From 4f1168068dd17e2ecefb06db5f148b770cbc3da3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yassin Kortam Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 14:01:31 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1/7] fix(datadog): split oversized batches on 413 instead of re-queueing forever (#29444) (cherry picked from commit fe108580d7c2e6703f9c6c47bcf64a6a5abe6eef) --- litellm/integrations/datadog/datadog.py | 97 ++++++++-- .../datadog/test_datadog_logger_batching.py | 183 ++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 246 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) diff --git a/litellm/integrations/datadog/datadog.py b/litellm/integrations/datadog/datadog.py index c3e555f6e89..79a9219a39c 100644 --- a/litellm/integrations/datadog/datadog.py +++ b/litellm/integrations/datadog/datadog.py @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ from litellm.integrations.datadog.datadog_handler import ( ) from litellm.litellm_core_utils.dd_tracing import tracer from litellm.llms.custom_httpx.http_handler import ( + MaskedHTTPStatusError, _get_httpx_client, get_async_httpx_client, httpxSpecialProvider, @@ -68,6 +69,22 @@ DD_LOGGED_SUCCESS_SERVICE_TYPES = [ ] +def _resolve_dd_batch_size() -> int: + raw = os.getenv("DD_BATCH_SIZE") + if raw is None: + return DD_MAX_BATCH_SIZE + try: + value = int(raw) + except ValueError: + verbose_logger.warning( + "Datadog: ignoring invalid DD_BATCH_SIZE=%r, using %s", + raw, + DD_MAX_BATCH_SIZE, + ) + return DD_MAX_BATCH_SIZE + return max(1, min(value, DD_MAX_BATCH_SIZE)) + + class DataDogLogger( CustomBatchLogger, AdditionalLoggingUtils, @@ -128,7 +145,9 @@ class DataDogLogger( asyncio.create_task(self.periodic_flush()) self.flush_lock = asyncio.Lock() super().__init__( - **kwargs, flush_lock=self.flush_lock, batch_size=DD_MAX_BATCH_SIZE + **kwargs, + flush_lock=self.flush_lock, + batch_size=_resolve_dd_batch_size(), ) except Exception as e: verbose_logger.exception( @@ -339,28 +358,14 @@ class DataDogLogger( "[DATADOG MOCK] Mock mode enabled - API calls will be intercepted" ) - response = await self.async_send_compressed_data(batch_to_send) - if response.status_code == 413: - verbose_logger.exception(DD_ERRORS.DATADOG_413_ERROR.value) - self.log_queue = batch_to_send + self.log_queue - return - - response.raise_for_status() - if response.status_code != 202: - raise Exception( - f"Response from datadog API status_code: {response.status_code}, text: {response.text}" - ) + undelivered = await self._send_with_413_split(batch_to_send) + if undelivered: + self.log_queue = undelivered + self.log_queue if self.is_mock_mode: verbose_logger.debug( f"[DATADOG MOCK] Batch of {len(batch_to_send)} events successfully mocked" ) - else: - verbose_logger.debug( - "Datadog: Response from datadog API status_code: %s, text: %s", - response.status_code, - response.text, - ) except Exception as e: self.log_queue = batch_to_send + self.log_queue @@ -368,6 +373,62 @@ class DataDogLogger( f"Datadog Error sending batch API - {str(e)}\n{traceback.format_exc()}" ) + async def _send_with_413_split(self, batch: List) -> List: + """ + Send a batch, halving any sub-batch that 413s (payload too large) and retrying the + halves, since Datadog enforces a 5MB uncompressed limit per request. + + A 413 surfaces as a raised MaskedHTTPStatusError (httpx raise_for_status), not a + returned response, so both paths are handled. A lone event that still 413s is + dropped to avoid wedging the queue on an undeliverable payload. Returns the events + that could not be delivered because of a non-413 (transient) error, so the caller + re-queues only those and never the events already accepted by Datadog. + """ + pending: List[List] = [batch] + while pending: + chunk = pending.pop() + if not chunk: + continue + try: + response = await self.async_send_compressed_data(chunk) + except Exception as e: + if isinstance(e, MaskedHTTPStatusError) and e.status_code == 413: + response = e.response + else: + verbose_logger.exception( + f"Datadog Error sending batch API - {str(e)}" + ) + return self._undelivered(chunk, pending) + + if response.status_code == 413: + if len(chunk) == 1: + verbose_logger.error(DD_ERRORS.DATADOG_413_ERROR.value) + continue + mid = len(chunk) // 2 + pending.append(chunk[mid:]) + pending.append(chunk[:mid]) + continue + + if response.status_code != 202: + verbose_logger.error( + "Datadog: unexpected response status_code=%s, text=%s", + response.status_code, + response.text, + ) + return self._undelivered(chunk, pending) + + verbose_logger.debug( + "Datadog: delivered %s events, status_code=%s, text=%s", + len(chunk), + response.status_code, + response.text, + ) + return [] + + @staticmethod + def _undelivered(chunk: List, pending: List[List]) -> List: + return chunk + [event for remaining in reversed(pending) for event in remaining] + async def flush_queue(self): if self.flush_lock is None: return diff --git a/tests/test_litellm/integrations/datadog/test_datadog_logger_batching.py b/tests/test_litellm/integrations/datadog/test_datadog_logger_batching.py index e4d7227cc88..d1c7a4032fb 100644 --- a/tests/test_litellm/integrations/datadog/test_datadog_logger_batching.py +++ b/tests/test_litellm/integrations/datadog/test_datadog_logger_batching.py @@ -1,10 +1,49 @@ from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, Mock, patch +import httpx import pytest from httpx import Request, Response from litellm.integrations.datadog.datadog import DataDogLogger -from litellm.types.integrations.datadog import DatadogPayload +from litellm.llms.custom_httpx.http_handler import MaskedHTTPStatusError +from litellm.types.integrations.datadog import DD_MAX_BATCH_SIZE, DatadogPayload + + +def _payloads(n): + return [ + DatadogPayload( + ddsource="litellm", + ddtags="env:test", + hostname="host", + message=f'{{"event": {i}}}', + service="svc", + status="info", + ) + for i in range(n) + ] + + +def _raised_413(): + request = Request("POST", "https://example.com") + response = Response(413, request=request, text="Payload Too Large") + return MaskedHTTPStatusError( + httpx.HTTPStatusError("413", request=request, response=response) + ) + + +def _make_send(max_ok, delivered, *, raise_413=True): + """Datadog double: 413 batches larger than max_ok, 202 (recording delivery) otherwise.""" + + async def _send(data): + request = Request("POST", "https://example.com") + if len(data) > max_ok: + if raise_413: + raise _raised_413() + return Response(413, request=request, text="Payload Too Large") + delivered.extend(event["message"] for event in data) + return Response(202, request=request, text="Accepted") + + return _send @pytest.fixture @@ -75,40 +114,152 @@ async def test_failure_hook_threshold_flush_uses_flush_queue(datadog_env): @pytest.mark.asyncio -async def test_async_send_batch_requeues_events_on_413(datadog_env): +async def test_413_splits_oversized_batch_and_delivers_every_event(datadog_env): + """A raised 413 (the real httpx path) halves the batch until each piece is accepted.""" with patch("asyncio.create_task"): logger = DataDogLogger() - logger.log_queue = [ - DatadogPayload( - ddsource="litellm", - ddtags="env:test", - hostname="host", - message=f'{{"event": {i}}}', - service="svc", - status="info", + logger.log_queue = _payloads(4) + delivered: list = [] + logger.async_send_compressed_data = AsyncMock(side_effect=_make_send(1, delivered)) + + await logger.async_send_batch() + + assert sorted(delivered) == [f'{{"event": {i}}}' for i in range(4)] + assert logger.log_queue == [] + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_413_does_not_requeue_oversized_batch(datadog_env): + """Regression for the infinite 413 loop: an undeliverable batch must not be re-queued.""" + with patch("asyncio.create_task"): + logger = DataDogLogger() + + logger.log_queue = _payloads(4) + logger.async_send_compressed_data = AsyncMock(side_effect=_make_send(0, [])) + + await logger.async_send_batch() + await logger.async_send_batch() + + assert logger.log_queue == [] + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_413_drops_single_oversized_event(datadog_env): + with patch("asyncio.create_task"): + logger = DataDogLogger() + + logger.log_queue = _payloads(1) + send = AsyncMock(side_effect=_make_send(0, [])) + logger.async_send_compressed_data = send + + await logger.async_send_batch() + + assert send.await_count == 1 + assert logger.log_queue == [] + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_413_returned_response_also_splits(datadog_env): + """Defensive path: a 413 returned (not raised) is handled the same way.""" + with patch("asyncio.create_task"): + logger = DataDogLogger() + + logger.log_queue = _payloads(4) + delivered: list = [] + logger.async_send_compressed_data = AsyncMock( + side_effect=_make_send(1, delivered, raise_413=False) + ) + + await logger.async_send_batch() + + assert sorted(delivered) == [f'{{"event": {i}}}' for i in range(4)] + assert logger.log_queue == [] + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_partial_delivery_then_transient_error_requeues_only_undelivered( + datadog_env, +): + """A transient error after a partial split delivery must not duplicate delivered events.""" + with patch("asyncio.create_task"): + logger = DataDogLogger() + + logger.log_queue = _payloads(4) + delivered: list = [] + + async def _send(data): + messages = [event["message"] for event in data] + if len(data) > 2: + raise _raised_413() + if messages == ['{"event": 2}', '{"event": 3}']: + raise RuntimeError("transient network error") + delivered.extend(messages) + return Response( + 202, request=Request("POST", "https://example.com"), text="Accepted" ) - for i in range(2) + + logger.async_send_compressed_data = AsyncMock(side_effect=_send) + + await logger.async_send_batch() + + assert delivered == ['{"event": 0}', '{"event": 1}'] + assert [event["message"] for event in logger.log_queue] == [ + '{"event": 2}', + '{"event": 3}', ] + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_unexpected_non_202_status_requeues(datadog_env): + """A non-413, non-202 response is treated as undelivered and re-queued.""" + with patch("asyncio.create_task"): + logger = DataDogLogger() + + logger.log_queue = _payloads(2) logger.async_send_compressed_data = AsyncMock( return_value=Response( - 413, - request=Request("POST", "https://example.com"), - text="Payload Too Large", + 200, request=Request("POST", "https://example.com"), text="OK" ) ) await logger.async_send_batch() - assert logger.async_send_compressed_data.await_count == 1 - assert len(logger.log_queue) == 2 assert [event["message"] for event in logger.log_queue] == [ '{"event": 0}', '{"event": 1}', ] +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "value, expected", + [ + ("50", 50), + ("1", 1), + ("0", 1), + ("-5", 1), + (str(DD_MAX_BATCH_SIZE + 100), DD_MAX_BATCH_SIZE), + ("not_an_int", DD_MAX_BATCH_SIZE), + ], +) +def test_dd_batch_size_env_resolution(monkeypatch, value, expected): + monkeypatch.setenv("DD_API_KEY", "test_api_key") + monkeypatch.setenv("DD_SITE", "test.datadoghq.com") + monkeypatch.setenv("DD_BATCH_SIZE", value) + with patch("asyncio.create_task"): + logger = DataDogLogger() + assert logger.batch_size == expected + + +def test_dd_batch_size_defaults_to_max(monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("DD_API_KEY", "test_api_key") + monkeypatch.setenv("DD_SITE", "test.datadoghq.com") + monkeypatch.delenv("DD_BATCH_SIZE", raising=False) + with patch("asyncio.create_task"): + logger = DataDogLogger() + assert logger.batch_size == DD_MAX_BATCH_SIZE + + @pytest.mark.asyncio async def test_async_send_batch_handles_empty_queue(datadog_env): with patch("asyncio.create_task"): From f05280f71ba2123f746bd35f6cd0646d27f5c2ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mateo Wang <277851410+mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 14:04:42 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 2/7] fix: stop use_chat_completions_api flag from leaking into provider request body (#29447) * fix: stop use_chat_completions_api flag from leaking into provider request body use_chat_completions_api is a LiteLLM control flag that forces the /responses -> /chat/completions bridge. It was missing from all_litellm_params, so get_non_default_completion_params treated it as a model-specific param and forwarded it to the upstream provider. A model-level "use_chat_completions_api: true" in the proxy config therefore reached the chat-completions path and was rejected by strict providers (OpenAI/Anthropic) with HTTP 400 for an unknown body field. Register it as a known internal param so it is stripped on every path (completion, the responses bridge that calls litellm.completion, and filter_out_litellm_params). Adds a regression test driving litellm.completion() with a mocked OpenAI client that asserts the flag never reaches the request body. * test: clarify extra_body assertion in use_chat_completions_api leak test Replace the misleading 'not in ... or {}' precedence idiom with an explicit parenthesized guard that also handles extra_body being None. (cherry picked from commit 65b6e04da651f64c5dd6ef6cd01a7858cecb5346) --- litellm/types/utils.py | 1 + .../test_use_chat_completions_api_no_leak.py | 74 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 75 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tests/test_litellm/llms/openai/test_use_chat_completions_api_no_leak.py diff --git a/litellm/types/utils.py b/litellm/types/utils.py index e6fd36f792b..de51eda6bce 100644 --- a/litellm/types/utils.py +++ b/litellm/types/utils.py @@ -3183,6 +3183,7 @@ all_litellm_params = ( "allowed_openai_params", "litellm_session_id", "use_litellm_proxy", + "use_chat_completions_api", "prompt_label", "shared_session", "search_tool_name", diff --git a/tests/test_litellm/llms/openai/test_use_chat_completions_api_no_leak.py b/tests/test_litellm/llms/openai/test_use_chat_completions_api_no_leak.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..9a266fca81f --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_litellm/llms/openai/test_use_chat_completions_api_no_leak.py @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +""" +Regression test for issue #28146. + +`use_chat_completions_api` is a LiteLLM-internal control flag (it forces the +/responses -> /chat/completions bridge). When set as a model-level param in the +proxy config, it must never be forwarded to the upstream provider's request +body. OpenAI/Anthropic reject unknown body params with HTTP 400. +""" + +import os +import sys +from unittest.mock import MagicMock + +sys.path.insert(0, os.path.abspath("../../../..")) + +import litellm +from litellm.types.utils import all_litellm_params +from litellm.utils import get_non_default_completion_params + + +def test_use_chat_completions_api_is_a_known_litellm_param(): + assert "use_chat_completions_api" in all_litellm_params + + +def test_use_chat_completions_api_not_forwarded_as_provider_param(): + forwarded = get_non_default_completion_params( + {"use_chat_completions_api": True, "temperature": 0.5} + ) + assert "use_chat_completions_api" not in forwarded + + +def test_completion_does_not_leak_flag_into_provider_request_body(): + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.model_dump.return_value = { + "id": "chatcmpl-1", + "object": "chat.completion", + "created": 1234567890, + "model": "gpt-4o-mini", + "choices": [ + { + "index": 0, + "message": {"role": "assistant", "content": "hi"}, + "finish_reason": "stop", + } + ], + "usage": { + "prompt_tokens": 1, + "completion_tokens": 1, + "total_tokens": 2, + }, + } + + mock_raw_response = MagicMock() + mock_raw_response.headers = {} + mock_raw_response.parse.return_value = mock_response + + mock_client = MagicMock() + mock_client.chat.completions.with_raw_response.create.return_value = ( + mock_raw_response + ) + + litellm.completion( + model="openai/gpt-4o-mini", + messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}], + use_chat_completions_api=True, + api_key="sk-test", + client=mock_client, + ) + + create_kwargs = ( + mock_client.chat.completions.with_raw_response.create.call_args.kwargs + ) + assert "use_chat_completions_api" not in create_kwargs + assert "use_chat_completions_api" not in (create_kwargs.get("extra_body") or {}) From 71cc179eca2db30a81c9a64d340eb854e777ddd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shivam Rawat Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 20:50:38 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 3/7] fix(integrations): cap Anthropic cache_control injection at 4 blocks (#30480) * fix(integrations): cap Anthropic cache_control injection at 4 blocks Respect Anthropic's 4 cache_control breakpoint limit by counting client-supplied blocks, skipping messages that already carry cache_control, and stopping further auto-injection once the limit is reached. Co-authored-by: Cursor * fix(integrations): reserve cache slot for tool_config and short-circuit cap Address review feedback on the cache_control cap: break out of the injection loop before resolving target indices once the limit is reached, and reserve one of the four breakpoint slots when a tool_config injection point is present so the cachePoint appended by the Bedrock transform does not push the total past Anthropic's limit. Co-authored-by: Cursor --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor (cherry picked from commit fc9d789d24bc4bbed4512c5da60e0d988866890c) --- .../anthropic_cache_control_hook.py | 155 ++++++-- .../test_anthropic_cache_control_hook.py | 354 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 476 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) diff --git a/litellm/integrations/anthropic_cache_control_hook.py b/litellm/integrations/anthropic_cache_control_hook.py index 213622cb43a..296bfb6fc85 100644 --- a/litellm/integrations/anthropic_cache_control_hook.py +++ b/litellm/integrations/anthropic_cache_control_hook.py @@ -27,6 +27,11 @@ else: LiteLLMLoggingObj = Any +# Anthropic (and Bedrock Claude) reject requests with more than 4 cache_control +# breakpoints: "A maximum of 4 blocks with cache_control may be provided." +MAX_CACHE_CONTROL_BLOCKS = 4 + + class AnthropicCacheControlHook(CustomPromptManagement): def get_chat_completion_prompt( self, @@ -61,16 +66,30 @@ class AnthropicCacheControlHook(CustomPromptManagement): processed_messages = copy.deepcopy(messages) # Separate message-level and non-message-level injection points - remaining_points = [] + message_points: List[CacheControlMessageInjectionPoint] = [] + remaining_points: List[CacheControlInjectionPoint] = [] for point in injection_points: if point.get("location") == "message": - point = cast(CacheControlMessageInjectionPoint, point) - processed_messages = self._process_message_injection( - point=point, messages=processed_messages - ) + message_points.append(cast(CacheControlMessageInjectionPoint, point)) else: remaining_points.append(point) + # Non-message points (currently Bedrock tool_config) are handled in the + # provider transform, where each tool_config point appends at most one + # cachePoint to the tools. That block also counts toward Anthropic's + # limit, so reserve a slot for it here to leave room. + reserved_blocks = ( + 1 + if any(p.get("location") == "tool_config" for p in remaining_points) + else 0 + ) + + processed_messages = self._apply_message_injections( + points=message_points, + messages=processed_messages, + max_blocks=MAX_CACHE_CONTROL_BLOCKS - reserved_blocks, + ) + # Pass through non-message injection points for provider-specific handling if remaining_points: non_default_params["cache_control_injection_points"] = remaining_points @@ -78,14 +97,71 @@ class AnthropicCacheControlHook(CustomPromptManagement): return model, processed_messages, non_default_params @staticmethod - def _process_message_injection( - point: CacheControlMessageInjectionPoint, messages: List[AllMessageValues] + def _apply_message_injections( + points: List[CacheControlMessageInjectionPoint], + messages: List[AllMessageValues], + max_blocks: int, ) -> List[AllMessageValues]: - """Process message-level cache control injection.""" - control: ChatCompletionCachedContent = point.get( - "control", None - ) or ChatCompletionCachedContent(type="ephemeral") + """Apply message-level cache control injection points in order. + Anthropic allows at most ``MAX_CACHE_CONTROL_BLOCKS`` cache_control + breakpoints per request. Client-supplied breakpoints count toward that + limit, so we never inject onto a message that already carries + cache_control (preserving the client's TTL) and we stop injecting once + ``max_blocks`` is reached. Injection points are honored in config order, + so earlier points win when slots are scarce. + """ + used_blocks = sum( + AnthropicCacheControlHook._count_cache_control_blocks(msg) + for msg in messages + ) + + limit_reached = False + for point in points: + if used_blocks >= max_blocks: + limit_reached = True + break + + control: ChatCompletionCachedContent = point.get( + "control", None + ) or ChatCompletionCachedContent(type="ephemeral") + + for target_index in AnthropicCacheControlHook._resolve_target_indices( + point=point, messages=messages + ): + if used_blocks >= max_blocks: + limit_reached = True + break + + if AnthropicCacheControlHook._message_has_cache_control( + messages[target_index] + ): + # Client already marked this message; don't overwrite it. + continue + + messages[target_index] = ( + AnthropicCacheControlHook._safe_insert_cache_control_in_message( + messages[target_index], control + ) + ) + used_blocks += 1 + + if limit_reached: + break + + if limit_reached: + verbose_logger.warning( + f"AnthropicCacheControlHook: Reached the Anthropic limit of " + f"{MAX_CACHE_CONTROL_BLOCKS} cache_control blocks. Skipping further injection." + ) + + return messages + + @staticmethod + def _resolve_target_indices( + point: CacheControlMessageInjectionPoint, messages: List[AllMessageValues] + ) -> List[int]: + """Resolve which message indices an injection point targets.""" _targetted_index: Optional[Union[int, str]] = point.get("index", None) targetted_index: Optional[int] = None if isinstance(_targetted_index, str): @@ -96,36 +172,49 @@ class AnthropicCacheControlHook(CustomPromptManagement): else: targetted_index = _targetted_index - targetted_role = point.get("role", None) - # Case 1: Target by specific index if targetted_index is not None: original_index = targetted_index - # Handle negative indices (convert to positive) if targetted_index < 0: targetted_index += len(messages) if 0 <= targetted_index < len(messages): - messages[targetted_index] = ( - AnthropicCacheControlHook._safe_insert_cache_control_in_message( - messages[targetted_index], control - ) - ) - else: - verbose_logger.warning( - f"AnthropicCacheControlHook: Provided index {original_index} is out of bounds for message list of length {len(messages)}. " - f"Targeted index was {targetted_index}. Skipping cache control injection for this point." - ) + return [targetted_index] + + verbose_logger.warning( + f"AnthropicCacheControlHook: Provided index {original_index} is out of bounds for message list of length {len(messages)}. " + f"Targeted index was {targetted_index}. Skipping cache control injection for this point." + ) + return [] + # Case 2: Target by role - elif targetted_role is not None: - for msg in messages: - if msg.get("role") == targetted_role: - msg = ( - AnthropicCacheControlHook._safe_insert_cache_control_in_message( - message=msg, control=control - ) - ) - return messages + targetted_role = point.get("role", None) + if targetted_role is not None: + return [ + idx + for idx, msg in enumerate(messages) + if msg.get("role") == targetted_role + ] + + return [] + + @staticmethod + def _count_cache_control_blocks(message: AllMessageValues) -> int: + """Count cache_control breakpoints on a message (message + content level).""" + count = 0 + if message.get("cache_control") is not None: + count += 1 + content = message.get("content") + if isinstance(content, list): + for block in content: + if isinstance(block, dict) and block.get("cache_control") is not None: + count += 1 + return count + + @staticmethod + def _message_has_cache_control(message: AllMessageValues) -> bool: + """Return True if the message already carries any cache_control.""" + return AnthropicCacheControlHook._count_cache_control_blocks(message) > 0 @staticmethod def _safe_insert_cache_control_in_message( diff --git a/tests/test_litellm/integrations/test_anthropic_cache_control_hook.py b/tests/test_litellm/integrations/test_anthropic_cache_control_hook.py index 1a4d03528e7..6afe5efc54d 100644 --- a/tests/test_litellm/integrations/test_anthropic_cache_control_hook.py +++ b/tests/test_litellm/integrations/test_anthropic_cache_control_hook.py @@ -1087,3 +1087,357 @@ async def test_anthropic_cache_control_hook_string_negative_index(): f"Expected cachePoint in last message content, got: {last_message_content}. " "String index '-1' was not parsed correctly (str.isdigit() returns False for negative strings)." ) + + +def _count_cache_control(messages: List[AllMessageValues]) -> int: + """Count cache_control breakpoints across messages (message + content level).""" + count = 0 + for message in messages: + if message.get("cache_control") is not None: + count += 1 + content = message.get("content") + if isinstance(content, list): + for block in content: + if isinstance(block, dict) and block.get("cache_control") is not None: + count += 1 + return count + + +def _build_injection_points(): + return [ + { + "location": "message", + "role": "system", + "control": {"type": "ephemeral", "ttl": "1h"}, + }, + { + "location": "message", + "index": -1, + "control": {"type": "ephemeral", "ttl": "5m"}, + }, + ] + + +def test_cache_control_hook_caps_at_four_blocks_with_client_cache_control(): + """Regression for LIT-3667 / Anthropic 'A maximum of 4 blocks ... Found 5'. + + A Hermes-style request already carries 4 client cache_control breakpoints on + its system messages. With both auto-inject points configured the hook must + NOT add a 5th breakpoint, and must NOT overwrite the client's existing + breakpoints (TTL must be preserved). + """ + hook = AnthropicCacheControlHook() + + messages: List[AllMessageValues] = [ + { + "role": "system", + "content": [ + { + "type": "text", + "text": f"System block {i}", + "cache_control": {"type": "ephemeral", "ttl": "1h"}, + } + ], + } + for i in range(4) + ] + messages.append({"role": "user", "content": "hello"}) + + _, processed, _ = hook.get_chat_completion_prompt( + model="bedrock/us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-6-v1:0", + messages=messages, + non_default_params={ + "cache_control_injection_points": _build_injection_points() + }, + prompt_id=None, + prompt_variables=None, + dynamic_callback_params={}, + ) + + assert ( + _count_cache_control(processed) == 4 + ), "Hook must cap cache_control at Anthropic's limit of 4 blocks" + + # Client TTL on system blocks must be preserved (not overwritten by config). + for i in range(4): + assert processed[i]["content"][-1]["cache_control"] == { + "type": "ephemeral", + "ttl": "1h", + } + + # The last (user) message must not receive a 5th breakpoint. + user_message = processed[-1] + assert user_message.get("cache_control") is None + user_content = user_message.get("content") + if isinstance(user_content, list): + assert all( + block.get("cache_control") is None + for block in user_content + if isinstance(block, dict) + ) + + +def test_cache_control_hook_caps_at_four_blocks_without_client_cache_control(): + """Four plain system messages + role:system + index:-1 must stay at 4 blocks. + + role:system fills all four slots, so the index:-1 point is skipped. + """ + hook = AnthropicCacheControlHook() + + messages: List[AllMessageValues] = [ + {"role": "system", "content": f"System {i}"} for i in range(4) + ] + messages.append({"role": "user", "content": "hello"}) + + _, processed, _ = hook.get_chat_completion_prompt( + model="bedrock/us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-6-v1:0", + messages=messages, + non_default_params={ + "cache_control_injection_points": _build_injection_points() + }, + prompt_id=None, + prompt_variables=None, + dynamic_callback_params={}, + ) + + assert _count_cache_control(processed) == 4 + # All four system messages cached; user message skipped (limit reached). + assert all(processed[i].get("cache_control") is not None for i in range(4)) + assert processed[-1].get("cache_control") is None + + +def test_cache_control_hook_does_not_overwrite_existing_cache_control(): + """If a targeted message already has client cache_control, do not inject.""" + hook = AnthropicCacheControlHook() + + messages: List[AllMessageValues] = [ + { + "role": "system", + "content": [ + { + "type": "text", + "text": "Cached by client", + "cache_control": {"type": "ephemeral", "ttl": "1h"}, + } + ], + }, + {"role": "user", "content": "hello"}, + ] + + _, processed, _ = hook.get_chat_completion_prompt( + model="bedrock/us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-6-v1:0", + messages=messages, + # Target the already-cached system message with a different TTL. + non_default_params={ + "cache_control_injection_points": [ + { + "location": "message", + "index": 0, + "control": {"type": "ephemeral", "ttl": "5m"}, + } + ] + }, + prompt_id=None, + prompt_variables=None, + dynamic_callback_params={}, + ) + + # Client's 1h TTL must be preserved, not replaced by the config's 5m. + assert processed[0]["content"][-1]["cache_control"] == { + "type": "ephemeral", + "ttl": "1h", + } + assert _count_cache_control(processed) == 1 + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_cache_control_hook_bedrock_payload_caps_cachepoints_at_four(): + """End-to-end: outgoing Bedrock payload must not exceed 4 cachePoint blocks. + + Reproduces the customer report where 4 client cache_control system blocks + plus auto-inject produced 5 cachePoint blocks and Bedrock returned 400. + """ + with patch.dict( + os.environ, + { + "AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID": "fake_access_key_id", + "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY": "fake_secret_access_key", + "AWS_REGION_NAME": "us-east-1", + }, + ): + litellm.callbacks = [AnthropicCacheControlHook()] + + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.json.return_value = { + "output": {"message": {"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"}}, + "stopReason": "end_turn", + "usage": {"inputTokens": 100, "outputTokens": 4, "totalTokens": 104}, + } + mock_response.status_code = 200 + + client = AsyncHTTPHandler() + with patch.object(client, "post", return_value=mock_response) as mock_post: + messages = [ + { + "role": "system", + "content": [ + { + "type": "text", + "text": f"System block {i}", + "cache_control": {"type": "ephemeral", "ttl": "1h"}, + } + ], + } + for i in range(4) + ] + messages.append({"role": "user", "content": "hello"}) + + await litellm.acompletion( + model="bedrock/us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-6-v1:0", + messages=messages, + max_tokens=32, + cache_control_injection_points=_build_injection_points(), + client=client, + ) + + request_body = json.loads(mock_post.call_args.kwargs["data"]) + + cache_points = sum( + 1 + for block in request_body.get("system", []) + if isinstance(block, dict) and "cachePoint" in block + ) + for msg in request_body.get("messages", []): + content = msg.get("content", []) + if isinstance(content, list): + cache_points += sum( + 1 + for block in content + if isinstance(block, dict) and "cachePoint" in block + ) + + assert cache_points <= 4, ( + f"Bedrock payload exceeded Anthropic's 4 cache_control block limit: " + f"found {cache_points} cachePoint blocks" + ) + + +def test_cache_control_hook_reserves_slot_for_tool_config_point(): + """A tool_config injection point consumes one of the 4 slots downstream. + + With role:system targeting 4 system messages plus a tool_config point, the + hook must inject at most 3 message-level blocks so the tool_config cachePoint + appended by the Bedrock transform keeps the total at 4, not 5. + """ + hook = AnthropicCacheControlHook() + + messages: List[AllMessageValues] = [ + {"role": "system", "content": f"System {i}"} for i in range(4) + ] + messages.append({"role": "user", "content": "hello"}) + + _, processed, non_default_params = hook.get_chat_completion_prompt( + model="bedrock/us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-6-v1:0", + messages=messages, + non_default_params={ + "cache_control_injection_points": [ + { + "location": "message", + "role": "system", + "control": {"type": "ephemeral", "ttl": "1h"}, + }, + {"location": "tool_config"}, + ] + }, + prompt_id=None, + prompt_variables=None, + dynamic_callback_params={}, + ) + + assert _count_cache_control(processed) == 3 + # The tool_config point is passed through for the provider transform. + assert non_default_params["cache_control_injection_points"] == [ + {"location": "tool_config"} + ] + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_cache_control_hook_bedrock_payload_caps_with_tool_config_point(): + """End-to-end: message + tool_config injection must not exceed 4 cachePoints.""" + with patch.dict( + os.environ, + { + "AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID": "fake_access_key_id", + "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY": "fake_secret_access_key", + "AWS_REGION_NAME": "us-east-1", + }, + ): + litellm.callbacks = [AnthropicCacheControlHook()] + + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.json.return_value = { + "output": {"message": {"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"}}, + "stopReason": "end_turn", + "usage": {"inputTokens": 100, "outputTokens": 4, "totalTokens": 104}, + } + mock_response.status_code = 200 + + client = AsyncHTTPHandler() + with patch.object(client, "post", return_value=mock_response) as mock_post: + messages = [ + {"role": "system", "content": f"System block {i}"} for i in range(4) + ] + messages.append({"role": "user", "content": "What is the weather?"}) + + await litellm.acompletion( + model="bedrock/us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-6-v1:0", + messages=messages, + max_tokens=32, + tools=[ + { + "type": "function", + "function": { + "name": "get_weather", + "description": "Get weather for a location", + "parameters": { + "type": "object", + "properties": {"location": {"type": "string"}}, + "required": ["location"], + }, + }, + } + ], + cache_control_injection_points=[ + { + "location": "message", + "role": "system", + "control": {"type": "ephemeral", "ttl": "1h"}, + }, + {"location": "tool_config"}, + ], + client=client, + ) + + request_body = json.loads(mock_post.call_args.kwargs["data"]) + + cache_points = sum( + 1 + for block in request_body.get("system", []) + if isinstance(block, dict) and "cachePoint" in block + ) + for msg in request_body.get("messages", []): + content = msg.get("content", []) + if isinstance(content, list): + cache_points += sum( + 1 + for block in content + if isinstance(block, dict) and "cachePoint" in block + ) + for tool in request_body.get("toolConfig", {}).get("tools", []): + if isinstance(tool, dict) and "cachePoint" in tool: + cache_points += 1 + + assert cache_points <= 4, ( + f"Bedrock payload exceeded Anthropic's 4 cache_control block limit " + f"when mixing message and tool_config injection: found {cache_points}" + ) From d0f29513b79a715ff213dff2c316e38a880148bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ryan-crabbe-berri Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 18:56:14 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 4/7] fix(guardrails): return 400 not 500 when AIM blocks a request (#30573) * fix(guardrails): return 400 not 500 when AIM blocks a request AIM guardrail blocks raised a bare HTTPException whose type and param serialized as the literal string "None", which broke OpenAI-SDK error parsing for downstream consumers. Switching AIM to raise a ProxyException surfaced a second bug: the shared error funnel re-derived the HTTP status from a nonexistent status_code attribute and downgraded the 400 to a 500. The funnel now honors an already-normalized ProxyException rather than rebuilding it, and ProxyException is excluded from llm_exceptions alerting so a content-policy block no longer pages on-call as an LLM API failure Resolves LIT-3751 * fix(guardrails): route all AIM rejection paths through ProxyException The block-action fix left two AIM rejection paths raising a bare HTTPException: the multimodal anonymize rejection and the output-side block. Both serialized type and param as the literal string "None", the same malformed shape the block fix removed. Funnel all three through a shared _rejection helper so they return a conformant OpenAI error body. The output block carries content_policy_violation; the multimodal rejection stays a plain invalid_request_error because it is a usage error, not a policy violation Resolves LIT-3751 * fix(guardrails): record AIM ProxyException blocks in failure logs Switching AIM blocks from HTTPException to ProxyException made _is_proxy_only_llm_api_error return False for them, so _handle_logging_proxy_only_error was skipped and the blocked prompt was dropped from the configured failure loggers. Classify ProxyException as a proxy-only error alongside HTTPException so guardrail blocks are recorded again, matching the prior behavior. The llm_exceptions alert suppression is a separate check and stays in place Resolves LIT-3751 * style(guardrails): use str | None over Optional[str] in AIM _rejection * style(guardrails): collapse AIM _rejection signature per black (cherry picked from commit b5fcd859bec1388267f6f1f9affc125190555525) --- litellm/proxy/common_request_processing.py | 7 + .../guardrails/guardrail_hooks/aim/aim.py | 34 +++-- litellm/proxy/utils.py | 5 +- tests/local_testing/test_aim_guardrails.py | 135 +++++++++++++++++- .../proxy/test_common_request_processing.py | 35 +++++ tests/test_litellm/proxy/test_proxy_utils.py | 116 ++++++++++++++- 6 files changed, 313 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/litellm/proxy/common_request_processing.py b/litellm/proxy/common_request_processing.py index 36acd9653e8..cb0397b610c 100644 --- a/litellm/proxy/common_request_processing.py +++ b/litellm/proxy/common_request_processing.py @@ -1900,6 +1900,13 @@ class ProxyBaseLLMRequestProcessing: except Exception: pass + if isinstance(e, ProxyException): + e.headers = { + **e.headers, + **{k: v if isinstance(v, str) else str(v) for k, v in headers.items()}, + } + raise e + if isinstance(e, HTTPException): raw_detail = getattr(e, "detail", str(e)) message, structured_fields = _serialize_http_exception_detail(raw_detail) diff --git a/litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/aim/aim.py b/litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/aim/aim.py index 5b5f91195e7..d70c8e4f310 100644 --- a/litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/aim/aim.py +++ b/litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/aim/aim.py @@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import json import os from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, AsyncGenerator, Optional, Type, Union -from fastapi import HTTPException from pydantic import BaseModel from websockets.asyncio.client import ClientConnection, connect @@ -21,7 +20,7 @@ from litellm.llms.custom_httpx.http_handler import ( get_async_httpx_client, httpxSpecialProvider, ) -from litellm.proxy._types import UserAPIKeyAuth +from litellm.proxy._types import ProxyException, UserAPIKeyAuth from litellm.proxy.guardrails._content_utils import ( apply_redacted_messages_back, build_inspection_messages, @@ -129,6 +128,16 @@ class AimGuardrail(CustomGuardrail): verbose_proxy_logger.error(f"Aim: {action_type} action") return data + @staticmethod + def _rejection(message: str, *, openai_code: str | None = None) -> ProxyException: + return ProxyException( + message=message, + type="invalid_request_error", + param=None, + code=400, + openai_code=openai_code, + ) + def _handle_block_action(self, analysis_result: Any, required_action: Any) -> None: detection_message = required_action.get("detection_message", None) verbose_proxy_logger.info( @@ -136,7 +145,7 @@ class AimGuardrail(CustomGuardrail): policies=list(analysis_result["policy_drill_down"].keys()), ), ) - raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=detection_message) + raise self._rejection(detection_message, openai_code="content_policy_violation") def _anonymize_request(self, res: Any, data: dict) -> dict: verbose_proxy_logger.info("Aim: anonymize action") @@ -148,14 +157,11 @@ class AimGuardrail(CustomGuardrail): # parts from a multimodal request — degrade to block so the # multimodal payload is never silently rewritten. if has_non_string_content(data): - raise HTTPException( - status_code=400, - detail=( - "Aim: anonymize action requested for multimodal input " - "but mask-in-place would drop non-text parts. Send the " - "request with plain string content to use anonymize, " - "or rely on block-mode policies." - ), + raise self._rejection( + "Aim: anonymize action requested for multimodal input " + "but mask-in-place would drop non-text parts. Send the " + "request with plain string content to use anonymize, " + "or rely on block-mode policies." ) redacted_messages = [ { @@ -287,9 +293,9 @@ class AimGuardrail(CustomGuardrail): if aim_output_guardrail_result and aim_output_guardrail_result.get( "detection_message" ): - raise HTTPException( - status_code=400, - detail=aim_output_guardrail_result.get("detection_message"), + raise self._rejection( + aim_output_guardrail_result.get("detection_message"), + openai_code="content_policy_violation", ) if aim_output_guardrail_result and aim_output_guardrail_result.get( "redacted_output" diff --git a/litellm/proxy/utils.py b/litellm/proxy/utils.py index e7ad5a9155f..04f3c2562f1 100644 --- a/litellm/proxy/utils.py +++ b/litellm/proxy/utils.py @@ -1991,7 +1991,7 @@ class ProxyLogging: litellm_call_id=request_data.get("litellm_call_id", ""), status="fail" ) if AlertType.llm_exceptions in self.alert_types and not isinstance( - original_exception, HTTPException + original_exception, (HTTPException, ProxyException) ): """ Just alert on LLM API exceptions. Do not alert on user errors @@ -2095,6 +2095,7 @@ class ProxyLogging: e.g should only return True for: - Authentication Errors from user_api_key_auth - HTTP HTTPException (rate limit errors) + - ProxyException (guardrail blocks, budget / rate-limit errors) """ ######################################################### @@ -2111,7 +2112,7 @@ class ProxyLogging: ): return False - return isinstance(original_exception, HTTPException) or ( + return isinstance(original_exception, (HTTPException, ProxyException)) or ( error_type == ProxyErrorTypes.auth_error ) diff --git a/tests/local_testing/test_aim_guardrails.py b/tests/local_testing/test_aim_guardrails.py index 31416c565c1..2cb7f9cd357 100644 --- a/tests/local_testing/test_aim_guardrails.py +++ b/tests/local_testing/test_aim_guardrails.py @@ -6,10 +6,10 @@ import sys from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, patch, call import pytest -from fastapi.exceptions import HTTPException from httpx import Request, Response from litellm import DualCache +from litellm.proxy._types import ProxyException from litellm.proxy.guardrails.guardrail_hooks.aim.aim import ( AimGuardrail, AimGuardrailMissingSecrets, @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ async def test_block_callback(mode: str): ], } - with pytest.raises(HTTPException, match="Jailbreak detected"): + with pytest.raises(ProxyException, match="Jailbreak detected") as exc_info: with patch( "litellm.llms.custom_httpx.http_handler.AsyncHTTPHandler.post", return_value=Response( @@ -135,6 +135,137 @@ async def test_block_callback(mode: str): call_type="completion", ) + exc = exc_info.value + assert exc.code == "400" + assert exc.type == "invalid_request_error" + assert exc.param is None + assert exc.openai_code == "content_policy_violation" + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_output_block_raises_proxy_exception(): + """An output-side block is a content-policy violation, like the input block: + it must surface a conformant ProxyException, not a bare HTTPException whose + type/param serialize as the literal string "None". Regression for LIT-3751.""" + init_guardrails_v2( + all_guardrails=[ + { + "guardrail_name": "gibberish-guard", + "litellm_params": { + "guardrail": "aim", + "mode": "post_call", + "api_key": "hs-aim-key", + }, + }, + ], + config_file_path="", + ) + aim_guardrails = [ + callback for callback in litellm.callbacks if isinstance(callback, AimGuardrail) + ] + assert len(aim_guardrails) == 1 + aim_guardrail = aim_guardrails[0] + + block_on_output = Response( + json={ + "analysis_result": {"policy_drill_down": {"PII": {}}}, + "required_action": { + "action_type": "block_action", + "detection_message": "Output blocked: leaked secret", + "policy_name": "blocking policy", + }, + }, + status_code=200, + request=Request(method="POST", url="http://aim"), + ) + response = ModelResponse( + choices=[ + { + "finish_reason": "stop", + "index": 0, + "message": {"content": "here is the secret", "role": "assistant"}, + } + ] + ) + + with patch( + "litellm.llms.custom_httpx.http_handler.AsyncHTTPHandler.post", + return_value=block_on_output, + ): + with pytest.raises(ProxyException, match="Output blocked") as exc_info: + await aim_guardrail.async_post_call_success_hook( + data={"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "tell me a secret"}]}, + response=response, + user_api_key_dict=UserAPIKeyAuth(), + ) + + exc = exc_info.value + assert exc.code == "400" + assert exc.type == "invalid_request_error" + assert exc.param is None + assert exc.openai_code == "content_policy_violation" + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_anonymize_multimodal_rejection_raises_proxy_exception(): + """Anonymize on multimodal input degrades to a 400 because mask-in-place would + drop non-text parts. That is a usage error, not a content-policy violation, so + it must raise a conformant ProxyException WITHOUT the content_policy_violation + code. Regression for LIT-3751.""" + init_guardrails_v2( + all_guardrails=[ + { + "guardrail_name": "gibberish-guard", + "litellm_params": { + "guardrail": "aim", + "mode": "pre_call", + "api_key": "hs-aim-key", + }, + }, + ], + config_file_path="", + ) + aim_guardrails = [ + callback for callback in litellm.callbacks if isinstance(callback, AimGuardrail) + ] + assert len(aim_guardrails) == 1 + aim_guardrail = aim_guardrails[0] + + data = { + "messages": [ + { + "role": "user", + "content": [ + {"type": "text", "text": "Hi my name is Brian"}, + { + "type": "image_url", + "image_url": {"url": ""}, + }, + ], + }, + ], + } + + with patch( + "litellm.llms.custom_httpx.http_handler.AsyncHTTPHandler.post", + return_value=response_with_detections, + ): + with pytest.raises( + ProxyException, match="anonymize action requested for multimodal" + ) as exc_info: + await aim_guardrail.async_pre_call_hook( + data=data, + cache=DualCache(), + user_api_key_dict=UserAPIKeyAuth(), + call_type="completion", + ) + + exc = exc_info.value + assert exc.code == "400" + assert exc.type == "invalid_request_error" + assert exc.param is None + assert exc.openai_code != "content_policy_violation" + @pytest.mark.asyncio @pytest.mark.parametrize("mode", ["pre_call", "during_call"]) diff --git a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/test_common_request_processing.py b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/test_common_request_processing.py index 265a82d4a44..657529c85f1 100644 --- a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/test_common_request_processing.py +++ b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/test_common_request_processing.py @@ -2244,6 +2244,41 @@ class TestHandleLLMApiExceptionDictDetail: assert proxy_exc.message == "Content blocked by guardrail" assert proxy_exc.provider_specific_fields is None + async def test_already_normalized_proxy_exception_is_honored(self): + """A ProxyException raised mid-request (e.g. a guardrail block) is already + the OpenAI wire format. The funnel must re-raise it untouched instead of + re-deriving the status from a (nonexistent) status_code attribute and + defaulting to 500. Regression for LIT-3751.""" + from litellm.proxy._types import ProxyException + + exc = ProxyException( + message='"Leroy Jenkins" detected as name', + type="invalid_request_error", + param=None, + code=400, + openai_code="content_policy_violation", + ) + proxy_exc = await self._invoke(exc) + assert proxy_exc is exc + assert proxy_exc.code == "400" + assert proxy_exc.type == "invalid_request_error" + assert proxy_exc.param is None + assert proxy_exc.openai_code == "content_policy_violation" + assert proxy_exc.message == '"Leroy Jenkins" detected as name' + + # The body the OpenAI-SDK client actually receives. The HTTP status line + # comes from int(exc.code) == 400; the wire ``code`` stays the status + # string. ``openai_code`` ("content_policy_violation") is intentionally + # NOT serialized here - to_dict() emits only ``code`` - so this asserts + # the real contract rather than the write-only attribute. + assert int(proxy_exc.code) == 400 + assert proxy_exc.to_dict() == { + "message": '"Leroy Jenkins" detected as name', + "type": "invalid_request_error", + "param": None, + "code": "400", + } + class TestAsyncStreamingDataGeneratorFastPath: """Fast/slow path branching in async_streaming_data_generator.""" diff --git a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/test_proxy_utils.py b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/test_proxy_utils.py index f0015d9df0d..ccbcbef212e 100644 --- a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/test_proxy_utils.py +++ b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/test_proxy_utils.py @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ sys.path.insert( ) # Adds the parent directory to the system path -from unittest.mock import MagicMock +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch from litellm.proxy.utils import get_custom_url, join_paths @@ -368,3 +368,117 @@ class TestPostCallFailureHookLiftsFirstApiCallStartTime: await self._run(request_data) assert "first_api_call_start_time" not in request_data assert "litellm_logging_obj" not in request_data + + +class TestPostCallFailureHookLLMExceptionAlerting: + """The llm_exceptions alert is for infra / LLM-API failures, not user + errors (https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/issues/3395). Already-normalized + client errors must be excluded so a guardrail content-policy block never + pages on-call. ProxyException is such an error; before LIT-3751 only + HTTPException was excluded, so AIM blocks paged as if the LLM API failed.""" + + async def _alerted(self, exc) -> bool: + import asyncio + from unittest.mock import AsyncMock + + from litellm.proxy._types import AlertType, UserAPIKeyAuth + + proxy_logging_obj = ProxyLogging(user_api_key_cache=DualCache()) + proxy_logging_obj.alert_types = [AlertType.llm_exceptions] + alerting_handler = AsyncMock() + with ( + patch.object(proxy_logging_obj, "update_request_status", new=AsyncMock()), + patch.object(proxy_logging_obj, "alerting_handler", new=alerting_handler), + ): + await proxy_logging_obj.post_call_failure_hook( + request_data={}, + original_exception=exc, + user_api_key_dict=UserAPIKeyAuth(), + ) + await asyncio.sleep(0) # let the fire-and-forget alert task run + return alerting_handler.called + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_proxy_exception_does_not_alert(self): + from litellm.proxy._types import ProxyException + + exc = ProxyException( + message="content blocked", + type="invalid_request_error", + param=None, + code=400, + openai_code="content_policy_violation", + ) + assert await self._alerted(exc) is False + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_http_exception_does_not_alert(self): + assert ( + await self._alerted(HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="blocked")) + is False + ) + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_genuine_llm_api_error_still_alerts(self): + assert await self._alerted(Exception("upstream 503")) is True + + +class TestPostCallFailureHookProxyExceptionLogging: + """A guardrail block raises a ProxyException; on an LLM route it must still + drive proxy-only failure logging (_handle_logging_proxy_only_error) so the + blocked request is recorded, exactly as the old HTTPException did. Before + LIT-3751 the classifier only matched HTTPException, so switching AIM to + ProxyException silently dropped the rejected prompt from failure logs.""" + + async def _logged(self, exc, *, request_route) -> bool: + from unittest.mock import AsyncMock + + from litellm.proxy._types import UserAPIKeyAuth + + proxy_logging_obj = ProxyLogging(user_api_key_cache=DualCache()) + proxy_logging_obj.alert_types = [] + handle_mock = AsyncMock() + with ( + patch.object(proxy_logging_obj, "update_request_status", new=AsyncMock()), + patch.object( + proxy_logging_obj, + "_handle_logging_proxy_only_error", + new=handle_mock, + ), + ): + await proxy_logging_obj.post_call_failure_hook( + request_data={}, + original_exception=exc, + user_api_key_dict=UserAPIKeyAuth( + api_key="sk-test", request_route=request_route + ), + ) + return handle_mock.await_count > 0 + + def _block(self): + from litellm.proxy._types import ProxyException + + return ProxyException( + message="content blocked", + type="invalid_request_error", + param=None, + code=400, + openai_code="content_policy_violation", + ) + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_proxy_exception_on_llm_route_is_logged(self): + assert ( + await self._logged(self._block(), request_route="/v1/chat/completions") + is True + ) + + @pytest.mark.asyncio + async def test_generic_exception_on_llm_route_is_not_logged(self): + # A raw provider/unknown exception is logged by the LLM call path, not here. + assert ( + await self._logged( + Exception("upstream 503"), request_route="/v1/chat/completions" + ) + is False + ) From 2f33a86e2fd869eade56fbb16c6b65672e597460 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: oss-agent-shin Date: Wed, 27 May 2026 12:28:11 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 5/7] fix(proxy): populate Exception.args so str(ProxyException) returns message (LIT-3094) (#29015) * fix(proxy): populate Exception.args so str(ProxyException) returns message Adds super().__init__(self.message) to ProxyException.__init__ so that str(exc) returns the stored message instead of empty string. Fixes LIT-3094. * test(proxy): regression tests for ProxyException.args (LIT-3094) * fix(proxy): populate Exception.args so str(ProxyException) returns message (LIT-3094) * fix(proxy): clean up unintended drift; keep only ProxyException.args fix (LIT-3094) (cherry picked from commit 1fe911d89db85bc29f88f4269a78ed63b8f23a00) --- litellm/proxy/_types.py | 5 ++ tests/test_litellm/proxy/test_proxy_types.py | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 78 insertions(+) diff --git a/litellm/proxy/_types.py b/litellm/proxy/_types.py index aeb52a3d239..1580e615f22 100644 --- a/litellm/proxy/_types.py +++ b/litellm/proxy/_types.py @@ -3695,6 +3695,11 @@ class ProxyException(Exception): provider_specific_fields: Optional[dict] = None, ): self.message = str(message) + # Populate Exception.args so str(self) returns the message. + # Without this, logging paths that call str(original_exception) + # (e.g. StandardLoggingPayloadSetup.get_error_information) record an + # empty error_message for ProxyException-based failures. See LIT-3094. + super().__init__(self.message) self.type = type self.param = param self.openai_code = openai_code or code diff --git a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/test_proxy_types.py b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/test_proxy_types.py index dbb952968ed..ed6e7bb8191 100644 --- a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/test_proxy_types.py +++ b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/test_proxy_types.py @@ -87,3 +87,76 @@ def test_user_api_key_auth_hashes_authorization_header_form_of_key(): assert from_header.api_key == baseline.api_key assert from_header.token == baseline.token assert not from_header.api_key.lower().startswith("bearer") + + +# === Regression tests for LIT-3094: ProxyException must populate Exception.args +# so logging integrations using str(exc) record a non-empty error_message. === + + +def test_proxy_exception_str_returns_message(): + """str(ProxyException) must return the stored message, not '' (LIT-3094).""" + from litellm.proxy._types import ProxyException + + msg = "key not allowed to access model" + exc = ProxyException(message=msg, type="auth_error", param=None, code=401) + assert str(exc) == msg + assert exc.args == (msg,) + assert exc.message == msg + + +def test_proxy_exception_populates_standard_logging_error_message(): + """The full logging path used by proxy callbacks must capture the message + instead of recording an empty error_message (LIT-3094 report).""" + from litellm.litellm_core_utils.litellm_logging import ( + StandardLoggingPayloadSetup, + ) + from litellm.proxy._types import ProxyException + + msg = "Authentication Error, Invalid proxy server token passed." + exc = ProxyException(message=msg, type="auth_error", param=None, code=401) + info = StandardLoggingPayloadSetup.get_error_information(original_exception=exc) + assert info["error_message"] == msg + assert info["error_class"] == "ProxyException" + assert info["error_code"] == "401" + + +def test_proxy_exception_to_dict_unchanged(): + """to_dict() shape must remain backwards-compatible after the fix.""" + from litellm.proxy._types import ProxyException + + exc = ProxyException( + message="boom", type="invalid_request_error", param="model", code=400 + ) + d = exc.to_dict() + assert d == { + "message": "boom", + "type": "invalid_request_error", + "param": "model", + "code": "400", + } + + +def test_proxy_exception_routing_code_override_still_works(): + """The 'No healthy deployment available' -> 429 remapping must survive + the super().__init__() addition.""" + from litellm.proxy._types import ProxyException + + exc = ProxyException( + message="No healthy deployment available for model=foo", + type="router_error", + param=None, + code=500, + ) + assert exc.code == "429" + assert str(exc) == "No healthy deployment available for model=foo" + + +def test_proxy_exception_non_string_message_coerced(): + """Non-string `message` must still be coerced to str via self.message = + str(message), and Exception.args must reflect the coerced value.""" + from litellm.proxy._types import ProxyException + + exc = ProxyException(message=42, type="x", param=None, code=400) + assert exc.message == "42" + assert str(exc) == "42" + assert exc.args == ("42",) From f67ad5e268da6658c1bb54c49bbd97433acae07d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yuneng Jiang Date: Sat, 20 Jun 2026 12:10:08 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 6/7] =?UTF-8?q?bump:=20version=201.88.3=20=E2=86=92=201.88?= =?UTF-8?q?.4?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit --- pyproject.toml | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/pyproject.toml b/pyproject.toml index 164327e0152..03ba1d1e092 100644 --- a/pyproject.toml +++ b/pyproject.toml @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ [project] name = "litellm" -version = "1.88.3" +version = "1.88.4" description = "Library to easily interface with LLM API providers" readme = "README.md" requires-python = ">=3.10, <3.14" @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ source-exclude = [ profile = "black" [tool.commitizen] -version = "1.88.3" +version = "1.88.4" version_files = [ "pyproject.toml:^version", ] From 364befef60889fc1bfceb614b74ed99ebf31aae1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yuneng Jiang Date: Sat, 20 Jun 2026 12:10:36 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 7/7] chore: refresh uv.lock for 1.88.4 --- uv.lock | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/uv.lock b/uv.lock index 0e6579a7e54..82c1983e390 100644 --- a/uv.lock +++ b/uv.lock @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ resolution-markers = [ ] [options] -exclude-newer = "2026-06-14T19:22:16.739045Z" +exclude-newer = "2026-06-17T19:10:29.753403Z" exclude-newer-span = "P3D" [manifest] @@ -3280,7 +3280,7 @@ wheels = [ [[package]] name = "litellm" -version = "1.88.3" +version = "1.88.4" source = { editable = "." } dependencies = [ { name = "aiohttp" },