From 6f8104606b4d1d7f1a7aaff3e1e71037d576a08f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Jensen Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 16:18:46 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] hibp support in password policy --- litellm/proxy/_types.py | 11 ++ litellm/proxy/auth/password_policy.py | 68 +++++++++ .../internal_user_endpoints.py | 9 +- litellm/proxy/proxy_server.py | 3 +- litellm/types/llms/custom_http.py | 1 + .../proxy/auth/test_onboarding.py | 140 +++++++++++++++++- .../proxy/auth/test_password_policy.py | 134 +++++++++++++++++ .../test_internal_user_endpoints.py | 34 +++++ tests/test_litellm/proxy/test__types.py | 16 ++ ui/litellm-dashboard/src/lib/http/schema.d.ts | 2 + 10 files changed, 409 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/litellm/proxy/_types.py b/litellm/proxy/_types.py index c22bb76629d..e8fa5d3a096 100644 --- a/litellm/proxy/_types.py +++ b/litellm/proxy/_types.py @@ -1791,6 +1791,17 @@ class NewUserRequest(GenerateRequestBase): send_invite_email: bool | None = None sso_user_id: str | None = None organizations: list[str] | None = None + password: str | None = None + + @field_validator("password") + @classmethod + def password_not_supported(cls, value: str | None) -> str | None: + if value is not None: + raise ValueError( + "password cannot be set via /user/new. Users set their own password through an " + "invitation link (POST /invitation/new)." + ) + return value class NewUserResponse(GenerateKeyResponse): diff --git a/litellm/proxy/auth/password_policy.py b/litellm/proxy/auth/password_policy.py index ab7a565894a..80c3ebeedca 100644 --- a/litellm/proxy/auth/password_policy.py +++ b/litellm/proxy/auth/password_policy.py @@ -4,13 +4,26 @@ Applied at every path that persists a new or changed password for a DB-backed user (``/user/update``, ``/user/bulk_update``, and the invitation onboarding claim flow), so the strength bar is configured in one place instead of per-endpoint. + +Also screens new passwords against known data breaches via the +haveibeenpwned.com (HIBP) k-anonymity range API: only the first 5 characters +of the password's SHA-1 hash ever leave the proxy, and the check fails open +(allows the password) when HIBP is unreachable. """ +import hashlib from collections.abc import Mapping from dataclasses import dataclass from typing import Final +from litellm._logging import verbose_proxy_logger +from litellm._version import version +from litellm.llms.custom_httpx.http_handler import AsyncHTTPHandler, get_async_httpx_client from litellm.proxy._types import ProxyErrorTypes, ProxyException +from litellm.types.llms.custom_http import httpxSpecialProvider + +HIBP_RANGE_API_BASE: Final = "https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range" +HIBP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS: Final = 5.0 DEFAULT_MIN_LENGTH: Final = 12 MIN_ALLOWED_LENGTH: Final = 8 @@ -90,3 +103,58 @@ def validate_password_policy(password: str, general_settings: Mapping[str, objec param="password", code=400, ) + + +def _hibp_client() -> AsyncHTTPHandler: + return get_async_httpx_client( + llm_provider=httpxSpecialProvider.PasswordBreachCheck, + params={"timeout": HIBP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS}, + ) + + +def _is_suffix_in_range_response(response_body: str, hash_suffix: str) -> bool: + for line in response_body.upper().splitlines(): + entry_suffix, _, count = line.strip().partition(":") + if entry_suffix == hash_suffix: + return int(count.strip() or "0") > 0 + return False + + +async def _is_password_breached(password: str, client: AsyncHTTPHandler) -> bool: + # usedforsecurity=False: SHA-1 is only a lookup key into the HIBP dataset, so no security property rests on it + sha1_hex: Final = hashlib.sha1(password.encode("utf-8"), usedforsecurity=False).hexdigest().upper() + try: + response: Final = await client.get( + f"{HIBP_RANGE_API_BASE}/{sha1_hex[:5]}", + headers={"Add-Padding": "true", "User-Agent": f"litellm-proxy/{version}"}, + ) + response.raise_for_status() + breached: Final = _is_suffix_in_range_response(response.text, sha1_hex[5:]) + except Exception as e: + verbose_proxy_logger.warning("Breached-password check skipped, HIBP lookup failed: %s", e) + return False + return breached + + +async def validate_password_not_breached( + password: str, + general_settings: Mapping[str, object], + client: AsyncHTTPHandler | None = None, +) -> None: + """Raise ``ProxyException`` (400) if ``password`` appears in a known data breach. + + Fails open: an unreachable or misbehaving HIBP allows the password.""" + check_enabled: Final = general_settings.get("password_policy_check_breached_passwords", True) is not False + if not check_enabled: + return + if not await _is_password_breached(password, client if client is not None else _hibp_client()): + return + raise ProxyException( + message=( + "This password appears in known data breaches and cannot be used. " + "Please choose a different password." + ), + type=ProxyErrorTypes.validation_error, + param="password", + code=400, + ) diff --git a/litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/internal_user_endpoints.py b/litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/internal_user_endpoints.py index d066f1e9138..d9518da3dab 100644 --- a/litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/internal_user_endpoints.py +++ b/litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/internal_user_endpoints.py @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ from litellm._logging import verbose_proxy_logger from litellm._uuid import uuid from litellm.proxy._types import * from litellm.proxy.auth.auth_checks import get_team_object, get_user_object -from litellm.proxy.auth.password_policy import validate_password_policy +from litellm.proxy.auth.password_policy import validate_password_not_breached, validate_password_policy from litellm.proxy.auth.user_api_key_auth import user_api_key_auth from litellm.proxy.common_utils.user_api_key_cache import ( object_permission_cache_key, @@ -157,10 +157,11 @@ def _team_membership_table( return team_membership_table -def _hash_password_in_dict(data: dict, general_settings: Mapping[str, object]) -> None: +async def _hash_password_in_dict(data: dict, general_settings: Mapping[str, object]) -> None: """Validate and hash password field in-place if present.""" if "password" in data and data["password"] is not None: validate_password_policy(data["password"], general_settings) + await validate_password_not_breached(data["password"], general_settings) data["password"] = hash_password(data["password"]) @@ -557,7 +558,7 @@ async def new_user( # generate_key_helper_fn only forwards object_permission_id, so without this the entitlement # the caller sent would be dropped on the floor. data_json = await _set_object_permission(data_json=data_json, prisma_client=prisma_client) - _hash_password_in_dict(data_json, general_settings) + data_json.pop("password", None) # always None: NewUserRequest.password_not_supported rejects any other value teams = data.teams if teams is None: teams = check_if_default_team_set() @@ -1436,7 +1437,7 @@ async def _update_single_user_helper( data_json: Final[dict] = user_request.model_dump(exclude_unset=True) non_default_values = _update_internal_user_params(data_json=data_json, data=user_request) - _hash_password_in_dict(non_default_values, general_settings) + await _hash_password_in_dict(non_default_values, general_settings) existing_user_row: BaseModel | None = None if user_request.user_id: diff --git a/litellm/proxy/proxy_server.py b/litellm/proxy/proxy_server.py index 9269fd48e6c..bb3012e2dc0 100644 --- a/litellm/proxy/proxy_server.py +++ b/litellm/proxy/proxy_server.py @@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ from litellm.proxy.auth.model_checks import ( get_mcp_server_ids, get_team_models, ) -from litellm.proxy.auth.password_policy import validate_password_policy +from litellm.proxy.auth.password_policy import validate_password_not_breached, validate_password_policy from litellm.proxy.auth.user_api_key_auth import ( _fetch_global_spend_with_event_coordination, user_api_key_auth, @@ -16190,6 +16190,7 @@ async def claim_onboarding_link(data: InvitationClaim, request: Request): ) validate_password_policy(data.password, general_settings) + await validate_password_not_breached(data.password, general_settings) hashed_pw: Final = hash_password(data.password) current_time = litellm.utils.get_utc_datetime() async with prisma_client.db.tx() as tx: diff --git a/litellm/types/llms/custom_http.py b/litellm/types/llms/custom_http.py index d80d7410aae..793893451df 100644 --- a/litellm/types/llms/custom_http.py +++ b/litellm/types/llms/custom_http.py @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ class httpxSpecialProvider(str, Enum): UI = "ui" Sandbox = "sandbox" ModelCostMap = "model_cost_map" + PasswordBreachCheck = "password_breach_check" VerifyTypes = str | bool | ssl.SSLContext diff --git a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/test_onboarding.py b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/test_onboarding.py index 524b655b465..8939baedd50 100644 --- a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/test_onboarding.py +++ b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/test_onboarding.py @@ -8,15 +8,20 @@ Covers the security behavior of: session key only after the password is written """ +import hashlib from datetime import timedelta from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch +import httpx import jwt import pytest +import respx from fastapi import HTTPException import litellm -from litellm.proxy._types import InvitationClaim +from litellm.proxy._types import InvitationClaim, ProxyException + +_POLICY_NO_BREACH_CHECK = {"password_policy_check_breached_passwords": False} # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Helpers @@ -386,7 +391,9 @@ async def test_claim_token_rejects_concurrent_reuse_before_password_write(): with ( patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.prisma_client", prisma), patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.master_key", "sk-test"), - patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.general_settings", {}), + patch( # test-quality-ok: claim_onboarding_link reads proxy_server module globals; no injection seam + "litellm.proxy.proxy_server.general_settings", _POLICY_NO_BREACH_CHECK + ), patch( "litellm.proxy.proxy_server.generate_key_helper_fn", new_callable=AsyncMock, @@ -426,7 +433,9 @@ async def test_claim_token_sets_accepted_at_after_password_written(): with ( patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.prisma_client", prisma), patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.master_key", "sk-test"), - patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.general_settings", {}), + patch( # test-quality-ok: claim_onboarding_link reads proxy_server module globals; no injection seam + "litellm.proxy.proxy_server.general_settings", _POLICY_NO_BREACH_CHECK + ), patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.premium_user", False), patch( "litellm.proxy.proxy_server.generate_key_helper_fn", @@ -483,7 +492,9 @@ async def test_claim_token_rolls_back_invite_when_session_key_mint_fails(): with ( patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.prisma_client", prisma), patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.master_key", "sk-test"), - patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.general_settings", {}), + patch( # test-quality-ok: claim_onboarding_link reads proxy_server module globals; no injection seam + "litellm.proxy.proxy_server.general_settings", _POLICY_NO_BREACH_CHECK + ), patch( "litellm.proxy.proxy_server.generate_key_helper_fn", new_callable=AsyncMock, @@ -505,3 +516,124 @@ async def test_claim_token_rolls_back_invite_when_session_key_mint_fails(): } assert rollback_kwargs["data"]["accepted_at"] is None assert rollback_kwargs["data"]["is_accepted"] is False + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# POST /onboarding/claim_token - password policy +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def _hibp_url_for(password: str) -> str: + sha1 = hashlib.sha1(password.encode("utf-8"), usedforsecurity=False).hexdigest().upper() + return f"https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/{sha1[:5]}" + + +def _hibp_suffix_for(password: str) -> str: + return hashlib.sha1(password.encode("utf-8"), usedforsecurity=False).hexdigest().upper()[5:] + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_claim_token_rejects_short_password_before_consuming_invite(): + """Default policy requires 12 characters; the invite must stay claimable.""" + from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import claim_onboarding_link + + invite = _make_invite(is_accepted=False) + prisma = _make_prisma(invite, _make_user()) + request = _make_claim_request(_make_onboarding_token()) + data = InvitationClaim( + invitation_link="invite-abc", + user_id="user-123", + password="Sh0rt!pw", + ) + + with ( + patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.prisma_client", prisma), # test-quality-ok: claim_onboarding_link reads proxy_server module globals; no injection seam + patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.master_key", "sk-test"), # test-quality-ok: same as above + patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.general_settings", {}), # test-quality-ok: same as above + ): + with pytest.raises(ProxyException) as exc_info: + await claim_onboarding_link(data=data, request=request) + + assert exc_info.value.code == "400" + assert "at least 12 characters" in exc_info.value.message + prisma.db.litellm_invitationlink.update_many.assert_not_called() + prisma.db.litellm_usertable.update.assert_not_called() + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +@respx.mock +async def test_claim_token_rejects_breached_password_before_consuming_invite(): + """A password found in the HIBP corpus must be rejected and never stored.""" + from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import claim_onboarding_link + + password = "P@ssword123456" + respx.get(_hibp_url_for(password)).mock( + return_value=httpx.Response(200, text=f"{_hibp_suffix_for(password)}:1387") + ) + + invite = _make_invite(is_accepted=False) + prisma = _make_prisma(invite, _make_user()) + request = _make_claim_request(_make_onboarding_token()) + data = InvitationClaim( + invitation_link="invite-abc", + user_id="user-123", + password=password, + ) + + with ( + patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.prisma_client", prisma), # test-quality-ok: claim_onboarding_link reads proxy_server module globals; no injection seam + patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.master_key", "sk-test"), # test-quality-ok: same as above + patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.general_settings", {}), # test-quality-ok: same as above + ): + with pytest.raises(ProxyException) as exc_info: + await claim_onboarding_link(data=data, request=request) + + assert exc_info.value.code == "400" + assert "data breaches" in exc_info.value.message + prisma.db.litellm_invitationlink.update_many.assert_not_called() + prisma.db.litellm_usertable.update.assert_not_called() + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +@respx.mock +async def test_claim_token_fails_open_when_hibp_unreachable(): + """An HIBP outage must never block onboarding: the claim proceeds.""" + from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import claim_onboarding_link + + password = "NewP@ssw0rd-2026" + respx.get(_hibp_url_for(password)).mock(side_effect=httpx.ConnectError("no route to host")) + + invite = _make_invite(is_accepted=False) + user = _make_user() + prisma = _make_prisma(invite, user) + request = _make_claim_request(_make_onboarding_token()) + data = InvitationClaim( + invitation_link="invite-abc", + user_id="user-123", + password=password, + ) + + with ( + patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.prisma_client", prisma), # test-quality-ok: claim_onboarding_link reads proxy_server module globals; no injection seam + patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.master_key", "sk-test"), # test-quality-ok: same as above + patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.general_settings", {}), # test-quality-ok: same as above + patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.premium_user", False), # test-quality-ok: same as above + patch( # test-quality-ok: same as above + "litellm.proxy.proxy_server.generate_key_helper_fn", + new_callable=AsyncMock, + return_value={"token": "sk-generated-key", "user_id": "user-123"}, + ), + patch( # test-quality-ok: same as above + "litellm.proxy.proxy_server.get_custom_url", + return_value="http://localhost:4000/", + ), + patch( # test-quality-ok: same as above + "litellm.proxy.proxy_server.get_disabled_non_admin_personal_key_creation", + return_value=False, + ), + patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.get_server_root_path", return_value=""), # test-quality-ok: same as above + ): + result = await claim_onboarding_link(data=data, request=request) + + assert "token" in result + prisma.db.litellm_usertable.update.assert_called_once() diff --git a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/test_password_policy.py b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/test_password_policy.py index f6e7d443907..edc88d21218 100644 --- a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/test_password_policy.py +++ b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/test_password_policy.py @@ -2,22 +2,54 @@ Tests for the configurable password-strength policy in `litellm.proxy.auth.password_policy`, enforced on every path that persists a new or changed password for a locally-managed user. + +The breach-check (HIBP) tests inject a real AsyncHTTPHandler wrapping an +httpx.MockTransport, so no network is touched and nothing is monkeypatched. """ +import hashlib + +import httpx import pytest +from litellm.llms.custom_httpx.http_handler import AsyncHTTPHandler from litellm.proxy._types import ProxyErrorTypes, ProxyException from litellm.proxy.auth.password_policy import ( DEFAULT_MIN_LENGTH, MIN_ALLOWED_LENGTH, PasswordPolicy, get_password_policy, + validate_password_not_breached, validate_password_policy, ) STRONG_PASSWORD = "Str0ng!Passw0rd" +def _sha1_upper(password: str) -> str: + return hashlib.sha1(password.encode("utf-8"), usedforsecurity=False).hexdigest().upper() + + +def _client_with_transport(handler) -> AsyncHTTPHandler: + http_handler = AsyncHTTPHandler() + http_handler.client = httpx.AsyncClient(transport=httpx.MockTransport(handler)) + return http_handler + + +def _client_never_called() -> AsyncHTTPHandler: + def handler(request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response: + raise AssertionError(f"unexpected HTTP call to {request.url}") + + return _client_with_transport(handler) + + +def _client_returning(body: str, status_code: int = 200) -> AsyncHTTPHandler: + def handler(request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response: + return httpx.Response(status_code, text=body) + + return _client_with_transport(handler) + + def test_get_password_policy_defaults_to_pif_baseline(): policy = get_password_policy({}) assert policy == PasswordPolicy( @@ -134,3 +166,105 @@ def test_validate_password_policy_rejects_unicode_letter_as_special_character(): def test_validate_password_policy_accepts_real_special_character_with_unicode_letters(): """Same base password as the rejection test above, plus an actual symbol.""" assert validate_password_policy("Passwörd1234!", {}) is None + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_breach_check_skipped_when_disabled(): + result = await validate_password_not_breached( + password="password12345", # breached in reality, but the check is off + general_settings={"password_policy_check_breached_passwords": False}, + client=_client_never_called(), + ) + assert result is None + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_rejects_breached_password(): + password = "correct horse battery staple" + sha1 = _sha1_upper(password) + body = f"AAAA000000000000000000000000000000A:0\r\n{sha1[5:]}:42\r\nBBBB000000000000000000000000000000B:7" + + with pytest.raises(ProxyException) as exc_info: + await validate_password_not_breached(password=password, general_settings={}, client=_client_returning(body)) + assert exc_info.value.code == "400" + assert exc_info.value.type == ProxyErrorTypes.validation_error + assert exc_info.value.param == "password" + assert "data breaches" in exc_info.value.message + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_only_sha1_prefix_leaves_the_proxy(): + password = "a very secret password" + sha1 = _sha1_upper(password) + captured_requests: list[httpx.Request] = [] + + def handler(request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response: + captured_requests.append(request) + return httpx.Response(200, text="0000000000000000000000000000000000A:1") + + result = await validate_password_not_breached( + password=password, general_settings={}, client=_client_with_transport(handler) + ) + assert result is None + + (request,) = captured_requests + assert request.url.path == f"/range/{sha1[:5]}" + assert sha1[5:] not in str(request.url) + assert request.headers["Add-Padding"] == "true" + assert "litellm" in request.headers["User-Agent"] + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_ignores_padding_entries_with_zero_count(): + """HIBP padding entries (requested via Add-Padding) carry count 0 and must + not be treated as breaches when they collide with the password's suffix.""" + password = "a padded-away password" + sha1 = _sha1_upper(password) + + result = await validate_password_not_breached( + password=password, general_settings={}, client=_client_returning(f"{sha1[5:]}:0") + ) + assert result is None + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_accepts_password_absent_from_breach_corpus(): + result = await validate_password_not_breached( + password="a genuinely novel password", + general_settings={}, + client=_client_returning("0018A45C4D1DEF81644B54AB7F969B88D65:1\r\n00D4F6E8FA6EECAD2A3AA415EEC418D38EC:2"), + ) + assert result is None + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_breach_check_fails_open_on_network_error(): + def handler(request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response: + raise httpx.ConnectError("no route to host") + + result = await validate_password_not_breached( + password="password12345", # breached, but HIBP is unreachable + general_settings={}, + client=_client_with_transport(handler), + ) + assert result is None + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_breach_check_fails_open_on_http_error_status(): + result = await validate_password_not_breached( + password="password12345", + general_settings={}, + client=_client_returning("service unavailable", status_code=503), + ) + assert result is None + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_breach_check_fails_open_on_malformed_response_body(): + result = await validate_password_not_breached( + password="password12345", + general_settings={}, + client=_client_returning(f"{_sha1_upper('password12345')[5:]}:not-a-number"), + ) + assert result is None diff --git a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/test_internal_user_endpoints.py b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/test_internal_user_endpoints.py index d1d669cae38..6d7235c587f 100644 --- a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/test_internal_user_endpoints.py +++ b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/test_internal_user_endpoints.py @@ -1,8 +1,11 @@ +import hashlib import json from datetime import datetime, timezone from types import SimpleNamespace +import httpx import pytest +import respx from fastapi.testclient import TestClient @@ -4358,6 +4361,11 @@ async def test_user_update_hashes_and_persists_strong_password(_admin_prisma, mo _update_single_user_helper, ) + mocker.patch( # test-quality-ok: same module-global mocking every test in this file already uses + "litellm.proxy.proxy_server.general_settings", + {"password_policy_check_breached_passwords": False}, + ) + mock_prisma_client = _admin_prisma existing_user = mocker.MagicMock() existing_user.model_dump.return_value = {"user_id": "target-user"} @@ -4375,3 +4383,29 @@ async def test_user_update_hashes_and_persists_strong_password(_admin_prisma, mo written_data = mock_prisma_client.update_data.call_args.kwargs["data"] assert written_data.get("password") is not None assert written_data["password"] != strong_password + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +@respx.mock +async def test_user_update_rejects_breached_password(_admin_prisma): + """A strength-passing password found in the HIBP corpus must be rejected + before it ever reaches the DB write.""" + from litellm.proxy.management_endpoints.internal_user_endpoints import ( + _update_single_user_helper, + ) + + password = "Str0ng!Passw0rd" + sha1 = hashlib.sha1(password.encode("utf-8"), usedforsecurity=False).hexdigest().upper() + respx.get(f"https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/{sha1[:5]}").mock( + return_value=httpx.Response(200, text=f"{sha1[5:]}:1387") + ) + + user_request = UpdateUserRequest(user_id="target-user", password=password) + admin_caller = UserAPIKeyAuth(user_id="admin-1", user_role=LitellmUserRoles.PROXY_ADMIN) + + with pytest.raises(ProxyException) as exc_info: + await _update_single_user_helper(user_request=user_request, user_api_key_dict=admin_caller) + + assert exc_info.value.code == "400" + assert "data breaches" in exc_info.value.message + _admin_prisma.db.litellm_usertable.find_first.assert_not_called() diff --git a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/test__types.py b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/test__types.py index 26bb1533da4..8f9c44d7a38 100644 --- a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/test__types.py +++ b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/test__types.py @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ from litellm.proxy._types import ( LiteLLM_AuditLogs, LiteLLM_TeamMembership, LitellmUserRoles, + NewUserRequest, OrganizationMemberUpdateRequest, ResetSpendRequest, UpdateKeyRequest, @@ -277,3 +278,18 @@ def test_team_membership_budget_table_present_still_works(): } result = LiteLLM_TeamMembership.model_validate(data) assert result.litellm_budget_table is None + + +def test_new_user_request_loudly_rejects_a_password(): + """ + /user/new has never persisted a password (the field used to be silently + dropped). Sending one must now fail visibly so the dead path cannot be + revived without going through the password policy. + """ + with pytest.raises(ValidationError, match="invitation link"): + NewUserRequest(user_email="alice@example.com", password="hunter2hunter2") + + +def test_new_user_request_without_password_still_works(): + request = NewUserRequest(user_email="alice@example.com") + assert request.password is None diff --git a/ui/litellm-dashboard/src/lib/http/schema.d.ts b/ui/litellm-dashboard/src/lib/http/schema.d.ts index 6d62ce2b675..9316ceae518 100644 --- a/ui/litellm-dashboard/src/lib/http/schema.d.ts +++ b/ui/litellm-dashboard/src/lib/http/schema.d.ts @@ -32764,6 +32764,8 @@ export interface components { object_permission?: components["schemas"]["LiteLLM_ObjectPermissionBase"] | null; /** Organizations */ organizations?: string[] | null; + /** Password */ + password?: string | null; /** * Permissions * @default {}