fabro/lib/apps/fabro-server/src/security_headers.rs
2026-07-23 17:59:34 -04:00

259 lines
9.2 KiB
Rust

//! Response-wide HTTP security headers.
//!
//! Applied as a tower layer outside every other middleware so inner handlers
//! can still override any header by setting their own value first — the
//! defaults here only fill in what's missing.
use axum::extract::Request;
use axum::http::{HeaderMap, HeaderName, HeaderValue, header};
use axum::middleware::Next;
use axum::response::Response;
use crate::csp;
pub async fn layer(req: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
let is_https = request_is_https(&req);
let mut response = next.run(req).await;
apply_defaults(response.headers_mut(), is_https);
apply_csp(response.headers_mut());
response
}
fn apply_csp(headers: &mut HeaderMap) {
// Report-only while we tune the policy: browsers evaluate violations and log
// them to the console without blocking any resources. Switch back to the
// enforcing `content-security-policy` header once the policy is clean.
if let Ok(value) = HeaderValue::from_str(csp::policy()) {
headers
.entry(HeaderName::from_static(
"content-security-policy-report-only",
))
.or_insert(value);
}
}
fn apply_defaults(headers: &mut HeaderMap, is_https: bool) {
// Always-on security posture. Static values, no per-request logic.
set_default(headers, header::X_CONTENT_TYPE_OPTIONS, "nosniff");
set_default(headers, header::X_FRAME_OPTIONS, "DENY");
set_default(
headers,
header::REFERRER_POLICY,
"strict-origin-when-cross-origin",
);
set_default(
headers,
HeaderName::from_static("cross-origin-opener-policy"),
"same-origin",
);
set_default(
headers,
HeaderName::from_static("cross-origin-resource-policy"),
"same-origin",
);
set_default(
headers,
HeaderName::from_static("permissions-policy"),
PERMISSIONS_POLICY,
);
set_default(
headers,
HeaderName::from_static("x-download-options"),
"noopen",
);
set_default(
headers,
HeaderName::from_static("x-permitted-cross-domain-policies"),
"none",
);
// Legacy header; current OWASP guidance is to disable the reflected-XSS
// filter (it has known bypasses and CSP is the proper replacement).
set_default(headers, HeaderName::from_static("x-xss-protection"), "0");
// Conservative cache defaults. Routes that deliberately want to cache
// (hashed static assets, public GETs) set their own Cache-Control before
// this middleware runs. When they have, we must not also stamp the no-cache
// pair: `Pragma: no-cache` next to a long-lived `Cache-Control: immutable`
// is contradictory, and browsers resolve it by revalidating on every load.
// Since these assets carry no ETag/Last-Modified, that revalidation
// degrades into a full re-download each time. Apply the no-store/no-cache
// defaults only to responses that haven't opted into caching; a present
// Cache-Control is the signal that the handler chose its own policy.
if !headers.contains_key(header::CACHE_CONTROL) {
headers.insert(header::CACHE_CONTROL, HeaderValue::from_static("no-store"));
headers.insert(header::PRAGMA, HeaderValue::from_static("no-cache"));
}
set_default(headers, header::VARY, "Accept-Encoding");
// HSTS is a no-op over plain HTTP per RFC 6797, but only emit it on
// connections we can actually verify came in over TLS — direct HTTPS or
// a reverse proxy that honored X-Forwarded-Proto. Prevents a misconfigured
// proxy from accidentally shipping an HSTS header for a host that isn't
// actually HTTPS-terminated.
if is_https {
set_default(
headers,
HeaderName::from_static("strict-transport-security"),
"max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains",
);
}
}
const PERMISSIONS_POLICY: &str = "\
accelerometer=(), \
autoplay=(), \
camera=(), \
display-capture=(), \
encrypted-media=(), \
fullscreen=(), \
geolocation=(), \
gyroscope=(), \
magnetometer=(), \
microphone=(), \
midi=(), \
payment=(), \
picture-in-picture=(), \
publickey-credentials-get=(), \
screen-wake-lock=(), \
usb=(), \
web-share=(), \
xr-spatial-tracking=()\
";
fn set_default(headers: &mut HeaderMap, name: HeaderName, value: &'static str) {
if !headers.contains_key(&name) {
headers.insert(name, HeaderValue::from_static(value));
}
}
fn request_is_https(req: &Request) -> bool {
if let Some(proto) = req
.headers()
.get("x-forwarded-proto")
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
{
// X-Forwarded-Proto may be a comma-separated list if the request went
// through multiple proxies; the leftmost value reflects the origin.
let first = proto.split(',').next().unwrap_or(proto).trim();
if first.eq_ignore_ascii_case("https") {
return true;
}
}
req.uri().scheme_str() == Some("https")
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use axum::body::Body;
use axum::http::{Request as HttpRequest, Response};
use super::*;
fn req(uri: &str, extra_headers: &[(&str, &str)]) -> Request {
let mut builder = HttpRequest::builder().uri(uri).method("GET");
for (k, v) in extra_headers {
builder = builder.header(*k, *v);
}
builder.body(Body::empty()).unwrap()
}
fn headers_after(req: &Request, seeded: &[(&str, &str)]) -> HeaderMap {
let is_https = request_is_https(req);
let mut response: Response<Body> = Response::new(Body::empty());
for (k, v) in seeded {
response.headers_mut().insert(
HeaderName::from_bytes(k.as_bytes()).unwrap(),
HeaderValue::from_str(v).unwrap(),
);
}
apply_defaults(response.headers_mut(), is_https);
response.into_parts().0.headers
}
#[test]
fn core_headers_are_applied() {
let headers = headers_after(&req("/", &[]), &[]);
assert_eq!(headers.get("x-content-type-options").unwrap(), "nosniff");
assert_eq!(headers.get("x-frame-options").unwrap(), "DENY");
assert_eq!(
headers.get("referrer-policy").unwrap(),
"strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
);
assert_eq!(
headers.get("cross-origin-opener-policy").unwrap(),
"same-origin"
);
assert_eq!(
headers.get("cross-origin-resource-policy").unwrap(),
"same-origin"
);
assert!(headers.contains_key("permissions-policy"));
assert_eq!(headers.get("x-download-options").unwrap(), "noopen");
assert_eq!(
headers.get("x-permitted-cross-domain-policies").unwrap(),
"none"
);
assert_eq!(headers.get("x-xss-protection").unwrap(), "0");
assert_eq!(headers.get("cache-control").unwrap(), "no-store");
assert_eq!(headers.get("pragma").unwrap(), "no-cache");
assert_eq!(headers.get("vary").unwrap(), "Accept-Encoding");
}
#[test]
fn csp_is_report_only_not_enforced() {
let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
apply_csp(&mut headers);
assert!(headers.contains_key("content-security-policy-report-only"));
assert!(!headers.contains_key("content-security-policy"));
}
#[test]
fn existing_cache_control_is_not_overridden() {
// Static assets set their own cache-control with long immutability.
// The middleware default must not clobber it, and must not stamp a
// contradictory `Pragma: no-cache` alongside it — that combination
// forces browsers to revalidate (and, absent validators, re-download)
// supposedly-immutable assets on every load.
let headers = headers_after(&req("/assets/app-abc.js", &[]), &[(
"cache-control",
"public, max-age=31536000, immutable",
)]);
assert_eq!(
headers.get("cache-control").unwrap(),
"public, max-age=31536000, immutable"
);
assert!(
!headers.contains_key("pragma"),
"cacheable responses must not carry Pragma: no-cache"
);
}
#[test]
fn hsts_is_added_when_x_forwarded_proto_is_https() {
let headers = headers_after(&req("/", &[("x-forwarded-proto", "https")]), &[]);
assert_eq!(
headers.get("strict-transport-security").unwrap(),
"max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains"
);
}
#[test]
fn hsts_is_skipped_on_plain_http() {
let headers = headers_after(&req("/", &[]), &[]);
assert!(!headers.contains_key("strict-transport-security"));
let headers = headers_after(&req("/", &[("x-forwarded-proto", "http")]), &[]);
assert!(!headers.contains_key("strict-transport-security"));
}
#[test]
fn hsts_reads_leftmost_value_of_chained_x_forwarded_proto() {
// When a request flows through multiple proxies, the leftmost value
// represents the original client → edge connection.
let headers = headers_after(&req("/", &[("x-forwarded-proto", "https, http")]), &[]);
assert!(headers.contains_key("strict-transport-security"));
let headers = headers_after(&req("/", &[("x-forwarded-proto", "http, https")]), &[]);
assert!(!headers.contains_key("strict-transport-security"));
}
}