diff --git a/litellm/litellm_core_utils/sensitive_data_masker.py b/litellm/litellm_core_utils/sensitive_data_masker.py
index f82d0acb581..08432ba20c6 100644
--- a/litellm/litellm_core_utils/sensitive_data_masker.py
+++ b/litellm/litellm_core_utils/sensitive_data_masker.py
@@ -226,30 +226,30 @@ def redact_credentials_in_payload(data: Mapping[str, object]) -> Mapping[str, ob
     and non-string secrets are covered too, which is what a payload rendered
     straight to stdout needs. ``None`` is preserved so an unset credential still
     reads as unset, and lists and tuples are rebuilt element by element so a
-    credential nested inside one is caught as well.
+    credential nested inside one is caught as well. A container sitting at the
+    recursion limit is replaced wholesale rather than passed through, so nesting a
+    payload deeper than the limit hides it instead of exposing it.
     """
     return _redact_mapping(data, 0)
 
 
 def _redact_mapping(data: Mapping[str, object], depth: int) -> Mapping[str, object]:
-    if depth >= DEFAULT_MAX_RECURSE_DEPTH_SENSITIVE_DATA_MASKER:
-        return data
     return {key: _redact_entry(key, value, depth) for key, value in data.items()}
 
 
 def _redact_entry(key: str, value: object, depth: int) -> object:
     if value is not None and _default_masker.is_sensitive_key(key):
         return REDACTED
+    if not isinstance(value, (Mapping, list, tuple)):
+        return value
+    if depth >= DEFAULT_MAX_RECURSE_DEPTH_SENSITIVE_DATA_MASKER:
+        return REDACTED
     if isinstance(value, Mapping):
         return _redact_mapping(value, depth + 1)
-    if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
-        return _redact_sequence(value, depth + 1)
-    return value
+    return _redact_sequence(value, depth + 1)
 
 
 def _redact_sequence(values: Sequence[object], depth: int) -> Sequence[object]:
-    if depth >= DEFAULT_MAX_RECURSE_DEPTH_SENSITIVE_DATA_MASKER:
-        return values
     redacted: Final = tuple(_redact_entry("", item, depth) for item in values)
     return redacted if isinstance(values, tuple) else list(redacted)
 
diff --git a/tests/test_litellm/litellm_core_utils/test_sensitive_data_masker.py b/tests/test_litellm/litellm_core_utils/test_sensitive_data_masker.py
index 26fb7674cb6..917ec1fced8 100644
--- a/tests/test_litellm/litellm_core_utils/test_sensitive_data_masker.py
+++ b/tests/test_litellm/litellm_core_utils/test_sensitive_data_masker.py
@@ -372,3 +372,24 @@ def test_redact_credentials_in_payload_reaches_credentials_nested_in_sequences()
     assert result["metadata"]["upstreams"][0]["aws_secret_access_key"] == "REDACTED"
     assert isinstance(result["metadata"]["upstreams"], tuple)
     assert result["messages"] == [{"role": "user", "content": "hello"}]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("wrap", ["mapping", "sequence"])
+def test_redact_credentials_in_payload_hides_containers_at_the_recursion_limit(wrap):
+    """The recursion limit exists to bound the walk, not to grant an exemption, so a caller who
+    buries a credential deeper than the limit must get the container hidden rather than handed
+    back verbatim. Nesting through lists costs depth twice as fast as nesting through mappings,
+    so both shapes are pushed well past the limit here."""
+    from litellm.constants import DEFAULT_MAX_RECURSE_DEPTH_SENSITIVE_DATA_MASKER
+    from litellm.litellm_core_utils.sensitive_data_masker import redact_credentials_in_payload
+
+    fake_key = "sk-fake-lit6835-past-the-limit"
+    node = {"api_key": fake_key}
+    for _ in range(2 * DEFAULT_MAX_RECURSE_DEPTH_SENSITIVE_DATA_MASKER + 1):
+        node = {"extra_body": node} if wrap == "mapping" else {"providers": [node]}
+
+    result = redact_credentials_in_payload({**node, "max_tokens": 17})
+
+    assert fake_key not in str(result)
+    assert "REDACTED" in str(result)
+    assert result["max_tokens"] == 17