Merge pull request #42039 from BerriAI/revert-41731-litellm_mcp_integration_regressions_4506

Revert "test(mcp): verify scoped execution and OAuth credential isolation"
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joshua-berri 2026-09-19 23:24:00 +00:00 committed by GitHub
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9 changed files with 1268 additions and 407 deletions

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@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import httpx
from integration._support.asgi import asgi_server
from integration._support.client import Gateway, Scenario
from integration._support.database import read_rows
from mcp.server.mcpserver import MCPServer
from mcp.server.fastmcp import FastMCP
from mcp.server.transport_security import TransportSecuritySettings
from mcp_tests.mcp_e2e_upstream_server import add, multiply
from starlette.requests import Request
@ -27,7 +27,12 @@ class McpPeer:
@contextmanager
def mcp_peer() -> Iterator[McpPeer]:
service: Final = MCPServer("integration-math")
service: Final = FastMCP(
"integration-math",
stateless_http=True,
json_response=True,
transport_security=TransportSecuritySettings(enable_dns_rebinding_protection=False),
)
service.add_tool(add)
service.add_tool(multiply)
@ -35,11 +40,7 @@ def mcp_peer() -> Iterator[McpPeer]:
def fail() -> str:
raise ValueError("synthetic tool failure")
app: Final = service.streamable_http_app(
stateless_http=True,
json_response=True,
transport_security=TransportSecuritySettings(enable_dns_rebinding_protection=False),
)
app: Final = service.streamable_http_app()
observed: Final[queue.Queue[dict[str, object]]] = queue.Queue()
async def capture(scope: Scope, receive: Receive, send: Send) -> None:
@ -93,7 +94,9 @@ def tool_names(gateway: Gateway, key: str, identity: str) -> dict[str, str]:
}
def call_tool(gateway: Gateway, key: str, identity: str, name: str, arguments: dict[str, object]) -> httpx.Response:
def call_tool(
gateway: Gateway, key: str, identity: str, name: str, arguments: dict[str, object]
) -> httpx.Response:
return gateway.client.post(
"/mcp-rest/tools/call",
headers={"x-litellm-api-key": key},

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@ -1311,27 +1311,6 @@
],
"tests/integration/cost_calculation/test_cost_tracking.py::test_case_bills_expected_cost[us.anthropic.claude-opus-5-v1:0-stream_full_usage]": [
"quota_management.spend_tracking.scripted_wire.logs_cost"
],
"tests/integration/mcp/test_mcp_lifecycle.py::test_health_intersects_route_restricted_key_grants_in_both_management_modes": [
"other.mcp.health.restricted_keys_intersect_grants_in_both_modes"
],
"tests/integration/mcp/test_mcp_lifecycle.py::test_warm_credential_removal_rejects_without_upstream_traffic": [
"other.mcp.credentials.warm_removal_fails_closed_without_upstream_traffic"
],
"tests/integration/observability/test_guardrail_effects.py::test_request_selected_mcp_guardrail_blocks_direct_and_virtual_calls": [
"other.mcp.guardrails.request_selection_blocks_resolved_tool_without_execution"
],
"tests/integration/mcp/test_oauth_configuration.py::test_same_url_oauth_credentials_and_revocation_are_isolated_by_user_and_server[revoke]": [
"other.mcp.oauth.same_url_credentials_are_isolated_by_user_and_server"
],
"tests/integration/mcp/test_oauth_configuration.py::test_same_url_oauth_credentials_and_revocation_are_isolated_by_user_and_server[expire]": [
"other.mcp.oauth.same_url_credentials_are_isolated_by_user_and_server"
],
"tests/integration/mcp/test_mcp_lifecycle.py::test_same_url_server_grants_scope_discovery_and_direct_or_virtual_execution[anonymous]": [
"other.mcp.permissions.same_url_servers_enforce_discovery_and_execution"
],
"tests/integration/mcp/test_mcp_lifecycle.py::test_same_url_server_grants_scope_discovery_and_direct_or_virtual_execution[bearer]": [
"other.mcp.permissions.same_url_servers_enforce_discovery_and_execution"
]
},
"browser": {

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@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
# MCP security regression coverage
[LIT-4506](https://linear.app/litellm-ai/issue/LIT-4506) tracks ten gateway guards and the later JWT/OAuth acceptance. This inventory distinguishes executable assertions from unresolved coverage. A listed test counts as verified only when its exact commit has an executed, passing result
Run the controlled gateway cases through `python tests/integration/run.py extensions`. They use real HTTP, PostgreSQL, scoped non-master keys and an SDK upstream. The existing runner supplies test entitlement; these tests do not validate licenses or external-provider consent. Canonical nodes and contract IDs live in `../contracts.json`
| Requested guard | Existing or added coverage | Remaining limitation and owner |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. Discovery scoped by org/team/user/key | `test_mcp_lifecycle.py` checks the exact key-granted catalog and health visibility in both management modes. [PR #38680](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/pull/38680) adds team/org/user toolset E2E assertions | Per-principal native MCP coverage is not established by REST results; reuse #38680 rather than duplicate it |
| 2. Users cannot attach unauthorized servers to their own keys | Existing live probes are recorded on LIT-4506; they are not durable endpoint regression tests | Own-key create/update escalation and its permission-validator boundary remain on existing management security tickets, including [LIT-4502](https://linear.app/litellm-ai/issue/LIT-4502). A generic route denial does not prove that validator ran |
| 3. UI/API permission parity | Existing dashboard tests cover admin operations | The same non-admin actor must be tested through browser and API; admin UI tests do not establish parity. Retained with [LIT-3644](https://linear.app/litellm-ai/issue/LIT-3644) |
| 4. Server ID determines identity | `test_mcp_lifecycle.py` grants one of two servers sharing a URL and denies calls to the other, using explicit server IDs for direct REST calls and server-qualified search results for virtual calls, with and without bearer credentials | Virtual calls identify the target by the searched tool name, not the REST `server_id` field. Bare names such as `add` are ambiguous across servers; duplicate aliases/names and unprefixed protocol routing remain with [LIT-4500](https://linear.app/litellm-ai/issue/LIT-4500) |
| 5. Same-URL servers do not share credentials | `test_oauth_configuration.py` crosses two gateway users with two server IDs and four distinct stored OAuth tokens. It checks actual upstream headers and successful results, then invalidates only one tuple | Controlled stored-token tests do not prove separate external-provider accounts or consent flows |
| 6. OAuth never falls back to anonymous | OAuth isolation variants remove a stored token or expire it without refresh, require separate list/call auth failures and no upstream requests, and preserve all other valid tuples. `test_mcp_lifecycle.py` also covers warm static-header removal and OBO without a caller JWT | External upstream revocation, refresh/reauthorization and aggregate challenges remain with [LIT-4501](https://linear.app/litellm-ai/issue/LIT-4501), [LIT-3433](https://linear.app/litellm-ai/issue/LIT-3433), [LIT-4422](https://linear.app/litellm-ai/issue/LIT-4422) and [LIT-4436](https://linear.app/litellm-ai/issue/LIT-4436) |
| 7. Stateful HTTP/session continuity | Legacy public-client tests exercise initialized sessions | No claim here proves upstream session state continuity; retained under [LIT-3143](https://linear.app/litellm-ai/issue/LIT-3143) |
| 8. Production guardrails/hooks run | `../observability/test_guardrail_effects.py` checks selected pre-call guards on direct and virtual execution, key/team/request selection, allowed results and zero denied executions. The two legacy test-owned dispatcher files are removed | This does not establish every post-call/output-scanning or concurrent hook contract |
| 9. Permissions enforced at discovery and execution | Exact key catalog and virtual search results plus forbidden direct/virtual calls in `test_mcp_lifecycle.py`; existing `../compatibility/test_persisted_toolsets.py` checks tool-level ceiling, denied sibling and allowed control | All principal/transport combinations are not established; link #38680's evidence for its additional principal cases |
| 10. Stateless/stateful matrix | These controlled peers use stateless HTTP upstreams | Stateful combinations depend on LIT-3143 and shared conformance runs. Modern-agent/legacy-upstream interaction remains deferred; legacy passes do not establish modern conformance |
## Additional JWT/OAuth acceptance
[LIT-3467 / PR #41909](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/pull/41909) owns one shared real login/consent, immediate list/call and cold-restart implementation, with aggregate SSO and explicitly configured per-server JWT variants. Reuse that implementation and its protected login secret; do not create another browser bootstrap here. Credit its exact-commit evidence separately from these controlled credential tests
The two-user/two-server cases here create non-admin users and scoped API keys through management APIs. They store synthetic upstream OAuth credentials through the real credential endpoint and assert the actual bearer at the owned upstream. This deliberately isolates credential lookup, expiry and revocation from consent. No gateway API key may replace the expected upstream token
Gateway JWT precedence, invalid/expired gateway JWTs, inactive-user denial, and their MCP-specific interaction with isolated credential lookup remain unverified by these API-key cases. General JWT unit/API tests are useful existing coverage but do not substitute for those MCP outcomes. Real-provider auth failures should extend LIT-3467's settled helpers; its explicit-header case must not be described as an uninterrupted Authorization-only OAuth flow
[PR #41718 / LIT-7737](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/pull/41718) owns dependency and public-client compatibility checks. This suite consumes the merged SDK2 API and keeps the existing dependency constraints. Its result must be reported independently of an installation-matrix pass

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@ -1,18 +1,14 @@
import json
import uuid
from contextlib import ExitStack
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Final
import pytest
import yaml
from hypothesis import strategies as st
from hypothesis.stateful import RuleBasedStateMachine, invariant, rule, run_state_machine_as_test
from integration._support.client import Gateway
from integration._support.database import read_rows
from integration._support.generation import LIFECYCLE_SETTINGS, bounded_http_requests
from integration._support.process import owned_proxy
from integration._support.mcp import call_tool, mcp_peer, register_mcp, tool_names
@ -57,7 +53,7 @@ def test_tool_error_remains_error_and_healthy_sibling_returns_value(gateway: Gat
failure: Final = call_tool(gateway, key, identity, names["fail"], {})
assert failure.status_code == 200, failure.text
assert failure.json()["isError"] is True
assert failure.json()["content"][0]["text"] == "Error executing tool fail"
assert "synthetic tool failure" in failure.json()["content"][0]["text"]
healthy: Final = call_tool(gateway, key, identity, names["multiply"], {"a": 3, "b": 5})
assert healthy.status_code == 200, healthy.text
assert healthy.json()["isError"] is False
@ -125,182 +121,3 @@ def test_generated_mcp_edits_preserve_actual_headers_and_tool_results(gateway: G
self.resources.close()
run_state_machine_as_test(Servers, settings=LIFECYCLE_SETTINGS)
@pytest.mark.covers("other.mcp.health.restricted_keys_intersect_grants_in_both_modes")
def test_health_intersects_route_restricted_key_grants_in_both_management_modes(
gateway: Gateway, tmp_path: Path
) -> None:
for mode in ("restricted", "view_all"):
config = yaml.safe_load(Path("tests/integration/proxy_config.yaml").read_text())
config["general_settings"]["user_mcp_management_mode"] = mode
path = tmp_path / f"health-{mode}.yaml"
path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(config))
with (
owned_proxy(gateway, tmp_path, {}, config=path) as candidate,
mcp_peer() as peer,
candidate.scenario() as scenario,
):
first = register_mcp(scenario, peer, "health" + uuid.uuid4().hex)
second = register_mcp(scenario, peer, "health" + uuid.uuid4().hex)
control = scenario.key(object_permission={"mcp_servers": [first]})
names = tool_names(candidate, control, first)
healthy = call_tool(candidate, control, first, names["add"], {"a": 3, "b": 5})
assert healthy.status_code == 200 and healthy.json()["content"][0]["text"] == "8", healthy.text
for grants in ([first], [second], []):
key = scenario.key(
allowed_routes=["/v1/mcp/server", "/v1/mcp/server/health"],
object_permission={"mcp_servers": grants},
)
listed = candidate.request("GET", "/v1/mcp/server", key=key)
assert listed.status_code == 200, listed.text
assert {row["server_id"] for row in listed.json()} == set(grants), listed.text
for requested in (None, [second], [first, second]):
response = candidate.client.get(
"/v1/mcp/server/health",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {key}"},
params=[] if requested is None else [("server_ids", identity) for identity in requested],
)
assert response.status_code == 200, response.text
expected = set(grants) if requested is None else set(grants).intersection(requested)
assert {row["server_id"] for row in response.json()} == expected, response.text
assert all(row["status"] == "healthy" for row in response.json())
@pytest.mark.covers("other.mcp.credentials.warm_removal_fails_closed_without_upstream_traffic")
def test_warm_credential_removal_rejects_without_upstream_traffic(gateway: Gateway) -> None:
with mcp_peer() as peer, gateway.scenario() as scenario:
identity = register_mcp(
scenario,
peer,
"credentials" + uuid.uuid4().hex,
auth_type="bearer_token",
static_headers={"Authorization": "Bearer synthetic-upstream-credential"},
)
key = scenario.key(object_permission={"mcp_servers": [identity]})
names = tool_names(gateway, key, identity)
warm = call_tool(gateway, key, identity, names["add"], {"a": 3, "b": 5})
assert warm.status_code == 200 and warm.json()["content"][0]["text"] == "8", warm.text
calls = tuple(item for item in peer.drain() if item["body"].get("method") == "tools/call")
assert len(calls) == 1
assert calls[0]["headers"][b"authorization"] == b"Bearer synthetic-upstream-credential"
removed = gateway.request("PUT", "/v1/mcp/server", {"server_id": identity, "static_headers": {}})
assert removed.status_code == 202, removed.text
stored = gateway.request("GET", f"/v1/mcp/server/{identity}")
assert stored.status_code == 200, stored.text
assert stored.json()["auth_type"] == "bearer_token"
assert not stored.json().get("static_headers"), stored.text
peer.drain()
for operation in ("list", "call"):
rejected = (
gateway.client.get(
"/mcp-rest/tools/list", params={"server_id": identity}, headers={"x-litellm-api-key": key}
)
if operation == "list"
else call_tool(gateway, key, identity, names["add"], {"a": 3, "b": 5})
)
assert rejected.status_code == 500, rejected.text
if operation == "list":
assert rejected.json()["detail"]["error"] == "internal", rejected.text
assert "Failed to list tools from server" in rejected.json()["detail"]["message"], rejected.text
else:
assert "requires a usable upstream credential" in rejected.text, rejected.text
assert peer.drain() == (), "missing static credential escaped to upstream"
changed = gateway.request(
"PUT",
"/v1/mcp/server",
{
"server_id": identity,
"auth_type": "oauth2_token_exchange",
"token_exchange_endpoint": peer.url + "/token",
"credentials": {"client_id": "synthetic-client"},
},
)
assert changed.status_code == 202, changed.text
peer.drain()
rejected_subject = call_tool(gateway, key, identity, names["add"], {"a": 3, "b": 5})
assert rejected_subject.status_code == 401, rejected_subject.text
assert peer.drain() == (), "virtual key cannot supply an OBO subject token"
control_id = register_mcp(scenario, peer, "control" + uuid.uuid4().hex, auth_type="none")
control_key = scenario.key(object_permission={"mcp_servers": [control_id]})
control_names = tool_names(gateway, control_key, control_id)
control = call_tool(gateway, control_key, control_id, control_names["multiply"], {"a": 3, "b": 5})
assert control.status_code == 200 and control.json()["content"][0]["text"] == "15", control.text
@pytest.mark.parametrize("authenticated", (False, True), ids=("anonymous", "bearer"))
@pytest.mark.covers("other.mcp.permissions.same_url_servers_enforce_discovery_and_execution")
def test_same_url_server_grants_scope_discovery_and_direct_or_virtual_execution(
gateway: Gateway, authenticated: bool
) -> None:
with mcp_peer() as peer, gateway.scenario() as scenario:
aliases: Final = tuple("scope" + uuid.uuid4().hex for _ in range(2))
servers: Final = tuple(
register_mcp(
scenario,
peer,
alias,
auth_type="bearer_token" if authenticated else "none",
static_headers={
"X-Integration-Server": alias,
**({"Authorization": f"Bearer synthetic-{alias}"} if authenticated else {}),
},
)
for alias in aliases
)
for virtual in (False, True):
keys: Final = tuple(
scenario.key(object_permission={"mcp_servers": [server], "mcp_tool_search_enabled": virtual})
for server in servers
)
for server, alias, key in zip(servers, aliases, keys):
catalog: Final = gateway.request("GET", "/mcp-rest/tools/list", key=key)
assert catalog.status_code == 200, catalog.text
if virtual:
assert {tool["name"] for tool in catalog.json()["tools"]} == {
"mcp_tool_search",
"mcp_tool_call",
"agent_search",
"skill_search",
}, catalog.text
search: Final = gateway.request(
"POST",
"/mcp-rest/tools/call",
{"name": "mcp_tool_search", "arguments": {"query": "add", "top_k": 10}},
key=key,
)
assert search.status_code == 200 and search.json()["isError"] is False, search.text
assert [tool["name"] for tool in json.loads(search.json()["content"][0]["text"])] == [
f"{alias}-add"
], search.text
else:
assert {tool["mcp_info"]["server_id"] for tool in catalog.json()["tools"]} == {server}
assert {tool["name"] for tool in catalog.json()["tools"]} == {"add", "multiply", "fail"}
for server_index, caller_index in ((0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1)):
peer.drain()
response: Final = gateway.request(
"POST",
"/mcp-rest/tools/call",
{
"name": "mcp_tool_call" if virtual else "add",
**({} if virtual else {"server_id": servers[server_index]}),
"arguments": (
{"tool_name": f"{aliases[server_index]}-add", "arguments": {"a": 3, "b": 5}}
if virtual
else {"a": 3, "b": 5}
),
},
key=keys[caller_index],
)
observed: Final = peer.drain()
if server_index != caller_index:
assert response.status_code == 403 and "not allowed" in response.text, response.text
assert observed == (), "forbidden server reached the upstream"
continue
assert response.status_code == 200 and response.json()["isError"] is False, response.text
assert response.json()["content"][0]["text"] == "8", response.text
calls: Final = tuple(item for item in observed if item["body"].get("method") == "tools/call")
assert len(calls) == 1
assert calls[0]["headers"][b"x-integration-server"] == aliases[server_index].encode()
expected_auth: Final = f"Bearer synthetic-{aliases[server_index]}".encode() if authenticated else None
assert all(item["headers"].get(b"authorization") == expected_auth for item in observed)

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@ -2,14 +2,14 @@ import json
import queue
import uuid
from urllib.parse import parse_qs, urlsplit
from typing import Final, Literal
from typing import Final
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from integration._support.client import Gateway, eventually
from integration._support.database import read_rows
from integration._support.mcp import McpPeer, call_tool, mcp_peer, register_mcp, tool_names
from integration._support.mcp import McpPeer, register_mcp
from integration._support.process import owned_proxy
from integration._support.wire import Reply, Request, wire_server
@ -102,87 +102,3 @@ def test_partial_discovery_and_unrelated_edit_keep_actual_authorization_destinat
"PUT", "/v1/mcp/server", {"server_id": identity, "server_name": alias + "renamed"}
)
assert updated.status_code == 202, updated.text
@pytest.mark.covers("other.mcp.oauth.same_url_credentials_are_isolated_by_user_and_server")
@pytest.mark.parametrize("transition", ("revoke", "expire"))
def test_same_url_oauth_credentials_and_revocation_are_isolated_by_user_and_server(
gateway: Gateway,
transition: Literal["revoke", "expire"],
) -> None:
with mcp_peer() as peer, gateway.scenario() as scenario:
servers: Final = tuple(
register_mcp(
scenario,
peer,
"oauth" + uuid.uuid4().hex,
auth_type="oauth2",
oauth2_flow="authorization_code",
authorization_url=peer.url + "/authorize",
token_url=peer.url + "/token",
credentials={"client_id": "synthetic-oauth-client"},
)
for _ in range(2)
)
users: Final = tuple(scenario.user(user_role="internal_user") for _ in range(2))
keys: Final = tuple(
scenario.key(user_id=user, object_permission={"mcp_servers": list(servers)}) for user in users
)
for user_index, key in enumerate(keys):
for server_index, server_id in enumerate(servers):
stored: Final = gateway.request(
"POST",
f"/v1/mcp/server/{server_id}/oauth-user-credential",
{"access_token": f"synthetic-user-{user_index}-server-{server_index}", "expires_in": 3600},
key=key,
)
assert stored.status_code == 200 and stored.json()["has_credential"] is True, stored.text
scenario.cleanups.callback(
gateway.request,
"DELETE",
f"/v1/mcp/server/{server_id}/oauth-user-credential",
key=key,
)
names: Final = tuple(tool_names(gateway, keys[0], server) for server in servers)
for generation in range(2):
for user_index, key in enumerate(keys):
for server_index, server_id in enumerate(servers):
peer.drain()
discovery: Final = gateway.request(
"GET",
"/mcp-rest/tools/list",
key=key,
params={"server_id": server_id},
)
call: Final = call_tool(gateway, key, server_id, names[server_index]["add"], {"a": 3, "b": 5})
observed: Final = peer.drain()
if generation == 1 and user_index == 0 and server_index == 0:
for rejected in (discovery, call):
assert rejected.status_code == 401, rejected.text
assert rejected.json() == {"detail": "Unauthorized"}, rejected.text
assert "resource_metadata=" in rejected.headers["www-authenticate"]
assert observed == (), "unusable credentials must not fall back to another user or server"
else:
assert discovery.status_code == 200, discovery.text
assert {tool["name"] for tool in discovery.json()["tools"]} == set(names[server_index].values())
assert call.status_code == 200 and call.json()["isError"] is False, call.text
assert call.json()["content"][0]["text"] == "8", call.text
calls: Final = tuple(item for item in observed if item["body"].get("method") == "tools/call")
assert len(calls) == 1
expected: Final = f"Bearer synthetic-user-{user_index}-server-{server_index}".encode()
assert calls[0]["headers"][b"authorization"] == expected
assert all(item["headers"].get(b"authorization") == expected for item in observed)
if generation == 0:
changed: Final = gateway.request(
"DELETE" if transition == "revoke" else "POST",
f"/v1/mcp/server/{servers[0]}/oauth-user-credential",
None
if transition == "revoke"
else {
"access_token": "synthetic-expired-user-0-server-0",
"expires_in": -60,
},
key=keys[0],
)
assert changed.status_code == 200, changed.text
assert changed.json()["has_credential"] is (transition == "expire"), changed.text

View file

@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import yaml
from integration._support.client import Gateway, eventually
from integration._support.database import read_rows
from integration._support.mcp import mcp_peer, register_mcp, tool_names
from integration._support.process import owned_proxy
from integration._support.wire import Reply, Request, wire_server
@ -144,73 +143,3 @@ def test_guardrail_denial_prevents_provider_and_preserves_allowed_control(gatewa
)
assert len(observed.get("/__observations").json()["requests"]) == 1
assert len(policy.drain()) == 2
@pytest.mark.covers("other.mcp.guardrails.request_selection_blocks_resolved_tool_without_execution")
def test_request_selected_mcp_guardrail_blocks_direct_and_virtual_calls(gateway: Gateway, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
guardrail = "mcp-policy-" + uuid.uuid4().hex
config = yaml.safe_load(Path("tests/integration/proxy_config.yaml").read_text())
config["guardrails"] = [
{
"guardrail_name": guardrail,
"litellm_params": {
"guardrail": "custom_code",
"mode": "pre_mcp_call",
"default_on": False,
"custom_code": (
"def apply_guardrail(inputs, request_data, input_type):\n"
' if inputs.get("tools", [{}])[0].get("function", {}).get("name") == "add":\n'
' return block("integration resolved add denied")\n'
" return allow()\n"
),
},
}
]
path = tmp_path / "mcp-guardrail.yaml"
path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(config))
with (
owned_proxy(gateway, tmp_path, {}, config=path) as candidate,
mcp_peer() as peer,
candidate.scenario() as scenario,
):
identity = register_mcp(scenario, peer, "guardrail" + uuid.uuid4().hex)
permission = {"mcp_servers": [identity], "mcp_tool_search_enabled": True}
key = scenario.key(object_permission=permission)
key_selected = scenario.key(object_permission=permission, guardrails=[guardrail])
team = scenario.team(guardrails=[guardrail], object_permission={"mcp_servers": [identity]})
team_selected = scenario.key(team_id=team, object_permission=permission)
catalog_key = scenario.key(object_permission={"mcp_servers": [identity]})
names = tool_names(candidate, catalog_key, identity)
assert set(names) == {"add", "multiply", "fail"}
for virtual in (False, True):
for caller, selected, tool, expected in (
(key, [], "add", 8),
(key, [guardrail], "add", None),
(key_selected, [], "add", None),
(team_selected, [], "add", None),
(key, [guardrail], "multiply", 15),
):
arguments = {"a": 3, "b": 5}
peer.drain()
response = candidate.client.post(
"/mcp-rest/tools/call",
headers={"x-litellm-api-key": caller},
json={
"server_id": identity,
"name": "mcp_tool_call" if virtual else names[tool],
"arguments": {"tool_name": names[tool], "arguments": arguments} if virtual else arguments,
"guardrails": selected,
},
)
calls = tuple(item for item in peer.drain() if item["body"].get("method") == "tools/call")
if expected is None:
assert response.status_code == 400, response.text
assert "integration resolved add denied" in response.text, response.text
assert calls == (), "pre-call denial must prevent upstream execution"
else:
assert response.status_code == 200, response.text
assert response.json()["isError"] is False
assert response.json()["content"][0]["text"] == str(expected), response.text
assert len(calls) == 1
assert calls[0]["body"]["params"]["name"] == tool
assert calls[0]["body"]["params"]["arguments"] == arguments

View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
"""Deterministic upstream MCP server for the mcp e2e suite.
A tiny MCP server exposing `add` and `multiply` over streamable-http so the
A tiny FastMCP server exposing `add` and `multiply` over streamable-http so the
suite has a self-hosted, offline upstream to register and exercise. DNS-rebinding
protection is turned off because the litellm container reaches this over the
compose network by service name (`mcp-upstream:8090`), not localhost, and the
@ -9,10 +9,15 @@ stack is an isolated throwaway. Bind host/port come from MCP_HOST/MCP_PORT.
import os
from mcp.server.mcpserver import MCPServer
from mcp.server.fastmcp import FastMCP
from mcp.server.transport_security import TransportSecuritySettings
mcp: MCPServer = MCPServer("e2e-math")
mcp: FastMCP = FastMCP(
"e2e-math",
host=os.getenv("MCP_HOST", "0.0.0.0"),
port=int(os.getenv("MCP_PORT", "8090")),
transport_security=TransportSecuritySettings(enable_dns_rebinding_protection=False),
)
@mcp.tool()
@ -28,12 +33,7 @@ def multiply(a: int, b: int) -> int:
def main() -> None:
mcp.run(
transport="streamable-http",
host=os.getenv("MCP_HOST", "0.0.0.0"),
port=int(os.getenv("MCP_PORT", "8090")),
transport_security=TransportSecuritySettings(enable_dns_rebinding_protection=False),
)
mcp.run(transport="streamable-http")
if __name__ == "__main__":

View file

@ -0,0 +1,770 @@
"""
Test file for MCP Guardrails Feature
This file tests the MCP guardrails functionality for both pre and during MCP call hooks,
including various guardrail types and proper exception handling.
"""
import asyncio
import pytest
from datetime import datetime
from typing import Optional, Dict, Any
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, AsyncMock, patch
# Add the project root to the path
import litellm
from litellm.exceptions import BlockedPiiEntityError, GuardrailRaisedException
from litellm.integrations.custom_guardrail import CustomGuardrail
from litellm.integrations.custom_logger import CustomLogger
from litellm.proxy._types import UserAPIKeyAuth
from litellm.caching.caching import DualCache
from litellm.types.mcp import (
MCPPreCallRequestObject,
MCPPreCallResponseObject,
MCPDuringCallRequestObject,
MCPDuringCallResponseObject,
)
from litellm.types.llms.base import HiddenParams
from litellm.types.guardrails import GuardrailEventHooks
from fastapi import HTTPException
class MockPiiGuardrail(CustomGuardrail):
"""Mock PII guardrail that raises BlockedPiiEntityError"""
def __init__(self, should_block: bool = True, entity_type: str = "EMAIL_ADDRESS"):
super().__init__()
self.should_block = should_block
self.entity_type = entity_type
self.guardrail_name = "mock-pii-guardrail"
self.call_count = 0
def should_run_guardrail(self, data: dict, event_type: GuardrailEventHooks) -> bool:
"""Always run for testing"""
return True
async def async_pre_call_hook(
self,
user_api_key_dict: UserAPIKeyAuth,
cache: DualCache,
data: dict,
call_type: str,
):
"""Mock pre-call hook that raises BlockedPiiEntityError"""
self.call_count += 1
if self.should_block:
raise BlockedPiiEntityError(
entity_type=self.entity_type,
guardrail_name=self.guardrail_name,
)
return None
class MockContentGuardrail(CustomGuardrail):
"""Mock content guardrail that raises GuardrailRaisedException"""
def __init__(self, should_block: bool = True):
super().__init__()
self.should_block = should_block
self.guardrail_name = "mock-content-guardrail"
self.call_count = 0
def should_run_guardrail(self, data: dict, event_type: GuardrailEventHooks) -> bool:
"""Always run for testing"""
return True
async def async_pre_call_hook(
self,
user_api_key_dict: UserAPIKeyAuth,
cache: DualCache,
data: dict,
call_type: str,
):
"""Mock pre-call hook that raises GuardrailRaisedException"""
self.call_count += 1
if self.should_block:
raise GuardrailRaisedException(
guardrail_name=self.guardrail_name, message="Content violates policy"
)
return None
class MockHttpGuardrail(CustomGuardrail):
"""Mock HTTP guardrail that raises HTTPException"""
def __init__(self, should_block: bool = True):
super().__init__()
self.should_block = should_block
self.guardrail_name = "mock-http-guardrail"
self.call_count = 0
def should_run_guardrail(self, data: dict, event_type: GuardrailEventHooks) -> bool:
"""Always run for testing"""
return True
async def async_pre_call_hook(
self,
user_api_key_dict: UserAPIKeyAuth,
cache: DualCache,
data: dict,
call_type: str,
):
"""Mock pre-call hook that raises HTTPException"""
self.call_count += 1
if self.should_block:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400, detail={"error": "Violated guardrail policy"}
)
return None
class MockDuringCallGuardrail(CustomGuardrail):
"""Mock guardrail for during-call testing"""
def __init__(self, should_block: bool = True):
super().__init__()
self.should_block = should_block
self.guardrail_name = "mock-during-guardrail"
self.call_count = 0
def should_run_guardrail(self, data: dict, event_type: GuardrailEventHooks) -> bool:
"""Always run for testing"""
return True
async def async_moderation_hook(
self,
data: dict,
user_api_key_dict: UserAPIKeyAuth,
call_type: str,
):
"""Mock during-call hook that raises exceptions"""
self.call_count += 1
if self.should_block:
raise BlockedPiiEntityError(
entity_type="PHONE_NUMBER",
guardrail_name=self.guardrail_name,
)
return None
class MockProxyLogging:
"""Mock proxy logging object for testing MCP guardrails"""
def __init__(self, guardrails: Optional[list] = None):
self.guardrails = guardrails if guardrails is not None else []
self.call_details = {"user_api_key_cache": DualCache()}
self.dynamic_success_callbacks = []
self.call_count = 0
def get_combined_callback_list(self, dynamic_success_callbacks, global_callbacks):
"""Return the guardrails for testing"""
return self.guardrails
def _convert_mcp_to_llm_format(self, request_obj, kwargs: dict) -> dict:
"""Convert MCP tool call to LLM message format"""
tool_call_content = (
f"Tool: {request_obj.tool_name}\nArguments: {request_obj.arguments}"
)
return {
"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": tool_call_content}],
"model": kwargs.get("model", "mcp-tool-call"),
"user_api_key_user_id": kwargs.get("user_api_key_user_id"),
"user_api_key_team_id": kwargs.get("user_api_key_team_id"),
}
def _convert_llm_result_to_mcp_response(self, llm_result, request_obj):
"""Convert LLM result back to MCP response format"""
return None # For testing, we don't need to convert back
def _parse_pre_mcp_call_hook_response(self, response, original_request):
"""Parse pre MCP call hook response"""
return response
async def async_pre_mcp_tool_call_hook(
self,
kwargs: dict,
request_obj: Any,
start_time: datetime,
end_time: datetime,
) -> Optional[Any]:
"""Mock pre MCP tool call hook"""
self.call_count += 1
# Simulate the actual hook logic
for guardrail in self.guardrails:
if isinstance(guardrail, CustomGuardrail):
try:
synthetic_data = self._convert_mcp_to_llm_format(
request_obj, kwargs
)
# Check if guardrail should run
if not guardrail.should_run_guardrail(
synthetic_data, GuardrailEventHooks.pre_mcp_call
):
continue
result = await guardrail.async_pre_call_hook(
user_api_key_dict=kwargs.get("user_api_key_auth"),
cache=self.call_details["user_api_key_cache"],
data=synthetic_data,
call_type="mcp_call",
)
if result is not None:
return self._parse_pre_mcp_call_hook_response(
result, request_obj
)
except (
BlockedPiiEntityError,
GuardrailRaisedException,
HTTPException,
) as e:
# Re-raise guardrail exceptions
raise e
except Exception as e:
# Log non-guardrail exceptions as non-blocking
print(
f"LiteLLM.LoggingError: [Non-Blocking] Exception occurred while logging {str(e)}"
)
return None
async def async_during_mcp_tool_call_hook(
self,
kwargs: dict,
request_obj: Any,
start_time: datetime,
end_time: datetime,
) -> Optional[Any]:
"""Mock during MCP tool call hook"""
self.call_count += 1
# Simulate the actual hook logic
for guardrail in self.guardrails:
if isinstance(guardrail, CustomGuardrail):
try:
synthetic_data = self._convert_mcp_to_llm_format(
request_obj, kwargs
)
result = await guardrail.async_moderation_hook(
data=synthetic_data,
user_api_key_dict=kwargs.get("user_api_key_auth"),
call_type="mcp_call",
)
if result is not None:
return result
except (
BlockedPiiEntityError,
GuardrailRaisedException,
HTTPException,
) as e:
# Re-raise guardrail exceptions
raise e
except Exception as e:
# Log non-guardrail exceptions as non-blocking
print(
f"LiteLLM.LoggingError: [Non-Blocking] Exception occurred while logging {str(e)}"
)
return None
@pytest.fixture
def mock_user_api_key():
"""Mock user API key for testing"""
return UserAPIKeyAuth(api_key="test_key", user_id="test_user")
@pytest.fixture
def mock_cache():
"""Mock cache for testing"""
return DualCache()
@pytest.fixture
def mock_pii_guardrail():
"""Mock PII guardrail that blocks"""
return MockPiiGuardrail(should_block=True)
@pytest.fixture
def mock_pii_guardrail_allow():
"""Mock PII guardrail that allows"""
return MockPiiGuardrail(should_block=False)
@pytest.fixture
def mock_content_guardrail():
"""Mock content guardrail that blocks"""
return MockContentGuardrail(should_block=True)
@pytest.fixture
def mock_http_guardrail():
"""Mock HTTP guardrail that blocks"""
return MockHttpGuardrail(should_block=True)
@pytest.fixture
def mock_during_guardrail():
"""Mock during-call guardrail that blocks"""
return MockDuringCallGuardrail(should_block=True)
@pytest.fixture
def mock_proxy_logging():
"""Mock proxy logging object"""
return MockProxyLogging()
class TestMCPGuardrailsPreCall:
"""Test MCP guardrails for pre-call hooks"""
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_pii_guardrail_blocks_pre_call(
self, mock_pii_guardrail, mock_user_api_key, mock_cache
):
"""Test that PII guardrail properly blocks pre-call"""
proxy_logging = MockProxyLogging([mock_pii_guardrail])
# Create MCP request
request_obj = MCPPreCallRequestObject(
tool_name="email_tool",
arguments={"email": "test@example.com"},
server_name="email_server",
user_api_key_auth=mock_user_api_key.model_dump(),
hidden_params=HiddenParams(),
)
kwargs = {
"name": "email_tool",
"arguments": {"email": "test@example.com"},
"server_name": "email_server",
"user_api_key_auth": mock_user_api_key,
}
# Test that BlockedPiiEntityError is raised
with pytest.raises(BlockedPiiEntityError) as excinfo:
await proxy_logging.async_pre_mcp_tool_call_hook(
kwargs=kwargs,
request_obj=request_obj,
start_time=datetime.now(),
end_time=datetime.now(),
)
# Verify the error details
assert excinfo.value.entity_type == "EMAIL_ADDRESS"
assert excinfo.value.guardrail_name == "mock-pii-guardrail"
assert mock_pii_guardrail.call_count == 1
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_pii_guardrail_allows_pre_call(
self, mock_pii_guardrail_allow, mock_user_api_key, mock_cache
):
"""Test that PII guardrail allows pre-call when configured to allow"""
proxy_logging = MockProxyLogging([mock_pii_guardrail_allow])
request_obj = MCPPreCallRequestObject(
tool_name="email_tool",
arguments={"email": "test@example.com"},
server_name="email_server",
user_api_key_auth=mock_user_api_key.model_dump(),
hidden_params=HiddenParams(),
)
kwargs = {
"name": "email_tool",
"arguments": {"email": "test@example.com"},
"server_name": "email_server",
"user_api_key_auth": mock_user_api_key,
}
# Test that no exception is raised
result = await proxy_logging.async_pre_mcp_tool_call_hook(
kwargs=kwargs,
request_obj=request_obj,
start_time=datetime.now(),
end_time=datetime.now(),
)
assert result is None
assert mock_pii_guardrail_allow.call_count == 1
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_content_guardrail_blocks_pre_call(
self, mock_content_guardrail, mock_user_api_key, mock_cache
):
"""Test that content guardrail properly blocks pre-call"""
proxy_logging = MockProxyLogging([mock_content_guardrail])
request_obj = MCPPreCallRequestObject(
tool_name="content_tool",
arguments={"content": "sensitive content"},
server_name="content_server",
user_api_key_auth=mock_user_api_key.model_dump(),
hidden_params=HiddenParams(),
)
kwargs = {
"name": "content_tool",
"arguments": {"content": "sensitive content"},
"server_name": "content_server",
"user_api_key_auth": mock_user_api_key,
}
# Test that GuardrailRaisedException is raised
with pytest.raises(GuardrailRaisedException) as excinfo:
await proxy_logging.async_pre_mcp_tool_call_hook(
kwargs=kwargs,
request_obj=request_obj,
start_time=datetime.now(),
end_time=datetime.now(),
)
# Verify the error details
assert "Content violates policy" in str(excinfo.value)
assert excinfo.value.guardrail_name == "mock-content-guardrail"
assert mock_content_guardrail.call_count == 1
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_http_guardrail_blocks_pre_call(
self, mock_http_guardrail, mock_user_api_key, mock_cache
):
"""Test that HTTP guardrail properly blocks pre-call"""
proxy_logging = MockProxyLogging([mock_http_guardrail])
request_obj = MCPPreCallRequestObject(
tool_name="http_tool",
arguments={"url": "http://example.com"},
server_name="http_server",
user_api_key_auth=mock_user_api_key.model_dump(),
hidden_params=HiddenParams(),
)
kwargs = {
"name": "http_tool",
"arguments": {"url": "http://example.com"},
"server_name": "http_server",
"user_api_key_auth": mock_user_api_key,
}
# Test that HTTPException is raised
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as excinfo:
await proxy_logging.async_pre_mcp_tool_call_hook(
kwargs=kwargs,
request_obj=request_obj,
start_time=datetime.now(),
end_time=datetime.now(),
)
# Verify the error details
assert excinfo.value.status_code == 400
assert "Violated guardrail policy" in str(excinfo.value.detail)
assert mock_http_guardrail.call_count == 1
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_multiple_guardrails_pre_call(
self, mock_pii_guardrail, mock_content_guardrail, mock_user_api_key, mock_cache
):
"""Test multiple guardrails - first one should block"""
proxy_logging = MockProxyLogging([mock_pii_guardrail, mock_content_guardrail])
request_obj = MCPPreCallRequestObject(
tool_name="test_tool",
arguments={"email": "test@example.com"},
server_name="test_server",
user_api_key_auth=mock_user_api_key.model_dump(),
hidden_params=HiddenParams(),
)
kwargs = {
"name": "test_tool",
"arguments": {"email": "test@example.com"},
"server_name": "test_server",
"user_api_key_auth": mock_user_api_key,
}
# Test that first guardrail blocks
with pytest.raises(BlockedPiiEntityError):
await proxy_logging.async_pre_mcp_tool_call_hook(
kwargs=kwargs,
request_obj=request_obj,
start_time=datetime.now(),
end_time=datetime.now(),
)
# Verify only first guardrail was called
assert mock_pii_guardrail.call_count == 1
assert mock_content_guardrail.call_count == 0
class TestMCPGuardrailsDuringCall:
"""Test MCP guardrails for during-call hooks"""
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_during_call_guardrail_blocks(
self, mock_during_guardrail, mock_user_api_key, mock_cache
):
"""Test that during-call guardrail properly blocks execution"""
proxy_logging = MockProxyLogging([mock_during_guardrail])
request_obj = MCPDuringCallRequestObject(
tool_name="phone_tool",
arguments={"phone": "555-123-4567"},
server_name="phone_server",
start_time=datetime.now().timestamp(),
hidden_params=HiddenParams(),
)
kwargs = {
"name": "phone_tool",
"arguments": {"phone": "555-123-4567"},
"server_name": "phone_server",
}
# Test that BlockedPiiEntityError is raised
with pytest.raises(BlockedPiiEntityError) as excinfo:
await proxy_logging.async_during_mcp_tool_call_hook(
kwargs=kwargs,
request_obj=request_obj,
start_time=datetime.now(),
end_time=datetime.now(),
)
# Verify the error details
assert excinfo.value.entity_type == "PHONE_NUMBER"
assert excinfo.value.guardrail_name == "mock-during-guardrail"
assert mock_during_guardrail.call_count == 1
class TestMCPGuardrailsIntegration:
"""Test MCP guardrails integration with MCP server manager"""
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_mcp_server_manager_with_guardrails(self):
"""Test MCP server manager with guardrail integration"""
mock_proxy_logging = MockProxyLogging([MockPiiGuardrail(should_block=True)])
# Test that guardrail exception is properly raised in the hook
with pytest.raises(BlockedPiiEntityError):
await mock_proxy_logging.async_pre_mcp_tool_call_hook(
kwargs={
"name": "email_tool",
"arguments": {"email": "test@example.com"},
},
request_obj=MagicMock(),
start_time=datetime.now(),
end_time=datetime.now(),
)
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_guardrail_exception_propagation(self):
"""Test that guardrail exceptions properly propagate through the system"""
# Test BlockedPiiEntityError
with pytest.raises(BlockedPiiEntityError):
raise BlockedPiiEntityError(
entity_type="EMAIL_ADDRESS", guardrail_name="test-guardrail"
)
# Test GuardrailRaisedException
with pytest.raises(GuardrailRaisedException):
raise GuardrailRaisedException(
guardrail_name="test-guardrail", message="Test message"
)
# Test HTTPException
with pytest.raises(HTTPException):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail={"error": "Test error"})
class TestMCPGuardrailsErrorHandling:
"""Test MCP guardrails error handling scenarios"""
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_non_guardrail_exception_logging(self, mock_user_api_key, mock_cache):
"""Test that non-guardrail exceptions are logged as non-blocking"""
class MockFailingGuardrail(CustomGuardrail):
def should_run_guardrail(
self, data: dict, event_type: GuardrailEventHooks
) -> bool:
return True
async def async_pre_call_hook(
self,
user_api_key_dict: UserAPIKeyAuth,
cache: DualCache,
data: dict,
call_type: str,
):
raise Exception("Non-guardrail error")
proxy_logging = MockProxyLogging([MockFailingGuardrail()])
request_obj = MCPPreCallRequestObject(
tool_name="test_tool",
arguments={"test": "data"},
server_name="test_server",
user_api_key_auth=mock_user_api_key.model_dump(),
hidden_params=HiddenParams(),
)
kwargs = {
"name": "test_tool",
"arguments": {"test": "data"},
"server_name": "test_server",
"user_api_key_auth": mock_user_api_key,
}
# Test that non-guardrail exceptions are handled gracefully
result = await proxy_logging.async_pre_mcp_tool_call_hook(
kwargs=kwargs,
request_obj=request_obj,
start_time=datetime.now(),
end_time=datetime.now(),
)
# Should return None (not raise exception)
assert result is None
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_guardrail_should_not_run(self, mock_user_api_key, mock_cache):
"""Test that guardrails don't run when should_run_guardrail returns False"""
class MockConditionalGuardrail(CustomGuardrail):
def should_run_guardrail(
self, data: dict, event_type: GuardrailEventHooks
) -> bool:
return False # Don't run
async def async_pre_call_hook(
self,
user_api_key_dict: UserAPIKeyAuth,
cache: DualCache,
data: dict,
call_type: str,
):
raise BlockedPiiEntityError("EMAIL_ADDRESS", "test-guardrail")
proxy_logging = MockProxyLogging([MockConditionalGuardrail()])
request_obj = MCPPreCallRequestObject(
tool_name="test_tool",
arguments={"test": "data"},
server_name="test_server",
user_api_key_auth=mock_user_api_key.model_dump(),
hidden_params=HiddenParams(),
)
kwargs = {
"name": "test_tool",
"arguments": {"test": "data"},
"server_name": "test_server",
"user_api_key_auth": mock_user_api_key,
}
# Test that guardrail doesn't run and no exception is raised
result = await proxy_logging.async_pre_mcp_tool_call_hook(
kwargs=kwargs,
request_obj=request_obj,
start_time=datetime.now(),
end_time=datetime.now(),
)
# Should return None (guardrail didn't run)
assert result is None
class TestMCPGuardrailsEdgeCases:
"""Test MCP guardrails edge cases and error conditions"""
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_empty_guardrails_list(self, mock_user_api_key, mock_cache):
"""Test behavior with empty guardrails list"""
proxy_logging = MockProxyLogging([]) # No guardrails
request_obj = MCPPreCallRequestObject(
tool_name="test_tool",
arguments={"test": "data"},
server_name="test_server",
user_api_key_auth=mock_user_api_key.model_dump(),
hidden_params=HiddenParams(),
)
kwargs = {
"name": "test_tool",
"arguments": {"test": "data"},
"server_name": "test_server",
"user_api_key_auth": mock_user_api_key,
}
# Should return None without any issues
result = await proxy_logging.async_pre_mcp_tool_call_hook(
kwargs=kwargs,
request_obj=request_obj,
start_time=datetime.now(),
end_time=datetime.now(),
)
assert result is None
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_guardrail_with_invalid_data(self, mock_user_api_key, mock_cache):
"""Test guardrail behavior with invalid data"""
class MockInvalidDataGuardrail(CustomGuardrail):
def should_run_guardrail(
self, data: dict, event_type: GuardrailEventHooks
) -> bool:
return True
async def async_pre_call_hook(
self,
user_api_key_dict: UserAPIKeyAuth,
cache: DualCache,
data: dict,
call_type: str,
):
# Try to access invalid data
invalid_data = data.get("invalid_key", {})
if invalid_data.get("should_fail"):
raise BlockedPiiEntityError("EMAIL_ADDRESS", "test-guardrail")
return None
proxy_logging = MockProxyLogging([MockInvalidDataGuardrail()])
request_obj = MCPPreCallRequestObject(
tool_name="test_tool",
arguments={"test": "data"},
server_name="test_server",
user_api_key_auth=mock_user_api_key.model_dump(),
hidden_params=HiddenParams(),
)
kwargs = {
"name": "test_tool",
"arguments": {"test": "data"},
"server_name": "test_server",
"user_api_key_auth": mock_user_api_key,
}
# Should handle invalid data gracefully
result = await proxy_logging.async_pre_mcp_tool_call_hook(
kwargs=kwargs,
request_obj=request_obj,
start_time=datetime.now(),
end_time=datetime.now(),
)
assert result is None
if __name__ == "__main__":
pytest.main([__file__])

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"""
Test file for MCP Hook Architecture
This file demonstrates the new MCP hook system with comprehensive examples
and validation tests.
"""
import asyncio
import pytest
from datetime import datetime
from typing import Optional
from litellm.integrations.custom_logger import CustomLogger
from litellm.types.mcp import (
MCPPreCallRequestObject,
MCPPreCallResponseObject,
MCPDuringCallRequestObject,
MCPDuringCallResponseObject,
MCPPostCallResponseObject,
)
from litellm.types.llms.base import HiddenParams
class TestMCPAccessControlHook(CustomLogger):
"""Test hook for access control functionality"""
def __init__(self):
self.allowed_tools = {"github/create_issue", "zapier/send_email"}
self.blocked_users = {"user123", "user456"}
self.call_count = 0
async def async_pre_mcp_tool_call_hook(
self, kwargs, request_obj: MCPPreCallRequestObject, start_time, end_time
) -> Optional[MCPPreCallResponseObject]:
"""Test access control validation"""
self.call_count += 1
tool_name = request_obj.tool_name
user_id = kwargs.get("user_api_key_auth", {}).get("user_id")
# Check if user is blocked
if user_id in self.blocked_users:
return MCPPreCallResponseObject(
should_proceed=False,
error_message=f"User {user_id} is not authorized to use MCP tools",
)
# Check if tool is allowed
if tool_name not in self.allowed_tools:
return MCPPreCallResponseObject(
should_proceed=False,
error_message=f"Tool {tool_name} is not authorized",
)
return None # Allow execution to proceed
class TestMCPCostTrackingHook(CustomLogger):
"""Test hook for cost tracking functionality"""
def __init__(self):
self.cost_map = {
"github/create_issue": 0.10,
"zapier/send_email": 0.05,
"default": 0.01,
}
self.call_count = 0
async def async_post_mcp_tool_call_hook(
self, kwargs, response_obj: MCPPostCallResponseObject, start_time, end_time
) -> Optional[MCPPostCallResponseObject]:
"""Test cost calculation after tool execution"""
self.call_count += 1
tool_name = kwargs.get("name", "")
cost = self.cost_map.get(tool_name, self.cost_map["default"])
# Set the response cost
response_obj.hidden_params.response_cost = cost
return response_obj
class TestMCPMonitoringHook(CustomLogger):
"""Test hook for real-time monitoring functionality"""
def __init__(self):
self.max_execution_time = 30.0 # seconds
self.call_count = 0
async def async_during_mcp_tool_call_hook(
self, kwargs, request_obj: MCPDuringCallRequestObject, start_time, end_time
) -> Optional[MCPDuringCallResponseObject]:
"""Test execution time monitoring"""
self.call_count += 1
tool_name = request_obj.tool_name
execution_time = (datetime.now() - start_time).total_seconds()
# Check if execution is taking too long
if execution_time > self.max_execution_time:
return MCPDuringCallResponseObject(
should_continue=False,
error_message=f"Tool {tool_name} execution timeout after {execution_time}s",
)
return None # Allow execution to continue
class TestMCPArgumentValidationHook(CustomLogger):
"""Test hook for argument validation functionality"""
def __init__(self):
self.call_count = 0
async def async_pre_mcp_tool_call_hook(
self, kwargs, request_obj: MCPPreCallRequestObject, start_time, end_time
) -> Optional[MCPPreCallResponseObject]:
"""Test argument validation and sanitization"""
self.call_count += 1
tool_name = request_obj.tool_name
arguments = request_obj.arguments.copy() # Create a copy to modify
# Example: Validate GitHub issue creation
if tool_name == "github/create_issue":
if not arguments.get("title"):
return MCPPreCallResponseObject(
should_proceed=False, error_message="GitHub issue title is required"
)
# Sanitize the title
title = arguments["title"]
if len(title) > 100:
title = title[:97] + "..."
arguments["title"] = title
# Example: Validate email sending
elif tool_name == "zapier/send_email":
if not arguments.get("to"):
return MCPPreCallResponseObject(
should_proceed=False, error_message="Email recipient is required"
)
return MCPPreCallResponseObject(
should_proceed=True, modified_arguments=arguments
)
# Test fixtures
@pytest.fixture
def access_control_hook():
return TestMCPAccessControlHook()
@pytest.fixture
def cost_tracking_hook():
return TestMCPCostTrackingHook()
@pytest.fixture
def monitoring_hook():
return TestMCPMonitoringHook()
@pytest.fixture
def argument_validation_hook():
return TestMCPArgumentValidationHook()
# Test cases
class TestMCPHooks:
"""Test cases for MCP hook functionality"""
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_access_control_hook_allowed_tool(self, access_control_hook):
"""Test that allowed tools pass validation"""
kwargs = {
"user_api_key_auth": {"user_id": "user789"},
"name": "github/create_issue",
}
request_obj = MCPPreCallRequestObject(
tool_name="github/create_issue",
arguments={"title": "Test issue"},
user_api_key_auth={"user_id": "user789"},
)
result = await access_control_hook.async_pre_mcp_tool_call_hook(
kwargs=kwargs,
request_obj=request_obj,
start_time=datetime.now(),
end_time=datetime.now(),
)
assert result is None # Should allow execution
assert access_control_hook.call_count == 1
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_access_control_hook_blocked_user(self, access_control_hook):
"""Test that blocked users are rejected"""
kwargs = {
"user_api_key_auth": {"user_id": "user123"},
"name": "github/create_issue",
}
request_obj = MCPPreCallRequestObject(
tool_name="github/create_issue",
arguments={"title": "Test issue"},
user_api_key_auth={"user_id": "user123"},
)
result = await access_control_hook.async_pre_mcp_tool_call_hook(
kwargs=kwargs,
request_obj=request_obj,
start_time=datetime.now(),
end_time=datetime.now(),
)
assert result is not None
assert result.should_proceed is False
assert "not authorized" in result.error_message
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_access_control_hook_unauthorized_tool(self, access_control_hook):
"""Test that unauthorized tools are rejected"""
kwargs = {
"user_api_key_auth": {"user_id": "user789"},
"name": "unauthorized_tool",
}
request_obj = MCPPreCallRequestObject(
tool_name="unauthorized_tool",
arguments={"param": "value"},
user_api_key_auth={"user_id": "user789"},
)
result = await access_control_hook.async_pre_mcp_tool_call_hook(
kwargs=kwargs,
request_obj=request_obj,
start_time=datetime.now(),
end_time=datetime.now(),
)
assert result is not None
assert result.should_proceed is False
assert "not authorized" in result.error_message
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_cost_tracking_hook(self, cost_tracking_hook):
"""Test cost tracking functionality"""
kwargs = {"name": "github/create_issue"}
response_obj = MCPPostCallResponseObject(
mcp_tool_call_response=[], hidden_params=HiddenParams()
)
result = await cost_tracking_hook.async_post_mcp_tool_call_hook(
kwargs=kwargs,
response_obj=response_obj,
start_time=datetime.now(),
end_time=datetime.now(),
)
assert result is not None
assert result.hidden_params.response_cost == 0.10
assert cost_tracking_hook.call_count == 1
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_cost_tracking_hook_default_cost(self, cost_tracking_hook):
"""Test default cost assignment"""
kwargs = {"name": "unknown_tool"}
response_obj = MCPPostCallResponseObject(
mcp_tool_call_response=[], hidden_params=HiddenParams()
)
result = await cost_tracking_hook.async_post_mcp_tool_call_hook(
kwargs=kwargs,
response_obj=response_obj,
start_time=datetime.now(),
end_time=datetime.now(),
)
assert result is not None
assert result.hidden_params.response_cost == 0.01 # Default cost
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_monitoring_hook_normal_execution(self, monitoring_hook):
"""Test monitoring hook with normal execution time"""
kwargs = {"name": "test_tool"}
request_obj = MCPDuringCallRequestObject(
tool_name="test_tool", arguments={}, start_time=datetime.now().timestamp()
)
result = await monitoring_hook.async_during_mcp_tool_call_hook(
kwargs=kwargs,
request_obj=request_obj,
start_time=datetime.now(),
end_time=datetime.now(),
)
assert result is None # Should allow execution to continue
assert monitoring_hook.call_count == 1
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_argument_validation_hook_valid_github_issue(
self, argument_validation_hook
):
"""Test argument validation for valid GitHub issue"""
kwargs = {"name": "github/create_issue"}
request_obj = MCPPreCallRequestObject(
tool_name="github/create_issue", arguments={"title": "Valid issue title"}
)
result = await argument_validation_hook.async_pre_mcp_tool_call_hook(
kwargs=kwargs,
request_obj=request_obj,
start_time=datetime.now(),
end_time=datetime.now(),
)
assert result is not None
assert result.should_proceed is True
assert result.modified_arguments == {"title": "Valid issue title"}
assert argument_validation_hook.call_count == 1
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_argument_validation_hook_missing_title(
self, argument_validation_hook
):
"""Test argument validation for missing GitHub issue title"""
kwargs = {"name": "github/create_issue"}
request_obj = MCPPreCallRequestObject(
tool_name="github/create_issue", arguments={} # Missing title
)
result = await argument_validation_hook.async_pre_mcp_tool_call_hook(
kwargs=kwargs,
request_obj=request_obj,
start_time=datetime.now(),
end_time=datetime.now(),
)
assert result is not None
assert result.should_proceed is False
assert "title is required" in result.error_message
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_argument_validation_hook_long_title_sanitization(
self, argument_validation_hook
):
"""Test argument validation with title sanitization"""
kwargs = {"name": "github/create_issue"}
long_title = "A" * 150 # Very long title
request_obj = MCPPreCallRequestObject(
tool_name="github/create_issue", arguments={"title": long_title}
)
result = await argument_validation_hook.async_pre_mcp_tool_call_hook(
kwargs=kwargs,
request_obj=request_obj,
start_time=datetime.now(),
end_time=datetime.now(),
)
assert result is not None
assert result.should_proceed is True
assert len(result.modified_arguments["title"]) == 100 # Truncated
assert result.modified_arguments["title"].endswith("...")
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_argument_validation_hook_email_validation(
self, argument_validation_hook
):
"""Test argument validation for email sending"""
kwargs = {"name": "zapier/send_email"}
request_obj = MCPPreCallRequestObject(
tool_name="zapier/send_email",
arguments={"to": "test@example.com", "subject": "Test"},
)
result = await argument_validation_hook.async_pre_mcp_tool_call_hook(
kwargs=kwargs,
request_obj=request_obj,
start_time=datetime.now(),
end_time=datetime.now(),
)
assert result is not None
assert result.should_proceed is True
assert result.modified_arguments == {
"to": "test@example.com",
"subject": "Test",
}
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_argument_validation_hook_missing_email_recipient(
self, argument_validation_hook
):
"""Test argument validation for missing email recipient"""
kwargs = {"name": "zapier/send_email"}
request_obj = MCPPreCallRequestObject(
tool_name="zapier/send_email",
arguments={"subject": "Test"}, # Missing 'to' field
)
result = await argument_validation_hook.async_pre_mcp_tool_call_hook(
kwargs=kwargs,
request_obj=request_obj,
start_time=datetime.now(),
end_time=datetime.now(),
)
assert result is not None
assert result.should_proceed is False
assert "recipient is required" in result.error_message
# Integration test
class TestMCPHookIntegration:
"""Integration tests for MCP hook system"""
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_hook_chain_execution(self):
"""Test that multiple hooks can work together"""
access_hook = TestMCPAccessControlHook()
cost_hook = TestMCPCostTrackingHook()
validation_hook = TestMCPArgumentValidationHook()
# Test data
kwargs = {
"user_api_key_auth": {"user_id": "user789"},
"name": "github/create_issue",
}
request_obj = MCPPreCallRequestObject(
tool_name="github/create_issue",
arguments={"title": "Integration test issue"},
user_api_key_auth={"user_id": "user789"},
)
# Execute pre-hooks
access_result = await access_hook.async_pre_mcp_tool_call_hook(
kwargs=kwargs,
request_obj=request_obj,
start_time=datetime.now(),
end_time=datetime.now(),
)
validation_result = await validation_hook.async_pre_mcp_tool_call_hook(
kwargs=kwargs,
request_obj=request_obj,
start_time=datetime.now(),
end_time=datetime.now(),
)
# Both hooks should allow execution
assert access_result is None
assert validation_result is not None
assert validation_result.should_proceed is True
# Simulate post-hook execution
response_obj = MCPPostCallResponseObject(
mcp_tool_call_response=[], hidden_params=HiddenParams()
)
cost_result = await cost_hook.async_post_mcp_tool_call_hook(
kwargs=kwargs,
response_obj=response_obj,
start_time=datetime.now(),
end_time=datetime.now(),
)
assert cost_result is not None
assert cost_result.hidden_params.response_cost == 0.10
if __name__ == "__main__":
# Run the tests
pytest.main([__file__, "-v"])