From 63b171b1a2f75563c4f872fde03470aad9002445 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Richmond <5629+jr@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2025 15:43:28 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] More patterns

---
 .../src/utils/__tests__/command-validation.spec.ts    |  4 ++++
 webview-ui/src/utils/command-validation.ts            | 11 +++++++----
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/webview-ui/src/utils/__tests__/command-validation.spec.ts b/webview-ui/src/utils/__tests__/command-validation.spec.ts
index 2427fc64b2..6180e6d28e 100644
--- a/webview-ui/src/utils/__tests__/command-validation.spec.ts
+++ b/webview-ui/src/utils/__tests__/command-validation.spec.ts
@@ -301,6 +301,8 @@ ls -la || echo "Failed"`
 		it("detects zsh glob qualifiers with code execution (e:...:)", () => {
 			// Basic glob qualifier with command execution
 			expect(containsDangerousSubstitution("ls *(e:whoami:)")).toBe(true)
+			// Zsh extended glob with qualifier list and brace-arg: e{'whoami'} as reported
+			expect(containsDangerousSubstitution("ls *(.e{'whoami'})")).toBe(true)
 
 			// Various glob patterns with code execution
 			expect(containsDangerousSubstitution("cat ?(e:rm -rf /:)")).toBe(true)
@@ -1043,6 +1045,8 @@ describe("Unified Command Decision Functions", () => {
 				const globExploit = "ls *(e:whoami:)"
 				// Even though 'ls' might be allowed, the dangerous pattern prevents auto-approval
 				expect(getCommandDecision(globExploit, ["ls", "echo"], [])).toBe("ask_user")
+				// Zsh extended glob with qualifier list and brace-arg form
+				expect(getCommandDecision("ls *(.e{'whoami'})", ["ls", "echo"], [])).toBe("ask_user")
 
 				// Various forms should all be blocked
 				expect(getCommandDecision("cat ?(e:rm -rf /:)", ["cat"], [])).toBe("ask_user")
diff --git a/webview-ui/src/utils/command-validation.ts b/webview-ui/src/utils/command-validation.ts
index a4c4f8c107..b92aba0d36 100644
--- a/webview-ui/src/utils/command-validation.ts
+++ b/webview-ui/src/utils/command-validation.ts
@@ -107,10 +107,13 @@ export function containsDangerousSubstitution(source: string): boolean {
 	// =(...) creates a temporary file containing the output of the command, but executes it
 	const zshProcessSubstitution = /=\([^)]+\)/.test(source)
 
-	// Check for zsh glob qualifiers with code execution (e:...:)
-	// Patterns like *(e:whoami:) or ?(e:rm -rf /:) execute commands during glob expansion
-	// This regex matches patterns like *(e:...:), ?(e:...:), +(e:...:), @(e:...:), !(e:...:)
-	const zshGlobQualifier = /[*?+@!]\(e:[^:]+:\)/.test(source)
+	// Check for zsh glob qualifiers with code execution via the "e" qualifier
+	// This must detect multiple zsh forms that execute code during glob expansion:
+	// - Classic: *(e:whoami:) or ?(e:rm -rf /:) etc.
+	// - With other qualifiers: *(.e:whoami:) (dot means "plain files" plus e:...)
+	// - Brace/quoted argument forms: *(e{'whoami'}), *(.e{'whoami'}), *(e{"whoami"}), *(.e{"whoami"})
+	// Any appearance of an "e" qualifier with an argument inside a glob qualifier list is dangerous.
+	const zshGlobQualifier = /\([^)]*e\s*(?::[^:]*:|\{[^}]*\}|'[^']*'|"[^"]*")[^)]*\)/.test(source)
 
 	// Check for $"..." string interpolation with command substitution
 	// $"..." is a bash feature for translated strings that allows command substitution inside