diff --git a/litellm/proxy/auth/v2/jwt_verifier.py b/litellm/proxy/auth/v2/jwt_verifier.py
index 32f3f0fc840..9b1e7e12f0a 100644
--- a/litellm/proxy/auth/v2/jwt_verifier.py
+++ b/litellm/proxy/auth/v2/jwt_verifier.py
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import time
-from typing import Any, Dict, Optional
+from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
 
-from authlib.jose import JsonWebKey, jwt
+from authlib.jose import JsonWebKey, JsonWebToken
 from authlib.jose.errors import JoseError
 
 
@@ -9,6 +9,25 @@ class JWTVerificationError(Exception):
     """Raised when a token fails signature or standard-claim validation."""
 
 
+# Pin verification to asymmetric algorithms. An OIDC JWKS holds public keys, so
+# permitting HMAC (HS*) here is what enables the RS256->HS256 confusion attack:
+# an attacker signs HS256 using the public key as the secret. Refusing HS* (and
+# the unsigned ``none`` alg, which authlib already rejects) closes that class
+# regardless of the library's internal key-type checks.
+_DEFAULT_ALGORITHMS: List[str] = [
+    "RS256",
+    "RS384",
+    "RS512",
+    "ES256",
+    "ES384",
+    "ES512",
+    "PS256",
+    "PS384",
+    "PS512",
+    "EdDSA",
+]
+
+
 def build_claims_options(
     issuer: Optional[str], audience: Optional[str]
 ) -> Dict[str, Any]:
@@ -25,16 +44,20 @@ def verify(
     key_set: Any,
     issuer: Optional[str] = None,
     audience: Optional[str] = None,
+    algorithms: Optional[List[str]] = None,
 ) -> Dict[str, Any]:
     """Verify ``token`` against ``key_set`` and validate exp/iss/aud.
 
     authlib owns the crypto: signature verification, key selection by ``kid``,
-    and standard-claim checks. ``key_set`` is an imported JWKS (injected so this
-    is testable without network). Raises :class:`JWTVerificationError` on any
-    failure so callers never branch on authlib's internal exception types.
+    and standard-claim checks. The accepted ``algorithms`` are pinned (asymmetric
+    only by default) so the token header cannot downgrade verification to HMAC.
+    ``key_set`` is an imported JWKS (injected so this is testable without
+    network). Raises :class:`JWTVerificationError` on any failure so callers
+    never branch on authlib's internal exception types.
     """
+    decoder = JsonWebToken(algorithms or _DEFAULT_ALGORITHMS)
     try:
-        claims = jwt.decode(
+        claims = decoder.decode(
             token, key_set, claims_options=build_claims_options(issuer, audience)
         )
         claims.validate(now=int(time.time()))
diff --git a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/v2/test_jwt_verifier.py b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/v2/test_jwt_verifier.py
index a083b9875d4..3a02ff8bb72 100644
--- a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/v2/test_jwt_verifier.py
+++ b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/v2/test_jwt_verifier.py
@@ -82,3 +82,30 @@ def test_garbage_is_rejected(signing):
     _, _, key_set = signing
     with pytest.raises(JWTVerificationError):
         verify("not.a.jwt", key_set, ISSUER, AUDIENCE)
+
+
+def test_rs256_to_hs256_algorithm_confusion_is_rejected(signing):
+    # The JWKS holds an RSA public key. An attacker forges an HS256 token using
+    # that public key as the HMAC secret. Pinning to asymmetric algorithms must
+    # refuse it; accepting it would be a full authentication bypass.
+    import base64
+    import hashlib
+    import hmac
+
+    key, kid, key_set = signing
+    public_pem = key.as_pem(is_private=False)
+
+    def b64(raw: bytes) -> bytes:
+        return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw).rstrip(b"=")
+
+    header = b64(b'{"alg":"HS256","kid":"%s"}' % kid.encode())
+    payload = b64(
+        b'{"sub":"attacker","iss":"%s","aud":"%s","exp":9999999999}'
+        % (ISSUER.encode(), AUDIENCE.encode())
+    )
+    signing_input = header + b"." + payload
+    signature = b64(hmac.new(public_pem, signing_input, hashlib.sha256).digest())
+    forged = (signing_input + b"." + signature).decode("utf-8")
+
+    with pytest.raises(JWTVerificationError):
+        verify(forged, key_set, ISSUER, AUDIENCE)