diff --git a/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/discoverable_endpoints.py b/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/discoverable_endpoints.py
index e56210ca393..47959380c0f 100644
--- a/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/discoverable_endpoints.py
+++ b/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/discoverable_endpoints.py
@@ -1160,7 +1160,7 @@ def _refresh_key_failure_to_mint_error(failure: _KeyResolutionFailure) -> _Bridg
 
 
 async def _prepare_bridge_refresh(
-    request: Request, mcp_server: MCPServer, refresh_value: Optional[str]
+    request: Request, mcp_server: MCPServer, refresh_value: str | None
 ) -> "_BridgeRefreshReady | _BridgeMintError":
     """Phase 1 for the refresh_token grant, BEFORE the upstream exchange: open the client's refresh
     envelope, re-validate the sealed litellm identity so a revoked key cannot keep refreshing, and
diff --git a/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/outbound_credentials/bridge_credentials.py b/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/outbound_credentials/bridge_credentials.py
index e6506ce27b8..c352f3a683e 100644
--- a/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/outbound_credentials/bridge_credentials.py
+++ b/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/outbound_credentials/bridge_credentials.py
@@ -194,10 +194,12 @@ def _strip_bearer(value: str) -> str:
 
 
 def is_bridge_envelope_shaped(authorization_value: str) -> bool:
-    """Cheap, keyless test that an ``Authorization`` value carries an envelope (optional
-    ``Bearer`` scheme stripped). The admission edge engages the bridge arm only for an
-    envelope, so a plain upstream bearer falls through to normal oauth2 admission."""
-    return is_envelope(_strip_bearer(authorization_value))
+    """Cheap, keyless test that an ``Authorization`` value carries an envelope of either kind (optional
+    ``Bearer`` scheme stripped). The admission edge engages the bridge arm for an access envelope (to
+    admit) and for a refresh envelope (to reject it explicitly, since a refresh credential is never
+    usable at the tool-call edge); a plain upstream bearer falls through to normal oauth2 admission."""
+    candidate = _strip_bearer(authorization_value)
+    return is_envelope(candidate) or is_refresh_envelope(candidate)
 
 
 def resolve_bridge_envelope(
@@ -214,6 +216,10 @@ def resolve_bridge_envelope(
     envelope, and ``BridgeEnvelopeInvalid`` for an envelope-shaped bearer that will not
     open. Never raises: it is total over hostile input via :func:`open_envelope`.
 
+    A refresh envelope is ``BridgeEnvelopeInvalid`` here: it is a valid gateway credential but only ever
+    presented back to the token endpoint, never usable to authenticate a tool call, so admission must
+    fail it closed rather than let it fall through to another arm.
+
     ``expected_server_id`` is the ``server_id`` of the MCP server the request targets; an
     opened envelope whose sealed ``server_id`` does not match is rejected as
     ``BridgeEnvelopeInvalid``. Binding here (rather than leaving it to the caller) prevents
@@ -223,6 +229,8 @@ def resolve_bridge_envelope(
     unlike ``hmac.compare_digest`` on ``str``, does not raise on a non-ASCII server_id.
     """
     candidate = _strip_bearer(authorization_value)
+    if is_refresh_envelope(candidate):
+        return BridgeEnvelopeInvalid()
     if not is_envelope(candidate):
         return NotBridgeEnvelope()
     opened = open_envelope(candidate, keys, now)
diff --git a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/outbound_credentials/test_bridge_credentials.py b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/outbound_credentials/test_bridge_credentials.py
index 37fe5704db5..753a3d6a942 100644
--- a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/outbound_credentials/test_bridge_credentials.py
+++ b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/outbound_credentials/test_bridge_credentials.py
@@ -100,12 +100,16 @@ def test_open_bridge_refresh_envelope_rejects_under_wrong_master_key():
 
 
 def test_refresh_envelope_is_never_admitted_at_the_tool_call_edge():
-    """A refresh envelope must never authenticate a tool call. It is not an access envelope, so the
-    admission consumer returns NotBridgeEnvelope, which admission fails closed (401): a refresh
-    credential can only ever be presented back to the token endpoint."""
+    """A refresh envelope must never authenticate a tool call. The admission edge engages the bridge arm
+    for it (is_bridge_envelope_shaped is true for either envelope kind), and the consumer rejects it as
+    BridgeEnvelopeInvalid, which admission fails closed (401): a refresh credential is only ever
+    presented back to the token endpoint."""
     keys = envelope_keys_from_master_key(_MASTER_KEY)
-    result = resolve_bridge_envelope(_sealed_refresh(keys), keys, _NOW, _SERVER_ID)
-    assert isinstance(result, NotBridgeEnvelope)
+    refresh = _sealed_refresh(keys)
+    assert is_bridge_envelope_shaped(refresh) is True
+    assert is_bridge_envelope_shaped(f"Bearer {refresh}") is True
+    result = resolve_bridge_envelope(refresh, keys, _NOW, _SERVER_ID)
+    assert isinstance(result, BridgeEnvelopeInvalid)
 
 
 def test_refresh_jwt_wearing_the_access_prefix_is_rejected_at_the_edge():