mirror of
https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus.git
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6f1cfffdd7
* Initial plan * chore(security): harden workflow permissions and pin Docker base image digests Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/sessions/2ddc8f2b-7355-48cf-9a0b-c06df66c3f47 * fix(security): restore permissions: {} on publish + release-candidate workflows These two release-publishing workflows had permissions: {} (the strictest valid form) before PR #1454, which replaced it with permissions: read-all. Every job in both files already declares its own permissions block, so the workflow-level default is only the safety net for future jobs added without one — read-all weakens that net for no benefit. Restore {} and the explanatory comment. Scorecard's TokenPermissions check accepts both forms, so this preserves U9 compliance. * fix(security): narrow permissions: read-all to contents: read on 13 workflows PR #1454 added permissions: read-all to 13 workflows that previously had no top-level permissions block. read-all is Scorecard-compliant but unnecessarily broad — every job in scope only needs contents:read at the workflow level (job-level blocks already grant the writes that any job actually performs). Snapshot of every job in the 13 workflows confirms contents:read is sufficient: - ci.yml: quality/tests/scope-parity have explicit contents:read job blocks; save-pr-meta uses upload-artifact only (no token scopes needed); ci-status is pure shell. - ci-e2e.yml, ci-quality.yml, ci-scope-parity.yml, ci-tests.yml: all jobs do checkout + npm + tsc/vitest/playwright/upload-artifact only; no API token scopes required. - claude.yml, codeql.yml, dependency-review.yml, docker.yml, gitleaks.yml, pr-labeler.yml, trivy.yml, workflow-lint.yml: all jobs already declare their own job-level blocks (security-events:write, pull-requests:write, packages:write, etc.) so the workflow-level default does not gate them. zizmor (--min-severity high) is clean on the resulting tree. Pre-existing medium findings (secrets-inherit, artipacked) are in unrelated workflows and untouched by this commit. scorecard.yml also uses read-all but pre-existed PR #1454 and is deferred to a follow-up PR per the plan's scope boundary. --------- Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Gergő Magyar <gergomagyar@icloud.com>
39 lines
1.1 KiB
YAML
39 lines
1.1 KiB
YAML
name: Dependency Review
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# Blocks PRs that introduce dependencies with high/critical known vulnerabilities.
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# Reads the dependency graph diff between PR head and base.
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#
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# This is a required-check candidate after one week of clean runs
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# (operator decision — see docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md).
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on:
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pull_request:
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branches: [main]
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permissions:
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contents: read
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concurrency:
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group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
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cancel-in-progress: true
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jobs:
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review:
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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timeout-minutes: 10
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permissions:
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contents: read
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# pull-requests:write enables the inline summary comment on failure.
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pull-requests: write
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steps:
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- name: Checkout
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uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
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with:
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persist-credentials: false
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- name: Dependency Review
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uses: actions/dependency-review-action@2031cfc080254a8a887f58cffee85186f0e49e48 # v4.9.0
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with:
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fail-on-severity: high
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comment-summary-in-pr: on-failure
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