diff --git a/litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/alice/__init__.py b/litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/alice/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..75ea16f7a88 --- /dev/null +++ b/litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/alice/__init__.py @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Final + +from litellm.types.guardrails import SupportedGuardrailIntegrations + +from .alice import AliceGuardrail + +if TYPE_CHECKING: + from litellm.types.guardrails import Guardrail, LitellmParams + + +def initialize_guardrail(litellm_params: "LitellmParams", guardrail: "Guardrail"): + import litellm + + _alice_guardrail_callback: Final = AliceGuardrail( + api_key=litellm_params.api_key, + api_base=litellm_params.api_base, + unreachable_fallback=getattr(litellm_params, "unreachable_fallback", "fail_closed"), + guardrail_name=guardrail.get("guardrail_name", ""), + event_hook=litellm_params.mode, + default_on=litellm_params.default_on, + ) + + litellm.logging_callback_manager.add_litellm_callback(_alice_guardrail_callback) + return _alice_guardrail_callback + + +guardrail_initializer_registry: Final = { # mutable-ok: module-level registry, built once and never mutated + SupportedGuardrailIntegrations.ALICE.value: initialize_guardrail, +} + + +guardrail_class_registry: Final = { # mutable-ok: module-level registry, built once and never mutated + SupportedGuardrailIntegrations.ALICE.value: AliceGuardrail, +} diff --git a/litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/alice/alice.py b/litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/alice/alice.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..27018769909 --- /dev/null +++ b/litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/alice/alice.py @@ -0,0 +1,369 @@ +# +-------------------------------------------------------------+ +# +# Use Alice for your LLM calls +# https://alice.io/ +# +# +-------------------------------------------------------------+ + +import json +import os +from collections.abc import Mapping +from typing import ( + TYPE_CHECKING, + Any, # noqa: TID251 # **kwargs forwards verbatim to CustomGuardrail.__init__; see ruff-strict.toml + Final, + Literal, + Optional, +) + +import httpx +from typing_extensions import NotRequired, ReadOnly, TypedDict + +from litellm._logging import verbose_proxy_logger +from litellm.exceptions import GuardrailRaisedException, Timeout +from litellm.integrations.custom_guardrail import ( + CustomGuardrail, + log_guardrail_information, +) +from litellm.llms.custom_httpx.http_handler import ( + get_async_httpx_client, + httpxSpecialProvider, +) +from litellm.types.guardrails import GuardrailEventHooks +from litellm.types.utils import GenericGuardrailAPIInputs + +if TYPE_CHECKING: + from litellm.litellm_core_utils.litellm_logging import Logging as LiteLLMLoggingObj + +GUARDRAIL_NAME: Final = "alice" + +_DEFAULT_API_BASE: Final = "https://api.alice.io" +_EVALUATE_PATH: Final = "/v2/evaluate/litellm" + +_VERDICT_ALLOW: Final = "ALLOW" +_VERDICT_BLOCK: Final = "BLOCK" +_VERDICT_MASK: Final = "MASK" +_VERDICT_DETECT: Final = "DETECT" +_KNOWN_VERDICTS: Final = frozenset({_VERDICT_ALLOW, _VERDICT_BLOCK, _VERDICT_MASK, _VERDICT_DETECT}) + +_DEFAULT_BLOCK_MESSAGE: Final = "Blocked by your organization's content policy." + +# apply_guardrail selects nothing: it forwards whichever of these came populated and lets Alice +# decide what is worth evaluating. Only skip the call when every one of them is empty — there is +# then genuinely nothing to send. +_SELECTABLE_INPUT_FIELDS: Final = ("texts", "images", "tools", "tool_calls", "structured_messages") + +# Caps on the outbound copy of request_data. A payload deeper or wider than this is malformed +# rather than large, and serializing it would cost more than the evaluation it feeds. +_MAX_DEPTH: Final = 12 +_MAX_ITEMS: Final = 5000 + +# request_data carries the caller's raw credentials under these keys, at any nesting depth — +# a real captured payload puts inbound headers at request_data["proxy_server_request"]["headers"], +# again under ["metadata"]["headers"] / ["litellm_metadata"]["headers"], and again under +# ["metadata"]["requester_metadata"]["headers"], any of which can carry an Authorization or +# x-api-key value. LiteLLM's own spend-log sanitizer excludes `secret_fields` for the same reason +# (spend_tracking_utils._SENSITIVE_REQUEST_BODY_KEYS): `secret_fields.raw_headers` holds the +# caller's Authorization / x-api-key in the clear, and `api_key` can carry a forwarded provider +# credential. Stripping by key name rather than by path means a new nesting path can never +# reintroduce the leak. Posting any of these to a third-party guardrail endpoint would be worse +# than what the proxy already refuses to persist in its own audit trail — so none of them leave +# the process. +_CREDENTIAL_KEYS_TO_STRIP: Final = frozenset( + {"secret_fields", "api_key", "raw_headers", "headers", "provider_specific_header"} +) + + +class AliceReplacement(TypedDict): + """A masked substitution, positional against the texts that were submitted.""" + + index: ReadOnly[NotRequired[int]] + text: ReadOnly[NotRequired[str]] + + +class AliceVerdict(TypedDict): + """Body returned by Alice's LiteLLM evaluate endpoint.""" + + verdict: ReadOnly[NotRequired[str]] + categories: ReadOnly[NotRequired["tuple[str, ...]"]] + correlation_id: ReadOnly[NotRequired[str]] + message: ReadOnly[NotRequired[str]] + replacements: ReadOnly[NotRequired["tuple[AliceReplacement, ...]"]] + + +class AliceGuardrailMissingSecrets(Exception): + """Raised when the Alice API key is not configured.""" + + +class AliceGuardrail(CustomGuardrail): + """ + Alice — policy-based guardrails for prompts and model responses. + + This forwards the hook's arguments as it received them and enforces the verdict that comes + back, with one deliberate exception: any key named `secret_fields`, `api_key`, `raw_headers`, + `headers`, or `provider_specific_header` is dropped from `request_data` at any nesting depth + before it is serialized, and never reaches Alice. Short of that, it selects nothing and + renames nothing: which parts of a conversation are worth evaluating, and how a verdict is + reached, are decided by Alice — so changing either is a change on their side rather than a + LiteLLM upgrade. A batch with nothing selectable at all (no `texts`, `images`, `tools`, + `tool_calls`, or `structured_messages`) still skips the call, since there would be nothing to + send. + + Known limitation: the unified guardrail's `streaming_transform_mode` defaults to + `block_only`, whose streaming path discards any returned text rewrite. A MASK verdict is + therefore a no-op on a streamed response — the original, unmasked text still reaches the + caller — while BLOCK continues to function on both streamed and non-streamed responses. + This is `during_call`'s documented behavior generally, not specific to Alice; configure a + masking-aware `streaming_transform_mode` if that gap matters for your traffic. + + Alice evaluates against policies configured per *application*, and one proxy typically fronts + several, so the application is named on the virtual key rather than in this config: + + curl $PROXY/key/generate -H "Authorization: Bearer $LITELLM_MASTER_KEY" \\ + -d '{"key_alias": "payments-bot", + "metadata": {"alice_app_id": "payments-bot"}}' + + Alice reads that off the authenticated key. Because the proxy strips caller-supplied + `user_api_key_*` from the request before a guardrail sees it, a caller cannot point its own + traffic at an application with laxer policies than the one its key was issued for. + + Configuration example (litellm config YAML): + guardrails: + - guardrail_name: alice + litellm_params: + guardrail: alice + mode: [pre_call, post_call] + api_key: os.environ/ALICE_API_KEY + api_base: https://api.alice.io # optional + unreachable_fallback: fail_closed # optional + """ + + def __init__( + self, + api_key: str | None = None, + api_base: str | None = None, + unreachable_fallback: Literal["fail_closed", "fail_open"] = "fail_closed", + **kwargs: Any, # kwargs-ok: forwarded verbatim to CustomGuardrail.__init__, whose param list is wide and evolving + ) -> None: + self.async_handler = get_async_httpx_client(llm_provider=httpxSpecialProvider.GuardrailCallback) + + alice_api_key: Final = api_key or os.environ.get("ALICE_API_KEY") + if not alice_api_key: + raise AliceGuardrailMissingSecrets( + "Alice API key is required. Set the `ALICE_API_KEY` environment variable or " + "pass `api_key` in the guardrail config." + ) + self.alice_api_key: str = alice_api_key + + base: Final = (api_base or os.environ.get("ALICE_API_BASE") or _DEFAULT_API_BASE).rstrip("/") + self.api_base: str = f"{base}{_EVALUATE_PATH}" + self.unreachable_fallback: Literal["fail_closed", "fail_open"] = unreachable_fallback + + if "supported_event_hooks" not in kwargs: + kwargs["supported_event_hooks"] = [ # mutable-ok: CustomGuardrail.__init__ requires a list here + GuardrailEventHooks.pre_call, + GuardrailEventHooks.during_call, + GuardrailEventHooks.post_call, + ] + + super().__init__(**kwargs) + + @log_guardrail_information + async def apply_guardrail( + self, + inputs: GenericGuardrailAPIInputs, + request_data: dict[str, object], # mutable-ok: overrides CustomGuardrail.apply_guardrail's plain-dict contract + input_type: Literal["request", "response"], + logging_obj: Optional["LiteLLMLoggingObj"] = None, + ) -> GenericGuardrailAPIInputs: + if not any(inputs.get(field) for field in _SELECTABLE_INPUT_FIELDS): + return inputs + + try: + verdict: AliceVerdict = await self._evaluate( + inputs=inputs, request_data=request_data, input_type=input_type + ) + except Timeout as e: + return self._on_unreachable(e, inputs) + except httpx.HTTPStatusError as e: + status_code: Final = getattr(getattr(e, "response", None), "status_code", None) + # Any 5xx is an outage on Alice's side, not our misconfiguration — route the whole + # class through the configured policy. A 4xx (rejected credential, bad request) is + # ours to fix and must never fail open, so it is deliberately left to propagate. + if isinstance(status_code, int) and 500 <= status_code < 600: + return self._on_unreachable(e, inputs) + raise + except httpx.RequestError as e: + return self._on_unreachable(e, inputs) + except (json.JSONDecodeError, UnicodeDecodeError, TypeError) as e: + # A body that cannot be decoded, cannot be parsed as JSON, or parses to something + # other than an object, is as unreachable as a dropped connection: this deployment's + # policy decides, not a raw exception. UnicodeDecodeError is named explicitly because + # it is a sibling of JSONDecodeError under ValueError, not a subclass of it. + return self._on_unreachable(e, inputs) + + return self._enforce(verdict, inputs) + + async def _evaluate( + self, + inputs: GenericGuardrailAPIInputs, + request_data: Mapping[str, object], + input_type: str, + ) -> AliceVerdict: + response: Final = await self.async_handler.post( + url=self.api_base, + json={ # mutable-ok: one-shot HTTP request body, never mutated after construction + "input_type": input_type, + "inputs": _json_safe(inputs), + "request_data": _json_safe(request_data, strip_keys=_CREDENTIAL_KEYS_TO_STRIP), + }, + headers={ # mutable-ok: one-shot HTTP headers, never mutated after construction + "Content-Type": "application/json", + "af-api-key": self.alice_api_key, + }, + ) + response.raise_for_status() + body = response.json() + if not isinstance(body, dict): + raise TypeError("Alice returned a non-object body") + return body + + def _enforce(self, verdict: AliceVerdict, inputs: GenericGuardrailAPIInputs) -> GenericGuardrailAPIInputs: + """Act on the verdict. An answer we cannot read is treated as unavailable, never as a pass.""" + name: Final = verdict.get("verdict") + if name not in _KNOWN_VERDICTS: + return self._on_unreachable(ValueError(f"unrecognized verdict: {name!r}"), inputs) + + if name == _VERDICT_BLOCK: + raise GuardrailRaisedException( + guardrail_name=GUARDRAIL_NAME, + message=verdict.get("message") or _DEFAULT_BLOCK_MESSAGE, + should_wrap_with_default_message=False, + blocked_content=True, + ) + + if name == _VERDICT_DETECT: + # Recorded by Alice and allowed through. The correlation id is what ties this request + # to that record; the evaluated text itself is never logged. + verbose_proxy_logger.warning( + "Alice guardrail: detection recorded, request allowed (correlation_id=%s, categories=%s)", + verdict.get("correlation_id"), + verdict.get("categories"), + ) + return inputs + + if name == _VERDICT_MASK: + self._apply_replacements(verdict, inputs) + + return inputs + + def _apply_replacements(self, verdict: AliceVerdict, inputs: GenericGuardrailAPIInputs) -> None: + """ + Write each replacement onto the text it names. + + Only `texts` is touched. The chat translation layer maps a returned `texts` list back onto + the request positionally, but takes a different branch entirely when `structured_messages` + comes back as a new object — which would drop these edits. + + All-or-nothing: a single out-of-range or malformed replacement blocks the whole verdict + rather than being silently skipped, so content Alice meant to replace can never reach the + model unmasked alongside content that was replaced. + """ + texts: Final = inputs.get("texts") or [] # mutable-ok: empty-list fallback, replaced wholesale below + replacements: Final = verdict.get("replacements") or [] # mutable-ok: empty-list fallback for iteration only + + if not replacements: + raise self._mask_rejected(verdict) + + for replacement in replacements: + index = replacement.get("index") + text = replacement.get("text") + if not (isinstance(index, int) and isinstance(text, str) and 0 <= index < len(texts)): + raise self._mask_rejected(verdict) + texts[index] = text # mutable-ok: item assignment into the local working copy above + + inputs["texts"] = texts + + def _mask_rejected(self, verdict: AliceVerdict) -> GuardrailRaisedException: + """A MASK verdict that cannot be applied in full is refused outright, never partially — + see `_apply_replacements`.""" + return GuardrailRaisedException( + guardrail_name=GUARDRAIL_NAME, + message=verdict.get("message") or _DEFAULT_BLOCK_MESSAGE, + should_wrap_with_default_message=False, + blocked_content=True, + ) + + def _on_unreachable(self, error: Exception, inputs: GenericGuardrailAPIInputs) -> GenericGuardrailAPIInputs: + """Apply the configured policy when Alice cannot be reached or cannot be understood.""" + if self.unreachable_fallback == "fail_open": + verbose_proxy_logger.critical( + "Alice guardrail unreachable, allowing request per unreachable_fallback: %s", + error, + ) + return inputs + raise GuardrailRaisedException( + guardrail_name=GUARDRAIL_NAME, + message="Alice guardrail is unavailable and this request cannot be checked", + should_wrap_with_default_message=False, + ) from error + + @staticmethod + def get_config_model() -> type | None: + from litellm.types.proxy.guardrails.guardrail_hooks.alice import ( + AliceGuardrailConfigModel, + ) + + return AliceGuardrailConfigModel + + +def _json_safe( + value: object, + depth: int = 0, + seen: frozenset[int] = frozenset(), + strip_keys: frozenset[str] = frozenset(), +) -> object: + """ + Copy `value` into something `json.dumps` accepts, dropping only what cannot cross. + + `request_data` carries live Python objects — an OpenTelemetry span among them — so it cannot + be serialized as it stands. What is dropped is decided by a mechanical rule rather than a + field list: a list drifts from what the far side needs, a rule cannot. Serializing naively + raises, and that error would be read as "guardrail unavailable" on every single request. + + `strip_keys` drops a dict key by name at every depth it appears, not just the root — a caller + passes `_CREDENTIAL_KEYS_TO_STRIP` here so a credential nested under any path is caught the + same way a top-level one is, without maintaining a list of paths. The source object is never + mutated: every branch below builds a new container. + """ + if isinstance(value, (str, int, float, bool)) or value is None: + return value + if depth >= _MAX_DEPTH or id(value) in seen: + return None + + nested: Final = seen | {id(value)} # mutable-ok: one-shot set literal, unioned into a frozenset immediately + + if isinstance(value, dict): + out: dict[str, object] = {} # mutable-ok: bounded accumulator local to this call, never escapes as-is + for key, item in list(value.items())[:_MAX_ITEMS]: # mutable-ok: list() only to slice an unordered view + if isinstance(key, str) and key not in strip_keys: + out[key] = _json_safe(item, depth + 1, nested, strip_keys) + return out + + if isinstance(value, (list, tuple, set, frozenset)): + return [ # mutable-ok: return value is a one-shot list, discarded by the caller after use + _json_safe(item, depth + 1, nested, strip_keys) + for item in list(value)[:_MAX_ITEMS] # mutable-ok: list() only to slice an unordered view + ] + + dump: Final = getattr(value, "model_dump", None) + if callable(dump): + try: + return _json_safe(dump(mode="json"), depth + 1, nested, strip_keys) + except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 # a model that will not dump is one we drop + return None + + # Everything json.dumps handles natively — str, int, float, bool, None, dict, list — is + # caught above, and a dict/list subclass is caught by isinstance. So whatever reaches here + # (bytes, datetime, an OpenTelemetry span) cannot cross the wire. + return None diff --git a/litellm/types/guardrails.py b/litellm/types/guardrails.py index 4cf4fa62eff..c17103da890 100644 --- a/litellm/types/guardrails.py +++ b/litellm/types/guardrails.py @@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ class SupportedGuardrailIntegrations(Enum): HEADROOM = "headroom" COMPRESR = "compresr" STRAIKER = "straiker" + ALICE = "alice" class Role(Enum): diff --git a/litellm/types/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/alice.py b/litellm/types/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/alice.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..73d31673dab --- /dev/null +++ b/litellm/types/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/alice.py @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +from pydantic import Field + +from .base import GuardrailConfigModel + + +class AliceGuardrailConfigModel(GuardrailConfigModel): + api_key: str | None = Field( + default=None, + description=("The API key for Alice. If not provided, the `ALICE_API_KEY` environment variable is checked."), + ) + api_base: str | None = Field( + default=None, + description=( + "The API base URL for Alice. If not provided, the `ALICE_API_BASE` environment " + "variable is checked, then `https://api.alice.io`." + ), + ) + + @staticmethod + def ui_friendly_name() -> str: + return "Alice" diff --git a/ruff-strict.toml b/ruff-strict.toml index 7afc5da71ee..ae092bdde7d 100644 --- a/ruff-strict.toml +++ b/ruff-strict.toml @@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ external = [ # caught a real mismatch, confirming Any is correct here, not a shortcut. "litellm/litellm_core_utils/litellm_logging.py" = ["ANN401"] "litellm/utils.py" = ["ANN401"] +# `**kwargs` forwards verbatim to CustomGuardrail.__init__, whose param list is wide and +# grows over time; typing it concretely (`object`) broke that forwarding call outright — +# basedpyright turned every named param into a reportArgumentType error. Any is correct here. +"litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/alice/alice.py" = ["ANN401"] [lint.mccabe] max-complexity = 15 diff --git a/tests/code_coverage_tests/recursive_detector.py b/tests/code_coverage_tests/recursive_detector.py index 37e940460f6..790956156b0 100644 --- a/tests/code_coverage_tests/recursive_detector.py +++ b/tests/code_coverage_tests/recursive_detector.py @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ IGNORE_FUNCTIONS = [ "json_unrewritable_labels", # max depth set (MAX_STRUCTURED_CONTENT_SCAN_DEPTH); returns the None sentinel at the cap so the caller blocks. "_flatten_form_field", # bounded by the nesting depth of the already-parsed request body (a finite JSON tree, no cycles possible). "_flatten_form_data_field", # bounded by the nesting depth of the already-parsed request body (a finite JSON tree, no cycles possible). + "_json_safe", # max depth set (_MAX_DEPTH) plus a seen-ids cycle guard for self-referential input. ] diff --git a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/test_alice.py b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/test_alice.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..fd2e86ccde8 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/test_alice.py @@ -0,0 +1,614 @@ +import json +import os +from copy import deepcopy +from unittest.mock import AsyncMock + +import httpx +import pytest +from httpx import Request, Response + +import litellm +from litellm.exceptions import GuardrailRaisedException +from litellm.proxy.guardrails.guardrail_hooks.alice.alice import ( + GUARDRAIL_NAME, + AliceGuardrail, + AliceGuardrailMissingSecrets, + _json_safe, +) +from litellm.proxy.guardrails.init_guardrails import init_guardrails_v2 + + +def _guardrail(**overrides: object) -> AliceGuardrail: + params: dict[str, object] = {"api_key": "test-key", "guardrail_name": "alice", "event_hook": "pre_call"} + params.update(overrides) + return AliceGuardrail(**params) + + +def _verdict(payload: dict[str, object], status_code: int = 200) -> Response: + return Response( + status_code=status_code, + json=payload, + request=Request("POST", "https://api.alice.io/v2/evaluate/litellm"), + ) + + +def test_alice_guardrail_config(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch): + """Should register through init_guardrails_v2 like any other provider.""" + monkeypatch.setattr(litellm, "guardrail_name_config_map", {}) + monkeypatch.setenv("ALICE_API_KEY", "test-key") + + init_guardrails_v2( + all_guardrails=[ + { + "guardrail_name": "alice", + "litellm_params": {"guardrail": "alice", "mode": "pre_call", "default_on": True}, + } + ], + config_file_path="", + ) + + registered = [cb for cb in litellm.callbacks if isinstance(cb, AliceGuardrail)] + assert len(registered) == 1 + assert registered[0].guardrail_name == "alice" + + +class TestAliceGuardrailInitialization: + def setup_method(self): + for key in ("ALICE_API_KEY", "ALICE_API_BASE"): + os.environ.pop(key, None) + + def test_missing_api_key_raises(self): + with pytest.raises(AliceGuardrailMissingSecrets, match="API key"): + AliceGuardrail(guardrail_name="alice", event_hook="pre_call") + + def test_reads_credentials_from_environment(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("ALICE_API_KEY", "env-key") + monkeypatch.setenv("ALICE_API_BASE", "https://env.alice.test") + + guardrail = AliceGuardrail(guardrail_name="alice", event_hook="pre_call") + + assert guardrail.alice_api_key == "env-key" + assert guardrail.api_base == "https://env.alice.test/v2/evaluate/litellm" + + def test_defaults_the_api_base(self): + assert _guardrail().api_base == "https://api.alice.io/v2/evaluate/litellm" + + def test_trailing_slash_does_not_double_up(self): + assert _guardrail(api_base="https://api.alice.io/").api_base == ("https://api.alice.io/v2/evaluate/litellm") + + +class TestAliceForwarding: + """The hook's arguments cross the wire as they were received — nothing selected, nothing + renamed — except the caller's raw credentials, which are stripped before request_data is + serialized (see TestAliceCredentialStripping).""" + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_forwards_the_hook_arguments_verbatim(self): + guardrail = _guardrail() + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock(return_value=_verdict({"verdict": "ALLOW", "categories": []})) + inputs = {"texts": ["hello"], "structured_messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hello"}]} + request_data = {"model": "gpt-4o", "metadata": {"user_api_key_alias": "payments-bot"}} + # Snapshot before the call: @log_guardrail_information writes its own entry into + # request_data["metadata"] afterwards, so the original is no longer what was sent. + sent_inputs = deepcopy(inputs) + sent_request_data = deepcopy(request_data) + + await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs=inputs, request_data=request_data, input_type="request") + + body = guardrail.async_handler.post.call_args.kwargs["json"] + assert body["input_type"] == "request" + assert body["inputs"] == sent_inputs + assert body["request_data"] == sent_request_data + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_sends_the_credential(self): + guardrail = _guardrail() + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock(return_value=_verdict({"verdict": "ALLOW", "categories": []})) + + await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs={"texts": ["hi"]}, request_data={}, input_type="request") + + assert guardrail.async_handler.post.call_args.kwargs["headers"]["af-api-key"] == "test-key" + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_marks_a_completion_as_a_response(self): + guardrail = _guardrail() + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock(return_value=_verdict({"verdict": "ALLOW", "categories": []})) + + await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs={"texts": ["answer"]}, request_data={}, input_type="response") + + assert guardrail.async_handler.post.call_args.kwargs["json"]["input_type"] == "response" + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_nothing_selectable_reaches_no_evaluation(self): + """No texts, images, tools, tool_calls, or structured_messages: genuinely nothing to send.""" + guardrail = _guardrail() + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock() + + result = await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs={"texts": []}, request_data={}, input_type="request") + + assert result == {"texts": []} + guardrail.async_handler.post.assert_not_called() + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_tool_calls_only_still_reaches_alice(self): + """A batch with empty texts but populated tool_calls is still a selection decision Alice + should make, not the plugin — see the class docstring.""" + guardrail = _guardrail() + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock(return_value=_verdict({"verdict": "ALLOW", "categories": []})) + inputs = {"texts": [], "tool_calls": [{"id": "call_1", "function": {"name": "get_weather"}}]} + + await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs=inputs, request_data={}, input_type="request") + + guardrail.async_handler.post.assert_called_once() + assert guardrail.async_handler.post.call_args.kwargs["json"]["inputs"]["tool_calls"] == inputs["tool_calls"] + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_images_only_still_reaches_alice(self): + guardrail = _guardrail() + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock(return_value=_verdict({"verdict": "ALLOW", "categories": []})) + + await guardrail.apply_guardrail( + inputs={"texts": [], "images": [""]}, request_data={}, input_type="request" + ) + + guardrail.async_handler.post.assert_called_once() + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_structured_messages_only_still_reaches_alice(self): + guardrail = _guardrail() + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock(return_value=_verdict({"verdict": "ALLOW", "categories": []})) + + await guardrail.apply_guardrail( + inputs={"texts": [], "structured_messages": [{"role": "user", "content": []}]}, + request_data={}, + input_type="request", + ) + + guardrail.async_handler.post.assert_called_once() + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_makes_exactly_one_attempt(self): + guardrail = _guardrail(unreachable_fallback="fail_open") + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock(side_effect=httpx.ConnectError("refused")) + + await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs={"texts": ["hi"]}, request_data={}, input_type="request") + + assert guardrail.async_handler.post.call_count == 1 + + +class TestAliceCredentialStripping: + """request_data's raw-credential keys never leave the process.""" + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_secret_fields_and_api_key_are_stripped(self): + guardrail = _guardrail() + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock(return_value=_verdict({"verdict": "ALLOW", "categories": []})) + request_data = { + "model": "gpt-4o", + "api_key": "sk-forwarded-provider-secret", + "secret_fields": {"raw_headers": {"authorization": "Bearer caller-virtual-key"}}, + "metadata": {"user_api_key_alias": "payments-bot"}, + } + + await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs={"texts": ["hi"]}, request_data=request_data, input_type="request") + + sent_request_data = guardrail.async_handler.post.call_args.kwargs["json"]["request_data"] + assert "secret_fields" not in sent_request_data + assert "api_key" not in sent_request_data + assert sent_request_data == {"model": "gpt-4o", "metadata": {"user_api_key_alias": "payments-bot"}} + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_nested_credentials_are_stripped_at_every_depth(self): + """Shaped after a real captured Claude Code payload: the caller's Authorization/x-api-key + lives under several independent nesting paths, none of which are the root.""" + guardrail = _guardrail() + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock(return_value=_verdict({"verdict": "ALLOW", "categories": []})) + request_data = { + "model": "claude-3-5-sonnet", + "secret_fields": {"raw_headers": {"authorization": "Bearer caller-virtual-key"}}, + "provider_specific_header": {"extra_headers": {"authorization": "sk-ant-oat01-nested-oauth"}}, + "proxy_server_request": { + "url": "/v1/messages", + "headers": {"authorization": "Bearer inbound-caller-secret", "x-request-id": "req-1"}, + "body": { + "model": "claude-3-5-sonnet", + "metadata": {"headers": {"authorization": "Bearer body-metadata-secret"}}, + }, + }, + "metadata": { + "user_api_key_alias": "payments-bot", + "headers": {"authorization": "Bearer metadata-secret"}, + "requester_metadata": {"headers": {"authorization": "Bearer requester-metadata-secret"}}, + }, + "litellm_metadata": {"headers": {"authorization": "Bearer litellm-metadata-secret"}}, + } + + await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs={"texts": ["hi"]}, request_data=request_data, input_type="request") + + posted_body = guardrail.async_handler.post.call_args.kwargs["json"] + serialized = json.dumps(posted_body) + assert "authorization" not in serialized.lower() + assert "caller-virtual-key" not in serialized + assert "nested-oauth" not in serialized + assert "inbound-caller-secret" not in serialized + assert "body-metadata-secret" not in serialized + assert "metadata-secret" not in serialized + assert "requester-metadata-secret" not in serialized + assert "litellm-metadata-secret" not in serialized + + sent_request_data = posted_body["request_data"] + assert sent_request_data["model"] == "claude-3-5-sonnet" + assert sent_request_data["proxy_server_request"]["url"] == "/v1/messages" + assert "headers" not in sent_request_data["proxy_server_request"] + assert sent_request_data["proxy_server_request"]["body"]["model"] == "claude-3-5-sonnet" + assert "headers" not in sent_request_data["proxy_server_request"]["body"]["metadata"] + assert sent_request_data["metadata"]["user_api_key_alias"] == "payments-bot" + assert "headers" not in sent_request_data["metadata"] + assert "requester_metadata" in sent_request_data["metadata"] + assert "headers" not in sent_request_data["metadata"]["requester_metadata"] + assert "headers" not in sent_request_data["litellm_metadata"] + assert "secret_fields" not in sent_request_data + assert "provider_specific_header" not in sent_request_data + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_the_original_request_data_is_not_mutated(self): + """Stripping must only affect the outbound copy — api_key still has to reach the + provider, and secret_fields still has to reach the rest of the request pipeline.""" + guardrail = _guardrail() + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock(return_value=_verdict({"verdict": "ALLOW", "categories": []})) + request_data = {"api_key": "sk-forwarded-provider-secret", "secret_fields": {"raw_headers": {}}} + + await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs={"texts": ["hi"]}, request_data=request_data, input_type="request") + + assert request_data["api_key"] == "sk-forwarded-provider-secret" + assert request_data["secret_fields"] == {"raw_headers": {}} + + +class TestAliceVerdicts: + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_allow_leaves_the_inputs_untouched(self): + guardrail = _guardrail() + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock(return_value=_verdict({"verdict": "ALLOW", "categories": []})) + + result = await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs={"texts": ["hello"]}, request_data={}, input_type="request") + + assert result["texts"] == ["hello"] + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_block_surfaces_the_policy_message(self): + guardrail = _guardrail() + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock( + return_value=_verdict( + { + "verdict": "BLOCK", + "categories": ["self_harm"], + "correlation_id": "c1", + "message": "Blocked by your organization's policy", + } + ) + ) + + with pytest.raises(GuardrailRaisedException) as error: + await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs={"texts": ["bad"]}, request_data={}, input_type="request") + + assert "Blocked by your organization's policy" in str(error.value) + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_block_without_a_message_still_blocks(self): + guardrail = _guardrail() + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock(return_value=_verdict({"verdict": "BLOCK", "categories": []})) + + with pytest.raises(GuardrailRaisedException): + await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs={"texts": ["bad"]}, request_data={}, input_type="request") + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_mask_substitutes_by_position(self): + guardrail = _guardrail() + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock( + return_value=_verdict( + { + "verdict": "MASK", + "categories": ["pii"], + "replacements": [{"index": 1, "text": "my ssn is ***"}], + } + ) + ) + + result = await guardrail.apply_guardrail( + inputs={"texts": ["untouched", "my ssn is 123-45-6789"]}, + request_data={}, + input_type="request", + ) + + assert result["texts"] == ["untouched", "my ssn is ***"] + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_mask_that_lands_nowhere_blocks(self): + """A mask that wrote nothing would let the text through under a verdict that said not to.""" + guardrail = _guardrail() + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock( + return_value=_verdict({"verdict": "MASK", "categories": [], "replacements": [{"index": 9, "text": "***"}]}) + ) + + with pytest.raises(GuardrailRaisedException): + await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs={"texts": ["hello"]}, request_data={}, input_type="request") + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_mask_with_no_replacements_blocks(self): + guardrail = _guardrail() + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock(return_value=_verdict({"verdict": "MASK", "categories": []})) + + with pytest.raises(GuardrailRaisedException): + await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs={"texts": ["hello"]}, request_data={}, input_type="request") + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_mask_with_one_invalid_replacement_blocks_entirely(self): + """A mixed valid/invalid replacement list must not let the valid half through: that + would leave the content named by the invalid entry unmasked while looking like success.""" + guardrail = _guardrail() + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock( + return_value=_verdict( + { + "verdict": "MASK", + "categories": ["pii"], + "replacements": [{"index": 0, "text": "***"}, {"index": 9, "text": "***"}], + } + ) + ) + + with pytest.raises(GuardrailRaisedException): + await guardrail.apply_guardrail( + inputs={"texts": ["my ssn is 123-45-6789"]}, request_data={}, input_type="request" + ) + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_mask_leaves_structured_messages_identical(self): + """A new structured_messages object makes the translation layer skip the texts write-back.""" + guardrail = _guardrail() + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock( + return_value=_verdict({"verdict": "MASK", "categories": [], "replacements": [{"index": 0, "text": "***"}]}) + ) + messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "secret"}] + + result = await guardrail.apply_guardrail( + inputs={"texts": ["secret"], "structured_messages": messages}, + request_data={}, + input_type="request", + ) + + assert result["structured_messages"] is messages + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_detect_allows_and_leaves_the_text_alone(self): + guardrail = _guardrail() + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock( + return_value=_verdict({"verdict": "DETECT", "categories": ["profanity"], "correlation_id": "c1"}) + ) + + result = await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs={"texts": ["mild"]}, request_data={}, input_type="request") + + assert result["texts"] == ["mild"] + + +class TestAliceUnreachable: + @pytest.mark.parametrize( + "failure", + [ + pytest.param({"side_effect": httpx.ConnectError("refused")}, id="connect-error"), + pytest.param({"return_value": _verdict({"verdict": "MAYBE"})}, id="unrecognized-verdict"), + pytest.param({"return_value": _verdict({})}, id="no-verdict"), + ], + ) + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_fails_closed_by_default(self, failure: dict): + guardrail = _guardrail() + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock(**failure) + + with pytest.raises(GuardrailRaisedException, match="unavailable"): + await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs={"texts": ["hello"]}, request_data={}, input_type="request") + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_fails_open_when_configured(self): + guardrail = _guardrail(unreachable_fallback="fail_open") + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock(side_effect=httpx.ConnectError("refused")) + + result = await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs={"texts": ["hello"]}, request_data={}, input_type="request") + + assert result["texts"] == ["hello"] + + +class TestAliceTransportFailures: + """Every path out of the HTTP call, since each decides whether traffic flows unscreened.""" + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_a_timeout_is_unreachable(self): + guardrail = _guardrail() + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock( + side_effect=litellm.exceptions.Timeout(message="slow", model="gpt-4o", llm_provider="openai") + ) + + with pytest.raises(GuardrailRaisedException, match="unavailable"): + await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs={"texts": ["hello"]}, request_data={}, input_type="request") + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("status", [500, 502, 503, 504]) + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_upstream_5xx_is_unreachable(self, status: int): + guardrail = _guardrail(unreachable_fallback="fail_open") + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock( + side_effect=httpx.HTTPStatusError( + "server error", + request=Request("POST", "https://api.alice.io/v2/evaluate/litellm"), + response=_verdict({}, status_code=status), + ) + ) + + result = await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs={"texts": ["hello"]}, request_data={}, input_type="request") + + assert result["texts"] == ["hello"] + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_a_500_fails_closed_by_default(self): + guardrail = _guardrail() + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock( + side_effect=httpx.HTTPStatusError( + "server error", + request=Request("POST", "https://api.alice.io/v2/evaluate/litellm"), + response=_verdict({}, status_code=500), + ) + ) + + with pytest.raises(GuardrailRaisedException, match="unavailable"): + await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs={"texts": ["hello"]}, request_data={}, input_type="request") + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_a_4xx_is_not_treated_as_unreachable(self): + """A rejected credential is our misconfiguration, not an outage — it must not fail open.""" + guardrail = _guardrail(unreachable_fallback="fail_open") + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock( + side_effect=httpx.HTTPStatusError( + "unauthorized", + request=Request("POST", "https://api.alice.io/v2/evaluate/litellm"), + response=_verdict({}, status_code=401), + ) + ) + + with pytest.raises(httpx.HTTPStatusError): + await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs={"texts": ["hello"]}, request_data={}, input_type="request") + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_a_non_object_body_fails_closed_by_default(self): + guardrail = _guardrail() + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock( + return_value=Response( + status_code=200, + json=["not", "an", "object"], + request=Request("POST", "https://api.alice.io/v2/evaluate/litellm"), + ) + ) + + with pytest.raises(GuardrailRaisedException, match="unavailable"): + await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs={"texts": ["hello"]}, request_data={}, input_type="request") + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_a_non_object_body_fails_open_when_configured(self): + guardrail = _guardrail(unreachable_fallback="fail_open") + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock( + return_value=Response( + status_code=200, + json=["not", "an", "object"], + request=Request("POST", "https://api.alice.io/v2/evaluate/litellm"), + ) + ) + + result = await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs={"texts": ["hello"]}, request_data={}, input_type="request") + + assert result["texts"] == ["hello"] + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_malformed_json_fails_closed_by_default(self): + guardrail = _guardrail() + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock( + return_value=Response( + status_code=200, + content=b"not json", + request=Request("POST", "https://api.alice.io/v2/evaluate/litellm"), + ) + ) + + with pytest.raises(GuardrailRaisedException, match="unavailable"): + await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs={"texts": ["hello"]}, request_data={}, input_type="request") + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_malformed_json_fails_open_when_configured(self): + guardrail = _guardrail(unreachable_fallback="fail_open") + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock( + return_value=Response( + status_code=200, + content=b"not json", + request=Request("POST", "https://api.alice.io/v2/evaluate/litellm"), + ) + ) + + result = await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs={"texts": ["hello"]}, request_data={}, input_type="request") + + assert result["texts"] == ["hello"] + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_an_undecodable_body_fails_closed_by_default(self): + """UnicodeDecodeError is a sibling of JSONDecodeError under ValueError, not a subclass.""" + guardrail = _guardrail() + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock( + return_value=Response( + status_code=200, + content=b"\xff\xfe not utf-8", + request=Request("POST", "https://api.alice.io/v2/evaluate/litellm"), + ) + ) + + with pytest.raises(GuardrailRaisedException, match="unavailable"): + await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs={"texts": ["hello"]}, request_data={}, input_type="request") + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_an_undecodable_body_fails_open_when_configured(self): + guardrail = _guardrail(unreachable_fallback="fail_open") + guardrail.async_handler.post = AsyncMock( + return_value=Response( + status_code=200, + content=b"\xff\xfe not utf-8", + request=Request("POST", "https://api.alice.io/v2/evaluate/litellm"), + ) + ) + + result = await guardrail.apply_guardrail(inputs={"texts": ["hello"]}, request_data={}, input_type="request") + + assert result["texts"] == ["hello"] + + +class TestAliceSerialization: + """`request_data` carries live objects, so it cannot be posted as it stands.""" + + def test_drops_what_cannot_serialize_and_keeps_the_rest(self): + class Span: + pass + + result = _json_safe({"model": "x", "metadata": {"span": Span(), "user": "u1"}, "n": 1}) + + assert result == {"model": "x", "metadata": {"span": None, "user": "u1"}, "n": 1} + + def test_survives_a_cycle(self): + data: dict = {"a": 1} + data["self"] = data + + assert _json_safe(data) == {"a": 1, "self": None} + + def test_drops_a_model_that_will_not_dump(self): + class Stubborn: + def model_dump(self, mode: str = "python") -> dict: + raise RuntimeError("cannot serialise") + + assert _json_safe({"m": Stubborn()}) == {"m": None} + + def test_drops_a_bare_unserialisable_value(self): + class Span: + pass + + assert _json_safe(Span()) is None + + def test_dumps_pydantic_models(self): + from pydantic import BaseModel + + class Model(BaseModel): + name: str + + assert _json_safe({"m": Model(name="x")}) == {"m": {"name": "x"}} + + +def test_config_model_is_exposed_for_the_ui(): + config_model = AliceGuardrail.get_config_model() + + assert config_model is not None + assert config_model.ui_friendly_name() == "Alice" + + +def test_guardrail_name_constant(): + assert GUARDRAIL_NAME == "alice" diff --git a/ui/litellm-dashboard/public/assets/logos/alice.svg b/ui/litellm-dashboard/public/assets/logos/alice.svg new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f18f887b98c --- /dev/null +++ b/ui/litellm-dashboard/public/assets/logos/alice.svg @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + + + + diff --git a/ui/litellm-dashboard/src/app/(dashboard)/guardrails/_components/guardrail_garden_configs.ts b/ui/litellm-dashboard/src/app/(dashboard)/guardrails/_components/guardrail_garden_configs.ts index 03cfeed42ff..7785a8e44ab 100644 --- a/ui/litellm-dashboard/src/app/(dashboard)/guardrails/_components/guardrail_garden_configs.ts +++ b/ui/litellm-dashboard/src/app/(dashboard)/guardrails/_components/guardrail_garden_configs.ts @@ -312,4 +312,10 @@ export const GUARDRAIL_PRESETS: Record = { mode: "pre_call", defaultOn: false, }, + alice: { + provider: "Alice", + guardrailNameSuggestion: "Alice", + mode: "pre_call", + defaultOn: false, + }, }; diff --git a/ui/litellm-dashboard/src/app/(dashboard)/guardrails/_components/guardrail_garden_data.test.ts b/ui/litellm-dashboard/src/app/(dashboard)/guardrails/_components/guardrail_garden_data.test.ts index 13909e48185..1e486639840 100644 --- a/ui/litellm-dashboard/src/app/(dashboard)/guardrails/_components/guardrail_garden_data.test.ts +++ b/ui/litellm-dashboard/src/app/(dashboard)/guardrails/_components/guardrail_garden_data.test.ts @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ const EXPECTED_PARTNER_LOGO_FILES: Record = { deepkeep: "deepkeep.svg", repelloai: "repelloai.png", straiker: "straiker.svg", + alice: "alice.svg", }; describe("guardrail_garden_data logos", () => { diff --git a/ui/litellm-dashboard/src/app/(dashboard)/guardrails/_components/guardrail_garden_data.ts b/ui/litellm-dashboard/src/app/(dashboard)/guardrails/_components/guardrail_garden_data.ts index 744af89a357..931b3a111d8 100644 --- a/ui/litellm-dashboard/src/app/(dashboard)/guardrails/_components/guardrail_garden_data.ts +++ b/ui/litellm-dashboard/src/app/(dashboard)/guardrails/_components/guardrail_garden_data.ts @@ -464,6 +464,16 @@ export const PARTNER_GUARDRAIL_CARDS: GuardrailCardInfo[] = [ tags: ["Agentic", "Prompt Injection", "Tool Misuse", "MCP", "Skills"], providerKey: "Straiker", }, + { + id: "alice", + name: "Alice", + description: + "Policy-based guardrails for prompts and model responses, evaluated per application so one proxy can enforce a different policy set per team or product.", + category: "partner", + logo: guardrailLogoMap["Alice"], + tags: ["Content Moderation", "Prompt Injection", "PII", "Policy"], + providerKey: "Alice", + }, ]; export const ALL_CARDS = [...LITELLM_CONTENT_FILTER_CARDS, ...PARTNER_GUARDRAIL_CARDS]; diff --git a/ui/litellm-dashboard/src/app/(dashboard)/guardrails/_components/guardrail_info_helpers.tsx b/ui/litellm-dashboard/src/app/(dashboard)/guardrails/_components/guardrail_info_helpers.tsx index 83038b8e0e7..c1f2ddcf51c 100644 --- a/ui/litellm-dashboard/src/app/(dashboard)/guardrails/_components/guardrail_info_helpers.tsx +++ b/ui/litellm-dashboard/src/app/(dashboard)/guardrails/_components/guardrail_info_helpers.tsx @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ import aimSecurityLogo from "../../../../../public/assets/logos/aim_security.jpeg"; import aktoLogo from "../../../../../public/assets/logos/akto.svg"; +import aliceLogo from "../../../../../public/assets/logos/alice.svg"; import aporiaLogo from "../../../../../public/assets/logos/aporia.png"; import bedrockLogo from "../../../../../public/assets/logos/bedrock.svg"; import catoNetworksLogo from "../../../../../public/assets/logos/cato_networks.svg"; @@ -83,6 +84,7 @@ export const guardrail_provider_map: Record = { Deepkeep: "deepkeep", QostodianNexus: "qostodian_nexus", Repelloai: "repelloai", + Alice: "alice", }; // Function to populate provider map from API response - updates the original map @@ -204,6 +206,7 @@ export const guardrailLogoMap = { "Qostodian Nexus": qohashLogo.src, "RepelloAI Argus": repelloAiLogo.src, Straiker: straikerLogo.src, + Alice: aliceLogo.src, } satisfies Record; export const getGuardrailLogo = (displayName: string): string | undefined =>