The check tested for `never reconstruct it from memory`, a phrase the
Kimi edit description no longer contains after it was reworded to match
Kimi Code. A one-sided `!contains` against a literal cannot tell "the
phrase is absent because nothing leaked" from "the phrase is absent
everywhere", so it silently stopped protecting anything.
Assert the marker is present in Kimi's own description and absent from
the stock one. Removing the marker from the description now fails the
test instead of quietly disarming it, verified by doing exactly that.
Also correct the grep docs: all three sandbox implementations probe for
`rg` and fall back to POSIX `grep`, so the page should not imply a
single engine. Pre-existing, adjacent to the lines this branch touched.
Reported by Copilot review on #646.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`ReadBeforeWriteSandbox` blocked writes to any existing file the agent
had not read, tracked by a session read set populated only by
`read_file`, `grep`, `read_many_files`, and the Kimi `Read`.
The gpt56 profile has none of those. It mirrors Codex's tool contract --
`shell_command`, `apply_patch`/`edit_file`, `update_plan`, `web_search`
-- and reads through the shell, so its read set stayed permanently
empty and every edit to an existing file failed. In run
01KYD4360GN6SED4BYEVGYP4XT all 28 `edit_file` calls failed, 25 of them
on the guard. The agent read `package.json` with `sed` and `cat`,
hex-dumped it trying to diagnose the rejections, then routed around the
guard with `sed -i`, which the guard never covered. It prevented no
blind write; it converted content-anchored edits into an unreviewed
in-place shell rewrite.
Neither Codex nor Kimi Code enforces read-before-write at runtime.
Codex's `apply_patch` `Add File` overwrites an existing path silently;
Kimi Code's `Write` has no check at all. Both rely on the exact-match
requirement in their edit tools, which is stronger proof of inspection
than a read set, plus per-write approval.
Tool descriptions and the Kimi prompt keep telling the model to read
before editing -- that guidance matches Kimi Code's own `edit.md` and
still prevents `old_string not found` -- but no longer claim the
workspace refuses unread writes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
server-secrets-strategy.md described only two credential mechanisms — bootstrap
ServerSecrets and vault-only optional integrations — and stated its most
restrictive rule in terms of "server runtime", which is ambiguous now that every
run is a server process plus a worker. It omitted the third mechanism actually
used by operator-configured integrations: settings-declared credentials in
InterpString fields, resolved at consumption time from {{ env.NAME }} or
{{ secrets.NAME }}, as LLM provider extra_headers already does.
Add a "Which process resolves what" table keyed on resolving process and timing,
a "Settings-declared credentials" section with the extra_headers precedent, and a
mechanism table at the head of "Adding A New Server Secret". Replace "server
runtime" with per-process statements, and describe where CredentialResolver's
process-env fallback is actually live.
Also correct six docs that told operators to export provider keys for "standalone
local runs". There is no CLI-local run execution: runs always execute in a worker
whose environment is cleared and repopulated from WORKER_ENV_ALLOWLIST, which
excludes provider API keys. Those instructions could not have worked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fabro advertised Bash while its three backends implemented three
different contracts: Daytona evaluated commands through `sh`, and
Docker's streaming, stdio, and setup paths used a login shell. Bash-only
syntax silently misbehaved depending on provider and code path, and
login profiles could change PATH and command behavior per image.
Make `bash -c` the enforced interpreter for every command string the
Unix sandbox API accepts, on every production backend and through both
buffered and streaming execution. This selects the interpreter only —
no `errexit`, no `pipefail`, no login mode — so `false | true` still
succeeds and a workflow that wants other semantics writes them into its
own command.
Local resolves `bash` through the worker's PATH (NixOS has no
/bin/bash) and reuses that one executable across all three command
paths. Docker and Daytona require /bin/bash with no `sh` fallback.
Fresh initialization and resume/start now verify Bash through a shared
marker-validating probe before reporting the sandbox usable, so a
missing or non-Bash interpreter fails at the lifecycle boundary with
provider-specific remediation instead of on the first command. The
probe also rejects Bash in POSIX mode, which an image whose `bash` is
really `sh` would otherwise pass.
Sandbox MCP scripts and the detached launch wrapper move under the same
contract; host-side stdio MCP scripts, hooks, and interactive terminals
are separate executors and keep their existing `sh` behavior.
The `shell` tool's name and JSON schema are unchanged across providers;
only its prose now identifies `command` as Bash source.
BREAKING CHANGE: sandbox commands no longer load login-shell profiles,
so environment set in /etc/profile.d/*.sh, ~/.bash_profile, or
nvm/rbenv/sdkman initializers is gone. Move those exports into the
Dockerfile's ENV or the Daytona snapshot image.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
## Summary
Separates Fabro server secrets into two explicit scopes: **bootstrap**
secrets that come from process env or `server.env`, and **optional
integration** secrets that come exclusively from the vault. This makes
secret resolution simple and predictable, and removes all `process env →
server.env` fallback paths for optional integrations such as GitHub App,
Slack, Daytona, Brave Search, and LLM provider keys.
## What changed
**New `ToolSecrets` struct in `fabro-agent`** — Brave Search API key is
now passed explicitly through `SessionOptions.tool_secrets` rather than
read from process env inside the tool. The standalone CLI reads the key
at the CLI boundary (with an explicit
`#[expect(clippy::disallowed_methods)]` annotation); the server will
read it from the vault. The error message changes from
`"BRAVE_SEARCH_API_KEY environment variable is not set"` to
`"BRAVE_SEARCH_API_KEY is not configured"`.
**`VaultCredentialSource::vault_only` constructor in `fabro-auth`** —
Adds a constructor that passes `|_| None` as the env lookup, ensuring
the server LLM credential source never resolves provider keys from
process env.
**GitHub App secrets move to vault in install flows** — Both the CLI
`fabro install github` path and the browser install finish handler now
write `GITHUB_APP_PRIVATE_KEY`, `GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_SECRET`, and
`GITHUB_APP_WEBHOOK_SECRET` to the vault instead of `server.env`.
Switching strategies removes stale secrets from the other strategy's
storage location. The `vault_set` field type changes from `Vec<(String,
String)>` to `Vec<VaultSecretWrite>` to carry per-secret type metadata
(file vs. token).
**`fabro-vault` gains a `fabro-static` dependency** — Needed so the
vault crate can reference canonical env-var names from the shared
registry without a cycle.
**`GH_TOKEN` fallback removed** — `GITHUB_TOKEN` is now read from the
vault only; the changelog and `server-configuration.mdx` note drops
mention of `GH_TOKEN` as an accepted fallback.
**Version bump** — Workspace crates promoted from `0.244.0-nightly.0` to
`0.244.0`.
**Docs** — Internal strategy doc, public admin docs (Docker, Railway,
server-configuration, security, troubleshooting), and integration docs
(GitHub, Slack, Daytona, Brave Search, LiteLLM, tools reference, models)
all updated to reflect vault-only optional secrets and direct users to
`fabro secret set` rather than process env or `server.env`.
### Plan Summary
- **Task 1** (secret registry) — not yet present in this diff;
classification lives in the places that consume it.
- **Task 3–6** (vault-only lookups for GitHub, Slack, Daytona, LLM) —
implemented via `vault_only` constructor, `tool_secrets` threading, and
install-path changes.
- **Task 7** (Brave Search explicit injection) — `ToolSecrets`,
`register_core_tools` wiring, CLI boundary read.
- **Task 8** (install persistence) — GitHub App secrets written to
vault; token strategy writes `GITHUB_TOKEN` to vault and clears app
vault keys; app strategy clears `GITHUB_TOKEN` vault key.
- **Task 9** (docs) — all public and internal docs updated.
### Fabro Details
<details>
<summary>Ran 0 stages in 155m 26s for $60.85</summary>
| Stage | Duration | Cost | Retries |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Total** | **155m 26s** | **$60.85** | **0** |
</details>
<details>
<summary>Ran <code>ImplementPlan.fabro</code> (11 nodes and 14
edges)</summary>
```dot
digraph ImplementPlan {
graph [
goal="Implement and simplify",
model_stylesheet="
* { model: claude-opus-4-7; }
"
]
rankdir=LR
start [shape=Mdiamond, label="Start"]
exit [shape=Msquare, label="Exit"]
toolchain [label="Toolchain", shape=parallelogram, script="command -v cargo >/dev/null || { curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh -s -- -y && sudo ln -sf $HOME/.cargo/bin/* /usr/local/bin/; }; cargo --version 2>&1", max_retries=0]
preflight_compile [label="Preflight Compile", shape=parallelogram, script="cargo check -q --workspace 2>&1", max_retries=0]
preflight_lint [label="Preflight Lint", shape=parallelogram, script="cargo +nightly-2026-04-14 clippy -q --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings 2>&1", max_retries=0]
fix_lints [label="Fix Lints", prompt="The preflight lint step failed. Read the build output from context and fix all clippy lint warnings.", max_visits=3]
implement [label="Implement", prompt="Read the plan file referenced in the goal and implement every step. Make all the code changes described in the plan. Use red/green TDD.", model="gpt-55", reasoning_effort="xhigh"]
simplify_opus [label="Simplify (Opus)", prompt="@prompts/simplify.md"]
simplify_gpt [label="Simplify (GPT-55)", prompt="@prompts/simplify.md", model="gpt-55"]
verify [label="Verify", shape=parallelogram, script="git fetch origin main 2>&1 && git merge --no-edit --no-stat origin/main 2>&1 && cargo +nightly-2026-04-14 fmt --all 2>&1 && cargo dev docs refresh 2>&1 && cargo +nightly-2026-04-14 fmt --check --all 2>&1 && { command -v rg >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo 'rg is required for verify'; exit 127; }; } && ! rg -n 'AuthMode::Disabled|RunAuthMethod|RunSubjectProvenance|\bActorRef\b|\bActorKind\b|AuthenticatedSubject|AuthenticatedService|AuthorizeRunScoped|AuthorizeRunBlob|AuthorizeStageArtifact|AuthorizeCommandLog|auth_method\s*==\s*\"disabled\"' lib/crates apps lib/packages docs/public/api-reference/fabro-api.yaml 2>&1 && cargo +nightly-2026-04-14 clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings 2>&1 && cargo nextest run --workspace --status-level slow --profile ci 2>&1 && cargo dev docs check 2>&1 && bun install --frozen-lockfile 2>&1 && (cd apps/fabro-web && bun run typecheck) 2>&1 && (cd apps/fabro-web && bun run test) 2>&1 && (cd lib/packages/fabro-api-client && bun run typecheck) 2>&1 && cargo dev build -- -p fabro-cli --release 2>&1", goal_gate=true, retry_target="fixup"]
fixup [label="Fixup", prompt="The verify step failed. Read the build output from context and fix all format, clippy, Rust test, docs, TypeScript typecheck/test, and build failures.", max_visits=3]
start -> toolchain
toolchain -> preflight_compile [condition="outcome=succeeded"]
toolchain -> exit
preflight_compile -> preflight_lint [condition="outcome=succeeded"]
preflight_compile -> exit
preflight_lint -> implement [condition="outcome=succeeded"]
preflight_lint -> fix_lints
fix_lints -> preflight_lint
implement -> simplify_opus -> simplify_gpt -> verify
verify -> exit [condition="outcome=succeeded"]
verify -> fixup
fixup -> verify
}
```
</details>
⚒️ Generated with [Fabro](https://fabro.sh)
---------
Co-authored-by: Fabro <noreply@fabro.sh>
Co-authored-by: Bryan Helmkamp <bryan@brynary.com>
## Summary
This PR makes agent execution a strict two-backend contract: API-backed
stages use Fabro-owned model/provider auth, while ACP-backed stages
launch a user-supplied stdio process that owns its own auth and tools.
That removes the legacy CLI backend and prevents ACP execution from
accidentally resolving or forwarding provider credentials.
## Changes
- Replaces the old `api`/`cli`/`acp` backend model with `AgentBackend {
api, acp }`, with `backend=\"cli\"` rejected and migrated toward
explicit ACP process configuration.
- Splits ACP process configuration into `acp.command` for shell command
strings and `acp.config` for JSON stdio configs, while rejecting legacy
`acp_command`.
- Restricts ACP to `agent` nodes and rejects API-only attributes such as
`model`, `provider`, `reasoning_effort`, `max_tokens`, and `speed` on
ACP nodes.
- Deletes the workflow CLI runtime, CLI credential resolver surface, CLI
live smoke tests, and `agent.cli.*` event handling.
- Updates ACP events and projections to report process identity
(`command`, optional `config_name`) rather than provider/model metadata.
- Updates import/stylesheet propagation, CLI workflow smoke coverage,
server steering tests, and web model extraction for the new
event/backend contract.
## Validation
- `cargo check -p fabro-auth -p fabro-acp -p fabro-workflow -p fabro-cli
--all-targets`
- `cargo nextest run -p fabro-auth -p fabro-acp -p fabro-validate -p
fabro-store -p fabro-workflow --lib`
- `cargo nextest run -p fabro-acp`
- `cargo nextest run -p fabro-cli --test it
workflow::acp::acp_backend_workflow`
- `cargo nextest run -p fabro-workflow --test it
codergen_without_backend_simulated`
- `cargo nextest run -p fabro-workflow --test it
import_e2e_through_engine`
- `cargo nextest run -p fabro-workflow --test it stylesheet_application`
- `cargo nextest run -p fabro-server
steer_with_active_acp_stage_returns_non_steerable_conflict`
- `cargo nextest run -p fabro-server
active_acp_stage_marker_clears_on_terminal_paths`
- `cargo nextest run -p fabro-types
agent_backend_accepts_only_api_and_acp`
- `cd apps/fabro-web && bun test app/routes/run-stages.test.ts`
- `cd apps/fabro-web && bun run typecheck`
- `cargo +nightly-2026-04-14 fmt --check --all`
- `cargo +nightly-2026-04-14 clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D
warnings`
---
[](https://github.com/EveryInc/compound-engineering-plugin)
🤖 Generated with GPT-5 via [Codex](https://openai.com/codex)
---------
Co-authored-by: Peter Bell <4843+PeterBell@users.noreply.github.com>
## Summary
Implemented ACP support as a first-class Fabro backend alongside `api`
and `cli`. This adds a new `fabro-acp` crate using the official ACP Rust
crates, routes `backend=\"acp\"` for agent and prompt nodes, adds
sandbox stdio support for local/Docker/test-support paths, emits ACP
workflow events/projections, updates server steerability handling,
validation, documentation, and black-box CLI coverage.
## Test Plan
Passed strict non-live verification:
- `ulimit -n 4096 && cargo nextest run -p fabro-workflow --run-ignored
all --no-fail-fast` — 1162 passed, 0 skipped.
- `ulimit -n 4096 && cargo nextest run -p fabro-acp -p fabro-sandbox -p
fabro-workflow -p fabro-validate -p fabro-store -p fabro-server -p
fabro-cli --run-ignored all --no-fail-fast -E 'not
test(daytona_streaming_live_smoke)'` — 3125 passed.
- `cargo build --workspace` — passed.
- `ulimit -n 4096 && cargo nextest run --workspace --run-ignored all
--no-fail-fast -E 'not test(daytona_streaming_live_smoke)'` — 5666
passed.
- `cargo +nightly-2026-04-14 fmt --check --all` — passed.
- `cargo +nightly-2026-04-14 clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D
warnings` — passed.
Live-environment tests skipped/excluded under explicit user override:
- `daytona_streaming_live_smoke` was excluded from final nextest runs
because it requires live Daytona infrastructure and `DAYTONA_API_KEY`.
- Confirmed with `env -u DAYTONA_API_KEY cargo test -p fabro-sandbox
--features daytona --test daytona_streaming_live
daytona_streaming_live::daytona_streaming_live_smoke -- --ignored
--exact --nocapture`: failed fast with `DAYTONA_API_KEY must be set to
run this live smoke test`.
Invert the docs convention so the Mintlify-published site lives under
docs/public/ and internal artifacts (strategy docs, brainstorms, plans,
etc.) sit at docs/ root or docs/internal/. Tools that default to writing
into docs/ now land in the catch-all instead of leaking into the
published tree.
- Move Mintlify content (administration/, agents/, api-reference/,
changelog/, core-concepts/, examples/, execution/, getting-started/,
human-tools/, integrations/, languages/, reference/, tutorials/,
workflows/, images/, logo/, docs.json, favicon.svg, dot-highlight.js)
into docs/public/.
- Collapse docs-internal/ into docs/internal/.
- Update Rust path references (fabro-api/build.rs, fabro-server,
fabro-dev), TypeScript generator arg, CI path filters, clippy.toml
reasons, AGENTS.md/CLAUDE.md, and README.md image refs.
Mintlify dashboard project root must be updated to docs/public/ in a
follow-up. .mintignore move/trim and .claude/skills/ updates land in a
separate commit.
