management surface (create_model /
-delete_model).
+delete_model) and the bounded spend read-back (spend_logs_window).
 
 The batches conftest and several llm_translation tests register deployments at
 runtime through gateway.create_model; when that method went missing, every batch
 test errored at fixture setup (AttributeError) before a single request reached
 the proxy. This pins the surface with a typed fake Transport so a rename or
 signature drift fails here instead of in a live stage run.
+
+spend_logs_window exists because the unpaginated /spend/logs whole-table read
+grew past the e2e runner's memory limit on stage and OOMKilled every run; these
+tests pin its /spend/logs/v2 pagination and that SpendLogsParams can no longer
+express the unfiltered read.
 """
 
 from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
 
 import pytest
-from pydantic import BaseModel
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ValidationError
 
 from batches.batch_client import BatchClient
 from e2e_gateway import Gateway
@@ -30,6 +36,9 @@ from models import (
     ModelNewBody,
     ModelNewResponse,
     ModelsListResponse,
+    SpendLogsPage,
+    SpendLogsPageParams,
+    SpendLogsParams,
 )
 
 
@@ -46,6 +55,8 @@ class _RecordingTransport:
     servable_after_gets: int = 0
     models_error: UnknownApiError | None = None
     model_gets: int = 0
+    spend_total: int = 0
+    spend_gets: list[SpendLogsPageParams] = field(default_factory=list)
     _created: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
 
     def post[R: BaseModel](
@@ -91,6 +102,22 @@ class _RecordingTransport:
             return Success(
                 data=response_type.model_validate({"data": [{"id": name} for name in visible]})
             )
+        if path == "/spend/logs/v2" and response_type is SpendLogsPage:
+            assert isinstance(params, SpendLogsPageParams)
+            self.spend_gets.append(params)
+            offset = (params.page - 1) * params.page_size
+            count = min(params.page_size, max(self.spend_total - offset, 0))
+            return Success(
+                data=response_type.model_validate(
+                    {
+                        "data": [{"request_id": f"req-{offset + i}"} for i in range(count)],
+                        "total": self.spend_total,
+                        "page": params.page,
+                        "page_size": params.page_size,
+                        "total_pages": (self.spend_total + params.page_size - 1) // params.page_size,
+                    }
+                )
+            )
         raise AssertionError(f"unexpected get: {path}")
 
     def delete[R: BaseModel](
@@ -202,3 +229,45 @@ def test_gateway_delete_model_posts_the_model_id() -> None:
     assert path == "/model/delete"
     assert isinstance(body, ModelDeleteBody)
     assert body.id == "registered-id"
+
+
+WINDOW_START = datetime(2026, 7, 14, 12, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+WINDOW_END = datetime(2026, 7, 14, 14, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+
+
+def test_gateway_spend_logs_window_pages_through_every_row_in_the_window() -> None:
+    transport = _RecordingTransport(spend_total=250)
+    gateway = Gateway(transport=transport)
+
+    rows = gateway.spend_logs_window(start=WINDOW_START, end=WINDOW_END)
+
+    assert len(rows) == 250
+    assert len({row.request_id for row in rows}) == 250
+    assert [params.page for params in transport.spend_gets] == [1, 2, 3]
+    assert all(params.start_date == "2026-07-14 12:00:00" for params in transport.spend_gets)
+    assert all(params.end_date == "2026-07-14 14:00:00" for params in transport.spend_gets)
+
+
+def test_gateway_spend_logs_window_stops_at_an_exact_page_boundary() -> None:
+    transport = _RecordingTransport(spend_total=200)
+    gateway = Gateway(transport=transport)
+
+    rows = gateway.spend_logs_window(start=WINDOW_START, end=WINDOW_END)
+
+    assert len(rows) == 200
+    assert [params.page for params in transport.spend_gets] == [1, 2]
+
+
+def test_gateway_spend_logs_window_returns_empty_for_an_empty_window() -> None:
+    transport = _RecordingTransport(spend_total=0)
+    gateway = Gateway(transport=transport)
+
+    rows = gateway.spend_logs_window(start=WINDOW_START, end=WINDOW_END)
+
+    assert rows == []
+    assert [params.page for params in transport.spend_gets] == [1]
+
+
+def test_spend_logs_params_rejects_the_unfiltered_whole_table_read() -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError, match="spend_logs_window"):
+        SpendLogsParams()

tests/logging_callback_tests/test_logging_redaction_e2e_test.py

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import io
 import os
 import sys
 
-from typing import Optional
+from typing import Optional, Union
 
 sys.path.insert(0, os.path.abspath("../.."))
 
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import json
 import logging
 import time
 from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, patch
+from datetime import datetime
 
 import httpx
 import pytest
@@ -20,17 +21,24 @@ import litellm
 from litellm._logging import verbose_logger
 from litellm.integrations.custom_logger import CustomLogger
 from litellm.responses.main import mock_responses_api_response
-from litellm.types.utils import StandardLoggingPayload
+from litellm.types.utils import (
+    ModelResponse,
+    ResponsesAPIResponse,
+    StandardLoggingPayload,
+    TextCompletionResponse,
+)
 
 
 class TestCustomLogger(CustomLogger):
     def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
         super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
         self.logged_standard_logging_payload: Optional[StandardLoggingPayload] = None
+        self.response_obj: Optional[Union[ModelResponse, TextCompletionResponse, ResponsesAPIResponse]] = None
 
     async def async_log_success_event(self, kwargs, response_obj, start_time, end_time):
         standard_logging_payload = kwargs.get("standard_logging_object", None)
         self.logged_standard_logging_payload = standard_logging_payload
+        self.response_obj = response_obj
 
 
 @pytest.mark.asyncio
@@ -108,6 +116,78 @@ async def test_dynamic_turn_off_message_logging_overrides_global_off(dynamic_tur
     assert standard_logging_payload["messages"][0]["content"] == expected_message_content
 
 
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_redaction_with_custom_logger_streaming():
+    """Test redaction of responses for custom logger callbacks"""
+    from litellm.litellm_core_utils.litellm_logging import Logging
+
+    class LoggingWithoutSyncSuccessHandler(Logging):
+        def success_handler(self, result=None, start_time=None, end_time=None, cache_hit=None, **kwargs):
+            pass
+
+    litellm.turn_off_message_logging = True
+    test_custom_logger = TestCustomLogger()
+
+    try:
+        litellm_logging_obj = LoggingWithoutSyncSuccessHandler(
+            model="gpt-5-mini",
+            messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
+            stream=True,
+            call_type="acompletion",
+            litellm_call_id="1234",
+            start_time=datetime.now(),
+            function_id="1234",
+            dynamic_async_success_callbacks=[test_custom_logger],
+        )
+
+        response = await litellm.acompletion(
+            model="gpt-5-mini",
+            messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
+            mock_response="hello",
+            stream=True,
+            litellm_logging_obj=litellm_logging_obj,
+        )
+
+        # Consume the stream to trigger logging
+        chunks = []
+        async for chunk in response:
+            chunks.append(chunk)
+
+        await asyncio.sleep(1)
+        async_complete_streaming_response = test_custom_logger.response_obj
+        assert async_complete_streaming_response is not None
+        assert async_complete_streaming_response.choices[0].message.content == "redacted-by-litellm"
+    finally:
+        litellm.turn_off_message_logging = False
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_streaming_redaction_scoped_to_opted_out_logger():
+    """One logger opting out of message logging must not blank the response for other loggers"""
+    litellm.turn_off_message_logging = False
+    opted_out_logger = TestCustomLogger(message_logging=False)
+    compliant_logger = TestCustomLogger()
+    litellm.callbacks = [opted_out_logger, compliant_logger]
+
+    try:
+        response = await litellm.acompletion(
+            model="gpt-5-mini",
+            messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
+            mock_response="hello",
+            stream=True,
+        )
+        async for _ in response:
+            pass
+
+        await asyncio.sleep(1)
+        assert opted_out_logger.response_obj is not None
+        assert opted_out_logger.response_obj.choices[0].message.content == "redacted-by-litellm"
+        assert compliant_logger.response_obj is not None
+        assert compliant_logger.response_obj.choices[0].message.content == "hello"
+    finally:
+        litellm.callbacks = []
+
+
 @pytest.mark.asyncio
 async def test_redaction_responses_api():
     """Test redaction with ResponsesAPIResponse format"""

tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_user_api_key_auth.py

@@ -219,8 +219,8 @@ async def test_aaauser_personal_budgets(key_ownership):
     """
     Set a personal budget on a user
 
-    - have it only apply when key belongs to user -> raises BudgetExceededError
-    - if key belongs to team, have key respect team budget -> allows call to go through
+    User budget is enforced regardless of key ownership (personal or team).
+    Both cases should raise BudgetExceededError when the user is over budget.
     """
     import asyncio
     import time
@@ -229,7 +229,12 @@ async def test_aaauser_personal_budgets(key_ownership):
     from starlette.datastructures import URL
     import litellm
 
-    from litellm.proxy._types import LiteLLM_UserTable, UserAPIKeyAuth
+    from litellm.proxy._types import (
+        LiteLLM_UserTable,
+        ProxyErrorTypes,
+        ProxyException,
+        UserAPIKeyAuth,
+    )
     from litellm.proxy.auth.user_api_key_auth import user_api_key_auth
     from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import hash_token, user_api_key_cache
 
@@ -273,14 +278,9 @@ async def test_aaauser_personal_budgets(key_ownership):
         == valid_token
     )
 
-    try:
+    with pytest.raises(ProxyException) as exc_info:
         await user_api_key_auth(request=request, api_key="Bearer " + user_key)
-
-        if key_ownership == "user_key":
-            pytest.fail("Expected this call to fail. User is over limit.")
-    except Exception:
-        if key_ownership == "team_key":
-            pytest.fail("Expected this call to work. Key is below team budget.")
+    assert exc_info.value.type == ProxyErrorTypes.budget_exceeded
 
 
 @pytest.mark.asyncio

tests/test_litellm/integrations/test_custom_guardrail.py

@@ -1614,3 +1614,105 @@ class TestGuardrailInterventionClassification:
 
         slg = request_data["metadata"]["standard_logging_guardrail_information"][0]
         assert slg["guardrail_status"] == "guardrail_intervened"
+
+
+class _ApplyStyleGuardrail(CustomGuardrail):
+    """Overrides only apply_guardrail, like openai_moderation; async_pre_call_hook stays the CustomLogger no-op."""
+
+    def __init__(self, block: bool):
+        from litellm.types.guardrails import GuardrailEventHooks
+
+        super().__init__(
+            guardrail_name="apply-style-guardrail",
+            event_hook=GuardrailEventHooks.pre_call,
+            default_on=False,
+        )
+        self.block = block
+        self.apply_called = False
+        self.seen_texts = None
+
+    async def apply_guardrail(self, inputs, request_data, input_type, logging_obj=None):
+        from fastapi import HTTPException
+
+        self.apply_called = True
+        self.seen_texts = inputs.get("texts")
+        if self.block:
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail={"error": "Violated moderation policy"})
+        return inputs
+
+
+class TestApplyGuardrailStyleDeploymentDispatch:
+    """LIT-4217 regression: model-level guardrails that implement only the
+    unified apply_guardrail interface must execute in
+    async_pre_call_deployment_hook instead of silently hitting the
+    async_pre_call_hook no-op."""
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize("call_type", [CallTypes.completion, CallTypes.acompletion])
+    async def test_blocks_when_requested_via_model_level_guardrails(self, call_type):
+        from fastapi import HTTPException
+
+        guardrail = _ApplyStyleGuardrail(block=True)
+        kwargs = {
+            "model": "gpt-4",
+            "messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "flagged content"}],
+            "guardrails": ["apply-style-guardrail"],
+            "metadata": {},
+        }
+
+        with pytest.raises(HTTPException):
+            await guardrail.async_pre_call_deployment_hook(kwargs, call_type)
+
+        assert guardrail.apply_called is True
+        assert guardrail.seen_texts == ["flagged content"]
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_pass_path_runs_guardrail_and_strips_dispatch_key(self):
+        guardrail = _ApplyStyleGuardrail(block=False)
+        kwargs = {
+            "model": "gpt-4",
+            "messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hello"}],
+            "guardrails": ["apply-style-guardrail"],
+            "metadata": {},
+        }
+
+        result = await guardrail.async_pre_call_deployment_hook(kwargs, CallTypes.acompletion)
+
+        assert guardrail.apply_called is True
+        assert result is not None
+        assert "guardrail_to_apply" not in result
+        assert result["messages"] == [{"role": "user", "content": "hello"}]
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_skips_when_not_requested(self):
+        guardrail = _ApplyStyleGuardrail(block=True)
+        kwargs = {
+            "model": "gpt-4",
+            "messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hello"}],
+            "guardrails": ["some-other-guardrail"],
+            "metadata": {},
+        }
+
+        result = await guardrail.async_pre_call_deployment_hook(kwargs, CallTypes.acompletion)
+
+        assert guardrail.apply_called is False
+        assert result is not None
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_fails_closed_when_proxy_extras_missing(self):
+        import sys
+        from unittest.mock import patch
+
+        guardrail = _ApplyStyleGuardrail(block=True)
+        kwargs = {
+            "model": "gpt-4",
+            "messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "flagged content"}],
+            "guardrails": ["apply-style-guardrail"],
+            "metadata": {},
+        }
+
+        with patch.dict(sys.modules, {"litellm.proxy.utils": None}):
+            with pytest.raises(ImportError, match="litellm\\[proxy\\]"):
+                await guardrail.async_pre_call_deployment_hook(kwargs, CallTypes.acompletion)
+
+        assert guardrail.apply_called is False

tests/test_litellm/integrations/test_prometheus_media_generation_metrics.py

@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+"""
+Unit tests for the video-seconds and images-generated Prometheus counters (LIT-4254).
+
+Video providers report ``duration_seconds`` inside the usage object that lands
+on ``standard_logging_payload["metadata"]["usage_object"]``; image generation
+calls report ``output_image_count`` there. Both counters are sparse: only
+incremented when the value is present and > 0.
+"""
+
+from typing import get_args
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock
+
+import pytest
+
+from litellm.integrations.prometheus import PrometheusLogger
+from litellm.types.integrations.prometheus import (
+    DEFINED_PROMETHEUS_METRICS,
+    PrometheusMetricLabels,
+    UserAPIKeyLabelValues,
+)
+
+MEDIA_GENERATION_METRICS = [
+    "litellm_video_duration_seconds_metric",
+    "litellm_images_generated_metric",
+]
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def sample_enum_values():
+    return UserAPIKeyLabelValues(
+        end_user="test-end-user",
+        hashed_api_key="test-key-hash",
+        api_key_alias="test-key-alias",
+        team="test-team",
+        team_alias="test-team-alias",
+        user="test-user",
+        model="sora-2",
+    )
+
+
+def _make_mock_logger():
+    logger = MagicMock()
+    for name in MEDIA_GENERATION_METRICS:
+        setattr(logger, name, MagicMock())
+    logger.get_labels_for_metric = MagicMock(
+        return_value=[
+            "model",
+            "hashed_api_key",
+            "api_key_alias",
+            "team",
+            "team_alias",
+            "end_user",
+            "user",
+        ]
+    )
+    return logger
+
+
+class TestMediaGenerationMetricsRegistration:
+    def test_metrics_in_defined_prometheus_metrics(self):
+        defined = get_args(DEFINED_PROMETHEUS_METRICS)
+        for name in MEDIA_GENERATION_METRICS:
+            assert name in defined, f"{name} missing from DEFINED_PROMETHEUS_METRICS"
+
+    def test_metric_labels_defined(self):
+        for name in MEDIA_GENERATION_METRICS:
+            assert hasattr(PrometheusMetricLabels, name), f"{name} missing from PrometheusMetricLabels"
+
+    def test_metrics_share_output_token_label_set(self):
+        assert (
+            PrometheusMetricLabels.litellm_video_duration_seconds_metric
+            == PrometheusMetricLabels.litellm_output_tokens_metric
+        )
+        assert (
+            PrometheusMetricLabels.litellm_images_generated_metric
+            == PrometheusMetricLabels.litellm_output_tokens_metric
+        )
+
+    def test_runtime_label_set_matches_output_tokens_metric(self):
+        """Full parity with litellm_output_tokens_metric, including the org labels
+        appended via _org_label_metrics, so existing token dashboards can be cloned."""
+        expected = PrometheusMetricLabels.get_labels("litellm_output_tokens_metric")
+        for name in MEDIA_GENERATION_METRICS:
+            assert PrometheusMetricLabels.get_labels(name) == expected
+
+
+class TestIncrementMediaGenerationMetrics:
+    def test_video_duration_incremented(self, sample_enum_values):
+        logger = _make_mock_logger()
+        payload = {"metadata": {"usage_object": {"duration_seconds": 8.0}}}
+
+        PrometheusLogger._increment_media_generation_metrics(
+            logger,
+            standard_logging_payload=payload,
+            enum_values=sample_enum_values,
+        )
+
+        logger.litellm_video_duration_seconds_metric.labels().inc.assert_called_once_with(8.0)
+        logger.litellm_images_generated_metric.labels.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_image_count_incremented(self, sample_enum_values):
+        logger = _make_mock_logger()
+        payload = {
+            "metadata": {
+                "usage_object": {
+                    "prompt_tokens": 18,
+                    "completion_tokens": 391,
+                    "total_tokens": 409,
+                    "output_image_count": 2,
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        PrometheusLogger._increment_media_generation_metrics(
+            logger,
+            standard_logging_payload=payload,
+            enum_values=sample_enum_values,
+        )
+
+        logger.litellm_images_generated_metric.labels().inc.assert_called_once_with(2.0)
+        logger.litellm_video_duration_seconds_metric.labels.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_token_only_usage_is_a_noop(self, sample_enum_values):
+        logger = _make_mock_logger()
+        payload = {
+            "metadata": {
+                "usage_object": {
+                    "prompt_tokens": 10,
+                    "completion_tokens": 20,
+                    "total_tokens": 30,
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        PrometheusLogger._increment_media_generation_metrics(
+            logger,
+            standard_logging_payload=payload,
+            enum_values=sample_enum_values,
+        )
+
+        for name in MEDIA_GENERATION_METRICS:
+            getattr(logger, name).labels.assert_not_called()
+
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_value", [0, 0.0, None, -4.0, "4", True])
+    def test_non_positive_or_non_numeric_values_are_ignored(self, sample_enum_values, bad_value):
+        logger = _make_mock_logger()
+        payload = {
+            "metadata": {
+                "usage_object": {
+                    "duration_seconds": bad_value,
+                    "output_image_count": bad_value,
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        PrometheusLogger._increment_media_generation_metrics(
+            logger,
+            standard_logging_payload=payload,
+            enum_values=sample_enum_values,
+        )
+
+        for name in MEDIA_GENERATION_METRICS:
+            getattr(logger, name).labels.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_missing_usage_object_is_a_noop(self, sample_enum_values):
+        logger = _make_mock_logger()
+
+        for payload in ({"metadata": {}}, {"metadata": None}, {"metadata": {"usage_object": "redacted"}}):
+            PrometheusLogger._increment_media_generation_metrics(
+                logger,
+                standard_logging_payload=payload,
+                enum_values=sample_enum_values,
+            )
+
+        for name in MEDIA_GENERATION_METRICS:
+            getattr(logger, name).labels.assert_not_called()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    pytest.main([__file__, "-v"])

tests/test_litellm/integrations/test_prometheus_rate_limit_labels.py

@@ -326,3 +326,148 @@ async def test_should_leave_rate_limit_labels_blank_for_non_rate_limit_failure()
     assert isinstance(enum_values, UserAPIKeyLabelValues)
     assert enum_values.rate_limit_category is None
     assert enum_values.rate_limit_type is None
+
+
+def _logger_with_mock_virtual_key_gauges() -> PrometheusLogger:
+    with patch(
+        "litellm.integrations.prometheus.PrometheusLogger.__init__", return_value=None
+    ):
+        logger = PrometheusLogger()
+    logger.litellm_remaining_api_key_requests_for_model = MagicMock()
+    logger.litellm_remaining_api_key_tokens_for_model = MagicMock()
+    logger.get_labels_for_metric = MagicMock(return_value=[])
+    return logger
+
+
+def _kwargs_with_v3_rate_limit_headers(additional_headers: dict) -> dict:
+    return {
+        "litellm_params": {"metadata": {"model_group": "gpt-4o-mini"}},
+        "standard_logging_object": {
+            "metadata": {},
+            "hidden_params": {"additional_headers": additional_headers},
+        },
+    }
+
+
+def _set_virtual_key_metrics(logger: PrometheusLogger, kwargs: dict) -> None:
+    logger._set_virtual_key_rate_limit_metrics(
+        user_api_key="test-hash",
+        user_api_key_alias="test-alias",
+        kwargs=kwargs,
+        metadata=kwargs["litellm_params"]["metadata"],
+        model_id="model-123",
+    )
+
+
+def test_should_read_v3_remaining_headers_when_metadata_keys_absent():
+    """
+    Regression for LIT-2577: the default v3 rate limiter writes remaining
+    per-(key, model) values into
+    ``standard_logging_object.hidden_params.additional_headers`` as
+    ``x-ratelimit-model_per_key-remaining-{requests,tokens}`` and never sets
+    the legacy ``litellm-key-remaining-*`` metadata keys, so the gauges were
+    pinned to ``sys.maxsize``.
+    """
+    logger = _logger_with_mock_virtual_key_gauges()
+    kwargs = _kwargs_with_v3_rate_limit_headers(
+        {
+            "x-ratelimit-model_per_key-remaining-requests": 42,
+            "x-ratelimit-model_per_key-remaining-tokens": 900,
+            "x-ratelimit-model_per_key-limit-requests": 100,
+            "x-ratelimit-model_per_key-limit-tokens": 1000,
+        }
+    )
+
+    _set_virtual_key_metrics(logger, kwargs)
+
+    logger.litellm_remaining_api_key_requests_for_model.labels.return_value.set.assert_called_once_with(
+        42
+    )
+    logger.litellm_remaining_api_key_tokens_for_model.labels.return_value.set.assert_called_once_with(
+        900
+    )
+
+
+def test_should_prefer_legacy_metadata_keys_over_v3_headers():
+    logger = _logger_with_mock_virtual_key_gauges()
+    kwargs = _kwargs_with_v3_rate_limit_headers(
+        {
+            "x-ratelimit-model_per_key-remaining-requests": 42,
+            "x-ratelimit-model_per_key-remaining-tokens": 900,
+        }
+    )
+    kwargs["litellm_params"]["metadata"].update(
+        {
+            "litellm-key-remaining-requests-gpt-4o-mini": 3,
+            "litellm-key-remaining-tokens-gpt-4o-mini": 200,
+        }
+    )
+
+    _set_virtual_key_metrics(logger, kwargs)
+
+    logger.litellm_remaining_api_key_requests_for_model.labels.return_value.set.assert_called_once_with(
+        3
+    )
+    logger.litellm_remaining_api_key_tokens_for_model.labels.return_value.set.assert_called_once_with(
+        200
+    )
+
+
+def test_should_treat_zero_v3_remaining_as_zero():
+    logger = _logger_with_mock_virtual_key_gauges()
+    kwargs = _kwargs_with_v3_rate_limit_headers(
+        {
+            "x-ratelimit-model_per_key-remaining-requests": 0,
+            "x-ratelimit-model_per_key-remaining-tokens": 0,
+        }
+    )
+
+    _set_virtual_key_metrics(logger, kwargs)
+
+    logger.litellm_remaining_api_key_requests_for_model.labels.return_value.set.assert_called_once_with(
+        0
+    )
+    logger.litellm_remaining_api_key_tokens_for_model.labels.return_value.set.assert_called_once_with(
+        0
+    )
+
+
+def test_should_keep_maxsize_sentinel_when_no_rate_limit_source_present():
+    import sys
+
+    logger = _logger_with_mock_virtual_key_gauges()
+    kwargs = {
+        "litellm_params": {"metadata": {"model_group": "gpt-4o-mini"}},
+        "standard_logging_object": {"metadata": {}, "hidden_params": {}},
+    }
+
+    _set_virtual_key_metrics(logger, kwargs)
+
+    logger.litellm_remaining_api_key_requests_for_model.labels.return_value.set.assert_called_once_with(
+        sys.maxsize
+    )
+    logger.litellm_remaining_api_key_tokens_for_model.labels.return_value.set.assert_called_once_with(
+        sys.maxsize
+    )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_value", ["not-a-number", None, True])
+def test_should_ignore_non_int_v3_header_values(bad_value):
+    import sys
+
+    logger = _logger_with_mock_virtual_key_gauges()
+    kwargs = _kwargs_with_v3_rate_limit_headers(
+        {
+            "x-ratelimit-model_per_key-remaining-requests": bad_value,
+            "x-ratelimit-model_per_key-remaining-tokens": bad_value,
+        }
+    )
+
+    _set_virtual_key_metrics(logger, kwargs)
+
+    logger.litellm_remaining_api_key_requests_for_model.labels.return_value.set.assert_called_once_with(
+        sys.maxsize
+    )
+    logger.litellm_remaining_api_key_tokens_for_model.labels.return_value.set.assert_called_once_with(
+        sys.maxsize
+    )

tests/test_litellm/litellm_core_utils/test_litellm_logging.py

@@ -3707,3 +3707,69 @@ def test_set_cost_breakdown_stores_reasoning_cost():
         cost_for_built_in_tools_cost_usd_dollar=0.0,
     )
     assert "reasoning_cost" not in no_reasoning.cost_breakdown
+
+
+def _build_payload_for_media_response(logging_obj, init_response_obj, kwargs=None):
+    import datetime
+
+    from litellm.litellm_core_utils.litellm_logging import (
+        get_standard_logging_object_payload,
+    )
+
+    now = datetime.datetime.now()
+    return get_standard_logging_object_payload(
+        kwargs=kwargs or {"litellm_call_id": "media-call-id", "model": "test-model", "messages": []},
+        init_response_obj=init_response_obj,
+        start_time=now,
+        end_time=now,
+        logging_obj=logging_obj,
+        status="success",
+    )
+
+
+def test_image_response_sets_output_image_count_on_usage_object(logging_obj):
+    """Generated-image count must land on metadata.usage_object for callbacks (e.g. Prometheus)."""
+    from litellm.types.utils import ImageResponse
+
+    response = ImageResponse(created=1, data=[{"url": "https://img/1"}, {"url": "https://img/2"}])
+
+    payload = _build_payload_for_media_response(logging_obj, response)
+
+    assert payload is not None
+    assert payload["metadata"]["usage_object"]["output_image_count"] == 2
+
+
+def test_output_image_count_survives_message_redaction(logging_obj, monkeypatch):
+    """Redaction replaces the ImageResponse body, so the count must be captured pre-redaction."""
+    import litellm
+    from litellm.types.utils import ImageResponse
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(litellm, "turn_off_message_logging", True)
+    response = ImageResponse(created=1, data=[{"url": "https://img/1"}])
+
+    payload = _build_payload_for_media_response(logging_obj, response)
+
+    assert payload is not None
+    assert payload["response"] == {"text": "redacted-by-litellm"}
+    assert payload["metadata"]["usage_object"]["output_image_count"] == 1
+
+
+def test_non_image_response_has_no_output_image_count(logging_obj):
+    payload = _build_payload_for_media_response(
+        logging_obj, {"id": "chatcmpl-1", "usage": {"prompt_tokens": 1, "completion_tokens": 2}}
+    )
+
+    assert payload is not None
+    assert "output_image_count" not in payload["metadata"]["usage_object"]
+
+
+def test_zero_token_video_usage_preserves_duration_seconds(logging_obj):
+    """Video usage bills by duration; the payload must keep duration_seconds even with zero tokens."""
+    payload = _build_payload_for_media_response(
+        logging_obj, {"id": "video-1", "usage": {"duration_seconds": 4.0}}
+    )
+
+    assert payload is not None
+    assert payload["metadata"]["usage_object"]["duration_seconds"] == 4.0
+    assert payload["total_tokens"] == 0
+    assert payload["completion_tokens"] == 0

tests/test_litellm/litellm_core_utils/test_redact_messages.py

@@ -10,9 +10,11 @@ from types import SimpleNamespace
 import pytest
 
 import litellm
+from litellm.integrations.custom_logger import CustomLogger
 from litellm.litellm_core_utils.redact_messages import (
     _redact_responses_api_output,
     perform_redaction,
+    redact_streaming_responses_for_custom_logger,
     should_redact_message_logging,
 )
 from litellm.responses.main import mock_responses_api_response
@@ -442,3 +444,109 @@ class TestPerformRedaction:
         assert "vertex_ai_url_context_metadata" not in hidden_params
         assert "vertex_ai_safety_ratings" not in hidden_params
         assert "vertex_ai_citation_metadata" not in hidden_params
+
+    def test_redact_async_complete_streaming_response(self):
+        """Test that async_complete_streaming_response is properly redacted."""
+        response_obj = litellm.ModelResponse(
+            choices=[
+                litellm.Choices(
+                    message=litellm.Message(content="secret content", role="assistant")
+                )
+            ]
+        )
+
+        model_call_details = {
+            "messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
+            "prompt": "hi",
+            "input": "hi",
+            "stream": True,
+            "async_complete_streaming_response": response_obj,
+        }
+
+        perform_redaction(model_call_details, result=None)
+
+        redacted_response = model_call_details["async_complete_streaming_response"]
+        assert redacted_response.choices[0].message.content == "redacted-by-litellm"
+
+    def test_redact_complete_streaming_response(self):
+        """Test that complete_streaming_response is properly redacted."""
+        response_obj = litellm.ModelResponse(
+            choices=[
+                litellm.Choices(
+                    message=litellm.Message(content="secret content", role="assistant")
+                )
+            ]
+        )
+
+        model_call_details = {
+            "messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
+            "prompt": "hi",
+            "input": "hi",
+            "stream": True,
+            "complete_streaming_response": response_obj,
+        }
+
+        perform_redaction(model_call_details, result=None)
+
+        redacted_response = model_call_details["complete_streaming_response"]
+        assert redacted_response.choices[0].message.content == "redacted-by-litellm"
+
+    def test_streaming_responses_untouched_when_disabled(self):
+        response_obj = litellm.ModelResponse(
+            choices=[
+                litellm.Choices(
+                    message=litellm.Message(content="secret content", role="assistant")
+                )
+            ]
+        )
+
+        model_call_details = {
+            "messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
+            "prompt": "hi",
+            "input": "hi",
+            "stream": True,
+            "async_complete_streaming_response": response_obj,
+        }
+
+        perform_redaction(model_call_details, result=None, redact_streaming_responses=False)
+
+        assert response_obj.choices[0].message.content == "secret content"
+
+
+class TestRedactStreamingResponsesForCustomLogger:
+    def _model_call_details(self):
+        response_obj = litellm.ModelResponse(
+            choices=[
+                litellm.Choices(
+                    message=litellm.Message(content="secret content", role="assistant")
+                )
+            ]
+        )
+        return {
+            "stream": True,
+            "async_complete_streaming_response": response_obj,
+        }, response_obj
+
+    def test_opted_out_logger_gets_redacted_copy(self):
+        model_call_details, response_obj = self._model_call_details()
+        opted_out_logger = CustomLogger(message_logging=False)
+
+        redacted_details = redact_streaming_responses_for_custom_logger(
+            model_call_details=model_call_details, custom_logger=opted_out_logger
+        )
+
+        redacted_response = redacted_details["async_complete_streaming_response"]
+        assert redacted_response.choices[0].message.content == "redacted-by-litellm"
+        assert response_obj.choices[0].message.content == "secret content"
+        assert model_call_details["async_complete_streaming_response"] is response_obj
+
+    def test_compliant_logger_gets_shared_response(self):
+        model_call_details, response_obj = self._model_call_details()
+        compliant_logger = CustomLogger()
+
+        result_details = redact_streaming_responses_for_custom_logger(
+            model_call_details=model_call_details, custom_logger=compliant_logger
+        )
+
+        assert result_details is model_call_details
+        assert response_obj.choices[0].message.content == "secret content"

tests/test_litellm/llms/anthropic/chat/test_anthropic_chat_transformation.py

@@ -957,15 +957,15 @@ def test_anthropic_structured_output_beta_header():
 @pytest.mark.parametrize(
     "model_name",
     [
-        "claude-opus-4-6-20250918",
-        "claude-opus-4.6-20250918",
+        "claude-opus-4-8",
+        "claude-opus-4-6-20260205",
         "claude-opus-4-5-20251101",
         "claude-opus-4.5-20251101",
     ],
 )
 def test_opus_uses_native_structured_output(model_name):
     """
-    Test that Opus 4.5 and 4.6 models use native Anthropic structured outputs
+    Test that supported Opus models use native Anthropic structured outputs
     (output_format) rather than the tool-based workaround.
     """
     config = AnthropicConfig()
@@ -1005,6 +1005,43 @@ def test_opus_uses_native_structured_output(model_name):
     assert optional_params.get("json_mode") is True
 
 
+def test_native_structured_output_uses_bundled_capability_when_remote_map_lags(
+    monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
+) -> None:
+    model = "claude-opus-4-8"
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        litellm,
+        "model_cost",
+        {model: {"supports_response_schema": True}},
+    )
+    litellm.get_model_info.cache_clear()
+
+    try:
+        optional_params = AnthropicConfig().map_openai_params(
+            non_default_params={
+                "response_format": {
+                    "type": "json_schema",
+                    "json_schema": {
+                        "name": "answer",
+                        "schema": {
+                            "type": "object",
+                            "properties": {"answer": {"type": "string"}},
+                            "required": ["answer"],
+                        },
+                    },
+                }
+            },
+            optional_params={},
+            model=model,
+            drop_params=False,
+        )
+    finally:
+        litellm.get_model_info.cache_clear()
+
+    assert "output_format" in optional_params
+    assert "tools" not in optional_params
+
+
 def test_non_structured_output_model_uses_tool_workaround():
     """
     Test that models NOT in the native structured output list still use the

tests/test_litellm/llms/anthropic/experimental_pass_through/messages/test_anthropic_messages_effort.py

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import pytest
 
 from litellm.constants import (
     DEFAULT_REASONING_EFFORT_HIGH_THINKING_BUDGET,
+    DEFAULT_REASONING_EFFORT_LOW_THINKING_BUDGET,
     DEFAULT_REASONING_EFFORT_MEDIUM_THINKING_BUDGET,
     DEFAULT_REASONING_EFFORT_XHIGH_THINKING_BUDGET,
 )
@@ -174,6 +175,81 @@ def test_unrecognized_effort_raises_clean_400():
     assert exc_info.value.status_code == 400
 
 
+def test_pinned_temperature_dropped_when_adaptive_downgraded_to_enabled():
+    """Regression (#33203): Claude Code's safety classifier sends adaptive thinking +
+    temperature=0 to Haiku 4.5. The adaptive interface is downgraded to legacy enabled
+    thinking, but Anthropic rejects "temperature may only be set to 1 when thinking is
+    enabled". The pinned temperature must be dropped so the request succeeds while the
+    downgraded thinking is preserved."""
+    params = _claude_code_payload(effort="medium")
+    params["temperature"] = 0
+    result = _transform("claude-haiku-4-5", params)
+
+    assert result["thinking"] == {
+        "type": "enabled",
+        "budget_tokens": DEFAULT_REASONING_EFFORT_MEDIUM_THINKING_BUDGET,
+    }
+    assert "temperature" not in result
+
+
+def test_temperature_one_preserved_with_enabled_thinking():
+    """temperature=1 is compatible with extended thinking, so it must be kept."""
+    params = _claude_code_payload(effort="medium")
+    params["temperature"] = 1
+    result = _transform("claude-haiku-4-5", params)
+
+    assert result["thinking"]["type"] == "enabled"
+    assert result["temperature"] == 1
+
+
+def test_pinned_temperature_preserved_when_thinking_dropped():
+    """When thinking is dropped entirely (non-reasoning model), there is no thinking
+    conflict, so a pinned temperature must survive untouched."""
+    params = _claude_code_payload(effort="medium")
+    params["temperature"] = 0
+    result = _transform("claude-3-5-haiku-latest", params)
+
+    assert "thinking" not in result
+    assert result["temperature"] == 0
+
+
+def test_pinned_temperature_preserved_for_adaptive_model():
+    """Adaptive models (4.6+) own the thinking/temperature relationship natively, so
+    the passthrough must not strip a pinned temperature for them."""
+    params = _claude_code_payload(effort="high")
+    params["temperature"] = 0
+    result = _transform("claude-sonnet-4-6", params)
+
+    assert result["thinking"] == {"type": "adaptive"}
+    assert result["temperature"] == 0
+
+
+def test_pinned_temperature_dropped_for_opus_4_5_effort():
+    """Opus 4.5 keeps native output_config.effort (extended thinking), which is equally
+    incompatible with a pinned non-1 temperature, so the temperature must be dropped."""
+    params = _claude_code_payload(effort="medium")
+    params["temperature"] = 0
+    result = _transform("claude-opus-4-5", params)
+
+    assert result["output_config"] == {"effort": "medium"}
+    assert "temperature" not in result
+
+
+def test_reasoning_effort_with_pinned_temperature_drops_temperature():
+    """The reasoning_effort alias synthesizes legacy enabled thinking on a non-adaptive
+    model; a co-pinned non-1 temperature must be dropped to avoid the Anthropic 400."""
+    result = _transform(
+        "claude-haiku-4-5",
+        {"max_tokens": 8192, "reasoning_effort": "low", "temperature": 0},
+    )
+
+    assert result["thinking"] == {
+        "type": "enabled",
+        "budget_tokens": DEFAULT_REASONING_EFFORT_LOW_THINKING_BUDGET,
+    }
+    assert "temperature" not in result
+
+
 def test_non_adaptive_request_without_effort_is_untouched():
     """A non-adaptive model receiving a request with no adaptive interface (no
     effort, no adaptive thinking) must pass through untouched."""

tests/test_litellm/llms/anthropic/experimental_pass_through/responses_adapters/test_responses_adapters_transformation.py

@@ -99,17 +99,11 @@ class TestContextManagementConversion:
             }
         )
         kwargs = _ADAPTER.translate_request(req)
-        assert kwargs["context_management"] == [
-            {"type": "compaction", "compact_threshold": 100000}
-        ]
+        assert kwargs["context_management"] == [{"type": "compaction", "compact_threshold": 100000}]
 
     def test_translate_request_drops_anthropic_only_context_management(self):
         """context_management with only unknown edit types is omitted from kwargs."""
-        req = _make_request(
-            context_management={
-                "edits": [{"type": "clear_thinking_20251015", "keep": "all"}]
-            }
-        )
+        req = _make_request(context_management={"edits": [{"type": "clear_thinking_20251015", "keep": "all"}]})
         kwargs = _ADAPTER.translate_request(req)
         assert "context_management" not in kwargs
 
@@ -134,9 +128,7 @@ class TestOutputConfigStructuredOutput:
 
     def test_output_config_format_json_schema_converted(self):
         """output_config.format.json_schema is converted to OpenAI text.format."""
-        req = _make_request(
-            output_config={"format": {"type": "json_schema", "schema": self._SCHEMA}}
-        )
+        req = _make_request(output_config={"format": {"type": "json_schema", "schema": self._SCHEMA}})
         kwargs = _ADAPTER.translate_request(req)
         assert "text" in kwargs
         fmt = kwargs["text"]["format"]
@@ -153,9 +145,7 @@ class TestOutputConfigStructuredOutput:
 
     def test_output_format_still_works(self):
         """The original output_format field still takes precedence when present."""
-        req = _make_request(
-            output_format={"type": "json_schema", "schema": self._SCHEMA}
-        )
+        req = _make_request(output_format={"type": "json_schema", "schema": self._SCHEMA})
         kwargs = _ADAPTER.translate_request(req)
         assert "text" in kwargs
         assert kwargs["text"]["format"]["type"] == "json_schema"
@@ -250,9 +240,7 @@ class TestTranslateMessagesToResponsesInput:
         ]
         result = _translate_messages(messages)
         assert len(result) == 1
-        assert result[0]["content"] == [
-            {"type": "input_image", "image_url": ""}
-        ]
+        assert result[0]["content"] == [{"type": "input_image", "image_url": ""}]
 
     def test_user_url_image(self):
         """User message with URL image source becomes input_image with the URL."""
@@ -268,9 +256,7 @@ class TestTranslateMessagesToResponsesInput:
             }
         ]
         result = _translate_messages(messages)
-        assert result[0]["content"] == [
-            {"type": "input_image", "image_url": "https://example.com/img.jpg"}
-        ]
+        assert result[0]["content"] == [{"type": "input_image", "image_url": "https://example.com/img.jpg"}]
 
     def test_user_base64_image_empty_data_skipped(self):
         """Base64 image with empty data is skipped (no URL can be formed)."""
@@ -341,9 +327,7 @@ class TestTranslateMessagesToResponsesInput:
         messages = [
             {
                 "role": "user",
-                "content": [
-                    {"type": "tool_result", "tool_use_id": "call_null", "content": None}
-                ],
+                "content": [{"type": "tool_result", "tool_use_id": "call_null", "content": None}],
             }
         ]
         result = _translate_messages(messages)
@@ -370,9 +354,7 @@ class TestTranslateMessagesToResponsesInput:
             }
         ]
         result = _translate_messages(messages)
-        assert result[0]["content"] == [
-            {"type": "output_text", "text": "Here is the answer."}
-        ]
+        assert result[0]["content"] == [{"type": "output_text", "text": "Here is the answer."}]
 
     def test_assistant_tool_use_becomes_function_call(self):
         """Assistant tool_use block becomes a top-level function_call item."""
@@ -404,15 +386,11 @@ class TestTranslateMessagesToResponsesInput:
         messages = [
             {
                 "role": "assistant",
-                "content": [
-                    {"type": "thinking", "thinking": "Let me reason step by step."}
-                ],
+                "content": [{"type": "thinking", "thinking": "Let me reason step by step."}],
             }
         ]
         result = _translate_messages(messages)
-        assert result[0]["content"] == [
-            {"type": "output_text", "text": "Let me reason step by step."}
-        ]
+        assert result[0]["content"] == [{"type": "output_text", "text": "Let me reason step by step."}]
 
     def test_assistant_empty_thinking_block_skipped(self):
         """Assistant thinking block with empty thinking text is skipped."""
@@ -584,28 +562,27 @@ class TestTranslateToolsToResponsesAPI:
 
 
 class TestTranslateToolChoiceToResponsesAPI:
-    """Anthropic tool_choice -> Responses API tool_choice."""
+    """Anthropic tool_choice -> Responses API tool_choice.
 
-    def test_auto_maps_to_auto(self):
-        assert _ADAPTER.translate_tool_choice_to_responses_api({"type": "auto"}) == {
-            "type": "auto"
-        }
+    The Responses API's tool_choice schema (openai.types.responses.tool_choice_options)
+    is a bare Literal["none", "auto", "required"] for these simple cases - not an
+    object like {"type": "auto"}. Sending the object shape to an OpenAI-compatible
+    server gets rejected with a pydantic validation error.
+    """
 
-    def test_any_maps_to_required(self):
-        assert _ADAPTER.translate_tool_choice_to_responses_api({"type": "any"}) == {
-            "type": "required"
-        }
+    def test_auto_maps_to_bare_string_auto(self):
+        assert _ADAPTER.translate_tool_choice_to_responses_api({"type": "auto"}) == "auto"
+
+    def test_any_maps_to_bare_string_required(self):
+        assert _ADAPTER.translate_tool_choice_to_responses_api({"type": "any"}) == "required"
+
+    def test_none_maps_to_bare_string_none(self):
+        assert _ADAPTER.translate_tool_choice_to_responses_api({"type": "none"}) == "none"
 
     def test_specific_tool_maps_to_function(self):
-        result = _ADAPTER.translate_tool_choice_to_responses_api(
-            {"type": "tool", "name": "get_weather"}
-        )
+        result = _ADAPTER.translate_tool_choice_to_responses_api({"type": "tool", "name": "get_weather"})
         assert result == {"type": "function", "name": "get_weather"}
 
-    def test_unknown_type_defaults_to_auto(self):
-        result = _ADAPTER.translate_tool_choice_to_responses_api({"type": "none"})
-        assert result == {"type": "auto"}
-
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # translate_thinking_to_reasoning
@@ -616,17 +593,13 @@ class TestTranslateThinkingToReasoning:
     """Anthropic thinking param -> Responses API reasoning param."""
 
     def test_budget_high_effort(self):
-        result = _ADAPTER.translate_thinking_to_reasoning(
-            {"type": "enabled", "budget_tokens": 10000}
-        )
+        result = _ADAPTER.translate_thinking_to_reasoning({"type": "enabled", "budget_tokens": 10000})
         # Default (reasoning_auto_summary=False): only effort, no summary
         assert result == {"effort": "high"}
         assert result is not None and "summary" not in result
 
     def test_budget_above_threshold_high_effort(self):
-        result = _ADAPTER.translate_thinking_to_reasoning(
-            {"type": "enabled", "budget_tokens": 50000}
-        )
+        result = _ADAPTER.translate_thinking_to_reasoning({"type": "enabled", "budget_tokens": 50000})
         assert result is not None
         assert result["effort"] == "high"
         assert "summary" not in result
@@ -652,9 +625,7 @@ class TestTranslateThinkingToReasoning:
         assert result is not None and "summary" not in result
 
     def test_budget_minimal_effort(self):
-        result = _ADAPTER.translate_thinking_to_reasoning(
-            {"type": "enabled", "budget_tokens": 500}
-        )
+        result = _ADAPTER.translate_thinking_to_reasoning({"type": "enabled", "budget_tokens": 500})
         assert result == {"effort": "minimal"}
         assert result is not None and "summary" not in result
 
@@ -707,9 +678,7 @@ class TestTranslateThinkingToReasoning:
         original = litellm.reasoning_auto_summary
         try:
             litellm.reasoning_auto_summary = True
-            result = _ADAPTER.translate_thinking_to_reasoning(
-                {"type": "enabled", "budget_tokens": 10000}
-            )
+            result = _ADAPTER.translate_thinking_to_reasoning({"type": "enabled", "budget_tokens": 10000})
             assert result == {"effort": "high", "summary": "detailed"}
         finally:
             litellm.reasoning_auto_summary = original
@@ -789,11 +758,7 @@ class TestTranslateRequestBroaderCoverage:
         assert kwargs["top_p"] == 0.9
 
     def test_tools_translated(self):
-        req = _make_request(
-            tools=[
-                {"name": "calculator", "description": "Does math.", "input_schema": {}}
-            ]
-        )
+        req = _make_request(tools=[{"name": "calculator", "description": "Does math.", "input_schema": {}}])
         kwargs = _ADAPTER.translate_request(req)
         assert len(kwargs["tools"]) == 1
         assert kwargs["tools"][0]["name"] == "calculator"
@@ -929,9 +894,7 @@ class TestTranslateResponse:
 
     def test_multiple_text_parts(self):
         """Multiple output_text parts become multiple text content blocks."""
-        response = _make_mock_response(
-            output=[_make_output_message(["Part 1", "Part 2"])]
-        )
+        response = _make_mock_response(output=[_make_output_message(["Part 1", "Part 2"])])
         result: Any = _ADAPTER.translate_response(response)
         assert len(result["content"]) == 2
         assert result["content"][0]["text"] == "Part 1"

tests/test_litellm/llms/bedrock/test_web_identity_session_policy.py

@@ -158,6 +158,54 @@ class TestClaudePlatformActionsCovered:
         )
 
 
+class TestBedrockMantleActionsCovered:
+    """LIT-3859: bedrock_mantle inference authorizes against the
+    ``bedrock-mantle`` action namespace, so the session-policy ceiling
+    must include it or every Mantle request via OIDC/WIF auth denies
+    with "no session policy allows the bedrock-mantle:CreateInference
+    action" even when the role's identity policy grants it."""
+
+    def test_bedrock_mantle_create_inference_present(self):
+        policy = _captured_policy()
+        all_actions: set = set()
+        for stmt in policy["Statement"]:
+            stmt_actions = stmt.get("Action")
+            if isinstance(stmt_actions, str):
+                all_actions.add(stmt_actions)
+            elif isinstance(stmt_actions, list):
+                all_actions.update(stmt_actions)
+        assert "bedrock-mantle:CreateInference" in all_actions, (
+            "bedrock-mantle:CreateInference missing from session policy — "
+            "bedrock_mantle/* requests will 403 on OIDC/WIF auth"
+        )
+
+    def test_bedrock_mantle_statement_allows(self):
+        policy = _captured_policy()
+        stmt = _statement_by_sid(policy, "BedrockMantleLiteLLM")
+        assert stmt["Effect"] == "Allow"
+        assert stmt["Resource"] == "*"
+
+    def test_no_bedrock_mantle_wildcard(self):
+        policy = _captured_policy()
+        stmt = _statement_by_sid(policy, "BedrockMantleLiteLLM")
+        actions = stmt["Action"]
+        if isinstance(actions, str):
+            actions = [actions]
+        assert "bedrock-mantle:*" not in actions, (
+            "session policy must not grant bedrock-mantle:* — "
+            "the ceiling should match the documented action set"
+        )
+
+    def test_bedrock_mantle_statement_carries_secure_transport_condition(self):
+        policy = _captured_policy()
+        stmt = _statement_by_sid(policy, "BedrockMantleLiteLLM")
+        cond = stmt.get("Condition") or {}
+        assert cond.get("Bool", {}).get("aws:SecureTransport") == "true", (
+            "BedrockMantleLiteLLM must require aws:SecureTransport=true "
+            "to keep parity with the bedrock statement"
+        )
+
+
 def _make_jwt(payload: dict) -> str:
     def _segment(data: dict) -> str:
         return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(json.dumps(data).encode()).rstrip(b"=").decode()

tests/test_litellm/llms/openai/responses/test_openai_responses_transformation.py

@@ -44,6 +44,60 @@ class TestOpenAIResponsesAPIConfig:
         # The function should return the params unchanged
         assert result == test_params
 
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize("max_output_tokens", [1, 15])
+    def test_map_openai_params_clamps_max_output_tokens_below_minimum(self, max_output_tokens):
+        """OpenAI's Responses API rejects max_output_tokens < 16.
+
+        Claude Code (via the Anthropic Messages -> Responses adapter) sends a
+        max_tokens=1 warmup probe when running `/model`, which produced:
+            "Invalid 'max_output_tokens': integer below minimum value.
+             Expected a value >= 16, but got 1 instead."
+        Clamp anything below the minimum up to 16 instead of erroring.
+        """
+        result = self.config.map_openai_params(
+            response_api_optional_params={"max_output_tokens": max_output_tokens},
+            model=self.model,
+            drop_params=False,
+        )
+
+        assert result["max_output_tokens"] == 16
+
+    def test_map_openai_params_preserves_max_output_tokens_at_or_above_minimum(self):
+        """Values already >= 16 must pass through untouched."""
+        result = self.config.map_openai_params(
+            response_api_optional_params={"max_output_tokens": 256},
+            model=self.model,
+            drop_params=False,
+        )
+
+        assert result["max_output_tokens"] == 256
+
+    def test_map_openai_params_leaves_max_output_tokens_absent(self):
+        """A request without max_output_tokens must not gain the key."""
+        result = self.config.map_openai_params(
+            response_api_optional_params={"input": "hi"},
+            model=self.model,
+            drop_params=False,
+        )
+
+        assert "max_output_tokens" not in result
+
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+        "value, expected",
+        [
+            (1, 16),
+            (15, 16),
+            (16, 16),
+            (17, 17),
+            (256, 256),
+            (None, None),
+        ],
+    )
+    def test_enforce_min_max_output_tokens(self, value, expected):
+        """Below the minimum clamps to 16; the boundary, larger values, and None
+        are returned unchanged so no previously-valid request regresses."""
+        assert self.config._enforce_min_max_output_tokens(value) == expected
+
     def validate_responses_api_request_params(self, params, expected_fields):
         """
         Validate that the params dict has the expected structure of ResponsesAPIRequestParams

tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/auth/test_user_api_key_auth_mcp.py

@@ -4910,6 +4910,7 @@ class TestMCPDcrBridgeDelegateAdmission:
         cls,
         *,
         key_hash=None,
+        user_id=None,
         server_id="bridge-server-id",
         access_token="inner-upstream-access-token",
         token_type="Bearer",
@@ -4921,17 +4922,23 @@ class TestMCPDcrBridgeDelegateAdmission:
             envelope_keys_from_master_key,
         )
         from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.outbound_credentials.envelope import (
-            EnvelopeIdentity,
             SealedEnvelope,
             UpstreamTokenGrant,
+            key_hash_identity,
             mint_envelope,
+            user_identity,
         )
         from pydantic import SecretStr
 
+        identity = (
+            user_identity(server_id=server_id, user_id=user_id)
+            if user_id is not None
+            else key_hash_identity(server_id=server_id, key_hash=key_hash or cls._KEY_HASH)
+        )
         keys = envelope_keys_from_master_key(master_key or cls._MASTER_KEY)
         now = minted_at or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
         sealed = mint_envelope(
-            identity=EnvelopeIdentity(server_id=server_id, key_hash=key_hash or cls._KEY_HASH),
+            identity=identity,
             grant=UpstreamTokenGrant(
                 access_token=SecretStr(access_token),
                 token_type=token_type,
@@ -4999,6 +5006,38 @@ class TestMCPDcrBridgeDelegateAdmission:
                 stack.enter_context(patcher)
             yield get_key_object
 
+    @staticmethod
+    @contextlib.contextmanager
+    def _patch_user_reload(*, return_value=None, side_effect=None):
+        """Patch the user-subject reload path an interactively-minted envelope takes: the
+        ``get_user_object`` lookup ``_reload_admitted_user`` runs (which also drives the SCIM gate),
+        plus the ``prisma_client`` / ``user_api_key_cache`` globals. The centralized gate's own
+        fetches fail-safe to None under the MagicMock prisma, so an unblocked user admits. Yields the
+        ``get_user_object`` mock so a caller can assert the sealed user_id was the reload key."""
+        get_user_object = AsyncMock(return_value=return_value, side_effect=side_effect)
+        with (
+            patch("litellm.proxy.auth.auth_checks.get_user_object", get_user_object),
+            patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.prisma_client", MagicMock()),
+            patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.user_api_key_cache", MagicMock()),
+        ):
+            yield get_user_object
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _wrapped_user_lookup_error(original: BaseException) -> ValueError:
+        """Reproduce get_user_object's real exception contract (litellm/proxy/auth/auth_checks.py): it
+        catches every DB failure in a broad ``except`` and re-raises a bare ``ValueError``, so the
+        original error (a missing-user Exception or a real outage) survives only as ``__context__``.
+        Injecting a raw ConnectionError/Exception instead would exercise a shape production never
+        produces and let a chain-blind outage classifier pass. That wrapping fidelity is itself pinned by
+        test_get_user_object_wraps_db_outage_as_valueerror_preserving_context in test_auth_checks."""
+        try:
+            raise original
+        except BaseException:
+            try:
+                raise ValueError(f"User doesn't exist in db. Got error - {original}")
+            except ValueError as wrapped:
+                return wrapped
+
     @staticmethod
     def _mcp_request(path="/mcp/bridge_delegate_server"):
         """A minimal ``Request`` for direct ``_admit_dcr_bridge_delegate`` calls, mirroring how
@@ -5060,6 +5099,155 @@ class TestMCPDcrBridgeDelegateAdmission:
             "bridge_delegate_server": {"Authorization": "Bearer inner-upstream-access-token"}
         }
 
+    async def test_user_subject_envelope_admits_under_the_reloaded_user(self):
+        """An interactively-minted (user_id) envelope admits under the reloaded USER, not a key: the
+        reload is keyed by the sealed user_id, the admitted auth carries that user_id, the raw-key
+        pipeline is never invoked, and the inner upstream token is injected for egress. This is the
+        interactive-DCR admission the whole flow exists for."""
+        envelope = self._mint_bridge_envelope(user_id="sso-user-7")
+        scope = {
+            "type": "http",
+            "method": "POST",
+            "path": "/mcp/bridge_delegate_server",
+            "headers": [(b"authorization", f"Bearer {envelope}".encode("latin-1"))],
+        }
+        with (
+            patch(
+                "litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.auth.user_api_key_auth_mcp.user_api_key_auth",
+                new_callable=AsyncMock,
+            ) as mock_auth,
+            patch("litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.mcp_server_manager.global_mcp_server_manager") as mock_mgr,
+            patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.master_key", self._MASTER_KEY),
+            self._patch_user_reload(
+                return_value=MagicMock(
+                    user_id="sso-user-7",
+                    metadata={"scim_active": True},
+                    user_role=None,
+                    object_permission=None,
+                    object_permission_id=None,
+                )
+            ) as get_user_object,
+        ):
+            mock_mgr.get_mcp_server_by_name.return_value = self._bridge_delegate_server()
+            (auth_result, _h, _s, mcp_server_auth_headers, _o, _r) = await MCPRequestHandler.process_mcp_request(scope)
+
+        assert get_user_object.await_args.kwargs["user_id"] == "sso-user-7"
+        assert auth_result.user_id == "sso-user-7"
+        mock_auth.assert_not_called()
+        assert mcp_server_auth_headers == {
+            "bridge_delegate_server": {"Authorization": "Bearer inner-upstream-access-token"}
+        }
+
+    async def test_user_subject_envelope_carries_the_users_mcp_object_permission(self):
+        """The admitted user's own MCP object permission rides on the returned auth so the shared
+        get_allowed_mcp_servers grants the user their litellm-granted servers, rather than admitting a
+        bare user with no MCP access. Regression for the signed-in SSO client getting zero tools because
+        the reload dropped the user's object permission."""
+        object_permission = LiteLLM_ObjectPermissionTable(
+            object_permission_id="op-user-7", mcp_servers=["bridge_delegate_server"]
+        )
+        envelope = self._mint_bridge_envelope(user_id="sso-user-7")
+        scope = {
+            "type": "http",
+            "method": "POST",
+            "path": "/mcp/bridge_delegate_server",
+            "headers": [(b"authorization", f"Bearer {envelope}".encode("latin-1"))],
+        }
+        with (
+            patch(
+                "litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.auth.user_api_key_auth_mcp.user_api_key_auth",
+                new_callable=AsyncMock,
+            ),
+            patch("litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.mcp_server_manager.global_mcp_server_manager") as mock_mgr,
+            patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.master_key", self._MASTER_KEY),
+            self._patch_user_reload(
+                return_value=MagicMock(
+                    user_id="sso-user-7",
+                    metadata={"scim_active": True},
+                    user_role=None,
+                    object_permission=object_permission,
+                    object_permission_id="op-user-7",
+                )
+            ),
+        ):
+            mock_mgr.get_mcp_server_by_name.return_value = self._bridge_delegate_server()
+            (auth_result, _h, _s, _headers, _o, _r) = await MCPRequestHandler.process_mcp_request(scope)
+
+        assert auth_result.object_permission is not None
+        assert auth_result.object_permission.mcp_servers == ["bridge_delegate_server"]
+
+    async def test_user_subject_envelope_missing_user_fails_closed_401(self):
+        """A user_id envelope whose user has since been deleted must fail closed with a 401, not a 500.
+        get_user_object catches the missing row and re-raises a bare ValueError (it does not return None
+        on the production path), so the reload must fail closed rather than let it propagate as an opaque
+        500, and must not mistake the wrapped ValueError for a DB outage. Regression for the missing-user
+        path surfacing as a 500."""
+        envelope = self._mint_bridge_envelope(user_id="ghost-user")
+        scope = {
+            "type": "http",
+            "method": "POST",
+            "path": "/mcp/bridge_delegate_server",
+            "headers": [(b"authorization", f"Bearer {envelope}".encode("latin-1"))],
+        }
+        with (
+            patch("litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.mcp_server_manager.global_mcp_server_manager") as mock_mgr,
+            patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.master_key", self._MASTER_KEY),
+            self._patch_user_reload(side_effect=self._wrapped_user_lookup_error(Exception())),
+        ):
+            mock_mgr.get_mcp_server_by_name.return_value = self._bridge_delegate_server()
+            with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
+                await MCPRequestHandler.process_mcp_request(scope)
+
+        assert exc_info.value.status_code == 401
+
+    async def test_user_subject_envelope_db_outage_is_retryable_503(self):
+        """A transient database outage while reloading the envelope's user is a retryable 503, not an
+        opaque 500, matching the key path's contract so an interactive DCR client retries instead of
+        treating a live identity as invalid. get_user_object wraps the outage in a bare ValueError, so this
+        exercises the chain-aware classifier; a raw ConnectionError would falsely pass even the old
+        chain-blind check because it is an OSError. Regression for the user reload dropping the 503 arm."""
+        envelope = self._mint_bridge_envelope(user_id="sso-user-7")
+        scope = {
+            "type": "http",
+            "method": "POST",
+            "path": "/mcp/bridge_delegate_server",
+            "headers": [(b"authorization", f"Bearer {envelope}".encode("latin-1"))],
+        }
+        with (
+            patch("litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.mcp_server_manager.global_mcp_server_manager") as mock_mgr,
+            patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.master_key", self._MASTER_KEY),
+            self._patch_user_reload(
+                side_effect=self._wrapped_user_lookup_error(ConnectionError("auth database unreachable"))
+            ),
+        ):
+            mock_mgr.get_mcp_server_by_name.return_value = self._bridge_delegate_server()
+            with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
+                await MCPRequestHandler.process_mcp_request(scope)
+
+        assert exc_info.value.status_code == 503
+
+    async def test_user_subject_envelope_scim_deactivated_user_fails_closed_401(self):
+        """SCIM-deactivating the envelope's user revokes it immediately: the reloaded user carries
+        scim_active False, so admission 401s rather than letting an offboarded user keep tool access
+        until the envelope expires."""
+        envelope = self._mint_bridge_envelope(user_id="offboarded-user")
+        scope = {
+            "type": "http",
+            "method": "POST",
+            "path": "/mcp/bridge_delegate_server",
+            "headers": [(b"authorization", f"Bearer {envelope}".encode("latin-1"))],
+        }
+        with (
+            patch("litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.mcp_server_manager.global_mcp_server_manager") as mock_mgr,
+            patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.master_key", self._MASTER_KEY),
+            self._patch_user_reload(return_value=MagicMock(user_id="offboarded-user", metadata={"scim_active": False})),
+        ):
+            mock_mgr.get_mcp_server_by_name.return_value = self._bridge_delegate_server()
+            with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
+                await MCPRequestHandler.process_mcp_request(scope)
+
+        assert exc_info.value.status_code == 401
+
     async def test_revoked_key_envelope_fails_closed_401(self):
         """An envelope whose key has since been deleted must fail closed: ``get_key_object`` raises
         for the missing row, so admission 401s instead of admitting the caller as an unrestricted

tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/faults/test_classify.py

@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+"""Classification matrix for upstream OAuth/DCR rejections: who is blamed depends only on the §5.2
+code and whose credentials the gateway presented, never on the upstream's HTTP status."""
+
+import httpx
+
+from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.faults.classify import (
+    classify_upstream_dcr_rejection,
+    classify_upstream_token_rejection,
+)
+from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.faults.types import (
+    CallerRejected,
+    GatewayRejected,
+    UpstreamProtocolFault,
+    UpstreamReportedFault,
+)
+
+
+def _response(status_code: int, *, json_body: object = None, text_body: str = "", headers: dict = None) -> httpx.Response:
+    request = httpx.Request("POST", "https://idp.example.com/token")
+    if json_body is not None:
+        return httpx.Response(status_code, json=json_body, request=request)
+    return httpx.Response(status_code, text=text_body, headers=headers or {}, request=request)
+
+
+def test_caller_fault_code_classifies_as_caller_rejected_regardless_of_status():
+    fault = classify_upstream_token_rejection(
+        _response(500, json_body={"error": "invalid_grant", "error_description": "Code expired."}),
+        credential_source="gateway_stored",
+        log_context="srv",
+    )
+    assert isinstance(fault, CallerRejected)
+    assert fault.code == "invalid_grant"
+    assert fault.description == "Code expired."
+
+
+def test_credential_code_with_gateway_stored_credentials_indicts_gateway():
+    fault = classify_upstream_token_rejection(
+        _response(401, json_body={"error": "invalid_client", "error_description": "not found"}),
+        credential_source="gateway_stored",
+        log_context="srv",
+    )
+    assert isinstance(fault, GatewayRejected)
+    assert fault.code == "invalid_client"
+
+
+def test_credential_code_with_caller_supplied_credentials_stays_caller_fault():
+    fault = classify_upstream_token_rejection(
+        _response(401, json_body={"error": "invalid_client"}),
+        credential_source="caller_supplied",
+        log_context="srv",
+    )
+    assert isinstance(fault, CallerRejected)
+    assert fault.code == "invalid_client"
+
+
+def test_unknown_code_relays_as_caller_rejected():
+    fault = classify_upstream_token_rejection(
+        _response(400, json_body={"error": "slow_down", "error_description": "Polling too fast."}),
+        credential_source="gateway_stored",
+        log_context="srv",
+    )
+    assert isinstance(fault, CallerRejected)
+    assert fault.code == "slow_down"
+
+
+def test_body_without_error_field_is_protocol_fault():
+    fault = classify_upstream_token_rejection(
+        _response(404, text_body="<html>not here</html>"),
+        credential_source="gateway_stored",
+        log_context="srv",
+    )
+    assert isinstance(fault, UpstreamProtocolFault)
+    assert fault.note == "upstream token endpoint returned HTTP 404"
+
+
+def test_unreadable_body_is_protocol_fault_not_exception():
+    unreadable = httpx.Response(
+        400,
+        stream=httpx.ByteStream(b"\x1f\x8bnot-gzip"),
+        headers={"content-encoding": "gzip"},
+        request=httpx.Request("POST", "https://idp.example.com/token"),
+    )
+    fault = classify_upstream_token_rejection(unreadable, credential_source="gateway_stored", log_context="srv")
+    assert isinstance(fault, UpstreamProtocolFault)
+
+
+def test_wire_fields_are_bounded():
+    fault = classify_upstream_token_rejection(
+        _response(400, json_body={"error": "invalid_request", "error_description": "x" * 5000}),
+        credential_source="gateway_stored",
+        log_context="srv",
+    )
+    assert isinstance(fault, CallerRejected)
+    assert len(fault.description) == 500
+
+
+def test_dcr_rejection_with_rfc7591_code_is_caller_rejected():
+    fault = classify_upstream_dcr_rejection(
+        _response(400, json_body={"error": "invalid_redirect_uri", "error_description": "not allowed"}),
+        log_context="srv",
+    )
+    assert isinstance(fault, CallerRejected)
+    assert fault.code == "invalid_redirect_uri"
+
+
+def test_dcr_rejection_without_code_is_protocol_fault():
+    fault = classify_upstream_dcr_rejection(_response(500, text_body="<html>trace</html>"), log_context="srv")
+    assert isinstance(fault, UpstreamProtocolFault)
+    assert fault.note == "upstream registration failed with HTTP 500"
+
+
+def test_upstream_self_blame_codes_stay_upstream_faults():
+    fault = classify_upstream_token_rejection(
+        _response(400, json_body={"error": "server_error", "error_description": "boom"}),
+        credential_source="caller_supplied",
+        log_context="srv",
+    )
+    assert isinstance(fault, UpstreamReportedFault)
+    assert fault.code == "server_error"
+
+
+def test_temporarily_unavailable_is_upstream_fault():
+    fault = classify_upstream_token_rejection(
+        _response(503, json_body={"error": "temporarily_unavailable"}),
+        credential_source="gateway_stored",
+        log_context="srv",
+    )
+    assert isinstance(fault, UpstreamReportedFault)
+    assert fault.code == "temporarily_unavailable"
+
+
+def test_invalid_target_is_gateway_fault_even_with_caller_credentials():
+    fault = classify_upstream_token_rejection(
+        _response(400, json_body={"error": "invalid_target"}),
+        credential_source="caller_supplied",
+        log_context="srv",
+    )
+    assert isinstance(fault, GatewayRejected)
+    assert fault.code == "invalid_target"
+
+
+def test_dcr_server_error_code_is_not_blamed_on_caller():
+    fault = classify_upstream_dcr_rejection(
+        _response(500, json_body={"error": "server_error"}),
+        log_context="srv",
+    )
+    assert isinstance(fault, UpstreamReportedFault)

tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/faults/test_render_oauth.py

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+"""Rendering contract: status, wire code, and prose all derive from the fault tag, so a caller-fault
+code can never ship on a server-fault status and gateway-side faults never carry provider prose."""
+
+import json
+
+from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.faults.render_oauth import (
+    dcr_fault_detail,
+    render_token_fault,
+)
+from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.faults.types import (
+    CallerRejected,
+    GatewayRejected,
+    UpstreamProtocolFault,
+    UpstreamReportedFault,
+)
+
+
+def test_caller_rejected_renders_code_derived_status():
+    response = render_token_fault(CallerRejected(code="invalid_grant", description="Code expired."))
+    assert response.status_code == 400
+    assert json.loads(response.body) == {"error": "invalid_grant", "error_description": "Code expired."}
+    assert response.headers["cache-control"] == "no-store"
+
+
+def test_caller_rejected_invalid_client_renders_401():
+    response = render_token_fault(CallerRejected(code="invalid_client"))
+    assert response.status_code == 401
+    assert json.loads(response.body) == {"error": "invalid_client"}
+
+
+def test_caller_rejected_includes_error_uri_only_when_present():
+    response = render_token_fault(
+        CallerRejected(code="invalid_scope", description="bad scope", error_uri="https://idp.example.com/e")
+    )
+    assert json.loads(response.body) == {
+        "error": "invalid_scope",
+        "error_description": "bad scope",
+        "error_uri": "https://idp.example.com/e",
+    }
+
+
+def test_gateway_rejected_renders_502_with_gateway_prose():
+    response = render_token_fault(GatewayRejected(code="invalid_client"))
+    assert response.status_code == 502
+    body = json.loads(response.body)
+    assert body["error"] == "server_error"
+    assert "invalid_client" in body["error_description"]
+    assert "client_id and client_secret" in body["error_description"]
+
+
+def test_gateway_invalid_target_prose_names_resource_indicators():
+    response = render_token_fault(GatewayRejected(code="invalid_target"))
+    body = json.loads(response.body)
+    assert response.status_code == 502
+    assert "RFC 8707" in body["error_description"]
+
+
+def test_protocol_fault_renders_502_note():
+    response = render_token_fault(UpstreamProtocolFault(note="upstream token endpoint returned HTTP 503"))
+    assert response.status_code == 502
+    assert json.loads(response.body) == {
+        "error": "server_error",
+        "error_description": "upstream token endpoint returned HTTP 503",
+    }
+
+
+def test_dcr_caller_rejection_is_400_per_rfc7591_regardless_of_upstream_status():
+    status_code, detail = dcr_fault_detail(CallerRejected(code="invalid_client_metadata", description="bad grant types"))
+    assert status_code == 400
+    assert detail == "invalid_client_metadata: bad grant types"
+
+
+def test_dcr_protocol_fault_is_502():
+    status_code, detail = dcr_fault_detail(UpstreamProtocolFault(note="upstream registration failed with HTTP 500"))
+    assert status_code == 502
+    assert detail == "upstream registration failed with HTTP 500"
+
+
+def test_upstream_reported_server_error_renders_502_with_matching_code():
+    response = render_token_fault(UpstreamReportedFault(code="server_error"))
+    assert response.status_code == 502
+    assert json.loads(response.body)["error"] == "server_error"
+
+
+def test_upstream_reported_temporarily_unavailable_renders_503_with_matching_code():
+    response = render_token_fault(UpstreamReportedFault(code="temporarily_unavailable"))
+    assert response.status_code == 503
+    body = json.loads(response.body)
+    assert body["error"] == "temporarily_unavailable"
+    assert "retry" in body["error_description"]
+
+
+def test_dcr_upstream_reported_fault_maps_to_5xx():
+    status_code, detail = dcr_fault_detail(UpstreamReportedFault(code="server_error"))
+    assert status_code == 502
+    assert "internal error" in detail

tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/outbound_credentials/test_bridge_credentials.py

@@ -15,10 +15,14 @@ from pydantic import SecretStr
 from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.outbound_credentials.bridge_credentials import (
     BridgeEnvelopeAdmitted,
     BridgeEnvelopeInvalid,
+    BridgeRefreshInvalid,
+    BridgeRefreshOpened,
     NotBridgeEnvelope,
+    build_bridge_refresh_token_response,
     build_bridge_token_response,
     envelope_keys_from_master_key,
     is_bridge_envelope_shaped,
+    open_bridge_refresh_envelope,
     resolve_bridge_envelope,
 )
 from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.outbound_credentials.envelope import (
@@ -26,15 +30,17 @@ from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.outbound_credentials.envelope import
     EnvelopeIdentity,
     EnvelopeKeys,
     EnvelopeTooLarge,
+    RefreshCredential,
     SealedEnvelope,
     UpstreamTokenGrant,
+    key_hash_identity,
     mint_envelope,
 )
 
 _NOW = datetime(2026, 7, 9, 12, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
 _MASTER_KEY = "sk-master-key-for-derivation-tests-0123456789"
 _ACCESS_TOKEN = "upstream-access-token-do-not-leak-8f14e45fceea"
-_IDENTITY = EnvelopeIdentity(server_id="srv-456", key_hash="hashed-key-123")
+_IDENTITY = key_hash_identity(server_id="srv-456", key_hash="hashed-key-123")
 _SERVER_ID = _IDENTITY.server_id
 
 
@@ -48,6 +54,76 @@ def _sealed_token(keys: EnvelopeKeys, now: datetime = _NOW, identity: EnvelopeId
     return sealed.token.get_secret_value()
 
 
+_UPSTREAM_REFRESH = "upstream-refresh-do-not-leak-9b2c"
+
+
+def _sealed_refresh(keys: EnvelopeKeys, now: datetime = _NOW, identity: EnvelopeIdentity = _IDENTITY) -> str:
+    sealed = build_bridge_refresh_token_response(
+        identity, RefreshCredential(refresh_token=SecretStr(_UPSTREAM_REFRESH)), keys, now
+    )
+    assert isinstance(sealed, SealedEnvelope)
+    return sealed.token.get_secret_value()
+
+
+def test_open_bridge_refresh_envelope_round_trips_identity_and_refresh():
+    keys = envelope_keys_from_master_key(_MASTER_KEY)
+    result = open_bridge_refresh_envelope(_sealed_refresh(keys), keys, _NOW, _SERVER_ID)
+    assert isinstance(result, BridgeRefreshOpened)
+    assert result.identity == _IDENTITY
+    assert result.refresh.refresh_token.get_secret_value() == _UPSTREAM_REFRESH
+
+
+def test_open_bridge_refresh_envelope_strips_bearer_scheme():
+    keys = envelope_keys_from_master_key(_MASTER_KEY)
+    result = open_bridge_refresh_envelope(f"Bearer {_sealed_refresh(keys)}", keys, _NOW, _SERVER_ID)
+    assert isinstance(result, BridgeRefreshOpened)
+
+
+def test_open_bridge_refresh_envelope_rejects_wrong_server():
+    keys = envelope_keys_from_master_key(_MASTER_KEY)
+    result = open_bridge_refresh_envelope(_sealed_refresh(keys), keys, _NOW, "a-different-server")
+    assert isinstance(result, BridgeRefreshInvalid)
+
+
+def test_open_bridge_refresh_envelope_rejects_non_refresh_bearers():
+    keys = envelope_keys_from_master_key(_MASTER_KEY)
+    # an access envelope is not a refresh envelope; a raw upstream refresh token is not one either
+    assert isinstance(open_bridge_refresh_envelope(_sealed_token(keys), keys, _NOW, _SERVER_ID), BridgeRefreshInvalid)
+    assert isinstance(open_bridge_refresh_envelope("raw-refresh-token", keys, _NOW, _SERVER_ID), BridgeRefreshInvalid)
+
+
+def test_open_bridge_refresh_envelope_rejects_under_wrong_master_key():
+    minted = envelope_keys_from_master_key(_MASTER_KEY)
+    other = envelope_keys_from_master_key(_MASTER_KEY + "-rotated")
+    result = open_bridge_refresh_envelope(_sealed_refresh(minted), other, _NOW, _SERVER_ID)
+    assert isinstance(result, BridgeRefreshInvalid)
+
+
+def test_refresh_envelope_is_never_admitted_at_the_tool_call_edge():
+    """A refresh envelope must never authenticate a tool call. The admission edge engages the bridge arm
+    for it (is_bridge_envelope_shaped is true for either envelope kind), and the consumer rejects it as
+    BridgeEnvelopeInvalid, which admission fails closed (401): a refresh credential is only ever
+    presented back to the token endpoint."""
+    keys = envelope_keys_from_master_key(_MASTER_KEY)
+    refresh = _sealed_refresh(keys)
+    assert is_bridge_envelope_shaped(refresh) is True
+    assert is_bridge_envelope_shaped(f"Bearer {refresh}") is True
+    result = resolve_bridge_envelope(refresh, keys, _NOW, _SERVER_ID)
+    assert isinstance(result, BridgeEnvelopeInvalid)
+
+
+def test_refresh_jwt_wearing_the_access_prefix_is_rejected_at_the_edge():
+    """Belt-and-suspenders against a swapped wire prefix: a refresh JWT re-prefixed as an access envelope
+    opens far enough to hit the signed kind claim, which rejects it, so admission fails closed rather
+    than forwarding a refresh credential's contents upstream."""
+    from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.outbound_credentials.envelope import REFRESH_ENVELOPE_PREFIX
+
+    keys = envelope_keys_from_master_key(_MASTER_KEY)
+    swapped = ENVELOPE_PREFIX + _sealed_refresh(keys).removeprefix(REFRESH_ENVELOPE_PREFIX)
+    result = resolve_bridge_envelope(swapped, keys, _NOW, _SERVER_ID)
+    assert isinstance(result, BridgeEnvelopeInvalid)
+
+
 def test_key_derivation_is_deterministic():
     assert envelope_keys_from_master_key(_MASTER_KEY) == envelope_keys_from_master_key(_MASTER_KEY)
 
@@ -138,7 +214,7 @@ def test_resolve_envelope_minted_for_another_server_is_invalid():
     captured or misrouted envelope cannot forward one server's upstream credential to
     another. The valid access token stays sealed; the mismatch alone fails the resolve."""
     keys = envelope_keys_from_master_key(_MASTER_KEY)
-    other_server_identity = EnvelopeIdentity(server_id="srv-OTHER", key_hash=_IDENTITY.key_hash)
+    other_server_identity = key_hash_identity(server_id="srv-OTHER", key_hash=_IDENTITY.subject)
     token = _sealed_token(keys, identity=other_server_identity)
     result = resolve_bridge_envelope(token, keys, _NOW, _SERVER_ID)
     assert isinstance(result, BridgeEnvelopeInvalid)
@@ -155,7 +231,7 @@ def test_resolve_non_ascii_server_id_stays_total_and_does_not_raise():
     unicode server_id); it stays total and returns a typed result. A matching non-ASCII id admits,
     a mismatching one is BridgeEnvelopeInvalid, and neither raises."""
     keys = envelope_keys_from_master_key(_MASTER_KEY)
-    unicode_identity = EnvelopeIdentity(server_id="srv-café", key_hash=_IDENTITY.key_hash)
+    unicode_identity = key_hash_identity(server_id="srv-café", key_hash=_IDENTITY.subject)
     token = _sealed_token(keys, identity=unicode_identity)
     assert isinstance(resolve_bridge_envelope(token, keys, _NOW, "srv-café"), BridgeEnvelopeAdmitted)
     assert isinstance(resolve_bridge_envelope(token, keys, _NOW, "srv-cafe"), BridgeEnvelopeInvalid)

tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/outbound_credentials/test_envelope.py

@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.outbound_credentials.envelope import
     ENVELOPE_PREFIX,
     MAX_ENVELOPE_BYTES,
     MAX_ENVELOPE_TTL_SECONDS,
+    MAX_REFRESH_ENVELOPE_TTL_SECONDS,
+    REFRESH_ENVELOPE_PREFIX,
     BadSignature,
     DecryptFailed,
     EnvelopeIdentity,
@@ -33,11 +35,18 @@ from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.outbound_credentials.envelope import
     MalformedPayload,
     NotAnEnvelope,
     OpenedEnvelope,
+    OpenedRefreshEnvelope,
+    RefreshCredential,
     SealedEnvelope,
     UpstreamTokenGrant,
     is_envelope,
+    is_refresh_envelope,
+    key_hash_identity,
     mint_envelope,
+    mint_refresh_envelope,
     open_envelope,
+    open_refresh_envelope,
+    user_identity,
 )
 from litellm.proxy.common_utils.encrypt_decrypt_utils import decrypt_value, encrypt_value
 
@@ -51,7 +60,7 @@ _WRONG_SIGNING = EnvelopeKeys(signing_key=SecretStr(_OTHER_SIGNING_KEY), encrypt
 _WRONG_ENCRYPTION = EnvelopeKeys(signing_key=SecretStr(_SIGNING_KEY), encryption_key=SecretStr(_OTHER_ENCRYPTION_KEY))
 _ACCESS_TOKEN = "upstream-access-token-do-not-leak-8f14e45fceea"
 _REFRESH_TOKEN = "upstream-refresh-token-do-not-leak-1d0aa4b7"
-_IDENTITY = EnvelopeIdentity(server_id="srv-456", key_hash="hashed-key-123")
+_IDENTITY = key_hash_identity(server_id="srv-456", key_hash="hashed-key-123")
 
 
 def _full_grant() -> UpstreamTokenGrant:
@@ -137,17 +146,99 @@ def test_minimal_grant_round_trips_without_none_leakage_into_claims():
 def test_claim_layout_and_no_plaintext_token_in_envelope():
     token = _sealed_token(_full_grant())
     claims = _unverified_claims(token)
-    assert set(claims) == {"iss", "iat", "exp", "server_id", "key_hash", "grant"}
+    assert set(claims) == {"iss", "iat", "exp", "kind", "server_id", "subject_type", "subject", "grant"}
     assert claims["iss"] == ENVELOPE_ISSUER
     assert claims["iat"] == int(_NOW.timestamp())
     assert claims["exp"] == int(_NOW.timestamp()) + 600
+    assert claims["kind"] == "access"
     assert claims["server_id"] == "srv-456"
-    assert claims["key_hash"] == "hashed-key-123"
+    assert claims["subject_type"] == "key_hash"
+    assert claims["subject"] == "hashed-key-123"
     assert _ACCESS_TOKEN not in token
     assert _ACCESS_TOKEN not in json.dumps(claims)
     assert _REFRESH_TOKEN not in json.dumps(claims)
 
 
+def _refresh_credential() -> RefreshCredential:
+    return RefreshCredential(refresh_token=SecretStr(_REFRESH_TOKEN), scope="read:tools", expires_in=None)
+
+
+def _sealed_refresh_token(refresh: RefreshCredential | None = None, keys: EnvelopeKeys = _KEYS) -> str:
+    sealed = mint_refresh_envelope(_IDENTITY, refresh or _refresh_credential(), keys, _NOW)
+    assert isinstance(sealed, SealedEnvelope)
+    return sealed.token.get_secret_value()
+
+
+def test_refresh_envelope_round_trips_identity_and_refresh_token():
+    token = _sealed_refresh_token()
+    assert is_refresh_envelope(token)
+    assert not is_envelope(token)
+    opened = open_refresh_envelope(token, _KEYS, _NOW)
+    assert isinstance(opened, OpenedRefreshEnvelope)
+    assert opened.identity == _IDENTITY
+    assert opened.refresh.refresh_token.get_secret_value() == _REFRESH_TOKEN
+    assert opened.refresh.scope == "read:tools"
+
+
+def test_refresh_envelope_ttl_is_min_of_upstream_refresh_lifetime_and_cap():
+    short = mint_refresh_envelope(
+        _IDENTITY, RefreshCredential(refresh_token=SecretStr("r"), expires_in=120), _KEYS, _NOW
+    )
+    assert isinstance(short, SealedEnvelope)
+    assert short.expires_at == _NOW + timedelta(seconds=120)
+    capped = mint_refresh_envelope(
+        _IDENTITY,
+        RefreshCredential(refresh_token=SecretStr("r"), expires_in=MAX_REFRESH_ENVELOPE_TTL_SECONDS + 86400),
+        _KEYS,
+        _NOW,
+    )
+    assert isinstance(capped, SealedEnvelope)
+    assert capped.expires_at == _NOW + timedelta(seconds=MAX_REFRESH_ENVELOPE_TTL_SECONDS)
+    default = mint_refresh_envelope(_IDENTITY, RefreshCredential(refresh_token=SecretStr("r")), _KEYS, _NOW)
+    assert isinstance(default, SealedEnvelope)
+    assert default.expires_at == _NOW + timedelta(seconds=MAX_REFRESH_ENVELOPE_TTL_SECONDS)
+
+
+def test_access_and_refresh_envelopes_do_not_cross_open():
+    access = _sealed_token(_full_grant())
+    refresh = _sealed_refresh_token()
+    # each opener rejects the other kind's prefix outright
+    assert isinstance(open_refresh_envelope(access, _KEYS, _NOW), NotAnEnvelope)
+    assert isinstance(open_envelope(refresh, _KEYS, _NOW), NotAnEnvelope)
+
+
+def test_prefix_swap_is_rejected_by_the_signed_kind_claim():
+    # the wire prefix is not signed, so swap it; the signed kind claim must still reject the cross-use
+    refresh = _sealed_refresh_token()
+    swapped_to_access = ENVELOPE_PREFIX + refresh.removeprefix(REFRESH_ENVELOPE_PREFIX)
+    assert isinstance(open_envelope(swapped_to_access, _KEYS, _NOW), MalformedPayload)
+    access = _sealed_token(_full_grant())
+    swapped_to_refresh = REFRESH_ENVELOPE_PREFIX + access.removeprefix(ENVELOPE_PREFIX)
+    assert isinstance(open_refresh_envelope(swapped_to_refresh, _KEYS, _NOW), MalformedPayload)
+
+
+def test_refresh_envelope_total_over_hostile_input():
+    token = _sealed_refresh_token()
+    # expired against the injected clock
+    assert isinstance(
+        open_refresh_envelope(token, _KEYS, _NOW + timedelta(seconds=MAX_REFRESH_ENVELOPE_TTL_SECONDS)), Expired
+    )
+    # wrong signing key
+    assert isinstance(open_refresh_envelope(token, _WRONG_SIGNING, _NOW), BadSignature)
+    # right signature, wrong encryption key
+    assert isinstance(open_refresh_envelope(token, _WRONG_ENCRYPTION, _NOW), DecryptFailed)
+    # not an envelope at all
+    assert isinstance(open_refresh_envelope("raw-upstream-refresh-token", _KEYS, _NOW), NotAnEnvelope)
+
+
+def test_refresh_envelope_never_leaks_the_refresh_token_in_plaintext():
+    token = _sealed_refresh_token()
+    assert _REFRESH_TOKEN not in token
+    claims = jwt.decode(token.removeprefix(REFRESH_ENVELOPE_PREFIX), options={"verify_signature": False})
+    assert claims["kind"] == "refresh"
+    assert _REFRESH_TOKEN not in json.dumps(claims)
+
+
 @pytest.mark.parametrize(
     "expires_in, expected_ttl",
     [
@@ -226,11 +317,11 @@ def test_wrong_issuer_is_malformed_payload():
 
 def test_missing_identity_claim_is_malformed_payload():
     claims = _unverified_claims(_sealed_token(_full_grant()))
-    forged = _forge({key: value for key, value in claims.items() if key != "key_hash"})
+    forged = _forge({key: value for key, value in claims.items() if key != "subject"})
     assert isinstance(open_envelope(forged, _KEYS, _NOW), MalformedPayload)
 
 
-@pytest.mark.parametrize("identity_claim", ["server_id", "key_hash"])
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("identity_claim", ["server_id", "subject"])
 def test_signed_empty_identity_claim_is_malformed_payload_not_a_raise(identity_claim):
     claims = _unverified_claims(_sealed_token(_full_grant()))
     forged = _forge({**claims, identity_claim: ""})
@@ -463,9 +554,11 @@ def test_non_positive_expires_in_is_rejected_at_construction_without_leaking():
 
 def test_empty_identity_and_key_fields_are_rejected_at_construction():
     with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
-        EnvelopeIdentity(server_id="", key_hash="hashed-key-123")
+        EnvelopeIdentity(server_id="", subject_type="key_hash", subject="hashed-key-123")
     with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
-        EnvelopeIdentity(server_id="srv-456", key_hash="")
+        EnvelopeIdentity(server_id="srv-456", subject_type="key_hash", subject="")
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        EnvelopeIdentity(server_id="srv-456", subject_type="not-a-subject-type", subject="x")
     with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
         EnvelopeKeys(signing_key=SecretStr(""), encryption_key=SecretStr(_ENCRYPTION_KEY))
     with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
@@ -474,6 +567,20 @@ def test_empty_identity_and_key_fields_are_rejected_at_construction():
         UpstreamTokenGrant(access_token=SecretStr(""), token_type="Bearer")
 
 
+def test_user_subject_identity_round_trips():
+    """The user_id subject variant seals and opens with its discriminator intact, so the edge can
+    tell an interactively-minted (user) envelope from a scripted (key_hash) one and reload the right
+    kind of record."""
+    identity = user_identity(server_id="srv-456", user_id="user-42")
+    sealed = mint_envelope(identity, _full_grant(), _KEYS, _NOW)
+    assert isinstance(sealed, SealedEnvelope)
+    opened = open_envelope(sealed.token.get_secret_value(), _KEYS, _NOW)
+    assert isinstance(opened, OpenedEnvelope)
+    assert opened.identity.server_id == "srv-456"
+    assert opened.identity.subject_type == "user_id"
+    assert opened.identity.subject == "user-42"
+
+
 def test_public_models_are_frozen():
     sealed = mint_envelope(_IDENTITY, _full_grant(), _KEYS, _NOW)
     assert isinstance(sealed, SealedEnvelope)
@@ -484,4 +591,4 @@ def test_public_models_are_frozen():
     with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
         opened.grant = _minimal_grant()
     with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
-        _IDENTITY.key_hash = "someone-elses-hash"
+        _IDENTITY.subject = "someone-elses-hash"