diff --git a/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/discoverable_endpoints.py b/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/discoverable_endpoints.py
index e27589ff567..59707f240b9 100644
--- a/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/discoverable_endpoints.py
+++ b/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/discoverable_endpoints.py
@@ -46,9 +46,21 @@ def _validate_mcp_oauth_outbound_url(
     try:
         return validate_url(url)
     except SSRFError as exc:
+        # The /token and /register endpoints are reachable without an API key,
+        # so the error response goes to an unauthenticated caller. The raw
+        # SSRFError message includes the resolved IP — leaking it would tell
+        # the caller exactly which internal address the operator's IdP lives at,
+        # which is the reconnaissance the SSRF guard is meant to deny. Log the
+        # real reason for operators and return a generic message to the caller.
+        verbose_logger.warning(
+            "MCP OAuth %s URL blocked by SSRF validation: %s", role, exc
+        )
         raise HTTPException(
             status_code=400,
-            detail=f"Configured MCP {role} URL is not safe to call: {exc}",
+            detail=(
+                f"Configured MCP {role} URL is not safe to call: "
+                "the destination resolves to a blocked address."
+            ),
         )
 
 
diff --git a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/test_discoverable_endpoints.py b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/test_discoverable_endpoints.py
index 06926ecf9eb..6e4c2305e1c 100644
--- a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/test_discoverable_endpoints.py
+++ b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/test_discoverable_endpoints.py
@@ -2537,17 +2537,25 @@ class TestOutboundOAuthURLValidation:
                 "http://127.0.0.1:8080/token", role="token"
             )
         assert exc_info.value.status_code == 400
-        assert "token" in str(exc_info.value.detail)
+        detail = str(exc_info.value.detail)
+        assert "token" in detail
+        # The /token endpoint is unauthenticated — leaking the resolved IP
+        # would hand reconnaissance to the caller. Detail must stay generic.
+        assert "127.0.0.1" not in detail
+        assert "blocked address" in detail
 
     def test_validator_rejects_rfc1918_url(self):
         from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.discoverable_endpoints import (
             _validate_mcp_oauth_outbound_url,
         )
 
-        with pytest.raises(HTTPException):
+        with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
             _validate_mcp_oauth_outbound_url(
                 "http://192.168.1.10/oauth/register", role="registration"
             )
+        detail = str(exc_info.value.detail)
+        assert "192.168.1.10" not in detail
+        assert "registration" in detail
 
     def test_validator_passes_when_validation_disabled(self):
         # Operators who explicitly opt out via litellm.user_url_validation = False