mirror of
https://github.com/fabro-sh/fabro.git
synced 2026-08-28 05:27:41 +00:00
29a9a3f7d6
## Summary
Removes Fabro's in-process inbound source-IP allowlist entirely.
`[server.ip_allowlist]` and
`[server.integrations.github.webhooks.ip_allowlist]` are gone from
config parsing, resolved settings types, the OpenAPI spec, generated API
clients, and the Settings > Security UI. Existing `settings.toml` files
containing those keys now fail as unknown fields — this is a hard
removal with no migration path.
Network source restrictions should be enforced upstream via a reverse
proxy, firewall, VPN, Tailscale ACLs, Kubernetes ingress, or platform
policy.
### What changed
- **Config/types** (`fabro-config`, `fabro-types`): Removed
`ServerIpAllowlistLayer`, `ServerIpAllowlistOverrideLayer`,
`ServerIpAllowlistSettings`, `ServerIpAllowlistOverrideSettings`,
`IpAllowEntry`, associated resolver functions, GitHub `/meta` hook-range
parsing, and Unix socket trusted-proxy validation. `ipnet` dropped from
`fabro-types`; kept in `fabro-config` for sandbox CIDR validation.
- **Server runtime** (`fabro-server`): Deleted `ip_allowlist.rs`,
removed `IpAllowlistConfig` parameter from `build_router_with_options`
and `RouterOptions`, removed the global allowlist middleware layer, and
removed `GitHubMetaResolver` startup logic. GitHub webhook HMAC
verification is unchanged.
- **OpenAPI + generated clients**: Removed `ServerIpAllowlistSettings`,
`ServerIpAllowlistOverrideSettings`, `IpAllowEntry`,
`LiteralIpAllowEntry`, `GitHubMetaHooksEntry` schemas; removed
`ip_allowlist` from `ServerNamespace` and `IntegrationWebhooksSettings`;
dropped `IpAllowEntry` re-exports from `fabro-api`.
- **Web UI**: Removed IP allowlist row from Settings > Security; updated
nav description and page copy.
- **Docs/changelog**: Security docs explicitly state Fabro provides no
source-IP filtering and direct operators upstream. Changelog entry dated
2026-05-27 documents the breaking removal and annotates the 2026-04-19
entry where the feature was introduced.
### Also in this diff (unrelated to IP allowlisting)
The worker control stream was migrated from reading newline-delimited
JSON on stdin to a reconnecting WebSocket
(`/api/v1/runs/{id}/worker/control-stream`). This adds
`tokio-tungstenite` to `fabro-cli`/`fabro-server`, introduces
`WorkerControlManagerHandle` with backoff reconnection and deduplication
of replayed delivery IDs, and adds `RunPause`/`RunUnpause` message
handling. A new integration test
(`detached_run_cancel_reaches_worker_over_control_websocket`) exercises
the full cancel path over the WebSocket.
### Key decisions
- **Hard removal via `deny_unknown_fields`**: stale config is
immediately visible as a startup error rather than silently ignored.
- **No stub or default pass-through**: `IpAllowlistConfig::default()` is
gone, not left as a no-op wrapper, to avoid keeping the feature shape
alive.
- **Webhook HMAC boundary unchanged**: source-IP filtering on webhook
routes is removed; cryptographic signature verification remains the
security boundary.
### Fabro Details
<details>
<summary>Ran 9 stages in 59m 53s for $27.24</summary>
| Stage | Duration | Cost | Retries |
|---|---|---|---|
| start | 0s | – | 0 |
| toolchain | 1s | – | 0 |
| preflight_compile | 2m 15s | – | 0 |
| preflight_lint | 2m 22s | – | 0 |
| implement | 33m 54s | $22.81 | 0 |
| simplify_opus | 5m 55s | $0.75 | 0 |
| simplify_gpt | 3m 35s | $2.81 | 0 |
| verify | 8m 34s | – | 0 |
| fixup | 2m 24s | $0.87 | 0 |
| **Total** | **59m 53s** | **$27.24** | **0** |
</details>
<details>
<summary>Ran <code>ImplementPlan.fabro</code> (11 nodes and 14
edges)</summary>
```dot
digraph ImplementPlan {
graph [
goal="Implement and simplify",
model_stylesheet="
* { model: claude-opus-4-7; }
"
]
rankdir=LR
start [shape=Mdiamond, label="Start"]
exit [shape=Msquare, label="Exit"]
toolchain [label="Toolchain", shape=parallelogram, script="command -v cargo >/dev/null || { curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh -s -- -y && sudo ln -sf $HOME/.cargo/bin/* /usr/local/bin/; }; cargo --version 2>&1", max_retries=0]
preflight_compile [label="Preflight Compile", shape=parallelogram, script="cargo check -q --workspace 2>&1", max_retries=0]
preflight_lint [label="Preflight Lint", shape=parallelogram, script="cargo +nightly-2026-04-14 clippy -q --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings 2>&1", max_retries=0]
fix_lints [label="Fix Lints", prompt="The preflight lint step failed. Read the build output from context and fix all clippy lint warnings.", max_visits=3]
implement [label="Implement", prompt="Read the plan file referenced in the goal and implement every step. Make all the code changes described in the plan. Use red/green TDD.", model="gpt-55", reasoning_effort="xhigh"]
simplify_opus [label="Simplify (Opus)", prompt="@prompts/simplify.md"]
simplify_gpt [label="Simplify (GPT-55)", prompt="@prompts/simplify.md", model="gpt-55"]
verify [label="Verify", shape=parallelogram, script="git fetch origin main 2>&1 && git merge --no-edit --no-stat origin/main 2>&1 && cargo +nightly-2026-04-14 fmt --all 2>&1 && cargo dev docs refresh 2>&1 && cargo +nightly-2026-04-14 fmt --check --all 2>&1 && { command -v rg >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo 'rg is required for verify'; exit 127; }; } && ! rg -n 'AuthMode::Disabled|RunAuthMethod|RunSubjectProvenance|\bActorRef\b|\bActorKind\b|AuthenticatedSubject|AuthenticatedService|AuthorizeRunScoped|AuthorizeRunBlob|AuthorizeStageArtifact|AuthorizeCommandLog|auth_method\s*==\s*\"disabled\"' lib/crates apps lib/packages docs/public/api-reference/fabro-api.yaml 2>&1 && cargo +nightly-2026-04-14 clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings 2>&1 && cargo nextest run --workspace --status-level slow --profile ci 2>&1 && cargo dev docs check 2>&1 && bun install --frozen-lockfile 2>&1 && (cd apps/fabro-web && bun run typecheck) 2>&1 && (cd apps/fabro-web && bun run test) 2>&1 && (cd lib/packages/fabro-api-client && bun run typecheck) 2>&1 && cargo dev build -- -p fabro-cli --release 2>&1", goal_gate=true, retry_target="fixup"]
fixup [label="Fixup", prompt="The verify step failed. Read the build output from context and fix all format, clippy, Rust test, docs, TypeScript typecheck/test, and build failures.", max_visits=3]
start -> toolchain
toolchain -> preflight_compile [condition="outcome=succeeded"]
toolchain -> exit
preflight_compile -> preflight_lint [condition="outcome=succeeded"]
preflight_compile -> exit
preflight_lint -> implement [condition="outcome=succeeded"]
preflight_lint -> fix_lints
fix_lints -> preflight_lint
implement -> simplify_opus -> simplify_gpt -> verify
verify -> exit [condition="outcome=succeeded"]
verify -> fixup
fixup -> verify
}
```
</details>
⚒️ Generated with [Fabro](https://fabro.sh)
---------
Co-authored-by: Fabro <noreply@fabro.sh>
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---
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title: "Security"
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description: "Security model and best practices"
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---
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<Warning>
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Fabro is currently a research preview. It has not yet been subject to third-party penetration testing. There may be vulnerabilities. We strongly recommend only deploying Fabro on private, self-hosted resources within a controlled networking environment.
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</Warning>
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## Security controls not in Fabro
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Fabro is single-tenant software designed for small, trusted teams. The following controls are **not implemented** — plan your deployment accordingly.
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| Control | Status |
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|---|---|
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| **Multi-tenancy** | Not supported. Fabro is single-tenant only — there is no organization or tenant isolation. |
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| **Roles or ACLs** | Not supported. All authenticated users have identical, full access to every run, workflow, and API endpoint. |
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| **Inbound source-IP allowlisting** | Not implemented in Fabro. Restrict source networks with a reverse proxy, firewall, VPN, Tailscale, platform ingress policy, or another deployment-layer control. |
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| **Rate limiting** | Not implemented. The API server does not throttle requests. |
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| **Custom security header policy** | Not configurable. Fabro emits default security headers, including enforced `Content-Security-Policy`, `X-Frame-Options`, `X-Content-Type-Options`, `Referrer-Policy`, `Permissions-Policy`, and `Strict-Transport-Security` when HTTPS is detected. |
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## Security recommendations
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### Network
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- **Deploy the web app on a private network.** Use a Tailscale tailnet, VPN, or internal network to keep the web UI off the public internet.
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- **Deploy the API on a private network.** Only allow access from expected hosts (the web app, CI runners, developer machines). The API binds to `127.0.0.1` by default — do not expose it with `--host 0.0.0.0` unless it is behind a firewall or private network.
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- **Enforce source-IP restrictions upstream.** Fabro does not provide inbound source-IP allowlisting. Use your reverse proxy, firewall, VPN, Tailscale ACLs, cloud load balancer, Kubernetes ingress, or platform policy to limit who can connect.
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- **Use Daytona sandboxes with network controls.** When running untrusted or generated code, use the Daytona sandbox provider with `network = "block"` or a CIDR-based allow list to restrict agent egress.
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### Authentication
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- **Enable authentication.** Fabro supports `dev-token` and GitHub OAuth. Do not disable auth outside of local development or controlled demos.
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- **Configure a username allowlist for GitHub OAuth.** `[server.auth.github].allowed_usernames` should contain the exact GitHub users allowed to log in. An empty list rejects everyone.
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- **Configure the session secret used by the web flow.** `SESSION_SECRET` should be provisioned with a strong value on long-lived deployments.
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- **Terminate HTTPS or mTLS upstream when needed.** Fabro's listener is plain HTTP/Unix only. If CI, scripts, or a browser must connect over HTTPS, terminate TLS at a reverse proxy or load balancer and keep the Fabro listener on a private network.
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### Secrets
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- **Keep API keys out of sandboxes.** The local sandbox strips environment variables ending in `_API_KEY`, `_SECRET`, `_TOKEN`, `_PASSWORD`, or `_CREDENTIAL`, but Docker and Daytona sandboxes provide stronger isolation — only explicitly configured variables are passed through.
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- **Use the server vault for optional integration credentials.** For server-backed workflows, persist LLM provider keys, Slack, Daytona, Brave Search, GitHub token, and GitHub App secrets with `fabro provider login`, `fabro secret set`, or `fabro install`. Process env and `server.env` are reserved for bootstrap secrets such as `SESSION_SECRET`, `FABRO_DEV_TOKEN`, and object-store credentials. Do not commit secrets to version control.
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- **Rotate the session secret.** The `SESSION_SECRET` environment variable encrypts web app sessions. Rotate it periodically and use a strong random value.
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### Execution
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- **Use Docker or Daytona for untrusted workflows.** The `local` sandbox offers no filesystem or network isolation — agents have the same access as the host. Use `docker` or `daytona` when running code you haven't reviewed.
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- **Restrict agent permissions.** Use `--permissions read-only` or `--permissions read-write` to limit which tools agents can invoke without approval. In non-interactive mode (`--auto-approve`), tools outside the permission level are denied outright.
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## Security reporting
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If you discover a security vulnerability in Fabro, please report it responsibly:
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1. **Email** [security@fabro.dev](mailto:security@fabro.dev) with a description of the vulnerability, steps to reproduce, and any relevant details.
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2. **Do not** disclose the vulnerability publicly until we have had a chance to investigate and release a fix.
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3. We will acknowledge receipt within 48 hours and aim to provide an initial assessment within 5 business days.
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4. We will work with you to understand the issue and coordinate disclosure timing.
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We appreciate the security research community's efforts in helping keep Fabro and its users safe.
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