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https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus.git
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83 lines
4.3 KiB
Text
83 lines
4.3 KiB
Text
# GitNexus HTTP Embedding Configuration
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# Copy to .env and uncomment to use a remote OpenAI-compatible endpoint
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# instead of the local snowflake-arctic-embed-xs model.
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# When unset, local embeddings are used unchanged.
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# GITNEXUS_EMBEDDING_URL=http://your-server:8080/v1
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# GITNEXUS_EMBEDDING_MODEL=BAAI/bge-large-en-v1.5
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# GITNEXUS_EMBEDDING_DIMS=1024
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# GITNEXUS_EMBEDDING_API_KEY=your-key
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# GITNEXUS_EMBEDDING_MAX_ATTEMPTS=3
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# GITNEXUS_EMBEDDING_RETRY_CAP_MS=5000
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# GITNEXUS_EMBEDDING_MIN_INTERVAL_MS=0
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# GITNEXUS_EMBEDDING_HTTP_TIMEOUT_MS=180000
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# Works with Infinity, vLLM, TEI, llama.cpp, Ollama, LM Studio, or OpenAI.
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# See README for details.
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# JVM / Kotlin same-package sibling injection
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# Limits implicit sibling class bindings per module scope, nearest first by path.
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# Set to 0 for no limit. Files whose sibling set is truncated are marked
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# visibility-incomplete (wildcard attribution disabled for them). Packages over
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# 500 files are skipped entirely regardless of this value.
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# GITNEXUS_MAX_INJECTED_SIBLINGS=200
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# Azure DevOps Server (Self-Hosted) Integration
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# Base URL of your Azure DevOps Server instance. Prefer https:// — the PAT is
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# sent in an Authorization header, so cleartext http:// exposes it on the wire
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# (http:// is still supported for internal-only instances; the server warns).
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# AZURE_DEVOPS_URL=https://azuredevops.example.com
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# Personal Access Token with Code (Read) scope for cloning private repos.
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# Used for both self-hosted and cloud (dev.azure.com) Azure DevOps.
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# AZURE_DEVOPS_PAT=your-pat-here
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# Scope-resolution property-key dispatch cap (default 32). Per-property-key
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# registration cap in the property-dispatch scope-resolution pass. Raise for
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# repos whose provider/hook tables lose CALLS coverage on a legitimate key.
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# Positive integer only — non-integer or < 1 values fall back to 32.
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# See README § "Scope-resolution property-key dispatch cap".
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# GITNEXUS_MAX_PROPERTY_DISPATCH_FANOUT=32
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# Per-callable-site dispatch-target cap (default 32). Raise this for repos whose
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# wide dispatch tables overflow the default and lose a whole call chain; analyze
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# then logs "callable-value-flow: candidate set exceeded the cap". Positive
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# integer only — non-integer or < 1 values fall back to 32.
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# See README § "Scope-resolution dispatch-target cap".
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# GITNEXUS_MAX_CALLABLE_VALUE_TARGETS=64
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# `serve` behind a reverse proxy
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# Only needed when `gitnexus serve` is reached through a proxy, or bound to a
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# wildcard address. Leave both unset for a local install.
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# The single browser origin this server is reached through. A wildcard bind has
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# no host identity, so without this the write-route guard rejects the UI's
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# writes.
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#
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# NOT USABLE YET: `serve` has no authentication, and requests with no Origin
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# header (curl, any script) already reach POST /api/analyze and DELETE /api/repo,
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# so setting this makes `serve` refuse to start rather than open a public bind
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# with nothing behind it.
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#
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# Matching rules for when the gate lifts: the hostname must match exactly, and so
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# must the scheme. A value with no scheme means https, so plain HTTP needs the
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# explicit http:// form. An explicit port must match; with no port, any port on
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# that hostname is accepted. Anything that is not one reachable host (a list, a
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# wildcard, a bare port number, a :0 port, a trailing dot) warns and allows
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# nothing.
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# GITNEXUS_PUBLIC_ORIGIN=https://gitnexus.example.com
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# Which upstream hops may set X-Forwarded-*, so the per-IP rate limiter keys on
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# the client IP and not the proxy's. Set it to the exact number of proxies you
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# control. Every hop past that is one more entry of the chain the caller gets to
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# write. false/no/off (and a 0 hop count) trust no hop; a proxy list Express can
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# compile ("loopback", "10.0.0.0/8, 127.0.0.1") names them instead.
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# true/yes/on is REJECTED: it reads the client-controlled leftmost
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# X-Forwarded-For entry, so a spoofed chain earns a fresh rate-limit key per
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# request, and express-rate-limit rejects it too. Counts above 16 are rejected as
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# well, as a sanity ceiling rather than a safety boundary. Any invalid value warns
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# and falls back to "loopback, linklocal, uniquelocal".
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# Bind non-loopback with this unset and `serve` warns: a load balancer outside the
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# private ranges is untrusted, so every request keys to the balancer and the
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# per-IP limit becomes one shared limit.
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# GITNEXUS_TRUST_PROXY=1
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