diff --git a/litellm/litellm_core_utils/secret_redaction.py b/litellm/litellm_core_utils/secret_redaction.py
index b62226a6a19..390abf41955 100644
--- a/litellm/litellm_core_utils/secret_redaction.py
+++ b/litellm/litellm_core_utils/secret_redaction.py
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ from typing import Final
 
 from litellm.constants import MINIMUM_CUSTOM_KEY_LENGTH
 
-_REDACTED: Final = "REDACTED"
+REDACTED: Final = "REDACTED"
 
 
 def _build_secret_patterns() -> "re.Pattern[str]":
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ _SECRET_RE: Final = _build_secret_patterns()
 
 def redact_string(value: str) -> str:
     """Scrub known secret/credential patterns from *value* and return the result."""
-    return _SECRET_RE.sub(_REDACTED, value)
+    return _SECRET_RE.sub(REDACTED, value)
 
 
 _UNIX_SYSTEM_PATH: Final = r"/(?:etc|var|opt|usr|home|root|private|Users|tmp|mnt|srv)/[^\s'\"\)\]}>,]+"
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ def redact_internal_details(value: str) -> str:
     on top of redact_string(). For client-facing messages only: server logs keep this detail."""
     marker_index: Final = value.find(_TRACEBACK_MARKER)
     without_traceback: Final = value[:marker_index].rstrip() if marker_index != -1 else value
-    return _INTERNAL_DETAIL_RE.sub(_REDACTED, redact_string(without_traceback))
+    return _INTERNAL_DETAIL_RE.sub(REDACTED, redact_string(without_traceback))
 
 
 def redact_structured_value(key: str | None, value: str) -> str:
@@ -126,4 +126,4 @@ def redact_structured_value(key: str | None, value: str) -> str:
     if scrubbed != value or key is None:
         return scrubbed
     rendered: Final = f"'{key}': '{value}'"
-    return _REDACTED if redact_string(rendered) != rendered else value
+    return REDACTED if redact_string(rendered) != rendered else value
diff --git a/litellm/litellm_core_utils/sensitive_data_masker.py b/litellm/litellm_core_utils/sensitive_data_masker.py
index 3d60c1bda12..149ec4d5365 100644
--- a/litellm/litellm_core_utils/sensitive_data_masker.py
+++ b/litellm/litellm_core_utils/sensitive_data_masker.py
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ from typing import Any, Final
 from pydantic import BaseModel
 
 from litellm.constants import DEFAULT_MAX_RECURSE_DEPTH_SENSITIVE_DATA_MASKER
+from litellm.litellm_core_utils.secret_redaction import REDACTED
 
 
 class SensitiveDataMasker:
@@ -214,6 +215,36 @@ def mask_sensitive_keys(data: dict[str, Any], sensitive_fields: set[str]) -> dic
     return masked
 
 
+def redact_credentials_in_payload(data: Mapping[str, object]) -> Mapping[str, object]:
+    """Return a copy of ``data`` where every value under a credential-named key is
+    replaced by the shared ``REDACTED`` marker, nested mappings are recursed into,
+    and every other value is preserved by identity.
+
+    Sensitive-key detection is delegated to the shared :class:`SensitiveDataMasker`,
+    so the credential names stay in one place. Unlike
+    :func:`mask_credentials_in_payload`, no prefix or suffix of the secret survives
+    and non-string secrets are covered too, which is what a payload rendered
+    straight to stdout needs. ``None`` is preserved so an unset credential still
+    reads as unset, and non-mapping containers are left alone so the caller's
+    ``repr`` is unchanged.
+    """
+    return _redact_mapping(data, 0)
+
+
+def _redact_mapping(data: Mapping[str, object], depth: int) -> Mapping[str, object]:
+    if depth >= DEFAULT_MAX_RECURSE_DEPTH_SENSITIVE_DATA_MASKER:
+        return data
+    return {key: _redact_entry(key, value, depth) for key, value in data.items()}
+
+
+def _redact_entry(key: str, value: object, depth: int) -> object:
+    if value is not None and _default_masker.is_sensitive_key(key):
+        return REDACTED
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        return _redact_mapping(value, depth + 1)
+    return value
+
+
 # Usage example:
 """
 masker = SensitiveDataMasker()
diff --git a/litellm/utils.py b/litellm/utils.py
index ba456fc353b..f5a4f8a38f8 100644
--- a/litellm/utils.py
+++ b/litellm/utils.py
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ from litellm.constants import (
 from litellm.litellm_core_utils.fallback_generalizations import (
     match_capability_generalizations,
 )
+from litellm.litellm_core_utils.sensitive_data_masker import redact_credentials_in_payload
 
 _CachingHandlerResponse = None
 _LLMCachingHandler = None
@@ -7459,7 +7460,8 @@ def print_args_passed_to_litellm(original_function, args, kwargs):
             return
 
         args_str: Final = ", ".join(map(repr, args))
-        kwargs_str: Final = ", ".join(f"{key}={value!r}" for key, value in kwargs.items())
+        redacted_kwargs: Final = redact_credentials_in_payload(kwargs)
+        kwargs_str: Final = ", ".join(f"{key}={value!r}" for key, value in redacted_kwargs.items())
         print_verbose(
             "\n",
         )  # new line before
diff --git a/tests/test_litellm/litellm_core_utils/test_sensitive_data_masker.py b/tests/test_litellm/litellm_core_utils/test_sensitive_data_masker.py
index f6b8a93c472..690a5fa79d9 100644
--- a/tests/test_litellm/litellm_core_utils/test_sensitive_data_masker.py
+++ b/tests/test_litellm/litellm_core_utils/test_sensitive_data_masker.py
@@ -312,3 +312,39 @@ def test_mask_credentials_in_payload_masks_only_sensitive_string_leaves():
     assert masked != plaintext
     assert masked.startswith(plaintext[:4])
     assert masked.endswith(plaintext[-4:])
+
+
+def test_redact_credentials_in_payload_leaves_no_fragment_of_the_secret():
+    """A payload rendered straight to stdout cannot afford the partial reveal
+    mask_credentials_in_payload leaves, so every credential-named value is replaced
+    whole, nested header dicts included, while ordinary params survive verbatim."""
+    from litellm.litellm_core_utils.sensitive_data_masker import redact_credentials_in_payload
+
+    fake_key = "sk-fake-lit6823-0000000000000000"
+    fake_token = "fake-azure-ad-token-0000"
+    result = redact_credentials_in_payload(
+        {
+            "api_key": fake_key,
+            "azure_ad_token": fake_token,
+            "aws_secret_access_key": "fake-aws-secret-0000",
+            "vertex_credentials": {"private_key": "fake-pem"},
+            "extra_headers": {"Authorization": "Bearer fake-bearer-0000", "x-request-id": "abc123"},
+            "model": "gpt-4o-mini",
+            "max_tokens": 17,
+            "temperature": 0.25,
+            "api_base": None,
+        }
+    )
+
+    assert fake_key not in str(result)
+    assert fake_token not in str(result)
+    assert "fake-aws-secret-0000" not in str(result)
+    assert "fake-pem" not in str(result)
+    assert "fake-bearer-0000" not in str(result)
+    assert result["api_key"] == "REDACTED"
+    assert result["extra_headers"]["Authorization"] == "REDACTED"
+    assert result["extra_headers"]["x-request-id"] == "abc123"
+    assert result["model"] == "gpt-4o-mini"
+    assert result["max_tokens"] == 17
+    assert result["temperature"] == 0.25
+    assert result["api_base"] is None
diff --git a/tests/test_litellm/test_utils.py b/tests/test_litellm/test_utils.py
index 200cfd02197..142511b161c 100644
--- a/tests/test_litellm/test_utils.py
+++ b/tests/test_litellm/test_utils.py
@@ -5805,3 +5805,53 @@ class TestIsVisionExplicitlyDisabled:
             is_vision_explicitly_disabled("fireworks_ai/accounts/fireworks/models/deepseek-v4-flash-0731") is True
         )
         assert is_vision_explicitly_disabled("anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-5") is False
+
+
+class TestVerboseRequestLineRedaction:
+    """`litellm.set_verbose = True` echoes the caller's kwargs to stdout, so a credential
+    kwarg lands in whatever collects stdout: a terminal, a container log drain, a CI job
+    log. Credential-named kwargs must not survive that echo, while ordinary params still
+    must, or the line stops telling the developer what they called."""
+
+    FAKE_API_KEY: Final = "sk-fake-lit6823-0000000000000000"
+
+    def _verbose_stdout(self, capsys, monkeypatch, **kwargs) -> str:
+        monkeypatch.setattr(litellm, "set_verbose", True)
+        monkeypatch.setattr("litellm._logging.set_verbose", True)
+        capsys.readouterr()
+        litellm.completion(
+            model="gpt-3.5-turbo",
+            messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "hello"}],
+            mock_response="hi",
+            **kwargs,
+        )
+        captured: Final = capsys.readouterr()
+        return captured.out + captured.err
+
+    def test_api_key_never_reaches_stdout(self, capsys, monkeypatch):
+        printed: Final = self._verbose_stdout(capsys, monkeypatch, api_key=self.FAKE_API_KEY)
+
+        assert "Request to litellm:" in printed
+        assert self.FAKE_API_KEY not in printed
+        assert "api_key='REDACTED'" in printed
+
+    def test_credential_headers_never_reach_stdout(self, capsys, monkeypatch):
+        printed: Final = self._verbose_stdout(
+            capsys,
+            monkeypatch,
+            api_key=self.FAKE_API_KEY,
+            extra_headers={"Authorization": "Bearer fake-lit6823-header", "x-request-id": "abc123"},
+        )
+
+        assert "fake-lit6823-header" not in printed
+        assert "'Authorization': 'REDACTED'" in printed
+        assert "'x-request-id': 'abc123'" in printed
+
+    def test_ordinary_params_still_printed(self, capsys, monkeypatch):
+        printed: Final = self._verbose_stdout(
+            capsys, monkeypatch, api_key=self.FAKE_API_KEY, max_tokens=17, temperature=0.25
+        )
+
+        assert "model='gpt-3.5-turbo'" in printed
+        assert "max_tokens=17" in printed
+        assert "temperature=0.25" in printed