Bryan Helmkamp 077469d0c6 refactor(auth): scrub FABRO_WORKER_TOKEN from worker env at startup ... The worker subprocess is spawned with env_clear+allowlist by the server, so the only sensitive value in its env is FABRO_WORKER_TOKEN itself. Read the token and remove_var it from the process env in main() before Tokio starts worker threads, then thread it explicitly through runner::execute(&str). Every descendant (hooks, local sandbox, devcontainer initializeCommand, MCP stdio, etc.) now inherits a worker env with no bearer in it, so an unscrubbed spawn site cannot leak the token. This makes the prior denylist scrub in fabro-hooks and fabro-sandbox redundant — delete it and the shared WORKER_SECRET_ENV_DENYLIST constant. The sandbox keeps its _api_key/_secret/ _token/_password/_credential suffix heuristic for user-supplied env_vars hygiene. Extend the server-dispatched-worker env-leak integration test to also assert a Bash stage running in the worker does not observe FABRO_WORKER_TOKEN. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>		2026-04-23 15:10:58 -04:00
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crates	refactor(auth): scrub FABRO_WORKER_TOKEN from worker env at startup	2026-04-23 15:10:58 -04:00
packages/fabro-api-client	Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main'	2026-04-22 21:18:50 -04:00