diff --git a/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/bridge_token_flow.py b/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/bridge_token_flow.py index 2b13baa624b..37a893973e3 100644 --- a/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/bridge_token_flow.py +++ b/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/bridge_token_flow.py @@ -262,7 +262,12 @@ async def _reload_active_user_by_id(user_id: str) -> "_KeyResolutionFailure | No return loaded if isinstance(loaded, str) else None -async def load_active_user_by_id(user_id: str) -> "LiteLLM_UserTable | _KeyResolutionFailure": +UserRowSource = Literal["cache", "database"] + + +async def load_active_user_by_id( + user_id: str, source: UserRowSource = "cache" +) -> "LiteLLM_UserTable | _KeyResolutionFailure": """Load a live litellm user by id, returning the record when the user is active or a precise failure otherwise. The interactive DCR client authenticates via SSO, so its refresh envelope seals a user subject; renewing it must re-check the user is still live (present and not SCIM-deactivated) so a @@ -273,7 +278,11 @@ async def load_active_user_by_id(user_id: str) -> "LiteLLM_UserTable | _KeyResol ``HTTPException``, a SCIM-deactivated user, and, unlike the key path, a missing user. ``get_user_object`` catches every DB failure and re-raises a bare ``ValueError`` (a deleted user and a real outage look identical, the original error surviving only as ``__context__``), so the outage check walks the cause - chain, and a missing user falls through to ``no_active_key`` rather than an opaque gateway fault.""" + chain, and a missing user falls through to ``no_active_key`` rather than an opaque gateway fault. + ``source="database"`` reads the row from the database, never the cache, so the credential mint refuses + a user that a writer deactivated or deleted without evicting the cached row, and it leaves the fresh + row in the cache for the requests the credential makes next. Every other caller keeps the cache read, + so introspection, which a resource server may call per request, stays off the database.""" from litellm.proxy._types import ( ProxyException, # noqa: PLC0415 # inline import avoids a module-load circular import ) @@ -296,6 +305,7 @@ async def load_active_user_by_id(user_id: str) -> "LiteLLM_UserTable | _KeyResol prisma_client=prisma_client, user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache, user_id_upsert=False, + check_db_only=source == "database", ) except (ProxyException, HTTPException): return "no_active_key" diff --git a/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/discoverable_endpoints.py b/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/discoverable_endpoints.py index 7733ad1c522..64bab0a7832 100644 --- a/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/discoverable_endpoints.py +++ b/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/discoverable_endpoints.py @@ -59,6 +59,11 @@ from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.gateway_dcr_flow import ( register_aggregate_client, relative_request_url, revoke_refresh_token, + supported_grant_types, +) +from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.idp_token_exchange import ( + exchange_idp_subject_token, + token_exchange_available, ) from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.oauth_identity_binding import ( RefreshOwnershipProven, @@ -1980,6 +1985,9 @@ async def token_endpoint( refresh_token: str | None = Form(None), scope: str | None = Form(None), resource: str | None = Form(None), + subject_token: str | None = Form(None), + subject_token_type: str | None = Form(None), + requested_token_type: str | None = Form(None), mcp_server_name: str | None = None, ): """ @@ -2010,6 +2018,10 @@ async def token_endpoint( cache=user_api_key_cache, resource=resource, mint_proxy_credential=mint_proxy_credential, + subject_token=subject_token, + subject_token_type=subject_token_type, + requested_token_type=requested_token_type, + exchange_subject_token=exchange_idp_subject_token, ) lookup_name: Final = mcp_server_name or client_id @@ -2131,7 +2143,9 @@ async def introspect_endpoint(token: str = Form(...)) -> Response: async def native_client_auth_discovery(request: Request) -> JSONResponse: """The versioned contract a native client (``lite login --pkce``, or a CLI in any other language) reads to sign a user in through the browser and obtain a proxy credential.""" - return JSONResponse(native_client_auth_contract(request), headers=TOKEN_NO_CACHE_HEADERS) + return JSONResponse( + native_client_auth_contract(request, token_exchange_available()), headers=TOKEN_NO_CACHE_HEADERS + ) # Per RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1, an IdP that rejects an OAuth authorization request @@ -2619,7 +2633,7 @@ def _build_aggregate_protected_resource_response(request: Request) -> dict: } -def _build_aggregate_authorization_server_response(request: Request) -> dict: +def _build_aggregate_authorization_server_response(request: Request, token_exchange_available: bool) -> dict: """RFC 8414 metadata for the gateway as the aggregate authorization server. The issuer is ``{base}/mcp`` and must stay equal to the value the @@ -2638,7 +2652,7 @@ def _build_aggregate_authorization_server_response(request: Request) -> dict: "registration_endpoint": f"{request_base_url}/register", "response_types_supported": ["code"], "scopes_supported": [], - "grant_types_supported": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"], + "grant_types_supported": supported_grant_types(token_exchange_available), "code_challenge_methods_supported": ["S256"], "token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported": ["none", "client_secret_post"], } @@ -2676,7 +2690,7 @@ async def oauth_authorization_server_aggregate(request: Request): per-server row win here instead would serve an issuer of {base} against a resource that advertised {base}/mcp, which fails the RFC 8414 issuer check and breaks the front door. """ - return _build_aggregate_authorization_server_response(request) + return _build_aggregate_authorization_server_response(request, token_exchange_available()) # Standard MCP pattern: /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp/{server_name} @@ -2902,7 +2916,9 @@ async def register_client(request: Request, mcp_server_name: str | None = None): # advertises that), so this does not affect it. A request without redirect_uris is not # a DCR request, so the legacy single-server-or-dummy fallback is kept for it. if data.get("redirect_uris"): - return await register_aggregate_client(request=request, request_body=data) + return await register_aggregate_client( + request=request, request_body=data, token_exchange_available=token_exchange_available() + ) resolved: Final = _resolve_oauth2_server_for_root_endpoints(client_ip=client_ip) if resolved: return await register_client_with_server( diff --git a/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/gateway_dcr_flow.py b/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/gateway_dcr_flow.py index f3fdd54b39d..e66504af47a 100644 --- a/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/gateway_dcr_flow.py +++ b/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/gateway_dcr_flow.py @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ from urllib.parse import parse_qsl, urlencode, urlparse, urlunparse from fastapi import HTTPException, Request from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse, JSONResponse, RedirectResponse, Response from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field, ValidationError -from typing_extensions import ReadOnly, TypedDict, assert_never +from typing_extensions import NotRequired, ReadOnly, TypedDict, assert_never from litellm._logging import verbose_logger from litellm.caching.caching import DualCache @@ -187,6 +187,52 @@ class MintProxyCredential(Protocol): ) -> Awaitable[MintedProxyCredential | ProxyCredentialMintFailure]: ... +TOKEN_EXCHANGE_GRANT_TYPE: Final = "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange" + + +def supported_grant_types(token_exchange_available: bool) -> tuple[str, ...]: + """The grants ``/token`` can serve on this deployment. The RFC 8693 exchange is listed + only where the JWT auth that proves a subject token is on, backed by a database, and + licensed, so a client never selects a grant the gateway would then refuse.""" + if token_exchange_available: + return ("authorization_code", "refresh_token", TOKEN_EXCHANGE_GRANT_TYPE) + return ("authorization_code", "refresh_token") + + +"""RFC 8693: a native client that already holds a token from the customer's identity +provider trades it for the proxy-API credential without a browser round trip.""" + +_IssuedTokenType = Literal["urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token"] +ACCESS_TOKEN_TOKEN_TYPE: Final[_IssuedTokenType] = "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token" +SUBJECT_TOKEN_TYPES: Final = frozenset( + { + "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:jwt", + "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:id_token", + ACCESS_TOKEN_TOKEN_TYPE, + } +) + + +class SubjectIdentity(BaseModel): + model_config = ConfigDict(frozen=True) + user_id: str = Field(min_length=1) + team_id: str | None = None + + +class SubjectTokenRefusal(BaseModel): + model_config = ConfigDict(frozen=True) + error: Literal["unsupported_grant_type", "invalid_request", "temporarily_unavailable"] + description: str = Field(min_length=1) + + +class ExchangeSubjectToken(Protocol): + """Injected RFC 8693 subject-token verifier ``(subject_token, request)``: proves the + IdP token the way the proxy's own JWT auth does and names the litellm user and team it + stands for, or says why this gateway will not take it.""" + + def __call__(self, subject_token: str, request: Request, /) -> Awaitable[SubjectIdentity | SubjectTokenRefusal]: ... + + class ConsentTeam(BaseModel): model_config = ConfigDict(frozen=True) team_id: str = Field(min_length=1) @@ -213,6 +259,12 @@ async def _refuse_proxy_credential(user_id: str, team_id: str | None) -> ProxyCr return "unresolvable" +async def _refuse_subject_token(subject_token: str, request: Request) -> SubjectTokenRefusal: + return SubjectTokenRefusal( + error="unsupported_grant_type", description="this gateway is not configured to exchange IdP tokens" + ) + + async def _unavailable_vendor_credential(user_id: str, server_id: str) -> VendorCredentialState: return "unavailable" @@ -318,7 +370,9 @@ def open_gateway_dcr_client(client_id: str) -> GatewayDcrClient | None: return _open_sealed(client_id, GATEWAY_DCR_CLIENT_ID_PREFIX, GatewayDcrClient, _CLIENT_RECORD_DEBUG_KEY) -async def register_aggregate_client(request: Request, request_body: Mapping[str, object]) -> Response: +async def register_aggregate_client( + request: Request, request_body: Mapping[str, object], token_exchange_available: bool +) -> Response: """RFC 7591 dynamic registration against the gateway itself, statelessly. Only ``redirect_uris`` is authoritative; every client is registered as a public @@ -382,7 +436,7 @@ async def register_aggregate_client(request: Request, request_body: Mapping[str, "client_id_issued_at": int(now.timestamp()), "redirect_uris": list(raw_uris), "token_endpoint_auth_method": "none", - "grant_types": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"], + "grant_types": list(supported_grant_types(token_exchange_available)), "response_types": ["code"], }, ) @@ -580,7 +634,7 @@ class NativeClientAuthContract(TypedDict): revocation_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: ReadOnly[tuple[str, ...]] -def native_client_auth_contract(request: Request) -> NativeClientAuthContract: +def native_client_auth_contract(request: Request, token_exchange_available: bool) -> NativeClientAuthContract: """The versioned discovery document at ``/.well-known/litellm-cli-auth``: everything a native client (in any language) needs to run the sign-in without reading LiteLLM source. ``resource`` is the exact value to send as the RFC 8707 ``resource`` parameter @@ -595,7 +649,7 @@ def native_client_auth_contract(request: Request) -> NativeClientAuthContract: "revocation_endpoint": f"{base_url}/revoke", "resource": base_url, "response_types_supported": ("code",), - "grant_types_supported": ("authorization_code", "refresh_token"), + "grant_types_supported": supported_grant_types(token_exchange_available), "code_challenge_methods_supported": ("S256",), "token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported": ("none",), "revocation_endpoint_auth_methods_supported": ("none",), @@ -1033,20 +1087,26 @@ class _ProxyCredentialTokenResponse(TypedDict): refresh_token: ReadOnly[str] user_id: ReadOnly[str] team_id: ReadOnly[str | None] + issued_token_type: NotRequired[ReadOnly[_IssuedTokenType]] def _proxy_credential_response( - minted: MintedProxyCredential, principal: SessionPrincipal, keys: SessionSigningKeys, now: datetime + minted: MintedProxyCredential, + principal: SessionPrincipal, + keys: SessionSigningKeys, + now: datetime, + issued_token_type: _IssuedTokenType | None = None, ) -> Response: """The proxy-API token response: the access token is the very credential ``lite login`` stores (accepted on every proxy route with user and team attribution), and the refresh token is a gateway-sealed rotating token bound to the team the credential - was minted for, so a renewal keeps the team the user consented to.""" + was minted for, so a renewal keeps the team the user consented to. A token exchange + also states ``issued_token_type``, which RFC 8693 section 2.2.1 requires.""" bound_principal: Final = principal.model_copy(update=MappingProxyType({"team_id": minted.team_id})) refresh: Final = mint_session_refresh_token(bound_principal, keys, now) if not isinstance(refresh, MintedSessionToken): return _oauth_error(500, "server_error", "failed to mint the session credential") - body: Final[_ProxyCredentialTokenResponse] = { + credential: Final[_ProxyCredentialTokenResponse] = { "access_token": minted.key, "token_type": "Bearer", "expires_in": minted.expires_in, @@ -1054,7 +1114,10 @@ def _proxy_credential_response( "user_id": minted.user_id, "team_id": minted.team_id, } - return JSONResponse(status_code=200, content=body, headers=TOKEN_NO_CACHE_HEADERS) + if issued_token_type is None: + return JSONResponse(status_code=200, content=credential, headers=TOKEN_NO_CACHE_HEADERS) + exchanged: Final[_ProxyCredentialTokenResponse] = {**credential, "issued_token_type": issued_token_type} + return JSONResponse(status_code=200, content=exchanged, headers=TOKEN_NO_CACHE_HEADERS) def _reload_failure_response(failure: ReloadUserFailure) -> Response: @@ -1073,6 +1136,16 @@ def _reload_failure_response(failure: ReloadUserFailure) -> Response: assert_never(failure) +def _subject_token_refusal_response(refusal: SubjectTokenRefusal) -> Response: + match refusal.error: + case "temporarily_unavailable": + return _oauth_error(503, refusal.error, refusal.description) + case "unsupported_grant_type" | "invalid_request": + return _oauth_error(400, refusal.error, refusal.description) + case _: + assert_never(refusal.error) + + def _mint_failure_response(failure: ProxyCredentialMintFailure) -> Response: match failure: case "not_a_member": @@ -1116,11 +1189,16 @@ async def aggregate_token( cache: DualCache, resource: str | None = None, mint_proxy_credential: MintProxyCredential = _refuse_proxy_credential, + subject_token: str | None = None, + subject_token_type: str | None = None, + requested_token_type: str | None = None, + exchange_subject_token: ExchangeSubjectToken = _refuse_subject_token, ) -> Response: """The aggregate token verb: authorization_code and refresh_token grants for the identity-only session pair, or for the proxy-API credential when the grant was issued - with that audience. Every path re-validates the litellm user live before minting, so a - deactivated user cannot obtain or renew a session.""" + with that audience, and the RFC 8693 token exchange that turns an IdP token straight + into the proxy-API credential. Every path re-validates the litellm user live before + minting, so a deactivated user cannot obtain or renew a session.""" if master_key is None: verbose_logger.error("mcp_gateway_dcr token grant rejected: no master_key configured") return _oauth_error(500, "server_error", "the gateway has no master key configured") @@ -1159,7 +1237,20 @@ async def aggregate_token( now=now, issue=issue, ) - return _oauth_error(400, "unsupported_grant_type", "grant_type must be authorization_code or refresh_token") + if grant_type == TOKEN_EXCHANGE_GRANT_TYPE: + return await _token_exchange_grant( + subject_token=subject_token, + subject_token_type=subject_token_type, + requested_token_type=requested_token_type, + client_id=client_id, + exchange_subject_token=exchange_subject_token, + issue=issue, + ) + return _oauth_error( + 400, + "unsupported_grant_type", + f"grant_type must be authorization_code, refresh_token, or {TOKEN_EXCHANGE_GRANT_TYPE}", + ) class _GrantIssuer: @@ -1211,10 +1302,9 @@ class _GrantIssuer: async def _issue_proxy_credential( self, principal: SessionPrincipal, claim_key: str, claim_ttl_seconds: int, replayed: str ) -> Response: - if self._resource is not None and not is_proxy_api_resource(self._request, self._resource): - return _oauth_error( - 400, "invalid_target", "resource does not match the proxy API this grant was issued for" - ) + target_refusal: Final = self._proxy_api_target_refusal() + if target_refusal is not None: + return target_refusal minted: Final = await self._mint_proxy_credential(principal.user_id, principal.team_id) if not isinstance(minted, MintedProxyCredential): return _mint_failure_response(minted) @@ -1223,6 +1313,33 @@ class _GrantIssuer: return refusal return _proxy_credential_response(minted, principal, self._keys, self._now) + async def exchange( + self, subject_token: str, client_id: str, exchange_subject_token: ExchangeSubjectToken + ) -> Response: + """The RFC 8693 tail: prove the IdP token, then mint. No single-use marker, because + the subject token stays a valid proof for as long as the IdP says it is and every + exchange mints a fresh credential and refresh token of its own.""" + target_refusal: Final = self._proxy_api_target_refusal() + if target_refusal is not None: + return target_refusal + identity: Final = await exchange_subject_token(subject_token, self._request) + if isinstance(identity, SubjectTokenRefusal): + return _subject_token_refusal_response(identity) + principal: Final = SessionPrincipal( + user_id=identity.user_id, client_id=client_id, audience=PROXY_API_AUDIENCE, team_id=identity.team_id + ) + minted: Final = await self._mint_proxy_credential(principal.user_id, principal.team_id) + if not isinstance(minted, MintedProxyCredential): + return _mint_failure_response(minted) + return _proxy_credential_response( + minted, principal, self._keys, self._now, issued_token_type=ACCESS_TOKEN_TOKEN_TYPE + ) + + def _proxy_api_target_refusal(self) -> Response | None: + if self._resource is None or is_proxy_api_resource(self._request, self._resource): + return None + return _oauth_error(400, "invalid_target", "resource does not match the proxy API this grant was issued for") + async def _claim_refusal(self, claim_key: str, claim_ttl_seconds: int, replayed: str) -> Response | None: return _claim_refusal( await self._guard.claim(claim_key, claim_ttl_seconds), replayed=_oauth_error(400, "invalid_grant", replayed) @@ -1297,6 +1414,32 @@ async def _refresh_token_grant( ) +async def _token_exchange_grant( + subject_token: str | None, + subject_token_type: str | None, + requested_token_type: str | None, + client_id: str, + exchange_subject_token: ExchangeSubjectToken, + issue: _GrantIssuer, +) -> Response: + """RFC 8693 token exchange for a registered native client that already holds an IdP + token: the gateway proves the token the way its JWT auth does and answers with the + proxy-API credential, so a fresh laptop with only an IdP login gets a gateway key + without a browser round trip. The client must be registered because the refresh token + in the answer is bound to it.""" + if not is_gateway_dcr_client_id(client_id) or open_gateway_dcr_client(client_id) is None: + return _oauth_error(401, "invalid_client", "unknown or malformed client_id") + if not subject_token or not subject_token_type: + return _oauth_error(400, "invalid_request", "subject_token and subject_token_type are required") + if subject_token_type not in SUBJECT_TOKEN_TYPES: + return _oauth_error( + 400, "invalid_request", f"subject_token_type must be one of {', '.join(sorted(SUBJECT_TOKEN_TYPES))}" + ) + if requested_token_type is not None and requested_token_type != ACCESS_TOKEN_TOKEN_TYPE: + return _oauth_error(400, "invalid_request", f"requested_token_type must be {ACCESS_TOKEN_TOKEN_TYPE}") + return await issue.exchange(subject_token, client_id, exchange_subject_token) + + async def revoke_refresh_token(token: str, client_id: str, master_key: str | None, cache: DualCache) -> Response: """RFC 7009 revocation for the gateway's refresh tokens: burn the presented token's ``jti`` so neither the holder nor a thief can rotate it again. Access tokens are diff --git a/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/idp_token_exchange.py b/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/idp_token_exchange.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..80868296b50 --- /dev/null +++ b/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/idp_token_exchange.py @@ -0,0 +1,217 @@ +"""The identity-provider side of the RFC 8693 token exchange on ``POST /token``: a native +client that already holds a JWT from the customer's IdP trades it for the same proxy-API +credential ``lite login`` stores, proven by the proxy's own JWT auth (signature, claims, +and the user and team sync it performs), so no browser round trip is needed.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +from collections.abc import Awaitable, Callable, Mapping +from dataclasses import dataclass +from typing import Final, Literal, Protocol + +from fastapi import HTTPException, Request +from typing_extensions import assert_never + +from litellm._logging import verbose_proxy_logger +from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.gateway_dcr_flow import SubjectIdentity, SubjectTokenRefusal +from litellm.proxy._types import JWTAuthBuilderResult, ProxyException +from litellm.proxy.auth.handle_jwt import JWTAuthManager, JWTHandler +from litellm.proxy.db.exception_handler import PrismaDBExceptionHandler + +EXCHANGE_ROUTE: Final = "/token" +REJECTED_SUBJECT_TOKEN: Final = "subject_token was rejected by the gateway's JWT auth" +SUBJECT_TOKEN_CHECK_UNAVAILABLE: Final = ( + "the gateway could not verify subject_token because its identity provider or database is unavailable; retry" +) +SUBJECT_TOKEN_CHECK_FAULTED: Final = ( + "the gateway could not verify subject_token because its database reported a fault that is not a transient " + "outage; retrying will not help until the gateway deployment is repaired" +) +GatewayOutage = Literal["retryable", "faulted"] + + +@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True) +class TokenExchangePrerequisites: + """The deployment-level gates ``user_api_key_auth`` applies before it verifies any JWT + bearer, plus the JWT-to-virtual-key mapping it consults first: a gateway that maps + tokens authenticates a JWT as its mapped key, with that key's models and budget, or + refuses an unmapped one, and the exchange proves the token through ``auth_builder`` + alone, so it would mint the user's own credential past that policy. Discovery and + registration advertise the exchange grant only when every gate holds, and an exchange + attempt is refused naming the first one that does not.""" + + jwt_auth_enabled: bool + has_database: bool + licensed: bool + maps_jwts_to_virtual_keys: bool + + @property + def available(self) -> bool: + return self.jwt_auth_enabled and self.has_database and self.licensed and not self.maps_jwts_to_virtual_keys + + def refusal(self) -> SubjectTokenRefusal | None: + if not self.jwt_auth_enabled: + return SubjectTokenRefusal( + error="unsupported_grant_type", + description="JWT auth is not enabled on this gateway, so it cannot exchange IdP tokens", + ) + if not self.has_database: + return SubjectTokenRefusal( + error="unsupported_grant_type", + description="this gateway has no database, so it cannot exchange IdP tokens", + ) + if not self.licensed: + return SubjectTokenRefusal( + error="unsupported_grant_type", + description="JWT auth is an enterprise only feature; no license is set", + ) + if self.maps_jwts_to_virtual_keys: + return SubjectTokenRefusal( + error="unsupported_grant_type", + description="this gateway maps IdP tokens to virtual keys, which the exchange does not serve", + ) + return None + + +def read_token_exchange_prerequisites() -> TokenExchangePrerequisites: + from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import ( # noqa: PLC0415 # rebound after startup, so read them per call + general_settings, + jwt_handler, + premium_user, + prisma_client, + ) + + return TokenExchangePrerequisites( + jwt_auth_enabled=general_settings.get("enable_jwt_auth", False) is True, + has_database=prisma_client is not None, + licensed=premium_user is True, + maps_jwts_to_virtual_keys=_maps_jwts_to_virtual_keys(jwt_handler), + ) + + +def _maps_jwts_to_virtual_keys(jwt_handler: JWTHandler) -> bool: + if not hasattr(jwt_handler, "litellm_jwtauth"): + return False + return jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth.is_virtual_key_mapping_configured() + + +def token_exchange_available() -> bool: + return read_token_exchange_prerequisites().available + + +class AuthorizeSubjectToken(Protocol): + """Injected JWT authorization ``(subject_token, request_headers)``: the proxy's + ``JWTAuthManager.auth_builder`` in production, which raises when the token is not + acceptable and otherwise names the user and team it resolved.""" + + def __call__( + self, subject_token: str, request_headers: Mapping[str, str], / + ) -> Awaitable[JWTAuthBuilderResult]: ... + + +async def exchange_idp_subject_token(subject_token: str, request: Request) -> SubjectIdentity | SubjectTokenRefusal: + from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import ( # noqa: PLC0415 # rebound after startup, so read them per call + general_settings, + jwt_handler, + prisma_client, + proxy_logging_obj, + user_api_key_cache, + ) + + async def authorize(token: str, request_headers: Mapping[str, str]) -> JWTAuthBuilderResult: + return await JWTAuthManager.auth_builder( + api_key=token, + jwt_handler=jwt_handler, + request_data={}, + general_settings=general_settings, + route=EXCHANGE_ROUTE, + prisma_client=prisma_client, + user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache, + parent_otel_span=None, + proxy_logging_obj=proxy_logging_obj, + request_headers=request_headers, + request_method="POST", + ) + + return await identity_from_subject_token( + subject_token, + request_headers=request.headers, + prerequisites=read_token_exchange_prerequisites(), + is_jwt=jwt_handler.is_jwt, + authorize=authorize, + ) + + +async def identity_from_subject_token( + subject_token: str, + request_headers: Mapping[str, str], + prerequisites: TokenExchangePrerequisites, + is_jwt: Callable[[str], bool], + authorize: AuthorizeSubjectToken, +) -> SubjectIdentity | SubjectTokenRefusal: + """Apply the same gates ``user_api_key_auth`` applies to a JWT bearer, then let the + proxy's JWT auth prove the token. A rejection comes back as ``invalid_request``, which + RFC 8693 section 2.2.2 prescribes for an invalid or unacceptable subject token, and a + check the gateway could not complete (the IdP's JWKS unreachable with no cached copy, + the auth database down) as ``temporarily_unavailable``, so the client retries instead + of treating a valid token as bad, worded by whether retrying can help. The reason stays + in the proxy log: this endpoint is public and JWT auth's own wording can name the JWKS + URL it fetched or quote the IdP's response.""" + unmet: Final = prerequisites.refusal() + if unmet is not None: + return unmet + if not is_jwt(subject_token): + return SubjectTokenRefusal(error="invalid_request", description="subject_token is not a JWT") + try: + result: Final = await authorize(subject_token, request_headers) + except HTTPException as denied: + return _refusal_for(denied, denied.detail) + except ProxyException as denied: + return _refusal_for(denied, denied.message) + except Exception as denied: # noqa: BLE001 # auth_jwt raises a plain Exception on signature and claim failures + return _refusal_for(denied, denied) + user_id: Final = result["user_id"] + if user_id is None: + return SubjectTokenRefusal(error="invalid_request", description="subject_token names no user the gateway knows") + return SubjectIdentity(user_id=user_id, team_id=result["team_id"]) + + +def _refusal_for(denied: Exception, reason: object) -> SubjectTokenRefusal: + outage: Final = _gateway_could_not_verify(denied) + if outage is None: + verbose_proxy_logger.warning("token exchange refused a subject_token: %s", reason) + return SubjectTokenRefusal(error="invalid_request", description=REJECTED_SUBJECT_TOKEN) + verbose_proxy_logger.error("token exchange could not verify a subject_token, %s: %s", outage, reason) + return SubjectTokenRefusal(error="temporarily_unavailable", description=_check_unavailable_description(outage)) + + +def _check_unavailable_description(outage: GatewayOutage) -> str: + match outage: + case "retryable": + return SUBJECT_TOKEN_CHECK_UNAVAILABLE + case "faulted": + return SUBJECT_TOKEN_CHECK_FAULTED + case _: + assert_never(outage) + + +def _gateway_could_not_verify(denied: Exception) -> GatewayOutage | None: + """A database fault anywhere in the chain (``get_user_object`` wraps prisma failures in a + bare ``ValueError``) or a 5xx from JWT auth (the IdP's JWKS unreachable with no cached + copy) is the gateway failing, not the token. A fault retrying cannot clear (a missing or + version-skewed query engine) is named as such, the way the mint path words it, so the + client is not told to wait on a deployment that needs repair.""" + fault: Final = PrismaDBExceptionHandler.find_database_service_unavailable_error_in_chain(denied) + if fault is not None: + return "faulted" if PrismaDBExceptionHandler.is_permanent_database_fault(fault) else "retryable" + return "retryable" if _is_server_error(denied) else None + + +def _is_server_error(denied: Exception) -> bool: + match denied: + case HTTPException(status_code=status_code): + return status_code >= 500 + case ProxyException(code=code): + return code.isdigit() and int(code) >= 500 + case _: + return False diff --git a/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/proxy_api_credentials.py b/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/proxy_api_credentials.py index 27d0ebbd5e6..2f7fcaef645 100644 --- a/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/proxy_api_credentials.py +++ b/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/proxy_api_credentials.py @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.gateway_dcr_flow import ( ReloadUserFailure, ) from litellm.proxy._types import LiteLLM_UserTable -from litellm.proxy.auth.auth_checks import ExperimentalUIJWTToken +from litellm.proxy.auth.auth_checks import ExperimentalUIJWTToken, effective_user_role from litellm.proxy.management_endpoints.ui_sso import ( CliSsoTeamDetail, fetch_cli_sso_team_details, @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ async def mint_proxy_credential( user_id: str, team_id: str | None ) -> MintedProxyCredential | ProxyCredentialMintFailure: """Mint the ``lite login`` credential for a consented grant. Membership is checked - live, so a team the user left between consent and redemption (or between refreshes) + live against the database row, so a team the user left between consent and redemption (or between refreshes) refuses the grant instead of minting a credential attributed to a team they are no longer on. The team is exactly the one the consent page sealed into the grant; nothing is picked on the user's behalf here, so a refresh can never move the credential, and a @@ -51,12 +51,12 @@ async def mint_proxy_credential( posting the consent form without one. Memberships whose team rows are gone count as no team at all, the way ``lite login`` treats them, so they can never lock a user out. The user row handed to the minter carries no team list, exactly like ``lite login``'s, so - the minter's own first-team fallback stays inert.""" - user: Final = await load_active_user_by_id(user_id) + the minter's own first-team fallback stays inert. The credential carries the role the + proxy already enforces for the user on every request, so a row with no role (JWT auth's + upsert writes none) mints as an internal user instead of being refused.""" + user: Final = await load_active_user_by_id(user_id, source="database") if isinstance(user, str): return user - if user.user_role is None: - return "no_active_key" if team_id is not None and team_id not in user.teams: return "not_a_member" details: Final = await _team_details(user.teams) if user.teams else () @@ -68,7 +68,9 @@ async def mint_proxy_credential( if selected is None: return "not_a_member" key: Final = ExperimentalUIJWTToken.get_cli_jwt_auth_token( - user_info=LiteLLM_UserTable(user_id=user.user_id, user_role=user.user_role, models=user.models), + user_info=LiteLLM_UserTable( + user_id=user.user_id, user_role=effective_user_role(user.user_role).value, models=user.models + ), team_id=team_id, team_alias=selected.team_alias, team_models=selected.team_models, diff --git a/litellm/proxy/_lazy_openapi_snapshot.json b/litellm/proxy/_lazy_openapi_snapshot.json index 8241e073935..73ea8cf1991 100644 --- a/litellm/proxy/_lazy_openapi_snapshot.json +++ b/litellm/proxy/_lazy_openapi_snapshot.json @@ -23684,6 +23684,17 @@ ], "title": "Refresh Token" }, + "requested_token_type": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "title": "Requested Token Type" + }, "resource": { "anyOf": [ { @@ -23705,6 +23716,28 @@ } ], "title": "Scope" + }, + "subject_token": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "title": "Subject Token" + }, + "subject_token_type": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "title": "Subject Token Type" } }, "required": [ @@ -23758,6 +23791,17 @@ ], "title": "Refresh Token" }, + "requested_token_type": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "title": "Requested Token Type" + }, "resource": { "anyOf": [ { @@ -23779,6 +23823,28 @@ } ], "title": "Scope" + }, + "subject_token": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "title": "Subject Token" + }, + "subject_token_type": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "title": "Subject Token Type" } }, "required": [ diff --git a/litellm/proxy/_types.py b/litellm/proxy/_types.py index 9d951d116fa..6322a1212fe 100644 --- a/litellm/proxy/_types.py +++ b/litellm/proxy/_types.py @@ -534,6 +534,7 @@ class LiteLLMRoutes(enum.Enum): "/mcp-rest/tools/call", "/v1/mcp/tools", "/introspect", + "/token", ] # MCP server CRUD routes — control-plane. Gated by DISABLE_ADMIN_ENDPOINTS. diff --git a/litellm/proxy/auth/auth_checks.py b/litellm/proxy/auth/auth_checks.py index 4de00f19db3..76f594f1c19 100644 --- a/litellm/proxy/auth/auth_checks.py +++ b/litellm/proxy/auth/auth_checks.py @@ -1216,21 +1216,19 @@ async def common_checks( return True +def effective_user_role(user_role: str | None) -> LitellmUserRoles: + try: + return LitellmUserRoles(user_role) + except ValueError: + return LitellmUserRoles.INTERNAL_USER + + def _get_user_role( user_obj: LiteLLM_UserTable | None, ) -> LitellmUserRoles | None: if user_obj is None: return None - - _user: Final = user_obj - - _user_role: Final = _user.user_role - try: - role: Final = LitellmUserRoles(_user_role) - except ValueError: - return LitellmUserRoles.INTERNAL_USER - - return role + return effective_user_role(user_obj.user_role) def _is_api_route_allowed( @@ -2577,7 +2575,7 @@ async def get_user_object( raise Exception("No db connected") try: db_access_time_key: Final = f"user_id:{user_id}" - should_check_db: Final = _should_check_db( + should_check_db: Final = bool(check_db_only) or _should_check_db( key=db_access_time_key, last_db_access_time=last_db_access_time, db_cache_expiry=db_cache_expiry, diff --git a/litellm/proxy/auth/handle_jwt.py b/litellm/proxy/auth/handle_jwt.py index 6a28cd7ff99..803093ff93a 100644 --- a/litellm/proxy/auth/handle_jwt.py +++ b/litellm/proxy/auth/handle_jwt.py @@ -1867,7 +1867,7 @@ class JWTAuthManager: @staticmethod def get_team_id_from_header( - request_headers: dict | None, + request_headers: Mapping[str, str] | None, allowed_team_ids: set[str], fallback_to_db_teams: bool = False, ) -> str | None: @@ -2037,7 +2037,7 @@ class JWTAuthManager: async def _attach_team_from_header_for_admin( admin_result: JWTAuthBuilderResult, route: str, - request_headers: dict | None, + request_headers: Mapping[str, str] | None, jwt_handler: JWTHandler, prisma_client: PrismaClient | None, user_api_key_cache: UserApiKeyCache, @@ -2293,7 +2293,7 @@ class JWTAuthManager: user_api_key_cache: UserApiKeyCache, parent_otel_span: Span | None, proxy_logging_obj: ProxyLogging, - request_headers: dict | None = None, + request_headers: Mapping[str, str] | None = None, request_method: str | None = None, ) -> JWTAuthBuilderResult: return await JWTAuthManager.authorize_jwt( @@ -2390,7 +2390,7 @@ class JWTAuthManager: user_api_key_cache: UserApiKeyCache, parent_otel_span: Span | None, proxy_logging_obj: ProxyLogging, - request_headers: dict[str, str] | None = None, + request_headers: Mapping[str, str] | None = None, request_method: str | None = None, provisioning: _JWTProvisioning | None = None, ) -> JWTAuthBuilderResult: diff --git a/litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/team_endpoints.py b/litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/team_endpoints.py index 28c12173ea7..9ff00922de4 100644 --- a/litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/team_endpoints.py +++ b/litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/team_endpoints.py @@ -3335,6 +3335,7 @@ async def team_member_add( ``` """ + from litellm.proxy.common_utils.auth_cache_invalidation_pubsub import evict_and_broadcast from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import ( litellm_proxy_admin_name, premium_user, @@ -3429,6 +3430,10 @@ async def team_member_add( litellm_proxy_admin_name=litellm_proxy_admin_name, ) + await evict_and_broadcast( + cache_keys=tuple(sorted(user.user_id for user in updated_users)), + user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache, + ) await _evict_created_membership_caches( user_ids=(tm.user_id for tm in updated_team_memberships), team_id=data.team_id, diff --git a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/test_discoverable_endpoints.py b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/test_discoverable_endpoints.py index aa45b2f6793..d7666f5e694 100644 --- a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/test_discoverable_endpoints.py +++ b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/test_discoverable_endpoints.py @@ -7568,6 +7568,69 @@ async def test_reload_active_user_by_id_permanent_engine_fault_is_faulted(proxy_ assert await _reload_active_user_by_id("sso-user-7") == "faulted" +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_load_active_user_by_id_reads_the_row_from_the_database_not_the_cache(proxy_globals): + """JWT auth caches the user it creates before it adds that user to the JWT's team, and adding a + member never evicts the cached row, so a credential minted off the cached row refused the very first + token exchange as not a member. The database source has to read the row from the database and leave + the fresh row in the cache for the requests the credential makes next.""" + from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.bridge_token_flow import load_active_user_by_id + from litellm.proxy._types import LiteLLM_UserTable + from litellm.proxy.common_utils.user_api_key_cache import UserApiKeyCache + + cache = UserApiKeyCache() + await cache.async_set_cache( + key="fresh-jwt-user", value=LiteLLM_UserTable(user_id="fresh-jwt-user", teams=[]), model_type=LiteLLM_UserTable + ) + prisma = MagicMock() + prisma.db.litellm_usertable.find_unique = AsyncMock( + return_value=LiteLLM_UserTable(user_id="fresh-jwt-user", teams=["team-a"]) + ) + proxy_globals.user_api_key_cache = cache + proxy_globals.prisma_client = prisma + + loaded = await load_active_user_by_id("fresh-jwt-user", source="database") + + assert not isinstance(loaded, str) + assert loaded.teams == ["team-a"] + cached = await cache.async_get_cache(key="fresh-jwt-user", model_type=LiteLLM_UserTable) + assert cached is not None + assert cached.teams == ["team-a"] + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_load_active_user_by_id_serves_a_cached_row_without_a_database_read(proxy_globals): + """Introspection and refresh revalidation run per call, so the loader's default source is the cache: a + cached row answers without a database read, and only a caller that asks for the database row pays for + one.""" + from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.bridge_token_flow import ( + _reload_active_user_by_id, + load_active_user_by_id, + ) + from litellm.proxy._types import LiteLLM_UserTable + from litellm.proxy.common_utils.user_api_key_cache import UserApiKeyCache + + cache = UserApiKeyCache() + await cache.async_set_cache( + key="cached-jwt-user", + value=LiteLLM_UserTable(user_id="cached-jwt-user", teams=["team-a"]), + model_type=LiteLLM_UserTable, + ) + prisma = MagicMock() + prisma.db.litellm_usertable.find_unique = AsyncMock( + return_value=LiteLLM_UserTable(user_id="cached-jwt-user", teams=[]) + ) + proxy_globals.user_api_key_cache = cache + proxy_globals.prisma_client = prisma + + loaded = await load_active_user_by_id("cached-jwt-user") + + assert not isinstance(loaded, str) + assert loaded.teams == ["team-a"] + assert await _reload_active_user_by_id("cached-jwt-user") is None + prisma.db.litellm_usertable.find_unique.assert_not_awaited() + + @pytest.mark.asyncio async def test_token_endpoint_uses_client_secret_basic_when_configured(): """LIT-4091: a server with token_endpoint_auth_method=client_secret_basic must send the @@ -11048,6 +11111,43 @@ def test_native_client_login_walks_discovery_consent_token_refresh_and_revoke(mo assert stranger.json()["error"] == "invalid_client" +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "jwt_auth_enabled, virtual_key_claim_field, exchange_servable", + [(True, None, True), (False, None, False), (True, "client_id", False)], + ids=["jwt auth on", "jwt auth off", "jwts mapped to virtual keys"], +) +def test_discovery_advertises_the_exchange_grant_only_where_the_gateway_can_serve_it( + monkeypatch, jwt_auth_enabled, virtual_key_claim_field, exchange_servable +): + """Every document a native client reads before it picks a grant (the versioned contract, the + aggregate authorization-server metadata, and the registration response) lists the RFC 8693 + exchange exactly when the running proxy can serve it: JWT auth on, a database, a license, and + no JWT-to-virtual-key mapping, since the exchange would mint past the mapped key's policy.""" + from litellm.caching.caching import DualCache + from litellm.proxy._types import LiteLLM_JWTAuth + from litellm.proxy.auth.handle_jwt import JWTHandler + + client, _session_cookie, _minted = _native_client_app(monkeypatch) + handler: Final = JWTHandler() + handler.update_environment( + prisma_client=None, + user_api_key_cache=DualCache(), + litellm_jwtauth=LiteLLM_JWTAuth(virtual_key_claim_field=virtual_key_claim_field), + ) + monkeypatch.setattr("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.jwt_handler", handler) + monkeypatch.setattr("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.general_settings", {"enable_jwt_auth": jwt_auth_enabled}) + monkeypatch.setattr("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.prisma_client", object()) + monkeypatch.setattr("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.premium_user", True) + exchange_grant = ["urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange"] if exchange_servable else [] + expected = ["authorization_code", "refresh_token", *exchange_grant] + + assert client.get("/.well-known/litellm-cli-auth").json()["grant_types_supported"] == expected + assert client.get("/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/mcp").json()["grant_types_supported"] == expected + registered = client.post("/register", json={"redirect_uris": ["http://127.0.0.1:51234/callback"]}) + assert registered.status_code == 201 + assert registered.json()["grant_types"] == expected + + def test_native_client_authorize_without_the_proxy_resource_keeps_the_mcp_flow(monkeypatch): """A registered client asking for the MCP resource (or no resource) never sees the consent page, so existing MCP clients are untouched by the native-client arm.""" @@ -11847,13 +11947,17 @@ async def test_oauth_refresh_revalidates_the_same_active_user_rule( from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.bridge_token_flow import _reload_active_user_by_id handler, _ = jwt_oauth_identity - handler.user_api_key_cache.set_cache( - "jwt-owner", LiteLLM_UserTable(user_id="jwt-owner", metadata={"scim_active": state != "inactive"}) - ) + user_id: Final = f"jwt-owner-{state}" + row: Final = LiteLLM_UserTable(user_id=user_id, metadata={"scim_active": state != "inactive"}) + proxy_server.prisma_client.db.litellm_usertable.find_unique = AsyncMock(return_value=row) if state == "missing_database": monkeypatch.setattr(proxy_server, "prisma_client", None) expected: Final = None if state == "active" else "no_active_key" if state == "inactive" else "unresolvable" - assert await _reload_active_user_by_id("jwt-owner") == expected + assert await _reload_active_user_by_id(user_id) == expected + if state != "missing_database": + cached: Final = handler.user_api_key_cache.get_cache(user_id, model_type=LiteLLM_UserTable) + assert cached is not None + assert cached.metadata == row.metadata @pytest.mark.asyncio diff --git a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/test_gateway_dcr_flow.py b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/test_gateway_dcr_flow.py index 7c80ee77cd7..2943ff4b74a 100644 --- a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/test_gateway_dcr_flow.py +++ b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/test_gateway_dcr_flow.py @@ -15,13 +15,18 @@ from starlette.requests import Request from litellm.caching.caching import DualCache from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.gateway_dcr_flow import ( _AUTH_CODE_DEBUG_KEY, + ACCESS_TOKEN_TOKEN_TYPE, CONNECT_FLOW_COOKIE_PREFIX, GATEWAY_AUTH_CODE_PREFIX, GATEWAY_AUTH_CODE_TTL_SECONDS, MANUAL_DELIVERY_AUTH_CODE_TTL_SECONDS, MAX_CLIENT_ID_LENGTH, + SUBJECT_TOKEN_TYPES, + TOKEN_EXCHANGE_GRANT_TYPE, ConsentTeam, MintedProxyCredential, + SubjectIdentity, + SubjectTokenRefusal, _GatewayAuthCode, _open_sealed, _seal, @@ -90,9 +95,11 @@ def _request(path="/authorize", query="", cookies=None, method="GET"): ) -async def _register(redirect_uris) -> dict: +async def _register(redirect_uris, token_exchange_available=True) -> dict: response = await register_aggregate_client( - request=_request(path="/register", method="POST"), request_body={"redirect_uris": redirect_uris} + request=_request(path="/register", method="POST"), + request_body={"redirect_uris": redirect_uris}, + token_exchange_available=token_exchange_available, ) return json.loads(response.body) @@ -105,6 +112,7 @@ async def _reload_user_active(user_id: str): async def test_register_mints_stateless_public_client(): body = await _register([REDIRECT_URI]) assert body["token_endpoint_auth_method"] == "none" + assert body["grant_types"] == ["authorization_code", "refresh_token", TOKEN_EXCHANGE_GRANT_TYPE] assert "client_secret" not in body assert body["redirect_uris"] == [REDIRECT_URI] assert is_gateway_dcr_client_id(body["client_id"]) @@ -113,11 +121,18 @@ async def test_register_mints_stateless_public_client(): assert record.redirect_uris == (REDIRECT_URI,) +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_register_omits_the_exchange_grant_where_the_gateway_cannot_serve_it(): + body = await _register([REDIRECT_URI], token_exchange_available=False) + assert body["grant_types"] == ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"] + + @pytest.mark.asyncio @pytest.mark.parametrize("redirect_uris", [VSCODE_REDIRECT_URIS, MAX_LENGTH_REDIRECT_URIS]) async def test_register_four_callbacks_preserves_metadata(redirect_uris: tuple[str, ...]) -> None: response: Final = await register_aggregate_client( request=_request(path="/register", method="POST"), + token_exchange_available=True, request_body={ "client_name": "Visual Studio Code", "client_uri": "https://code.visualstudio.com", @@ -143,6 +158,7 @@ async def test_register_four_callbacks_preserves_metadata(redirect_uris: tuple[s async def test_register_rejects_five_valid_callbacks() -> None: response: Final = await register_aggregate_client( request=_request(path="/register", method="POST"), + token_exchange_available=True, request_body={"redirect_uris": [*VSCODE_REDIRECT_URIS, "http://127.0.0.1:33419/"]}, ) assert response.status_code == 400 @@ -156,6 +172,7 @@ async def test_register_rejects_five_valid_callbacks() -> None: async def test_register_four_callbacks_preserves_encoded_size_guard() -> None: response: Final = await register_aggregate_client( request=_request(path="/register", method="POST"), + token_exchange_available=True, request_body={"redirect_uris": [f"https://client.example/{index}/".ljust(256, "é") for index in range(4)]}, ) assert response.status_code == 400 @@ -208,6 +225,7 @@ async def test_register_rejects_userinfo_spoofed_origin(): response = await register_aggregate_client( request=_request(path="/register", method="POST"), request_body={"redirect_uris": ["https://claude.ai@attacker.example/callback"]}, + token_exchange_available=True, ) assert response.status_code == 400 assert json.loads(response.body)["error"] == "invalid_redirect_uri" @@ -228,7 +246,9 @@ async def test_register_rejects_userinfo_spoofed_origin(): ) async def test_register_rejects_bad_redirect_uris(redirect_uris): response = await register_aggregate_client( - request=_request(path="/register", method="POST"), request_body={"redirect_uris": redirect_uris} + request=_request(path="/register", method="POST"), + request_body={"redirect_uris": redirect_uris}, + token_exchange_available=True, ) assert response.status_code == 400 assert json.loads(response.body)["error"] in ("invalid_redirect_uri", "invalid_client_metadata") @@ -1948,7 +1968,7 @@ async def test_revoke_refuses_unknown_clients_and_a_missing_master_key(): def test_native_client_auth_contract_points_every_endpoint_at_this_proxy(): - assert json.loads(json.dumps(native_client_auth_contract(_request("/.well-known/litellm-cli-auth")))) == { + assert json.loads(json.dumps(native_client_auth_contract(_request("/.well-known/litellm-cli-auth"), True))) == { "contract_version": 1, "issuer": "https://llm.example.com", "authorization_endpoint": "https://llm.example.com/authorize", @@ -1957,13 +1977,22 @@ def test_native_client_auth_contract_points_every_endpoint_at_this_proxy(): "revocation_endpoint": "https://llm.example.com/revoke", "resource": "https://llm.example.com", "response_types_supported": ["code"], - "grant_types_supported": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"], + "grant_types_supported": [ + "authorization_code", + "refresh_token", + "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange", + ], "code_challenge_methods_supported": ["S256"], "token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported": ["none"], "revocation_endpoint_auth_methods_supported": ["none"], } +def test_native_client_auth_contract_omits_the_exchange_grant_where_the_gateway_cannot_serve_it(): + contract = native_client_auth_contract(_request("/.well-known/litellm-cli-auth"), False) + assert list(contract["grant_types_supported"]) == ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"] + + @pytest.mark.parametrize( "resource, expected", [ @@ -2148,3 +2177,180 @@ async def test_gateway_owned_resource_stays_scoped_through_consent_and_refresh(a ) assert renewed.status_code == 200 assert _opened_principal(json.loads(renewed.body)).resource_server_id == "github-id" + + +JWT_SUBJECT_TOKEN_TYPE = "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:jwt" +IDP_TOKEN = "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJ1MSJ9.idp-signature" + + +class _Exchanger: + def __init__(self, result=None): + self.calls = [] + self.result = result + + async def __call__(self, subject_token, request): + self.calls.append((subject_token, request.url.path)) + if self.result is not None: + return self.result + return SubjectIdentity(user_id="u1", team_id="team-b") + + +async def _exchange_native(client_id, minter, exchanger, cache=None, **overrides): + arguments = { + "grant_type": TOKEN_EXCHANGE_GRANT_TYPE, + "subject_token": IDP_TOKEN, + "subject_token_type": JWT_SUBJECT_TOKEN_TYPE, + "exchange_subject_token": exchanger, + } + return await _redeem_native(None, client_id, minter, cache=cache, **{**arguments, **overrides}) + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_token_exchange_mints_the_proxy_credential_for_the_idp_subject(): + """RFC 8693: a registered native client trades the IdP token it already holds for the + same credential the consent flow mints, attributed to the user and team the gateway's + JWT auth resolved, with a rotating refresh token bound to that team and the client. + The exchange can be repeated while the IdP token lives; nothing is burned.""" + client_id = (await _register([LOOPBACK_REDIRECT_URI]))["client_id"] + minter, exchanger, cache = _Minter(), _Exchanger(), DualCache() + response = await _exchange_native(client_id, minter, exchanger, cache=cache) + assert response.status_code == 200 + assert response.headers["cache-control"] == "no-store" + body = json.loads(response.body) + assert exchanger.calls == [(IDP_TOKEN, "/token")] + assert minter.calls == [("u1", "team-b")] + assert body["issued_token_type"] == ACCESS_TOKEN_TOKEN_TYPE + assert body["access_token"] == "sk-cli-u1" + assert body["token_type"] == "Bearer" + assert body["expires_in"] == 3600 + assert (body["user_id"], body["team_id"]) == ("u1", "team-b") + principal = _opened_refresh(body["refresh_token"], client_id) + assert (principal.user_id, principal.client_id, principal.audience, principal.team_id) == ( + "u1", + client_id, + "proxy_api", + "team-b", + ) + again = await _exchange_native(client_id, minter, exchanger, cache=cache) + assert again.status_code == 200 + assert json.loads(again.body)["refresh_token"] != body["refresh_token"] + assert minter.calls == [("u1", "team-b"), ("u1", "team-b")] + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_exchanged_credential_refreshes_and_rotates_like_a_consented_one(): + client_id = (await _register([LOOPBACK_REDIRECT_URI]))["client_id"] + minter, cache = _Minter(), DualCache() + exchanged = json.loads((await _exchange_native(client_id, minter, _Exchanger(), cache=cache)).body) + refreshed = await _refresh_native(exchanged["refresh_token"], client_id, minter, cache) + assert refreshed.status_code == 200 + body = json.loads(refreshed.body) + assert "issued_token_type" not in body + assert (body["access_token"], body["user_id"], body["team_id"]) == ("sk-cli-u1", "u1", "team-b") + assert body["refresh_token"] != exchanged["refresh_token"] + assert minter.calls == [("u1", "team-b"), ("u1", "team-b")] + replay = await _refresh_native(exchanged["refresh_token"], client_id, minter, cache) + assert replay.status_code == 400 + assert json.loads(replay.body)["error"] == "invalid_grant" + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_token_exchange_for_a_teamless_subject_mints_a_teamless_credential(): + client_id = (await _register([LOOPBACK_REDIRECT_URI]))["client_id"] + minter = _Minter() + response = await _exchange_native(client_id, minter, _Exchanger(SubjectIdentity(user_id="u2"))) + assert response.status_code == 200 + body = json.loads(response.body) + assert minter.calls == [("u2", None)] + assert (body["user_id"], body["team_id"]) == ("u2", None) + assert _opened_refresh(body["refresh_token"], client_id).team_id is None + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +@pytest.mark.parametrize("subject_token_type", sorted(SUBJECT_TOKEN_TYPES)) +async def test_token_exchange_accepts_every_advertised_subject_token_type(subject_token_type): + client_id = (await _register([LOOPBACK_REDIRECT_URI]))["client_id"] + response = await _exchange_native(client_id, _Minter(), _Exchanger(), subject_token_type=subject_token_type) + assert response.status_code == 200 + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_token_exchange_without_an_idp_exchanger_is_unsupported(): + """A gateway that wires no IdP verifier into the endpoint answers the way it always + answered an unknown grant, and never reaches the minter.""" + client_id = (await _register([LOOPBACK_REDIRECT_URI]))["client_id"] + minter = _Minter() + response = await _redeem_native( + None, + client_id, + minter, + grant_type=TOKEN_EXCHANGE_GRANT_TYPE, + subject_token=IDP_TOKEN, + subject_token_type=JWT_SUBJECT_TOKEN_TYPE, + ) + assert response.status_code == 400 + assert json.loads(response.body)["error"] == "unsupported_grant_type" + assert minter.calls == [] + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "overrides, status, error", + [ + ({"subject_token": None}, 400, "invalid_request"), + ({"subject_token": ""}, 400, "invalid_request"), + ({"subject_token_type": None}, 400, "invalid_request"), + ({"subject_token_type": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:saml2"}, 400, "invalid_request"), + ({"requested_token_type": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:refresh_token"}, 400, "invalid_request"), + ({"resource": "https://other.example.com"}, 400, "invalid_target"), + ({"resource": "https://llm.example.com/mcp"}, 400, "invalid_target"), + ({"client_id": "llm_dcrc_forged"}, 401, "invalid_client"), + ({"client_id": "not-a-gateway-client"}, 401, "invalid_client"), + ], +) +async def test_token_exchange_refuses_a_malformed_request_before_touching_the_idp_token(overrides, status, error): + registered = (await _register([LOOPBACK_REDIRECT_URI]))["client_id"] + minter, exchanger = _Minter(), _Exchanger() + response = await _exchange_native( + overrides.get("client_id", registered), + minter, + exchanger, + **{name: value for name, value in overrides.items() if name != "client_id"}, + ) + assert response.status_code == status + assert json.loads(response.body)["error"] == error + assert exchanger.calls == [] + assert minter.calls == [] + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "error, status", + [("unsupported_grant_type", 400), ("invalid_request", 400), ("temporarily_unavailable", 503)], +) +async def test_token_exchange_relays_the_idp_refusal_and_never_mints(error, status): + client_id = (await _register([LOOPBACK_REDIRECT_URI]))["client_id"] + minter = _Minter() + exchanger = _Exchanger(SubjectTokenRefusal(error=error, description="subject_token was rejected: bad signature")) + response = await _exchange_native(client_id, minter, exchanger) + assert response.status_code == status + body = json.loads(response.body) + assert (body["error"], body["error_description"]) == (error, "subject_token was rejected: bad signature") + assert minter.calls == [] + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "failure, status, error", + [ + ("not_a_member", 400, "invalid_grant"), + ("team_required", 400, "invalid_grant"), + ("no_active_key", 400, "invalid_grant"), + ("unavailable", 503, "temporarily_unavailable"), + ], +) +async def test_token_exchange_relays_a_mint_refusal(failure, status, error): + client_id = (await _register([LOOPBACK_REDIRECT_URI]))["client_id"] + response = await _exchange_native(client_id, _Minter(failure), _Exchanger()) + assert response.status_code == status + assert json.loads(response.body)["error"] == error diff --git a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/test_idp_token_exchange.py b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/test_idp_token_exchange.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..03165bd0a4a --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/test_idp_token_exchange.py @@ -0,0 +1,237 @@ +import logging + +import pytest +from fastapi import HTTPException +from prisma.engine.errors import BinaryNotFoundError +from prisma.errors import DataError + +from litellm.caching.caching import DualCache +from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.gateway_dcr_flow import SubjectIdentity, SubjectTokenRefusal +from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.idp_token_exchange import ( + REJECTED_SUBJECT_TOKEN, + SUBJECT_TOKEN_CHECK_FAULTED, + SUBJECT_TOKEN_CHECK_UNAVAILABLE, + TokenExchangePrerequisites, + identity_from_subject_token, + token_exchange_available, +) +from litellm.proxy._types import JWTIssuerConfig, LiteLLM_JWTAuth, ProxyException +from litellm.proxy.auth.handle_jwt import JWKSUnreachableError, JWTHandler, jwks_unavailable_exception + +IDP_JWT = "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJ1MSJ9.idp-signature" +REQUEST_HEADERS = {"x-litellm-team-id": "team-b", "user-agent": "lite/0.1"} +EVERY_GATE_HOLDS = { + "jwt_auth_enabled": True, + "has_database": True, + "licensed": True, + "maps_jwts_to_virtual_keys": False, +} +JWKS_URL = "https://idp.example.com/.well-known/jwks.json" +JWKS_DOWN = jwks_unavailable_exception(JWKSUnreachableError(f"ConnectError fetching {JWKS_URL} after 3 attempts")) + + +def _authorized(user_id="u1", team_id="team-b"): + return { + "is_proxy_admin": False, + "team_object": None, + "user_object": None, + "end_user_object": None, + "org_object": None, + "token": IDP_JWT, + "team_id": team_id, + "user_id": user_id, + "user_email": None, + "end_user_id": None, + "org_id": None, + "team_membership": None, + "jwt_claims": {"sub": user_id}, + "agent_id": None, + } + + +class _Authorizer: + def __init__(self, result=None, raises=None): + self.calls = [] + self.result = result if result is not None else _authorized() + self.raises = raises + + async def __call__(self, subject_token, request_headers): + self.calls.append((subject_token, dict(request_headers))) + if self.raises is not None: + raise self.raises + return self.result + + +async def _identity(authorizer, subject_token=IDP_JWT, **unmet): + return await identity_from_subject_token( + subject_token, + request_headers=REQUEST_HEADERS, + prerequisites=TokenExchangePrerequisites(**{**EVERY_GATE_HOLDS, **unmet}), + is_jwt=JWTHandler.is_jwt, + authorize=authorizer, + ) + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_a_jwt_the_proxy_accepts_names_its_user_and_team(): + """The subject token goes to the proxy's own JWT auth with the caller's headers (that is + where the team header is read), and the identity it resolved is what gets minted.""" + authorizer = _Authorizer() + assert await _identity(authorizer) == SubjectIdentity(user_id="u1", team_id="team-b") + assert authorizer.calls == [(IDP_JWT, REQUEST_HEADERS)] + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_a_jwt_that_resolves_no_team_names_a_teamless_identity(): + assert await _identity(_Authorizer(_authorized(team_id=None))) == SubjectIdentity(user_id="u1", team_id=None) + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "unmet, subject_token, error, mentions", + [ + ({"jwt_auth_enabled": False}, IDP_JWT, "unsupported_grant_type", "JWT auth is not enabled"), + ({"has_database": False}, IDP_JWT, "unsupported_grant_type", "no database"), + ({"licensed": False}, IDP_JWT, "unsupported_grant_type", "enterprise"), + ({"maps_jwts_to_virtual_keys": True}, IDP_JWT, "unsupported_grant_type", "virtual keys"), + ({}, "sk-litellm-virtual-key", "invalid_request", "not a JWT"), + ], +) +async def test_the_gates_user_api_key_auth_applies_refuse_before_any_verification( + unmet, subject_token, error, mentions +): + authorizer = _Authorizer() + refusal = await _identity(authorizer, subject_token=subject_token, **unmet) + assert isinstance(refusal, SubjectTokenRefusal) + assert refusal.error == error + assert mentions in refusal.description + assert authorizer.calls == [] + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "unmet", + [ + {}, + {"jwt_auth_enabled": False}, + {"has_database": False}, + {"licensed": False}, + {"maps_jwts_to_virtual_keys": True}, + ], +) +def test_the_grant_is_available_exactly_when_every_gate_holds(unmet): + prerequisites = TokenExchangePrerequisites(**{**EVERY_GATE_HOLDS, **unmet}) + assert prerequisites.available is (unmet == {}) + assert (prerequisites.refusal() is None) is prerequisites.available + + +MAPPED_ISSUER = JWTIssuerConfig( + issuer="https://idp.example.test", audience="litellm-gateway", virtual_key_claim_field="client_id" +) + + +def _running_jwt_handler(litellm_jwtauth): + handler = JWTHandler() + if litellm_jwtauth is not None: + handler.update_environment(prisma_client=None, user_api_key_cache=DualCache(), litellm_jwtauth=litellm_jwtauth) + return handler + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "general_settings, prisma_client, premium_user, litellm_jwtauth, expected", + [ + ({"enable_jwt_auth": True}, object(), True, LiteLLM_JWTAuth(), True), + ({"enable_jwt_auth": True}, object(), True, None, True), + ({}, object(), True, LiteLLM_JWTAuth(), False), + ({"enable_jwt_auth": True}, None, True, LiteLLM_JWTAuth(), False), + ({"enable_jwt_auth": True}, object(), False, LiteLLM_JWTAuth(), False), + ({"enable_jwt_auth": True}, object(), True, LiteLLM_JWTAuth(virtual_key_claim_field="client_id"), False), + ({"enable_jwt_auth": True}, object(), True, LiteLLM_JWTAuth(issuers=[MAPPED_ISSUER]), False), + ], +) +def test_availability_is_read_from_the_running_proxy( + monkeypatch, general_settings, prisma_client, premium_user, litellm_jwtauth, expected +): + monkeypatch.setattr("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.general_settings", general_settings) + monkeypatch.setattr("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.prisma_client", prisma_client) + monkeypatch.setattr("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.premium_user", premium_user) + monkeypatch.setattr("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.jwt_handler", _running_jwt_handler(litellm_jwtauth)) + assert token_exchange_available() is expected + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "raised, reason", + [ + (HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="User not allowed to access this route"), "not allowed"), + (ProxyException(message="Token expired", type="auth_error", param="token", code=401), "Token expired"), + (Exception("Validation fails: signature verification failed"), "signature verification failed"), + (Exception("Invalid JWT Submitted"), "Invalid JWT"), + (Exception(f"Failed to fetch keys from {JWKS_URL}: 502 Bad Gateway from the IdP"), JWKS_URL), + (ValueError("User doesn't exist in db. 'user_id'=u1. Got error - not found"), "not found"), + ], +) +async def test_a_jwt_the_proxy_rejects_is_refused_with_the_reason_kept_in_the_log(raised, reason, caplog): + """The endpoint is public, so the response never quotes JWT auth's wording (it can name + the JWKS URL or relay the IdP's reply); the operator reads the reason in the proxy log.""" + caplog.set_level(logging.WARNING, logger="LiteLLM Proxy") + refusal = await _identity(_Authorizer(raises=raised)) + assert refusal == SubjectTokenRefusal(error="invalid_request", description=REJECTED_SUBJECT_TOKEN) + assert reason in caplog.text + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_a_jwt_that_resolves_no_user_cannot_be_exchanged(): + refusal = await _identity(_Authorizer(_authorized(user_id=None))) + assert refusal == SubjectTokenRefusal( + error="invalid_request", description="subject_token names no user the gateway knows" + ) + + +def _user_lookup_wrapping_a_database_outage(): + p1001 = DataError( + data={"user_facing_error": {"message": "Can't reach database server at `127.0.0.1`:`5432`", "meta": {}}} + ) + try: + raise p1001 + except DataError as outage: + try: + raise ValueError(f"User doesn't exist in db. 'user_id'=u1. Got error - {outage}") + except ValueError as wrapped: + return wrapped + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "raised, reason", + [ + (JWKS_DOWN, JWKS_URL), + (HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="the auth database is not reachable"), "not reachable"), + (_user_lookup_wrapping_a_database_outage(), "Can't reach database server"), + ], +) +async def test_an_idp_or_gateway_outage_is_reported_as_retryable_not_as_a_bad_token(raised, reason, caplog): + caplog.set_level(logging.ERROR, logger="LiteLLM Proxy") + refusal = await _identity(_Authorizer(raises=raised)) + assert refusal == SubjectTokenRefusal(error="temporarily_unavailable", description=SUBJECT_TOKEN_CHECK_UNAVAILABLE) + assert reason in caplog.text + + +def _user_lookup_wrapping_a_fault_retrying_cannot_clear(): + try: + raise BinaryNotFoundError("query engine binary not found") + except BinaryNotFoundError as fault: + try: + raise ValueError(f"User doesn't exist in db. 'user_id'=u1. Got error - {fault}") + except ValueError as wrapped: + return wrapped + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_a_database_fault_retrying_cannot_clear_is_not_reported_as_a_transient_outage(caplog): + """The status stays 503 (the only OAuth error a client reads as the server's fault, and what + the mint path answers to the same fault) but the wording must not tell the client to wait.""" + caplog.set_level(logging.ERROR, logger="LiteLLM Proxy") + refusal = await _identity(_Authorizer(raises=_user_lookup_wrapping_a_fault_retrying_cannot_clear())) + assert refusal == SubjectTokenRefusal(error="temporarily_unavailable", description=SUBJECT_TOKEN_CHECK_FAULTED) + assert "retrying will not help" in refusal.description + assert "faulted: " in caplog.text and "query engine binary not found" in caplog.text diff --git a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/test_proxy_api_credentials.py b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/test_proxy_api_credentials.py index 8bb8bdada7d..ed3e5f48516 100644 --- a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/test_proxy_api_credentials.py +++ b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/test_proxy_api_credentials.py @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ """Tests for minting the ``lite login`` credential from a consented native-client grant.""" -from unittest.mock import ANY, AsyncMock +from unittest.mock import ANY, AsyncMock, MagicMock import pytest @@ -8,7 +8,9 @@ from litellm.constants import CLI_JWT_EXPIRATION_HOURS from litellm.models.user import LiteLLM_UserTable from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.gateway_dcr_flow import ConsentTeam, MintedProxyCredential from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.proxy_api_credentials import lookup_consent_teams, mint_proxy_credential +from litellm.proxy._types import LitellmUserRoles from litellm.proxy.auth.auth_checks import ExperimentalUIJWTToken +from litellm.proxy.common_utils.user_api_key_cache import UserApiKeyCache from litellm.proxy.management_endpoints.ui_sso import CliSsoTeamDetail _LOAD_USER = "litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.proxy_api_credentials.load_active_user_by_id" @@ -67,10 +69,21 @@ async def test_mint_passes_user_lookup_failures_through(failure, load_user, fetc @pytest.mark.asyncio -async def test_mint_refuses_a_user_without_a_role(load_user, fetch_teams): - load_user.return_value = _user(user_role=None) - assert await mint_proxy_credential("u1", None) == "no_active_key" - fetch_teams.assert_not_awaited() +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "stored_role, minted_role", + [ + (None, LitellmUserRoles.INTERNAL_USER), + ("made_up_role", LitellmUserRoles.INTERNAL_USER), + ("proxy_admin", LitellmUserRoles.PROXY_ADMIN), + ], +) +async def test_mint_carries_the_role_the_proxy_enforces_for_the_user(load_user, fetch_teams, stored_role, minted_role): + """A user JWT auth upserted has no role in the database, and the proxy already treats + such a user as an internal user on every request, so the credential says the same.""" + load_user.return_value = _user(user_role=stored_role) + minted = await mint_proxy_credential("u1", "team-a") + assert isinstance(minted, MintedProxyCredential) + assert _decoded(minted).user_role == minted_role @pytest.mark.asyncio @@ -79,7 +92,7 @@ async def test_mint_refuses_a_teamless_grant_for_a_team_member(load_user, fetch_ is refused for a user with teams instead of minting an unscoped credential or drifting onto the first team, on redemption and on every refresh alike.""" assert await mint_proxy_credential("u1", None) == "team_required" - load_user.assert_awaited_once_with("u1") + load_user.assert_awaited_once_with("u1", source="database") fetch_teams.assert_awaited_once_with(ANY, ["team-a", "team-b"]) @@ -114,6 +127,53 @@ async def test_mint_honors_the_consented_team(load_user, fetch_teams): assert decoded.team_model_aliases == {"fast": "gpt-5.4-mini"} +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_mint_reads_the_users_teams_from_the_database_not_a_stale_cached_row(fetch_teams, monkeypatch): + """JWT auth caches the user it creates before it adds that user to the JWT's team, and adding a member + never evicts the cached row, so a mint off the cached row refused the very first token exchange as not + a member. The mint has to read the database row, whatever the cache holds.""" + from litellm.proxy import proxy_server + + cache = UserApiKeyCache() + await cache.async_set_cache( + key="stale-cache-user", value=_user(user_id="stale-cache-user", teams=[]), model_type=LiteLLM_UserTable + ) + prisma = MagicMock() + prisma.db.litellm_usertable.find_unique = AsyncMock( + return_value=_user(user_id="stale-cache-user", teams=["team-a"]) + ) + monkeypatch.setattr(proxy_server, "user_api_key_cache", cache) + monkeypatch.setattr(proxy_server, "prisma_client", prisma) + + minted = await mint_proxy_credential("stale-cache-user", "team-a") + + assert isinstance(minted, MintedProxyCredential) + assert minted.team_id == "team-a" + assert _decoded(minted).team_id == "team-a" + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_mint_refuses_a_user_scim_deactivated_after_the_cache_last_saw_them_active(fetch_teams, monkeypatch): + """SCIM deactivation writes the user row without evicting the cached copy, so a mint off the cache would + keep issuing credentials for the management-object TTL. The mint reads the database row, so the + deactivated user is refused on the first refresh after the deactivation.""" + from litellm.proxy import proxy_server + + cache = UserApiKeyCache() + await cache.async_set_cache( + key="deactivated-user", value=_user(user_id="deactivated-user", teams=["team-a"]), model_type=LiteLLM_UserTable + ) + prisma = MagicMock() + prisma.db.litellm_usertable.find_unique = AsyncMock( + return_value=_user(user_id="deactivated-user", teams=["team-a"], metadata={"scim_active": False}) + ) + monkeypatch.setattr(proxy_server, "user_api_key_cache", cache) + monkeypatch.setattr(proxy_server, "prisma_client", prisma) + + assert await mint_proxy_credential("deactivated-user", "team-a") == "no_active_key" + fetch_teams.assert_not_awaited() + + @pytest.mark.asyncio async def test_mint_refuses_a_team_the_user_is_not_on(load_user, fetch_teams): assert await mint_proxy_credential("u1", "team-c") == "not_a_member" diff --git a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/test_auth_checks.py b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/test_auth_checks.py index 85673df57ba..1ae986db23b 100644 --- a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/test_auth_checks.py +++ b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/test_auth_checks.py @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ import asyncio import json +import time from collections.abc import Mapping from types import SimpleNamespace from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Final, Literal, Optional @@ -916,6 +917,32 @@ async def test_get_user_object_wraps_db_outage_as_valueerror_preserving_context( assert isinstance(exc_info.value.__context__, ConnectionError) +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_get_user_object_check_db_only_ignores_recent_miss(monkeypatch): + """A database-only read is never answered by the per-worker negative memo: a row created after a miss on + this worker is returned within db_cache_expiry seconds instead of raising UserNotFoundError, so the token + exchange mints for a user JWT auth just accepted.""" + from litellm.proxy.auth import auth_checks + + user_id = "memo-probe-user" + monkeypatch.setitem(auth_checks.last_db_access_time, f"user_id:{user_id}", (None, time.time())) + db_row = LiteLLM_UserTable(user_id=user_id, user_email=None, user_role="internal_user") + mock_prisma_client = MagicMock() + mock_prisma_client.db.litellm_usertable.find_unique = AsyncMock(return_value=db_row) + + result = await get_user_object( + user_id=user_id, + prisma_client=mock_prisma_client, + user_api_key_cache=UserApiKeyCache(), + user_id_upsert=False, + check_db_only=True, + ) + + assert result is not None + assert result.user_id == user_id + mock_prisma_client.db.litellm_usertable.find_unique.assert_awaited_once() + + @pytest.mark.asyncio async def test_get_user_object_upsert_includes_user_email(): """Test that user_email is included when creating a new user via get_user_object upsert""" @@ -8740,6 +8767,23 @@ async def test_access_group_model_fallback_uses_the_injected_database(channel: s reader.assert_awaited_once_with(where={"access_group_id": "group-a"}) +def test_jwt_team_role_reaches_the_gateway_token_endpoint_by_default(): + """The RFC 8693 token exchange authorizes the IdP JWT against ``POST /token`` itself, and JWT + auth only binds a team from a multi-team claim when that team may call the route, so the + default team allowlist has to cover the gateway's token endpoint or the exchange would mint + teamless credentials for every ``team_ids_jwt_field`` deployment.""" + from litellm.proxy._types import LiteLLM_JWTAuth + from litellm.proxy.auth.auth_checks import allowed_routes_check + + assert allowed_routes_check( + user_role=LitellmUserRoles.TEAM, user_route="/token", litellm_proxy_roles=LiteLLM_JWTAuth() + ) + assert not allowed_routes_check( + user_role=LitellmUserRoles.TEAM, + user_route="/token", + litellm_proxy_roles=LiteLLM_JWTAuth(team_allowed_routes=[]), + ) + def test_route_skips_budget_checks_marks_only_spend_free_routes() -> None: assert route_skips_budget_checks(route="/v1/models") is True assert route_skips_budget_checks(route="/spend/logs") is True diff --git a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/test_route_checks.py b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/test_route_checks.py index a0912cac600..603a8686692 100644 --- a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/test_route_checks.py +++ b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/test_route_checks.py @@ -627,6 +627,7 @@ def test_virtual_key_llm_api_routes_denies_spend_logs_v2(): "/mcp/tools/call", "/mcp-rest/tools/call", "/mcp/tools/list", + "/token", ], ) def test_mcp_inference_routes_classified_as_llm_api(route): diff --git a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/test_team_endpoints.py b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/test_team_endpoints.py index 690b5ae80b6..9fd388887f4 100644 --- a/tests/test_litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/test_team_endpoints.py +++ b/tests/test_litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/test_team_endpoints.py @@ -13316,6 +13316,77 @@ async def test_team_member_add_audits_a_user_created_from_a_list_payload(monkeyp assert created_user_id not in mock_audit.call_args.kwargs["existing_user_ids"] +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_team_member_add_evicts_the_new_members_cached_user_row_on_every_worker(monkeypatch): + """Auth admits a team-bound credential off the teams list of the cached user row. The add wrote the + new team to the database row only, so a worker still holding the old row refused the member's + credential with 403 until the management-object TTL expired. The add now evicts the row here and + broadcasts the eviction to the other workers, the way /team/member_delete already does.""" + from litellm.proxy._types import TeamMemberAddRequest + from litellm.proxy.common_utils.user_api_key_cache import UserApiKeyCache + from litellm.proxy.management_endpoints.team_endpoints import team_member_add + + team_id = "team-b" + user_id = "dev-1" + cache = UserApiKeyCache() + await cache.async_set_cache( + key=user_id, value=LiteLLM_UserTable(user_id=user_id, teams=["team-a"]), model_type=LiteLLM_UserTable + ) + broadcast = AsyncMock() + monkeypatch.setattr("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.prisma_client", AsyncMock()) + monkeypatch.setattr("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.premium_user", True) + monkeypatch.setattr("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.litellm_proxy_admin_name", "default_user_id") + monkeypatch.setattr("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.user_api_key_cache", cache) + monkeypatch.setattr( + "litellm.proxy.common_utils.auth_cache_invalidation_pubsub.publish_auth_cache_invalidation", broadcast + ) + + updated_team = MagicMock() + updated_team.model_dump.return_value = { + "team_id": team_id, + "members_with_roles": [{"user_id": user_id, "role": "user"}], + } + + async def fake_add_team_members_to_team(**kwargs): + return updated_team, [LiteLLM_UserTable(user_id=user_id, teams=["team-a", team_id])], [] + + with ( + patch( # test-quality-ok: team_member_add has no injection seam for its prisma-backed helpers + "litellm.proxy.management_endpoints.team_endpoints.get_team_object", + new_callable=AsyncMock, + return_value=LiteLLM_TeamTable(team_id=team_id, members_with_roles=[]), + ), + patch( # test-quality-ok: team_member_add has no injection seam for its prisma-backed helpers + "litellm.proxy.management_endpoints.team_endpoints._validate_team_member_add_permissions", + new_callable=AsyncMock, + ), + patch( # test-quality-ok: team_member_add has no injection seam for its prisma-backed helpers + "litellm.proxy.management_endpoints.team_endpoints._validate_and_populate_member_user_info", + new_callable=AsyncMock, + ), + patch( # test-quality-ok: team_member_add has no injection seam for its prisma-backed helpers + "litellm.proxy.management_endpoints.team_endpoints._resolve_existing_member_user_ids", + new_callable=AsyncMock, + return_value=frozenset({user_id}), + ), + patch( # test-quality-ok: team_member_add has no injection seam for its prisma-backed helpers + "litellm.proxy.management_endpoints.team_endpoints._add_team_members_to_team", + side_effect=fake_add_team_members_to_team, + ), + patch( # test-quality-ok: team_member_add has no injection seam for its prisma-backed helpers + "litellm.proxy.management_endpoints.team_endpoints._create_team_member_add_audit_logs", + new_callable=AsyncMock, + ), + ): + await team_member_add( + data=TeamMemberAddRequest(team_id=team_id, member=Member(user_id=user_id, role="user")), + user_api_key_dict=UserAPIKeyAuth(user_role=LitellmUserRoles.PROXY_ADMIN, user_id="admin-1"), + ) + + assert await cache.async_get_cache(key=user_id, model_type=LiteLLM_UserTable) is None + broadcast.assert_awaited_once_with(cache_key=user_id) + + def test_validate_member_user_id_provisioning_caps_the_ids_it_echoes_back(): """A large member list must not echo every id back in the error body.""" from litellm.proxy.management_endpoints.team_endpoints import ( diff --git a/ui/litellm-dashboard/src/lib/http/schema.d.ts b/ui/litellm-dashboard/src/lib/http/schema.d.ts index 252f6030dbb..a5ede63bf7f 100644 --- a/ui/litellm-dashboard/src/lib/http/schema.d.ts +++ b/ui/litellm-dashboard/src/lib/http/schema.d.ts @@ -24767,10 +24767,16 @@ export interface components { redirect_uri?: string; /** Refresh Token */ refresh_token?: string | null; + /** Requested Token Type */ + requested_token_type?: string | null; /** Resource */ resource?: string | null; /** Scope */ scope?: string | null; + /** Subject Token */ + subject_token?: string | null; + /** Subject Token Type */ + subject_token_type?: string | null; }; /** Body_token_endpoint_token_post */ Body_token_endpoint_token_post: { @@ -24788,10 +24794,16 @@ export interface components { redirect_uri?: string; /** Refresh Token */ refresh_token?: string | null; + /** Requested Token Type */ + requested_token_type?: string | null; /** Resource */ resource?: string | null; /** Scope */ scope?: string | null; + /** Subject Token */ + subject_token?: string | null; + /** Subject Token Type */ + subject_token_type?: string | null; }; /** Body_upload_logo_upload_logo_post */ Body_upload_logo_upload_logo_post: {