diff --git a/litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/headroom/headroom.py b/litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/headroom/headroom.py
index 18797b0a880..9740b5801bf 100644
--- a/litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/headroom/headroom.py
+++ b/litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/headroom/headroom.py
@@ -50,7 +50,8 @@ HEADROOM_RETRIEVE_TOOL_NAME: Final = "headroom_retrieve"
 # Headroom writes a retrieval hash as either `<<ccr:HASH,type,size>>` or
 # `Retrieve more: hash=HASH`, and its own reader accepts 12 to 24 hex chars
 # (the row-drop path emits SHA-256[:12]).
-_HASH_PATTERN: Final = re.compile(r"(?:<<ccr:|hash=)([a-f0-9]{12,24})(?![a-f0-9])")
+_HASH_VALUE_PATTERN: Final = re.compile(r"[a-f0-9]{12,24}")
+_HASH_PATTERN: Final = re.compile(rf"(?:<<ccr:|hash=)({_HASH_VALUE_PATTERN.pattern})(?![a-f0-9])")
 _HASH_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS: Final = 15 * 60
 
 
@@ -189,7 +190,7 @@ def _read_ccr_hashes(body: Mapping[str, object]) -> tuple[str, ...]:
     raw: Final = body.get("ccr_hashes")
     if not _is_object_list(raw):
         return ()
-    return tuple(item for item in raw if isinstance(item, str) and item)
+    return tuple(item for item in raw if isinstance(item, str) and _HASH_VALUE_PATTERN.fullmatch(item))
 
 
 def extract_hashes_from_messages(messages: list[dict[str, object]]) -> list[str]:
diff --git a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/test_headroom.py b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/test_headroom.py
index 3f2df420540..f5638f2cbe8 100644
--- a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/test_headroom.py
+++ b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/test_headroom.py
@@ -419,6 +419,38 @@ async def test_apply_guardrail_trusts_ccr_hashes_from_compress_response(
     assert tool_result["content"] == original_content
 
 
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_apply_guardrail_ignores_malformed_ccr_hashes(
+    guardrail: HeadroomGuardrail,
+):
+    """A hash goes straight into the retrieval URL, so anything that is not a
+    Headroom hash must not reach the authorized set."""
+    inputs = GenericGuardrailAPIInputs(
+        texts=["A" * 5000],
+        structured_messages=ORIGINAL_MESSAGES,
+    )
+    mock_response = _make_compress_response(
+        COMPRESSED_MESSAGES,
+        ccr_hashes=["../../etc/passwd", "", "NOTAHASH", "f3b3d2ef"],
+    )
+    request_data = {"model": "gpt-4o", "litellm_call_id": "call-bad"}
+
+    with patch.object(
+        guardrail.async_handler,
+        "post",
+        new_callable=AsyncMock,
+        return_value=mock_response,
+    ):
+        result = await guardrail.apply_guardrail(
+            inputs=inputs,
+            request_data=request_data,
+            input_type="request",
+        )
+
+    assert not has_headroom_retrieve_tool(result.get("tools") or [])
+    assert "call-bad" not in guardrail._issued_hashes_by_call_id
+
+
 @pytest.mark.asyncio
 async def test_apply_guardrail_no_tool_injected_when_no_hashes(
     guardrail: HeadroomGuardrail,