diff --git a/litellm/proxy/agent_session_endpoints/auth.py b/litellm/proxy/agent_session_endpoints/auth.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..433844caa86
--- /dev/null
+++ b/litellm/proxy/agent_session_endpoints/auth.py
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+"""
+JWT minting + validation for the daemon-side internal endpoints.
+
+Daemon tokens are minted at session creation and scoped to a single session.
+The token's SHA-256 hash is stored on the session row so revoking the
+session also revokes the token without rotating signing keys.
+"""
+
+import hashlib
+import os
+import time
+from typing import Any, Dict, Optional
+
+import jwt
+from fastapi import Header, HTTPException
+
+from litellm.proxy.agent_session_endpoints.constants import (
+    AGENT_JWT_ALGORITHM,
+    AGENT_JWT_SECRET_ENV,
+    AGENT_RUNTIME_SCOPE,
+    SESSION_TERMINAL_STATUSES,
+)
+
+
+class AgentDaemonTokenError(Exception):
+    """Raised when a daemon token is invalid (used internally by validators)."""
+
+
+def _get_signing_secret() -> str:
+    """Resolve the JWT signing secret.
+
+    Falls back to ``LITELLM_MASTER_KEY`` for local dev so a fresh proxy
+    boot doesn't blow up; production deploys MUST set
+    ``LITELLM_AGENT_JWT_SECRET``.
+    """
+    secret = os.environ.get(AGENT_JWT_SECRET_ENV)
+    if not secret:
+        secret = os.environ.get("LITELLM_MASTER_KEY")
+    if not secret:
+        raise RuntimeError(
+            f"Neither {AGENT_JWT_SECRET_ENV} nor LITELLM_MASTER_KEY is set; "
+            "cannot mint or validate daemon JWTs."
+        )
+    return secret
+
+
+def hash_daemon_token(token: str) -> str:
+    """Return ``sha256(token)`` as hex — what we store on the session row."""
+    return hashlib.sha256(token.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def mint_daemon_token(
+    session_id: str,
+    agent_id: str,
+    expires_at_epoch: int,
+) -> str:
+    """Mint a session-scoped JWT for the daemon.
+
+    Claims:
+      sub:      session id (the only session this token can act on)
+      agent_id: parent agent id (informational)
+      iat:      issued-at
+      exp:      epoch seconds
+      scope:    "agent_runtime_internal" — gated by a dedicated dependency
+                so this token CANNOT be used as a normal user virtual key.
+    """
+    now = int(time.time())
+    payload: Dict[str, Any] = {
+        "sub": session_id,
+        "agent_id": agent_id,
+        "iat": now,
+        "exp": expires_at_epoch,
+        "scope": AGENT_RUNTIME_SCOPE,
+    }
+    return jwt.encode(payload, _get_signing_secret(), algorithm=AGENT_JWT_ALGORITHM)
+
+
+def decode_daemon_token(token: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+    """Decode + verify signature + verify ``exp`` and ``scope``.
+
+    Raises HTTPException(401) for any failure so callers can re-raise
+    directly.
+    """
+    try:
+        payload = jwt.decode(
+            token,
+            _get_signing_secret(),
+            algorithms=[AGENT_JWT_ALGORITHM],
+        )
+    except jwt.ExpiredSignatureError as exc:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Daemon token expired") from exc
+    except jwt.InvalidTokenError as exc:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid daemon token") from exc
+
+    if payload.get("scope") != AGENT_RUNTIME_SCOPE:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=401,
+            detail="Daemon token has wrong scope",
+        )
+    return payload
+
+
+def _extract_bearer(authorization: Optional[str]) -> str:
+    if not authorization:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Missing Authorization header")
+    parts = authorization.split(" ", 1)
+    if len(parts) != 2 or parts[0].lower() != "bearer":
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=401, detail="Authorization header must be 'Bearer <token>'"
+        )
+    return parts[1].strip()
+
+
+async def daemon_token_auth(
+    session_id: str,
+    authorization: Optional[str] = Header(default=None),
+) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+    """FastAPI dependency: validate the daemon JWT for a path-scoped session.
+
+    Validation steps (in order):
+      1. Decode + verify signature, ``exp``, ``scope``.
+      2. Confirm ``sub == session_id`` (cross-session abuse).
+      3. Look up session, confirm it's not terminated.
+      4. Confirm ``sha256(token) == session.daemon_token_hash`` (revoked tokens).
+
+    Returns the validated payload dict (with ``_session_row`` injected) so
+    downstream code can avoid re-fetching the session.
+    """
+    token = _extract_bearer(authorization)
+    payload = decode_daemon_token(token)
+
+    if payload.get("sub") != session_id:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Token not valid for this session")
+
+    from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import prisma_client
+
+    if prisma_client is None:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=503, detail="Database unavailable for daemon token check"
+        )
+
+    session = await prisma_client.db.litellm_agentsession.find_unique(
+        where={"id": session_id}
+    )
+    if session is None:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Session not found")
+
+    if session.status in SESSION_TERMINAL_STATUSES:
+        # Stored hash check would also fail after termination, but we want
+        # a 410 Gone so the daemon's systemd unit knows to shutdown.
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=410, detail="Session terminated")
+
+    expected_hash = session.daemon_token_hash
+    if not expected_hash or hash_daemon_token(token) != expected_hash:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Daemon token revoked")
+
+    return {**payload, "_session_row": session}