diff --git a/litellm/proxy/vector_store_endpoints/litellm_params_encryption.py b/litellm/proxy/vector_store_endpoints/litellm_params_encryption.py
index 64a35b1995e..4f54ca291b9 100644
--- a/litellm/proxy/vector_store_endpoints/litellm_params_encryption.py
+++ b/litellm/proxy/vector_store_endpoints/litellm_params_encryption.py
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
 """Encryption at rest for the secret values in a managed vector store's ``litellm_params``."""
 
 import os
-from collections.abc import Callable, Mapping
+from collections.abc import Callable, Iterator, Mapping
 from datetime import timedelta
+from itertools import chain
+from types import MappingProxyType
 from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Final
 
 from typing_extensions import TypeIs
@@ -41,20 +43,54 @@ def _map_litellm_param_strings(
     ``is_secret`` is true for a secret-named key and for every string nested under one. A list item is passed
     with the key of the list that holds it.
     """
-    mapped: Final[dict[str, object]] = {}
-    for key, value in litellm_params.items():
-        is_secret = parent_is_secret or VECTOR_STORE_SECRET_PARAM_MASKER.is_sensitive_key(key)
-        if isinstance(value, str):
-            mapped[key] = transform(key, value, is_secret)
-        elif _is_json_object(value) and depth < DEFAULT_MAX_RECURSE_DEPTH:
-            mapped[key] = _map_litellm_param_strings(value, transform, is_secret, depth + 1)
-        elif _is_json_array(value) and depth < DEFAULT_MAX_RECURSE_DEPTH:
-            mapped[key] = [
-                _map_litellm_param_strings({key: item}, transform, parent_is_secret, depth + 1)[key] for item in value
-            ]
-        else:
-            mapped[key] = value
-    return mapped
+    return {
+        key: _map_param_value(
+            key,
+            value,
+            transform,
+            parent_is_secret or VECTOR_STORE_SECRET_PARAM_MASKER.is_sensitive_key(key),
+            depth,
+        )
+        for key, value in litellm_params.items()
+    }
+
+
+def _map_param_value(
+    key: str, value: object, transform: Callable[[str, str, bool], str], is_secret: bool, depth: int
+) -> object:
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        return transform(key, value, is_secret)
+    if depth >= DEFAULT_MAX_RECURSE_DEPTH:
+        return value
+    if _is_json_object(value):
+        return _map_litellm_param_strings(value, transform, is_secret, depth + 1)
+    if _is_json_array(value):
+        return [_map_param_value(key, item, transform, is_secret, depth + 1) for item in value]
+    return value
+
+
+def _secret_strings(
+    litellm_params: Mapping[str, object], parent_is_secret: bool = False, depth: int = 0
+) -> Iterator[tuple[str, str]]:
+    """Every ``(key, value)`` string that ``_map_litellm_param_strings`` would pass with ``is_secret`` true."""
+    return chain.from_iterable(
+        _secret_strings_in(
+            key, value, parent_is_secret or VECTOR_STORE_SECRET_PARAM_MASKER.is_sensitive_key(key), depth
+        )
+        for key, value in litellm_params.items()
+    )
+
+
+def _secret_strings_in(key: str, value: object, is_secret: bool, depth: int) -> Iterator[tuple[str, str]]:
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        return iter(((key, value),) if is_secret else ())
+    if depth >= DEFAULT_MAX_RECURSE_DEPTH:
+        return iter(())
+    if _is_json_object(value):
+        return _secret_strings(value, is_secret, depth + 1)
+    if _is_json_array(value):
+        return chain.from_iterable(_secret_strings_in(key, item, is_secret, depth + 1) for item in value)
+    return iter(())
 
 
 def encrypt_vector_store_litellm_params(litellm_params: Mapping[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
@@ -89,17 +125,10 @@ def decrypt_vector_store_litellm_params(vector_store: LiteLLM_ManagedVectorStore
 
 def holds_undecrypted_secret(vector_store: LiteLLM_ManagedVectorStore) -> bool:
     """Whether a decrypted ``vector_store`` still has an encrypted secret value, one this proxy's key cannot read."""
-    undecrypted: Final[list[str]] = []
-
-    def find(key: str, value: str, is_secret: bool) -> str:
-        if is_secret and value.startswith(CALLBACK_VAR_ENCRYPTED_PREFIX):
-            undecrypted.append(key)
-        return value
-
     litellm_params: Final = vector_store.get("litellm_params")
-    if isinstance(litellm_params, dict):
-        _map_litellm_param_strings(litellm_params, find)
-    return bool(undecrypted)
+    return isinstance(litellm_params, dict) and any(
+        value.startswith(CALLBACK_VAR_ENCRYPTED_PREFIX) for _, value in _secret_strings(litellm_params)
+    )
 
 
 def _decrypt_secret_value(key: str, value: str) -> str | None:
@@ -123,35 +152,28 @@ async def reencrypt_vector_store_litellm_params(prisma_client: "PrismaClient", n
     """
     salt_key: Final = os.getenv("LITELLM_SALT_KEY")
     new_encryption_key: Final = new_master_key if salt_key is None else salt_key
-    undecryptable_keys: Final[list[str]] = []
 
     def reencrypt(key: str, value: str, is_secret: bool) -> str:
         plaintext: Final = _decrypt_secret_value(key, value) if is_secret else None
         if plaintext is None:
-            if is_secret and value.startswith(CALLBACK_VAR_ENCRYPTED_PREFIX):
-                undecryptable_keys.append(key)
             return value
         return CALLBACK_VAR_ENCRYPTED_PREFIX + encrypt_value_helper(plaintext, new_encryption_key=new_encryption_key)
 
-    table: Final = ManagedVectorStoresRepository(prisma_client).table
-    rewrites: Final[dict[str, dict[str, object]]] = {}
-    for row in await table.find_many():
-        stored = LiteLLM_ManagedVectorStore(**dict(row))
-        litellm_params = stored.get("litellm_params")
-        if not isinstance(litellm_params, dict):
-            continue
-        undecryptable_keys.clear()
-        reencrypted = _map_litellm_param_strings(litellm_params, reencrypt)
-        if undecryptable_keys:
-            verbose_proxy_logger.warning(
-                "Vector store %s: litellm_params %s do not decrypt with the current key and were not re-encrypted",
-                stored.get("vector_store_id"),
-                sorted(undecryptable_keys),
-            )
-        vector_store_id = stored.get("vector_store_id")
-        if reencrypted == litellm_params or vector_store_id is None:
-            continue
-        rewrites[vector_store_id] = reencrypted
+    stored_rows: Final = tuple(
+        LiteLLM_ManagedVectorStore(**dict(row))
+        for row in await ManagedVectorStoresRepository(prisma_client).table.find_many()
+    )
+    for stored in stored_rows:
+        _warn_about_undecryptable_values(stored)
+    rewrites: Final = MappingProxyType(
+        {
+            vector_store_id: reencrypted
+            for stored in stored_rows
+            if isinstance(litellm_params := stored.get("litellm_params"), dict)
+            and (vector_store_id := stored.get("vector_store_id")) is not None
+            and (reencrypted := _map_litellm_param_strings(litellm_params, reencrypt)) != litellm_params
+        }
+    )
     if rewrites:
         async with prisma_client.tx(timeout=timedelta(minutes=2)) as tx:
             for vector_store_id, reencrypted in rewrites.items():
@@ -160,3 +182,22 @@ async def reencrypt_vector_store_litellm_params(prisma_client: "PrismaClient", n
                     data={"litellm_params": safe_dumps(reencrypted)},
                 )
     return len(rewrites)
+
+
+def _warn_about_undecryptable_values(vector_store: LiteLLM_ManagedVectorStore) -> None:
+    litellm_params: Final = vector_store.get("litellm_params")
+    undecryptable_keys: Final = (
+        sorted(
+            key
+            for key, value in _secret_strings(litellm_params)
+            if value.startswith(CALLBACK_VAR_ENCRYPTED_PREFIX) and _decrypt_secret_value(key, value) is None
+        )
+        if isinstance(litellm_params, dict)
+        else []
+    )
+    if undecryptable_keys:
+        verbose_proxy_logger.warning(
+            "Vector store %s: litellm_params %s do not decrypt with the current key and were not re-encrypted",
+            vector_store.get("vector_store_id"),
+            undecryptable_keys,
+        )
diff --git a/tests/code_coverage_tests/recursive_detector.py b/tests/code_coverage_tests/recursive_detector.py
index 585ac836c95..f8ec07690b3 100644
--- a/tests/code_coverage_tests/recursive_detector.py
+++ b/tests/code_coverage_tests/recursive_detector.py
@@ -57,6 +57,8 @@ IGNORE_FUNCTIONS = [
     "_redact_scanned_content",  # max depth set (DEFAULT_MAX_RECURSE_DEPTH); fails closed by returning "[REDACTED]" at the cap.
     "replace_ciphertexts",  # max depth set (DEFAULT_MAX_RECURSE_DEPTH); walks stored JSON, which has no cycles, and leaves values below the cap untouched.
     "_map_litellm_param_strings",  # max depth set (DEFAULT_MAX_RECURSE_DEPTH); walks vector store litellm_params JSON, which has no cycles, and leaves values below the cap untouched.
+    "_map_param_value",  # max depth set (DEFAULT_MAX_RECURSE_DEPTH); list items of vector store litellm_params, same walk as _map_litellm_param_strings.
+    "_secret_strings_in",  # max depth set (DEFAULT_MAX_RECURSE_DEPTH); read-only twin of _map_param_value over vector store litellm_params.
     "_iter_fallback_targets",  # max depth set (2 * ROUTER_MAX_FALLBACKS); fails closed by raising ValueError at the cap.
     "_mergeable_branch",  # max depth set (_MAX_SCHEMA_FLATTEN_DEPTH=32) plus a seen_refs cycle guard; passes the schema through untouched at the cap.
     "json_string_leaves",  # max depth set (MAX_STRUCTURED_CONTENT_SCAN_DEPTH); fails closed by raising at the cap so nothing goes unscanned.