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28884ae093
- Rename 20 crate directories lib/crates/arc-* → fabro-* - Update all Cargo.toml: crate names, dep paths, feature flags, bin name - Rename arc_server module → fabro_server in fabro-llm - ArcError → FabroError across 30+ files - ARC_VERSION/ARC_GIT_SHA/ARC_BUILD_DATE → FABRO_* constants - All use/qualified paths: arc_agent:: → fabro_agent::, etc. (~1500 occurrences) - Env vars ARC_* → FABRO_* in string literals and shell scripts - String literals: X-Arc-Demo, arc-bot, arc@local, arc-web, arc-mcp, etc. - Path strings: .arc/ → .fabro/, arc.toml → fabro.toml, refs/arc/ → refs/fabro/ - arc-api.yaml → fabro-api.yaml (OpenAPI spec) - skills/arc-create-workflow → fabro-create-workflow - trycmd fixtures: $ arc → $ fabro - Inline snapshots (insta) updated - CI, Docker, install.sh, scripts, CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md - TypeScript app: env vars, headers, JWT issuer - Docs: page slugs, git refs, config paths, sandbox names, repo URLs - Repo references: brynary/arc → fabro-sh/fabro Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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56 lines
4.1 KiB
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---
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title: "Security"
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description: "Security model and best practices"
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---
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<Warning>
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Fabro is currently a research preview. It has not yet been subject to third-party penetration testing. There may be vulnerabilities. We strongly recommend only deploying Fabro on private, self-hosted resources within a controlled networking environment.
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</Warning>
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## Security controls not in Fabro
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Fabro is single-tenant software designed for small, trusted teams. The following controls are **not implemented** — plan your deployment accordingly.
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| Control | Status |
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|---|---|
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| **Multi-tenancy** | Not supported. Fabro is single-tenant only — there is no organization or tenant isolation. |
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| **Roles or ACLs** | Not supported. All authenticated users have identical, full access to every run, workflow, and API endpoint. |
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| **Rate limiting** | Not implemented. The API server does not throttle requests. |
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| **Security headers** | Not configured. The API does not set `Strict-Transport-Security`, `Content-Security-Policy`, `X-Frame-Options`, or similar headers. |
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## Security recommendations
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### Network
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- **Deploy the web app on a private network.** Use a Tailscale tailnet, VPN, or internal network to keep the web UI off the public internet.
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- **Deploy the API on a private network.** Only allow access from expected hosts (the web app, CI runners, developer machines). The API binds to `127.0.0.1` by default — do not expose it with `--host 0.0.0.0` unless it is behind a firewall or private network.
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- **Use Daytona sandboxes with network controls.** When running untrusted or generated code, use the Daytona sandbox provider with `network = "block"` or a CIDR-based allow list to restrict agent egress.
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### Authentication
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- **Enable authentication.** Fabro supports GitHub OAuth and Tailscale header-based auth for the web app. Do not use `insecure_disabled` outside of local development.
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- **Configure a username allowlist.** Both GitHub and Tailscale auth support `allowed_usernames` in `server.toml`. An empty allowlist rejects all requests.
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- **Use JWT to connect the web app to the API.** Configure `FABRO_JWT_PRIVATE_KEY` on the web app and `FABRO_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY` on the API server. JWT tokens are Ed25519-signed and short-lived (30 seconds).
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- **Use mTLS for machine-to-machine API access.** Configure `[api.tls]` in `server.toml` with server cert, key, and CA. Set client auth to `Required` for programmatic clients (CI, scripts).
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### Secrets
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- **Keep API keys out of sandboxes.** The local sandbox strips environment variables ending in `_API_KEY`, `_SECRET`, `_TOKEN`, `_PASSWORD`, or `_CREDENTIAL`, but Docker and Daytona sandboxes provide stronger isolation — only explicitly configured variables are passed through.
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- **Use `.env` files for credentials.** Fabro loads credentials from `~/.fabro/.env` and the project-root `.env`. Do not commit these files to version control.
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- **Rotate the session secret.** The `SESSION_SECRET` environment variable encrypts web app sessions. Rotate it periodically and use a strong random value.
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### Execution
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- **Use Docker or Daytona for untrusted workflows.** The `local` sandbox offers no filesystem or network isolation — agents have the same access as the host. Use `docker` or `daytona` when running code you haven't reviewed.
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- **Restrict agent permissions.** Use `--permissions read-only` or `--permissions read-write` to limit which tools agents can invoke without approval. In non-interactive mode (`--auto-approve`), tools outside the permission level are denied outright.
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## Security reporting
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If you discover a security vulnerability in Fabro, please report it responsibly:
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1. **Email** [security@fabro.dev](mailto:security@fabro.dev) with a description of the vulnerability, steps to reproduce, and any relevant details.
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2. **Do not** disclose the vulnerability publicly until we have had a chance to investigate and release a fix.
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3. We will acknowledge receipt within 48 hours and aim to provide an initial assessment within 5 business days.
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4. We will work with you to understand the issue and coordinate disclosure timing.
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We appreciate the security research community's efforts in helping keep Fabro and its users safe.
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