- ExecStreamingRequest: drop #[non_exhaustive] and the six Option-taking
builder setters; call sites use struct literals over ::new(), matching
GrepOptions/WalkOptions, and providers can destructure exhaustively
- Docker: pass ExecStreamingRequest through docker_exec_shell_streaming
instead of seven positional args; revert the no-op StartExecOptions
- Daytona: stdin temp-file cleanup is now best-effort (mirrors
DaytonaSession::close) so a failed delete cannot fail a completed
command or double-delete from Drop; upload overlaps session creation;
one shared DAYTONA_CLEANUP_TIMEOUT
- write_process_stdin tolerates ConnectionReset/ConnectionAborted so a
command that stops reading stdin does not fail on TCP Docker daemons
- Local sandbox aborts the stdin writer after process exit instead of
joining unbounded
- Cap stdin_source payloads at 10 MiB, mirroring the for_each bound
- Add Node::context_key_attr() tri-state so the handler and lint rule
share one definition of a valid context-key attribute
- inert_attribute canonicalizes handler types via StageHandler, fixing
false warnings for command attrs on tool nodes
- Share resolve_flat_context_value between command stdin and for_each;
resolve_json_value takes Value by value, removing a deep clone
- Reuse MockSandbox in command handler stdin tests instead of extending
SpySandbox with a hand-rolled streaming override
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A Daytona-backed run could fail five seconds after start when the sandbox
git clone hit a transient GitHub "Repository not found" error. Clone-based
providers mint an installation access token and clone with it in the same
breath, but GitHub replicates a new token to its edge cache sites
asynchronously. A clone that starts within a second of the mint can be
rejected before the token is visible to the site serving it, and on a
private repo that rejection arrives as "Repository not found" because
GitHub answers unauthorized reads with 404.
Nothing retried the clone, and the failure classified as `deterministic`,
which is the one category `loop_restart` refuses to restart. An identical
run relaunched 46 seconds later succeeded with no changes.
A successful mint is what makes the message safe to retry.
`resolve_clone_credentials` already fails loudly on every deterministic
explanation for a clone 404: the installation lookup 404s when the App is
not installed for the owner, and token creation 422s when the installation
does not cover the repo. Once credentials are in hand, "not found" from the
clone itself cannot mean "no access".
Add `clone_retry` and use it from both clone-based providers: 3 attempts
with 3s then 9s backoff, reusing the same token so replication keeps making
progress instead of restarting the clock. Token-replication signatures
retry only when credentials are present, so a public clone of a wrong URL
still fails fast. Infrastructure failures retry either way.
The Docker provider had the identical single-shot clone and is the default
runtime provider, so it is covered too.
Also fix two nearby issues found while reading the area:
- The GitHub-URL-parse path in the Daytona clone skipped `fail_init`,
unlike every sibling path, so `InitializeFailed` was never emitted.
- The `classify_exec_failure` hint for "repository not found" asserted the
App installation may not cover the repo. After a successful scoped mint
that diagnosis is impossible, and it sent operators hunting a
configuration problem that did not exist.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The process environment is no longer a configuration source. `{{ vars.NAME }}`
(non-sensitive, server-stored) and `{{ secrets.NAME }}` (vault-backed) cover
both cases, and reading the worker's ambient environment made a run's inputs
depend on how its process happened to be launched.
`Namespace::Env` is kept but wired to nothing, so `{{ env.NAME }}` still
parses and fails with a message naming its replacement rather than reaching
a consumer as literal text. `ResolveCtx::with_env` is gone, so no call site
can opt back in.
Two long-standing warts were env-only and go with it:
- `InterpString::resolve_or_source`, the "fall back to the raw template
source on failure" path, which let an unresolved token reach a sandbox or
the GitHub API as literal `{{ ... }}` text. Its own comment noted it was
slated for hard-error semantics.
- `RunEnvironmentSettings::resolve_env`'s matching source fallback for
env-only values.
Both carried `#[expect(clippy::disallowed_methods)]` escape hatches. Every
run-boundary resolver — sandbox env, prepare steps, MCP transports, GitHub
permissions, Slack channels, run goal files, provider extra_headers — now
fails closed instead.
Hooks lose their `allowed_env_vars` allowlist, `resolve_header`, and
`HeaderResolveError` along with the `E: Env` generic threaded through the
executor. They keep `{{ vars.* }}`, which `RunSettings::substitute_variables`
already substitutes server-side at run creation.
`allowed_env_vars` is removed from the OpenAPI spec and the generated
TypeScript client. The docs example showing `{{ env.* }}` in
`[server.slatedb.s3].bucket` was already wrong — that field is a plain
String and never interpolated — and is now a literal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`ReadBeforeWriteSandbox` blocked writes to any existing file the agent
had not read, tracked by a session read set populated only by
`read_file`, `grep`, `read_many_files`, and the Kimi `Read`.
The gpt56 profile has none of those. It mirrors Codex's tool contract --
`shell_command`, `apply_patch`/`edit_file`, `update_plan`, `web_search`
-- and reads through the shell, so its read set stayed permanently
empty and every edit to an existing file failed. In run
01KYD4360GN6SED4BYEVGYP4XT all 28 `edit_file` calls failed, 25 of them
on the guard. The agent read `package.json` with `sed` and `cat`,
hex-dumped it trying to diagnose the rejections, then routed around the
guard with `sed -i`, which the guard never covered. It prevented no
blind write; it converted content-anchored edits into an unreviewed
in-place shell rewrite.
Neither Codex nor Kimi Code enforces read-before-write at runtime.
Codex's `apply_patch` `Add File` overwrites an existing path silently;
Kimi Code's `Write` has no check at all. Both rely on the exact-match
requirement in their edit tools, which is stronger proof of inspection
than a read set, plus per-write approval.
Tool descriptions and the Kimi prompt keep telling the model to read
before editing -- that guidance matches Kimi Code's own `edit.md` and
still prevents `old_string not found` -- but no longer claim the
workspace refuses unread writes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extend the Daytona Bash probe to cover the streaming toolbox-session transport in addition to the direct process exec. The two build different requests, so passing one is not evidence for the other: the `exec` regression fixed in #636 left every streaming command stalling until its timeout while the lifecycle probe reported a healthy sandbox. The session probe reuses the streaming path's own command construction and completion wait, so a transport that suppresses Daytona's exit-code bookkeeping fails at the lifecycle boundary with a remediation that names the wrapper-shell contract.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Run the streaming Bash wrapper as a child of Daytona's session shell so the provider can resume its bookkeeping and persist the command exit code. Add a regression test that exercises the sourced-command contract and preserves a nonzero exit status.
Fabro advertised Bash while its three backends implemented three
different contracts: Daytona evaluated commands through `sh`, and
Docker's streaming, stdio, and setup paths used a login shell. Bash-only
syntax silently misbehaved depending on provider and code path, and
login profiles could change PATH and command behavior per image.
Make `bash -c` the enforced interpreter for every command string the
Unix sandbox API accepts, on every production backend and through both
buffered and streaming execution. This selects the interpreter only —
no `errexit`, no `pipefail`, no login mode — so `false | true` still
succeeds and a workflow that wants other semantics writes them into its
own command.
Local resolves `bash` through the worker's PATH (NixOS has no
/bin/bash) and reuses that one executable across all three command
paths. Docker and Daytona require /bin/bash with no `sh` fallback.
Fresh initialization and resume/start now verify Bash through a shared
marker-validating probe before reporting the sandbox usable, so a
missing or non-Bash interpreter fails at the lifecycle boundary with
provider-specific remediation instead of on the first command. The
probe also rejects Bash in POSIX mode, which an image whose `bash` is
really `sh` would otherwise pass.
Sandbox MCP scripts and the detached launch wrapper move under the same
contract; host-side stdio MCP scripts, hooks, and interactive terminals
are separate executors and keep their existing `sh` behavior.
The `shell` tool's name and JSON schema are unchanged across providers;
only its prose now identifies `command` as Bash source.
BREAKING CHANGE: sandbox commands no longer load login-shell profiles,
so environment set in /etc/profile.d/*.sh, ~/.bash_profile, or
nvm/rbenv/sdkman initializers is gone. Move those exports into the
Dockerfile's ENV or the Daytona snapshot image.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The shell executor rendered every returned ExecResult and returned
Ok(output), so nonzero exits, timeouts, and cancellations reached
execute_one_tool() as successes. That false ToolResult propagated
consistently: agent.tool.completed recorded is_error: false, the success
post-tool hook ran, Anthropic saw is_error: false, OpenAI Responses saw a
completed function-call output, and CLI/web rendered a successful tool
call.
ExecResult::is_success() is now the authoritative predicate. The executor
runs through exec_command_streaming() with a sink callback, so it keeps
the production providers' stream provenance and partial-output capture,
and drops the exec 2>&1 prefix that merged stderr into stdout before
Fabro could report it. Model-facing text labels termination, exit code,
duration, and either separate stdout/stderr sections or one combined
section when the provider cannot separate streams.
Session-bound dispatch also emits a typed agent.tool.process.completed
event carrying the process metadata, streams_separated, and bounded
redacted output tails. It is subordinate diagnostic data: the following
agent.tool.completed remains the one tool-protocol completion and the
authoritative owner of is_error, so consumers need no new row.
Nonzero, timed-out, and cancelled commands intentionally change from
successful to failed tool results, and PostToolUseFailure replaces
PostToolUse for them. On Docker the agent shell tool now uses the
streaming path's bash -lc supervisor, which terminates the process group
on timeout instead of leaving container-side processes running.
The public shell schema is unchanged and pinned by an exact assertion.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
