GitNexus/gitnexus-claude-plugin/skills/gitnexus-plan/scripts/evidence-provenance.mjs
Gergő Magyar 740f0a4e57
fix(skills): publish gitnexus-plan artifacts on macOS without an interpreter (#2905) (#2922)
* fix(skills): anchor gitnexus-plan safe writer on macOS (#2905)

The safe generated-plan writer refused to run on anything but Linux.
`requireDescriptorAnchoring()` hard-gated `process.platform !== 'linux'`
because every name it resolves went through `/proc/self/fd/<fd>/<child>`,
and publication went through `renameat2(RENAME_NOREPLACE)`. macOS has
neither, so `write-plan` and `read-plan` failed on every input and
`snapshot` failed whenever a materialized path was absent.

Node cannot perform openat-style directory-relative resolution on macOS
at all: `node:fs` exposes no dir_fd parameter, and `fcntl(F_GETPATH)` is
a snapshot string that XNU reconstructs from the name cache, so using it
would reintroduce the exact race this helper exists to prevent. Python
does expose the *at() family via dir_fd, and macOS has renameatx_np with
RENAME_EXCL, so the anchoring borrows the interpreter the writer already
spawns for renameat2.

Anchoring now goes through a backend with two implementations. The Linux
one keeps the original expressions, flags, ordering and error strings.
The Darwin one runs each operation in the integrity-checked python3: it
re-walks the chain from the repository root with O_DIRECTORY|O_NOFOLLOW,
asserting the caller's recorded device, inode and mode at every level
before acting. A chain that fails that assertion reports a dedicated
anchoring errno and never ENOENT, so a moved parent cannot be read as an
absent file. Node holds an open descriptor on every chain element for the
anchor's lifetime, which pins the inodes so their numbers cannot be
recycled between spawns, and that coupling is re-checked on the way into
every request rather than left implicit.

A filesystem that answers ENOTSUP to RENAME_EXCL is a refusal, never a
fallback to a replacing rename. Every other platform is still refused.

The suite had silently skipped on every non-Linux runner, so it is now
gated on linux-or-darwin and registered in the cross-platform test list,
which puts it on the macos-latest CI matrix.

Disclosed rather than papered over: operations that must hand Node a file
descriptor are anchored in the helper and then opened lexically with
O_NOFOLLOW and identity-compared. A racer can force a mismatch, which
aborts, or land on the inode the anchored walk already found, which is
harmless. A perfect ABA inside that window is impossible on Linux and
detected in all but its narrowest form on macOS. The reference doc says
so.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NtGZN6YSNU8chALSnKYHBp

* test(skills): normalize the anchoring-gate fixture repo on Windows

The two capability-gate tests are the only ones in this file that run on
Windows, and both failed there: `createBaseRepo` returned the path
`os.tmpdir()` gave it, which on Windows is the 8.3 short form
(C:\Users\RUNNER~1\...). `assertRepository` compares fs.realpathSync of
the caller's path against the realpath of `git rev-parse --show-toplevel`,
and plain realpathSync does not expand short names while git always
reports the long form, so the helper rejected its own fixture with
"--repo must be the Git worktree root" before either platform gate was
reached.

Resolve the fixture with the native resolver, which returns the canonical
long path. No-op on platforms where the two already agree.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NtGZN6YSNU8chALSnKYHBp

* test(skills): skip the darwin backend gate on Windows

Spoofing process.platform does not spoof fs.constants. Windows Node
defines no O_DIRECTORY, so a darwin-spoofed run there refuses at the
anchoring-flag check and returns that message instead of ever reaching
the python3-backend branch the test exists to cover.

Skip it on win32 rather than loosening the regex, which would also let a
macOS run pass on the wrong message. The sibling test still asserts the
Windows refusal on Windows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NtGZN6YSNU8chALSnKYHBp

* refactor(skills): tighten the macOS anchoring backend

Quality pass over the Darwin backend. No behaviour change was intended
on the success paths; the guarantees are the same or stronger.

Structural:

- openChildRead now proves identity inside the backend instead of by
  comment. It was returning a raw descriptor from a lexical open, with
  the "callers always compare against the preceding anchored stat"
  invariant enforced across four call sites in prose — and since the
  Linux predicate is a literal `return true`, a fifth caller that forgot
  would have been an unanchored open on macOS that Linux CI could not
  see. It routes through darwinAdoptAnchoredFile, which already did
  open-then-compare-then-close-on-mismatch for createChild.

- recordAnchoredAbsence shares one prefix walk per snapshot instead of
  re-walking from the repository root for every absent cited path. With
  three absent paths under a three-deep prefix that is 12 helper spawns
  down to 6 and 12 retained descriptors down to 4. citedPaths is
  caller-supplied and unbounded, so the descriptor retention was the
  real problem; the cache is now the sole close owner. This does change
  Linux descriptor lifetime — prefixes stay open for the snapshot rather
  than only the tail, deduplicated across paths.

- assertRepository and the sibling realpath comparisons use
  realpathSync.native. Windows hands back 8.3 short names that plain
  realpathSync preserves while git reports the long form, so `snapshot`,
  which is not platform-gated, could reject a worktree root by quoting
  that same directory back at the user. The fixture workaround that
  papered over this for the new gate tests is gone.

Efficiency, all measured at ~13.5ms per helper spawn:

- consume the identity mkdir already computed rather than re-stat it
- act on renameNoReplace's return value rather than spending two stats
  re-deriving what it already reported
- drop a duplicate anchored stat taken twice in a row in movePathToVault
- import ctypes only where it is used; 19 of 20 spawns never touch it

Simplification: pins folded into the descriptors the handle already
carried, an unreachable refreshAnchorTail branch and the dead
darwinHardenedOpen mode parameter removed, the four copies of the spawn
options collapsed, the spawn-and-parse shared between the probe and the
request path, the unreachable launch-path fallback and a redundant memo
deleted, and the helper's dispatch made a real elif chain with leaf name
and mode validated at one chokepoint rather than per operation.

The two chain encodings were left alone deliberately: merging them would
have grown triple fields on Linux for no Linux benefit and changed the
Linux validatePlanParent comparison. The double re-stamp that motivated
the merge is contained in one named helper with the hazard documented.

Rejected candidate interpreters now say which dir_fd operations were
missing instead of producing a generic refusal.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NtGZN6YSNU8chALSnKYHBp

* refactor(skills): publish plans with link(2) and drop the interpreter

The macOS backend spawned python3 for two jobs: openat-style resolution,
which Node cannot do, and a no-replace rename. Only the first is actually
unavoidable, and the second was carrying the whole dependency.

link(2) is a no-replace publish. It is atomic, it fails EEXIST when the
destination name is taken, and it refuses a symlinked destination without
following it — the same guarantee renameat2(RENAME_NOREPLACE) and
renameatx_np(RENAME_EXCL) give, reachable from plain fs.linkSync. The
published file is the same inode as the verified temporary, so the
downstream identity checks hold by construction rather than by argument.

That removes the interpreter from Linux entirely, since /proc already did
the resolving there, and it removes ctypes, libSystem, RENAME_EXCL and the
ENOTSUP handling from macOS. Deleted with them: the trusted-executable
validation, the held-descriptor exec and its two-tier probe, the capability
probe, the JSON request protocol, and both embedded Python programs. The
helper drops from 3047 to 2327 lines.

macOS keeps the part that genuinely cannot be done in Node, and now does it
without a subprocess: a lexical O_NOFOLLOW walk that holds an open
descriptor on every directory in the chain and re-proves the chain either
side of every step. Pinning is load-bearing — an open descriptor keeps its
inode number from being recycled, which is what makes the recorded
identities trustworthy across steps.

The guarantees are no longer symmetric and the docs say so plainly.
/dev/fd/<fd> is a devfs node, not a magic link: opening it works, resolving
through it does not, open("/dev/fd/<fd>/child") returns ENOENT and realpath
returns /dev/fd/<fd> — measured on macOS 26 rather than inferred. So Linux
makes a parent swap impossible while macOS detects one and aborts.

Also fixes the writer on 9p mounts, where renameat2(RENAME_NOREPLACE)
returns EINVAL and publication failed every time; link(2) succeeds there.

Tests 174 -> 154: dropped 29 fixtures that drove the deleted Python program
directly, added coverage for the link publish, for a macOS parent swap
caught through the pinned chain, and for a spoofed-darwin round trip that
asserts no /proc path reaches the hooks, which the portable backend now
makes runnable on Linux CI.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NtGZN6YSNU8chALSnKYHBp

* fix(skills): drop O_NOFOLLOW_ANY, guard trailing slashes, handle link edge cases

macOS CI rejected our hardened directory open with EINVAL on 30 tests. The
flag O_NOFOLLOW_ANY was ORed into every open on the theory that XNU ignores
unrecognized open bits, so it would be inert where unsupported. That theory
is wrong, at least combined with O_DIRECTORY. The Python design never hit
it because the walk ran inside the interpreter; once Node did the opening,
every Darwin directory open went through it.

Removed rather than probed. The per-component O_NOFOLLOW walk is what
delivers the guarantee, and cap-std — the closest reference implementation
of this problem — has not adopted O_NOFOLLOW_ANY either. A fixture now pins
the exact flags of every directory open under a spoofed darwin, so the next
failure names the flag instead of printing a stack trace. With the flag
gone the two backends' directory open became identical, so it is no longer
a platform concern at all.

Three findings from researching the prior art, all now covered:

Trailing slashes. CVE-2026-39822 escaped Go's os.Root because
open(fd, path, O_NOFOLLOW) follows symlinks when the path ends in "/". It
reproduces here: with docs a symlink, opening "docs" is ENOTDIR but "docs/"
succeeds into the attacker's directory, and path.join preserves the slash.
We were safe only by construction, and only for repo-derived names — the
generated temporary and vault artifact names never passed through the
validator. The guard now sits at anchoredChild, the single place a name
becomes a path, so it holds for every caller.

link() can lie on NFS. Per link(2) BUGS, the return code may be wrong if
the server creates the link then dies before replying; open(2) NOTES gives
the remedy, which is to stat the source and treat a link count of 2 as
success. Implemented, with the man-page reasoning in the comment so it is
not later removed as paranoia.

Filesystems without hard links now fail loudly. EPERM, ENOTSUP and EMLINK
say so and refuse to fall back to a replacing rename. Git falls back and
accepts losing collision detection because its objects are content
addressed; that reasoning does not transfer to a named plan destination.

Durability was already correct — the temporary is fsynced before
publication and the parent directory immediately after — but the comment
now records why the parent fsync is required for link as it was for rename,
and the honest limitation that fsync is not a write barrier on macOS while
F_FULLFSYNC, which Node cannot reach, is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NtGZN6YSNU8chALSnKYHBp

* refactor(skills): shrink the anchoring seam and fix two CI breaks

Four quality reviews over the pure-Node writer. Two real breaks, one
drift that had already happened, and a seam that was sized for a design
we deleted.

The macOS round-trip fixture asserted that every observed path started
with join(repo, 'docs/plans'). Reproduced on Linux by handing the helper
a repo reached through a symlink, which is the shape macOS gives us via
/var to /private/var: assertRepository realpaths the repo, so the handle
builds paths from the resolved form while the fixture holds the form it
passed in, and the prefix can never match. The assertion now proves the
same thing without depending on the prefix — a lexical resolution always
contains a docs/plans segment and /proc/self/fd/<fd>/<name> never does.

Two publish fixtures sat in the capability-gate describe, the one block
deliberately not skipped on unsupported platforms, while this PR added
the file to the Windows matrix. They test link(2), not the gate, so they
moved to SAFE_WRITE_FIXTURES.

validatePlanParent restated verifyLexicalChain's loop without the
try/catch that converts ENOENT and ENOTDIR into the parity message, so a
raw errno could escape a function with a dozen call sites. It was masked
on Darwin only because parentStillResolves catches first. It now calls
the helpers, which also removes a second full chain walk per call there.

openVerifiedFile adds O_NONBLOCK so a FIFO swapped in at the target name
cannot wedge the process on open, and only Darwin was calling it. The
operations are now shared, so Linux gets it by construction rather than
by a per-backend decision.

The backend is five methods rather than ten. The platform difference is
two things — how a name becomes a path, and what guard wraps an
operation — so the five operations became shared functions over a
`verified` hook that is run() on Linux and the pinned-plus-lexical
sandwich on Darwin. openChildRead always runs the identity adoption, so
that proof is structural rather than a comment about what callers must
remember. Selecting the backend is a registry that throws on an unknown
platform instead of a ternary defaulting to Linux, which surfaced seven
dead bindings that ran before the capability gate and made win32 report
the registry error instead of the refusal.

Snapshot capture no longer re-walks a prefix per record: 36,018 lstats
to 6,384 and 162ms to 130ms on 2,000 dirty files across 100 directories,
with a byte-identical global_dirty_digest. Absence anchoring is now
bounded at 4096 pinned directories and refuses rather than evicting,
because closing a cached descriptor would break the pinned chain of a
guard already recorded — the inode-recycling hole the pins exist to
close.

The test suite no longer cache-busts its imports. That existed for the
memoized python3 descriptor, the file's only mutable module binding,
which is gone; the suite drops from 10.0s to 8.2s.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NtGZN6YSNU8chALSnKYHBp

---------

Co-authored-by: Gergo Magyar <gergomagyar0@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-11 12:24:53 +01:00

2366 lines
89 KiB
JavaScript

#!/usr/bin/env node
import { createHash, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
import fs from 'node:fs';
import path from 'node:path';
import process from 'node:process';
import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
export const EVIDENCE_PROVENANCE_SCHEMA_VERSION = 2;
export const EVIDENCE_PROVENANCE_CANONICALIZATION =
'gitnexus-evidence-provenance-v2 NUL-framed UTF-8 records';
const ABSENT = 'absent';
const OBJECT_KINDS = new Set(['regular', 'symlink', 'gitlink', 'directory', ABSENT]);
const STATES = new Set([
'clean',
'staged',
'unstaged',
'untracked',
'deleted',
'renamed',
'mixed',
ABSENT,
]);
const RECORD_FIELDS = [
'path',
'state',
'head_kind',
'index_kind',
'worktree_kind',
'untracked_kind',
'rename_from',
'rename_to',
'head_digest',
'index_digest',
'worktree_digest',
'untracked_digest',
];
const UTF8_FATAL = new TextDecoder('utf-8', { fatal: true });
const MAX_GIT_OUTPUT = 1024 * 1024 * 1024;
const MAX_PLAN_BYTES = 16 * 1024 * 1024;
const GENERATED_PLAN_READ_PATTERN = /^docs\/plans\/[^/]*gitnexus-plan[^/]*\.md$/;
const GENERATED_PLAN_WRITE_PATTERN =
/^docs\/plans\/(\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2})-gitnexus-plan-[a-z0-9]+(?:-[a-z0-9]+){2,4}\.md$/;
export const DIRECTORY_LIMITS = Object.freeze({
maxEntries: 10_000,
maxDepth: 256,
maxBytes: 256 * 1024 * 1024,
});
function sha256(bytes) {
return `sha256:${createHash('sha256').update(bytes).digest('hex')}`;
}
function statIdentity(stat) {
return [stat.dev, stat.ino, stat.mode, stat.nlink, stat.size, stat.mtimeNs, stat.ctimeNs]
.map(String)
.join(':');
}
function assertStableIdentity(before, after, label) {
if (statIdentity(before) !== statIdentity(after)) {
throw new Error(`${label} changed while evidence was being read`);
}
}
function hashFile(file, mutationGuards, directoryTraversal) {
const hash = createHash('sha256');
const noFollow = fs.constants.O_NOFOLLOW ?? 0;
const fd = fs.openSync(file, fs.constants.O_RDONLY | noFollow);
const buffer = Buffer.allocUnsafe(1024 * 1024);
try {
const before = fs.fstatSync(fd, { bigint: true });
if (!before.isFile()) throw new Error(`Expected a regular file at ${file}`);
if (directoryTraversal) {
directoryTraversal.bytes += before.size;
if (directoryTraversal.bytes > BigInt(DIRECTORY_LIMITS.maxBytes)) {
throw new Error(`Directory inventory exceeds ${DIRECTORY_LIMITS.maxBytes} content bytes`);
}
}
for (;;) {
const count = fs.readSync(fd, buffer, 0, buffer.length, null);
if (count === 0) break;
hash.update(buffer.subarray(0, count));
}
const after = fs.fstatSync(fd, { bigint: true });
assertStableIdentity(before, after, file);
mutationGuards.push({ type: 'stat', absolute: file, identity: statIdentity(after) });
} finally {
fs.closeSync(fd);
}
return `sha256:${hash.digest('hex')}`;
}
function git(repo, args, { allowFailure = false, input } = {}) {
const result = spawnSync('git', ['-C', repo, ...args], {
encoding: null,
env: { ...process.env, LANG: 'C', LC_ALL: 'C', GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS: '0' },
input,
maxBuffer: MAX_GIT_OUTPUT,
windowsHide: true,
});
if (result.error) throw result.error;
if (result.status !== 0 && !allowFailure) {
const stderr = Buffer.from(result.stderr ?? [])
.toString('utf8')
.trim();
throw new Error(`git ${args.join(' ')} failed (${result.status}): ${stderr}`);
}
return {
status: result.status,
stdout: Buffer.from(result.stdout ?? []),
stderr: Buffer.from(result.stderr ?? []),
};
}
function decodeUtf8(bytes, label) {
let decoded;
try {
decoded = UTF8_FATAL.decode(bytes);
} catch {
throw new Error(`${label} is not valid UTF-8`);
}
return decoded;
}
export function normalizeRepoPath(input, label = 'path') {
if (typeof input !== 'string') throw new Error(`${label} must be a string`);
if (input.length === 0) throw new Error(`${label} must not be empty`);
if (input.includes('\0')) throw new Error(`${label} must not contain NUL`);
if (input.includes('\\')) throw new Error(`${label} must use POSIX '/' separators`);
if (input !== input.normalize('NFC')) throw new Error(`${label} must already be Unicode NFC`);
if (Buffer.from(input, 'utf8').toString('utf8') !== input) {
throw new Error(`${label} contains an invalid Unicode scalar value`);
}
if (input.startsWith('/') || /^[A-Za-z]:\//.test(input)) {
throw new Error(`${label} must be repo-relative`);
}
const components = input.split('/');
if (components.some((component) => component === '' || component === '.' || component === '..')) {
throw new Error(`${label} must be a normalized repo-relative path without dot segments`);
}
return input;
}
function requireString(value, label) {
if (typeof value !== 'string') throw new Error(`${label} must be a string`);
return value;
}
function requireBoolean(value, label) {
if (typeof value !== 'boolean') throw new Error(`${label} must be a literal boolean`);
return value;
}
function normalizeSha256Digest(value, label = 'plan digest') {
if (typeof value !== 'string' || !/^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(value)) {
throw new Error(`${label} must be sha256:<64 lowercase hexadecimal characters>`);
}
return value;
}
function normalizeGeneratedPlanWritePath(input) {
const normalized = normalizeRepoPath(input, 'generated plan path');
const match = GENERATED_PLAN_WRITE_PATTERN.exec(normalized);
if (!match) {
throw new Error(
'Generated-plan writes are restricted to docs/plans/YYYY-MM-DD-gitnexus-plan-<3-5-word-slug>.md',
);
}
const parsedDate = new Date(`${match[1]}T00:00:00Z`);
if (Number.isNaN(parsedDate.valueOf()) || parsedDate.toISOString().slice(0, 10) !== match[1]) {
throw new Error(`Generated-plan path has an invalid calendar date: ${match[1]}`);
}
return normalized;
}
function normalizeGeneratedPlanReadPath(input) {
const normalized = normalizeRepoPath(input, 'existing plan path');
if (!GENERATED_PLAN_READ_PATTERN.test(normalized)) {
throw new Error('Existing-plan reads are restricted to docs/plans/*gitnexus-plan*.md');
}
return normalized;
}
function decodeRepoPath(bytes, label) {
return normalizeRepoPath(decodeUtf8(bytes, label), label);
}
function splitNul(bytes) {
const parts = [];
let start = 0;
for (let index = 0; index < bytes.length; index += 1) {
if (bytes[index] !== 0) continue;
parts.push(bytes.subarray(start, index));
start = index + 1;
}
if (start !== bytes.length) throw new Error('Git emitted a non-NUL-terminated record stream');
return parts;
}
function splitFixedHeader(record, fieldCount, label) {
const fields = [];
let cursor = 0;
for (let index = 0; index < fieldCount; index += 1) {
const separator = record.indexOf(' ', cursor);
if (separator < 0) throw new Error(`Malformed ${label} record`);
fields.push(record.slice(cursor, separator));
cursor = separator + 1;
}
return { fields, path: record.slice(cursor) };
}
function classifyXY(xy) {
if (!/^[.MTADRCU?!]{2}$/.test(xy)) throw new Error(`Unsupported Git XY status: ${xy}`);
const [indexState, worktreeState] = xy;
if (indexState === 'U' || worktreeState === 'U') {
throw new Error('Unmerged paths cannot be canonicalized; resolve the index first');
}
if (indexState !== '.' && worktreeState !== '.') return 'mixed';
if (indexState === 'D' || worktreeState === 'D') return 'deleted';
if (indexState !== '.') return 'staged';
if (worktreeState !== '.') return 'unstaged';
throw new Error(`Porcelain reported a non-dirty ordinary record (${xy})`);
}
function addDirtyRecord(records, record) {
const incomingFacts = new Set(record.fact_states ?? [record.state]);
const current = records.get(record.path);
if (!current) {
records.set(record.path, {
...record,
fact_states: incomingFacts,
has_untracked: record.has_untracked ?? record.state === 'untracked',
directory_hint: record.directory_hint ?? false,
});
return;
}
const mergeEndpoint = (field) => {
const left = current[field];
const right = record[field];
if (left && right && left !== right) {
throw new Error(`Conflicting ${field} facts for ${JSON.stringify(record.path)}`);
}
return left ?? right ?? null;
};
const facts = new Set([...current.fact_states, ...incomingFacts]);
current.fact_states = facts;
current.state = facts.has('mixed') || facts.size > 1 ? 'mixed' : [...facts][0];
current.rename_from = mergeEndpoint('rename_from');
current.rename_to = mergeEndpoint('rename_to');
current.has_untracked =
current.has_untracked || record.has_untracked || record.state === 'untracked';
current.directory_hint = current.directory_hint || record.directory_hint;
}
function readDirtySnapshot(repo) {
const output = git(repo, [
'-c',
'diff.renameLimit=0',
'-c',
'status.renameLimit=0',
'status',
'--porcelain=v2',
'-z',
'--untracked-files=all',
'--find-renames=50%',
'--ignore-submodules=none',
]).stdout;
const tokens = splitNul(output);
const records = new Map();
for (let index = 0; index < tokens.length; index += 1) {
const token = tokens[index];
if (token.length === 0) continue;
const kind = String.fromCharCode(token[0]);
const text = decodeUtf8(token, 'git status record');
if (kind === '1') {
const parsed = splitFixedHeader(text, 8, 'ordinary status');
const xy = parsed.fields[1];
const repoPath = normalizeRepoPath(parsed.path, 'git status path');
addDirtyRecord(records, {
path: repoPath,
state: classifyXY(xy),
rename_from: null,
rename_to: null,
has_untracked: false,
});
continue;
}
if (kind === '2') {
const parsed = splitFixedHeader(text, 9, 'rename status');
const newPath = normalizeRepoPath(parsed.path, 'rename destination');
index += 1;
if (index >= tokens.length) throw new Error('Rename status is missing its source endpoint');
const oldPath = decodeRepoPath(tokens[index], 'rename source');
addDirtyRecord(records, {
path: oldPath,
state: 'renamed',
rename_from: null,
rename_to: newPath,
has_untracked: false,
});
addDirtyRecord(records, {
path: newPath,
state: parsed.fields[1][1] === '.' ? 'renamed' : 'mixed',
rename_from: oldPath,
rename_to: null,
has_untracked: false,
});
continue;
}
if (kind === '?') {
const rawPath = text.slice(2);
const directoryHint = rawPath.endsWith('/');
const repoPath = normalizeRepoPath(
directoryHint ? rawPath.slice(0, -1) : rawPath,
'untracked path',
);
addDirtyRecord(records, {
path: repoPath,
state: 'untracked',
rename_from: null,
rename_to: null,
has_untracked: true,
directory_hint: directoryHint,
});
continue;
}
if (kind === 'u') {
throw new Error('Unmerged paths cannot be canonicalized; resolve the index first');
}
if (kind !== '!') throw new Error(`Unsupported porcelain-v2 record kind: ${kind}`);
}
return { output, records };
}
function kindFromMode(mode) {
if (mode === '040000') return 'directory';
if (mode === '100644' || mode === '100755') return 'regular';
if (mode === '120000') return 'symlink';
if (mode === '160000') return 'gitlink';
throw new Error(`Unsupported Git object mode: ${mode}`);
}
function readBatchObjects(repo, descriptors) {
const requested = new Map();
for (const descriptor of descriptors) {
if (descriptor.kind === 'gitlink') continue;
const expectedType = descriptor.kind === 'directory' ? 'tree' : 'blob';
const prior = requested.get(descriptor.oid);
if (prior && prior !== expectedType) {
throw new Error(
`Git object ${descriptor.oid} is requested as both ${prior} and ${expectedType}`,
);
}
requested.set(descriptor.oid, expectedType);
}
if (requested.size === 0) return new Map();
const input = Buffer.from(`${[...requested.keys()].join('\n')}\n`, 'ascii');
const output = git(repo, ['cat-file', '--batch'], { input }).stdout;
const digests = new Map();
let cursor = 0;
for (const [requestedOid, expectedType] of requested) {
const newline = output.indexOf(10, cursor);
if (newline < 0) throw new Error(`Missing cat-file header for ${requestedOid}`);
const header = decodeUtf8(output.subarray(cursor, newline), 'cat-file header').split(' ');
if (header.length !== 3 || header[0] !== requestedOid) {
throw new Error(`Malformed cat-file header for ${requestedOid}`);
}
const [, actualType, sizeText] = header;
const size = Number(sizeText);
if (actualType !== expectedType || !Number.isSafeInteger(size) || size < 0) {
throw new Error(`Unexpected cat-file object metadata for ${requestedOid}`);
}
const start = newline + 1;
const end = start + size;
if (end >= output.length || output[end] !== 10) {
throw new Error(`Truncated cat-file object ${requestedOid}`);
}
digests.set(requestedOid, sha256(output.subarray(start, end)));
cursor = end + 1;
}
if (cursor !== output.length) throw new Error('cat-file emitted unexpected trailing bytes');
return digests;
}
function loadGitLayers(repo, neededPaths, headOid, indexOutput) {
const headDescriptors = new Map();
const headOutput = git(repo, ['ls-tree', '-r', '-t', '-z', '--full-tree', headOid]).stdout;
for (const record of splitNul(headOutput)) {
if (record.length === 0) continue;
const tab = record.indexOf(9);
if (tab < 0) throw new Error('Malformed HEAD tree entry');
const repoPath = decodeRepoPath(record.subarray(tab + 1), 'HEAD path');
if (!neededPaths.has(repoPath)) continue;
const header = decodeUtf8(record.subarray(0, tab), 'HEAD entry').split(' ');
if (header.length !== 3) throw new Error(`Malformed HEAD entry for ${repoPath}`);
const [mode, type, oid] = header;
const objectKind = kindFromMode(mode);
const expectedType =
objectKind === 'directory' ? 'tree' : objectKind === 'gitlink' ? 'commit' : 'blob';
if (type !== expectedType) throw new Error(`Unexpected HEAD object type for ${repoPath}`);
headDescriptors.set(repoPath, { kind: objectKind, oid });
}
const indexDescriptors = new Map();
for (const record of splitNul(indexOutput)) {
if (record.length === 0) continue;
const tab = record.indexOf(9);
if (tab < 0) throw new Error('Malformed index entry');
const repoPath = decodeRepoPath(record.subarray(tab + 1), 'index path');
if (!neededPaths.has(repoPath)) continue;
const header = decodeUtf8(record.subarray(0, tab), 'index entry').split(' ');
if (header.length !== 3) throw new Error(`Malformed index entry for ${repoPath}`);
const [mode, oid, stage] = header;
if (stage !== '0' || indexDescriptors.has(repoPath)) {
throw new Error(`Unmerged index stages cannot be canonicalized for ${repoPath}`);
}
const objectKind = kindFromMode(mode);
if (objectKind === 'directory') throw new Error('The Git index cannot contain a tree entry');
indexDescriptors.set(repoPath, { kind: objectKind, oid });
}
const allDescriptors = [...headDescriptors.values(), ...indexDescriptors.values()];
const objectDigests = readBatchObjects(repo, allDescriptors);
const materialize = (descriptor) => {
if (!descriptor) return { kind: ABSENT, digest: ABSENT };
return {
kind: descriptor.kind,
digest:
descriptor.kind === 'gitlink'
? sha256(Buffer.from(descriptor.oid, 'ascii'))
: objectDigests.get(descriptor.oid),
};
};
return {
head(repoPath) {
return materialize(headDescriptors.get(repoPath));
},
index(repoPath) {
return materialize(indexDescriptors.get(repoPath));
},
};
}
function compareUtf8(left, right) {
return Buffer.compare(Buffer.from(left, 'utf8'), Buffer.from(right, 'utf8'));
}
function serializeFields(prefixFields, records, fields) {
const chunks = [];
const append = (value) => {
if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.includes('\0')) {
throw new Error('Canonical provenance fields must be NUL-free strings');
}
chunks.push(Buffer.from(value, 'utf8'), Buffer.from([0]));
};
for (const field of prefixFields) append(field);
chunks.push(Buffer.from([0]));
for (const record of records) {
append('record');
for (const field of fields) {
append(field);
append(record[field]);
}
chunks.push(Buffer.from([0]));
}
return Buffer.concat(chunks);
}
function resolveOwnGitTopLevel(absolute) {
const result = git(absolute, ['rev-parse', '--show-toplevel'], { allowFailure: true });
if (result.status !== 0) return null;
let topLevel;
try {
topLevel = fs.realpathSync.native(decodeUtf8(result.stdout, 'nested repository root').trim());
} catch {
return null;
}
return topLevel === fs.realpathSync.native(absolute) ? topLevel : null;
}
function readOwnGitlinkHead(absolute) {
const topLevel = resolveOwnGitTopLevel(absolute);
if (!topLevel) {
throw new Error(`Gitlink worktree is not its own repository: ${absolute}`);
}
const result = git(absolute, ['rev-parse', '--verify', 'HEAD'], { allowFailure: true });
if (result.status !== 0)
throw new Error(`Cannot resolve checked-out gitlink HEAD at ${absolute}`);
const oid = decodeUtf8(result.stdout, 'gitlink HEAD').trim();
if (!/^[0-9a-f]{40,64}$/.test(oid)) throw new Error(`Invalid gitlink object ID at ${absolute}`);
const status = git(absolute, [
'status',
'--porcelain=v2',
'-z',
'--untracked-files=all',
'--ignored=matching',
'--ignore-submodules=none',
]).stdout;
if (status.length !== 0) {
throw new Error(
`Checked-out gitlink is dirty at ${absolute}; commit or clean staged, unstaged, untracked, and ignored changes before snapshotting`,
);
}
return { oid, topLevel };
}
function readStableSymlink(absolute, mutationGuards) {
const before = fs.lstatSync(absolute, { bigint: true });
const target = fs.readlinkSync(absolute, { encoding: 'buffer' });
const after = fs.lstatSync(absolute, { bigint: true });
assertStableIdentity(before, after, absolute);
mutationGuards.push({
type: 'symlink',
absolute,
identity: statIdentity(after),
target: Buffer.from(target),
});
return { kind: 'symlink', digest: sha256(target) };
}
function digestDirectory(root, mutationGuards, testHooks) {
const traversal = { entries: 0, bytes: 0n };
const walk = (directory, depth) => {
if (depth > DIRECTORY_LIMITS.maxDepth) {
throw new Error(`Directory inventory exceeds depth ${DIRECTORY_LIMITS.maxDepth}`);
}
const before = fs.lstatSync(directory, { bigint: true });
if (!before.isDirectory()) throw new Error(`Expected a directory at ${directory}`);
const children = fs
.readdirSync(directory, { withFileTypes: true, encoding: 'buffer' })
.map((child) => ({
child,
name: decodeUtf8(Buffer.from(child.name), 'directory entry name'),
}))
.sort((left, right) => compareUtf8(left.name, right.name));
const ownRepository = children.some(({ name }) => name === '.git')
? resolveOwnGitTopLevel(directory)
: null;
const entries = [];
for (const { name: childName } of children) {
if (ownRepository && childName === '.git') continue;
normalizeRepoPath(childName, 'directory entry name');
const absolute = path.join(directory, childName);
const childStat = fs.lstatSync(absolute, { bigint: true });
traversal.entries += 1;
if (traversal.entries > DIRECTORY_LIMITS.maxEntries) {
throw new Error(`Directory inventory exceeds ${DIRECTORY_LIMITS.maxEntries} entries`);
}
testHooks?.onDirectoryEntry?.({ absolute, count: traversal.entries, depth: depth + 1 });
let layer;
let descendants = [];
if (childStat.isFile()) {
layer = {
kind: 'regular',
digest: hashFile(absolute, mutationGuards, traversal),
};
} else if (childStat.isSymbolicLink()) {
layer = readStableSymlink(absolute, mutationGuards);
} else if (childStat.isDirectory()) {
const nested = walk(absolute, depth + 1);
layer = { kind: 'directory', digest: nested.digest };
descendants = nested.entries.map((entry) => ({
...entry,
path: `${childName}/${entry.path}`,
}));
} else {
throw new Error(`Unsupported filesystem object at ${absolute}`);
}
entries.push({ path: childName, kind: layer.kind, digest: layer.digest }, ...descendants);
}
const after = fs.lstatSync(directory, { bigint: true });
assertStableIdentity(before, after, directory);
mutationGuards.push({ type: 'stat', absolute: directory, identity: statIdentity(after) });
entries.sort((left, right) => compareUtf8(left.path, right.path));
const bytes = serializeFields(['gitnexus-evidence-directory', 'schema_version', '1'], entries, [
'path',
'kind',
'digest',
]);
return { digest: sha256(bytes), entries };
};
return walk(root, 0).digest;
}
function filesystemObject(absolute, expectedKind, mutationGuards, testHooks) {
let stat;
try {
stat = fs.lstatSync(absolute);
} catch (error) {
if (error?.code === 'ENOENT' || error?.code === 'ENOTDIR') {
return { kind: ABSENT, digest: ABSENT };
}
throw error;
}
if (expectedKind === 'gitlink') {
if (!stat.isDirectory()) throw new Error(`Expected gitlink directory at ${absolute}`);
const { oid, topLevel } = readOwnGitlinkHead(absolute);
mutationGuards.push({ type: 'gitlink', absolute, oid, topLevel });
return { kind: 'gitlink', digest: sha256(Buffer.from(oid, 'ascii')) };
}
if (stat.isFile()) return { kind: 'regular', digest: hashFile(absolute, mutationGuards) };
if (stat.isSymbolicLink()) return readStableSymlink(absolute, mutationGuards);
if (stat.isDirectory()) {
return { kind: 'directory', digest: digestDirectory(absolute, mutationGuards, testHooks) };
}
throw new Error(`Unsupported filesystem object at ${absolute}`);
}
// Every dirty path re-walks its own parents, and dirty paths overwhelmingly
// share them — the repository root is re-stat'ed once per path. `guarded` is
// per-snapshot and remembers which absolute directories already carry a guard,
// so each distinct directory is stat'ed and guarded exactly once.
//
// Keeping the first-seen identity is the conservative choice: verifyGuards
// re-checks every guard against the filesystem at the end, so a directory that
// changes after it was guarded still fails there. Skipping a re-stat cannot hide
// a change; it only avoids recording the same directory twice.
function guardPathParents(repo, repoPath, mutationGuards, guarded) {
const components = repoPath.split('/');
let current = repo;
if (!guarded.has(repo)) {
guarded.add(repo);
mutationGuards.push({
type: 'directory',
absolute: repo,
identity: stableDirectoryIdentity(fs.lstatSync(repo, { bigint: true })),
});
}
for (const component of components.slice(0, -1)) {
current = path.join(current, component);
// Already proved a real directory and already guarded on an earlier path.
if (guarded.has(current)) continue;
let stat;
try {
stat = fs.lstatSync(current, { bigint: true });
} catch (error) {
if (error?.code === 'ENOENT' || error?.code === 'ENOTDIR') return;
throw error;
}
if (stat.isSymbolicLink()) {
throw new Error(`Refusing to traverse symlink parent for ${repoPath}`);
}
if (!stat.isDirectory()) return;
guarded.add(current);
mutationGuards.push({
type: 'directory',
absolute: current,
identity: stableDirectoryIdentity(stat),
});
}
}
// A bound, not a bug: the absence cache deduplicates correctly and leaks nothing,
// but citedPaths is caller-supplied and unbounded, so a pathological snapshot
// could hold more descriptors than the process is allowed (macOS
// kern.maxfilesperproc is 24576). The peak precedes a `git` spawn, so exhaustion
// would surface as a git failure misreported as evidence instability.
//
// Refuse rather than evict: closing a cached descriptor would silently break the
// pinned chain of an absence guard that was already recorded against it, which is
// exactly the inode-recycling hole the pins exist to close.
const ABSENCE_ANCHOR_LIMITS = Object.freeze({ maxPinnedDirectories: 4096 });
// Every no-follow read and every exclusive create in this file uses one of these
// two, so a change lands in one place rather than in seven.
const VERIFIED_READ_FLAGS =
fs.constants.O_RDONLY | fs.constants.O_NOFOLLOW | (fs.constants.O_CLOEXEC ?? 0);
const VERIFIED_CREATE_FLAGS =
fs.constants.O_RDWR |
fs.constants.O_CREAT |
fs.constants.O_EXCL |
fs.constants.O_NOFOLLOW |
(fs.constants.O_CLOEXEC ?? 0);
function requireAbsenceAnchorCapacity(cache) {
if (cache.size >= ABSENCE_ANCHOR_LIMITS.maxPinnedDirectories) {
throw new Error(
`Absence anchoring exceeds ${ABSENCE_ANCHOR_LIMITS.maxPinnedDirectories} pinned directories`,
);
}
}
const ANCHORED_DIRECTORY_FLAGS =
fs.constants.O_RDONLY |
fs.constants.O_DIRECTORY |
fs.constants.O_NOFOLLOW |
(fs.constants.O_CLOEXEC ?? 0);
// Every absence receipt is verified long after its walk returns, so the chain
// that produced it has to stay pinned until the snapshot ends — an unpinned inode
// number can be recycled by a replacement directory that then reproduces the
// recorded identity exactly. Absent cited paths overwhelmingly share prefixes, so
// the walked directories are cached per snapshot and keyed by repo-relative
// prefix: one open descriptor and one anchored walk per distinct directory rather
// than per path. snapshotEvidence owns every descriptor in this cache and closes
// each exactly once; guards only borrow them for verification.
function anchoredAbsenceRoot(repo, cache) {
const cached = cache.get('');
if (cached) return cached;
requireAbsenceAnchorCapacity(cache);
const fd = openVerifiedDirectory(repo, ANCHORED_DIRECTORY_FLAGS);
const handle = {
fd,
expectedPath: repo,
chain: [
{ expectedPath: repo, identity: stableDirectoryIdentity(fs.fstatSync(fd, { bigint: true })) },
],
descriptors: [fd],
};
cache.set('', handle);
return handle;
}
function recordAnchoredAbsence(repo, repoPath, mutationGuards, cache) {
requireDescriptorAnchoring();
const components = repoPath.split('/');
let handle = anchoredAbsenceRoot(repo, cache);
let prefix = '';
for (let index = 0; index < components.length; index += 1) {
const component = components[index];
const isFinal = index === components.length - 1;
prefix = prefix === '' ? component : `${prefix}/${component}`;
// The final component is always re-checked against the filesystem: it is the
// one whose absence is being recorded, and a cached answer would be a stale
// one. Only the prefix directories are reused.
const cached = isFinal ? undefined : cache.get(prefix);
if (cached) {
handle = cached;
continue;
}
const child = anchoredChild(handle, component);
let childStat;
try {
childStat = lstatChild(child);
} catch (error) {
if (error?.code !== 'ENOENT' && error?.code !== 'ENOTDIR') throw error;
const parentStat = fs.fstatSync(handle.fd, { bigint: true });
if (!parentStat.isDirectory()) {
throw new Error(`Absence parent is no longer a directory for ${repoPath}`);
}
mutationGuards.push({
type: 'absence',
// The handle is the holder the guard verifies against, and `ref` is the
// child path already built through the anchoredChild chokepoint — the
// guard must never re-derive that name itself.
handle,
ref: child,
fd: handle.fd,
repoPath,
parentMutationIdentity: statIdentity(parentStat),
});
return;
}
if (isFinal) {
throw new Error(`${repoPath} appeared while its absence was being anchored`);
}
if (childStat.isSymbolicLink() || !childStat.isDirectory()) {
throw new Error(`Refusing a non-directory parent while anchoring absence for ${repoPath}`);
}
requireAbsenceAnchorCapacity(cache);
const childFd = openVerifiedDirectory(child.path, ANCHORED_DIRECTORY_FLAGS);
const expectedPath = path.join(handle.expectedPath, component);
let next;
try {
if (!anchoringBackend().descriptorMatchesChild(childFd, expectedPath, childStat)) {
throw new Error(
`Absence parent descriptor does not match its verified inode for ${repoPath}`,
);
}
next = {
fd: childFd,
expectedPath,
chain: [...handle.chain, { expectedPath, identity: stableDirectoryIdentity(childStat) }],
descriptors: [...handle.descriptors, childFd],
};
} catch (error) {
fs.closeSync(childFd);
throw error;
}
cache.set(prefix, next);
handle = next;
}
throw new Error(`Could not anchor absence for ${repoPath}`);
}
function materializeRecord(repo, statusRecord, layers, mutationGuards, testHooks, walkState) {
const head = layers.head(statusRecord.path);
const index = layers.index(statusRecord.path);
const expectedKind = index.kind === 'gitlink' || head.kind === 'gitlink' ? 'gitlink' : null;
guardPathParents(repo, statusRecord.path, mutationGuards, walkState.guardedDirectories);
const filesystem = filesystemObject(
path.join(repo, ...statusRecord.path.split('/')),
expectedKind,
mutationGuards,
testHooks,
);
if (filesystem.kind === ABSENT) {
recordAnchoredAbsence(repo, statusRecord.path, mutationGuards, walkState.absenceCache);
}
if (statusRecord.directory_hint && filesystem.kind !== 'directory') {
throw new Error(
`Git reported an embedded directory but found ${filesystem.kind}: ${statusRecord.path}`,
);
}
const isUntracked = statusRecord.has_untracked || (head.kind === ABSENT && index.kind === ABSENT);
const worktree = isUntracked ? { kind: ABSENT, digest: ABSENT } : filesystem;
const untracked = isUntracked ? filesystem : { kind: ABSENT, digest: ABSENT };
return {
path: statusRecord.path,
object_kind: {
head: head.kind,
index: index.kind,
worktree: worktree.kind,
untracked: untracked.kind,
},
state: statusRecord.state,
rename_from: statusRecord.rename_from,
rename_to: statusRecord.rename_to,
head_digest: head.digest,
index_digest: index.digest,
worktree_digest: worktree.digest,
untracked_digest: untracked.digest,
};
}
function canonicalRecord(manifestEntry) {
const record = {
path: manifestEntry.path,
state: manifestEntry.state,
head_kind: manifestEntry.object_kind.head,
index_kind: manifestEntry.object_kind.index,
worktree_kind: manifestEntry.object_kind.worktree,
untracked_kind: manifestEntry.object_kind.untracked,
rename_from: manifestEntry.rename_from ?? ABSENT,
rename_to: manifestEntry.rename_to ?? ABSENT,
head_digest: manifestEntry.head_digest,
index_digest: manifestEntry.index_digest,
worktree_digest: manifestEntry.worktree_digest,
untracked_digest: manifestEntry.untracked_digest,
};
if (!STATES.has(record.state)) throw new Error(`Unsupported evidence state: ${record.state}`);
for (const kindField of ['head_kind', 'index_kind', 'worktree_kind', 'untracked_kind']) {
if (!OBJECT_KINDS.has(record[kindField])) {
throw new Error(`Unsupported object kind: ${record[kindField]}`);
}
}
return record;
}
export function serializeDirtyRecords(entries) {
const records = entries
.map(canonicalRecord)
.sort((left, right) => compareUtf8(left.path, right.path));
for (let index = 1; index < records.length; index += 1) {
if (records[index - 1].path === records[index].path) {
throw new Error(`Duplicate canonical dirty path: ${records[index].path}`);
}
}
return serializeFields(
['gitnexus-evidence-provenance', 'schema_version', String(EVIDENCE_PROVENANCE_SCHEMA_VERSION)],
records,
RECORD_FIELDS,
);
}
function assertRepository(repoInput) {
// realpathSync.native, not realpathSync: the JS resolver preserves a Windows
// 8.3 short component (C:\Users\RUNNER~1\...) while git always reports the long
// form, so the two would never compare equal and every caller would be told the
// worktree root is not the worktree root it just named.
const repo = fs.realpathSync.native(requireString(repoInput, 'repo'));
const topLevelResult = git(repo, ['rev-parse', '--show-toplevel']);
const topLevel = fs.realpathSync.native(
decodeUtf8(topLevelResult.stdout, 'repository root').trim(),
);
if (topLevel !== repo) throw new Error(`--repo must be the Git worktree root (${topLevel})`);
return repo;
}
function resolveAdministrativePath(repo, gitPath) {
const raw = decodeUtf8(
git(repo, ['rev-parse', '--git-path', gitPath]).stdout,
`Git administrative path ${gitPath}`,
).trim();
return path.resolve(repo, raw);
}
function captureControlFile(absolute, label) {
let before;
try {
before = fs.lstatSync(absolute, { bigint: true });
} catch (error) {
if (error?.code === 'ENOENT' || error?.code === 'ENOTDIR') {
return { absolute, label, kind: ABSENT };
}
throw error;
}
if (before.isSymbolicLink() || !before.isFile()) {
throw new Error(`${label} must be a regular no-follow file`);
}
const fd = fs.openSync(
absolute,
fs.constants.O_RDONLY | (fs.constants.O_NOFOLLOW ?? 0) | (fs.constants.O_CLOEXEC ?? 0),
);
try {
const opened = fs.fstatSync(fd, { bigint: true });
if (!opened.isFile() || statIdentity(opened) !== statIdentity(before)) {
throw new Error(`${label} changed while its descriptor opened`);
}
const hash = createHash('sha256');
const buffer = Buffer.allocUnsafe(1024 * 1024);
for (;;) {
const count = fs.readSync(fd, buffer, 0, buffer.length, null);
if (count === 0) break;
hash.update(buffer.subarray(0, count));
}
const after = fs.fstatSync(fd, { bigint: true });
assertStableIdentity(opened, after, label);
return {
absolute,
label,
kind: 'regular',
identity: statIdentity(after),
digest: `sha256:${hash.digest('hex')}`,
};
} finally {
fs.closeSync(fd);
}
}
function verifyControlFile(guard) {
const current = captureControlFile(guard.absolute, guard.label);
if (
current.kind !== guard.kind ||
current.identity !== guard.identity ||
current.digest !== guard.digest
) {
throw new Error(`${guard.label} changed while evidence was materialized`);
}
}
function captureHeadGuards(repo) {
const symbolic = git(repo, ['symbolic-ref', '-q', 'HEAD'], { allowFailure: true });
const paths = new Set(['HEAD', 'logs/HEAD', 'packed-refs']);
if (symbolic.status === 0) {
const ref = decodeUtf8(symbolic.stdout, 'symbolic HEAD ref').trim();
if (!/^refs\/[A-Za-z0-9._\/-]+$/.test(ref) || ref.includes('..')) {
throw new Error(`Invalid symbolic HEAD ref: ${ref}`);
}
paths.add(ref);
paths.add(`logs/${ref}`);
}
return [...paths].map((gitPath) =>
captureControlFile(resolveAdministrativePath(repo, gitPath), `Git ${gitPath}`),
);
}
function stableDirectoryIdentity(stat) {
return [stat.dev, stat.ino, stat.mode].map(String).join(':');
}
function stableFileIdentity(stat) {
return [stat.dev, stat.ino, stat.mode, stat.size].map(String).join(':');
}
// The two backends below differ in one decisive way, and it is worth stating
// plainly because the security properties are not the same.
//
// Linux ANCHORS. A name is resolved through /proc/self/fd/<fd>/<child>, which
// starts the walk at the inode the descriptor holds, so a parent that is renamed
// away cannot be traversed at all: the descriptor keeps pointing at the original
// directory and the impostor planted at the same name is simply never reached.
//
// macOS VERIFIES. Node cannot resolve a name relative to a descriptor there —
// /dev/fd/<fd> is not a magic link (it stats as the directory but every attempt
// to traverse a child through it returns ENOENT), and fcntl F_GETPATH is a
// name-cache snapshot rather than a live anchor. So the Darwin backend resolves
// lexically, holds an open descriptor on every element of the chain, and proves
// before and after each operation that the path chain still names exactly the
// inodes it is holding. That DETECTS a swapped parent and aborts the write; it
// does not make the swap impossible the way the Linux path does. A swap landing
// inside the window between a check and the call it guards is caught by the
// following check, after the fact, rather than being unreachable.
//
// Every other platform gets neither and is refused outright.
function requireDescriptorAnchoring() {
const directoryFlagsAvailable =
fs.constants.O_DIRECTORY !== undefined && fs.constants.O_NOFOLLOW !== undefined;
if (process.platform === 'linux') {
if (!directoryFlagsAvailable || !fs.existsSync('/proc/self/fd')) {
throw new Error(
'Safe generated-plan writes require Linux /proc/self/fd and O_DIRECTORY/O_NOFOLLOW; refusing an unanchored write',
);
}
return;
}
if (process.platform === 'darwin') {
if (!directoryFlagsAvailable) {
throw new Error(
'Safe generated-plan writes require macOS O_DIRECTORY/O_NOFOLLOW; refusing an unverified write',
);
}
return;
}
throw new Error(
`Safe generated-plan writes require Linux /proc/self/fd or macOS O_DIRECTORY/O_NOFOLLOW; ${process.platform} offers neither, so refusing an unanchored write`,
);
}
function descriptorPath(fd, childName) {
const base = `/proc/self/fd/${fd}`;
return childName === undefined ? base : path.join(base, childName);
}
// Directory opens are plain O_RDONLY|O_DIRECTORY|O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC on both
// platforms, and deliberately nothing else.
//
// O_NOFOLLOW_ANY (macOS 11+) used to be ORed in here on the theory that XNU
// ignores unrecognized open flag bits, so it would be inert where unsupported.
// That was wrong: combined with O_DIRECTORY macOS rejects it outright with
// EINVAL, and every directory open on Darwin failed. It is gone and is not
// coming back behind a probe or a degrade-on-EINVAL path — the per-component
// O_NOFOLLOW walk is what delivers the guarantee. Rust's cap-std, the closest
// reference implementation of this problem, has not adopted O_NOFOLLOW_ANY
// either (their issue #179 is still open).
function openVerifiedDirectory(absolute, flags) {
return fs.openSync(absolute, flags);
}
// File opens additionally get O_NONBLOCK, which directory opens do not need:
// it stops a FIFO swapped in at the target name from wedging the process on
// open. The identity comparison that follows rejects the FIFO anyway, but only
// if we ever get as far as running it.
function openVerifiedFile(absolute, flags, mode) {
const nonBlocking = flags | (fs.constants.O_NONBLOCK ?? 0);
return mode === undefined
? fs.openSync(absolute, nonBlocking)
: fs.openSync(absolute, nonBlocking, mode);
}
// The publish primitive, identical on both platforms.
//
// link() is the portable no-replace publish: it fails with EEXIST if the
// destination name is taken — by a regular file, by a directory, or by a symlink,
// live or dangling — and it never follows that symlink to clobber its target.
// It also works where renameat2(RENAME_NOREPLACE) does not, notably v9fs, which
// is why the WSL2 9p case that used to fail every time now works.
//
// The published file is the same inode as the temporary, so every identity
// comparison the callers already make still holds, and validateCommittedPlan
// becomes strictly stronger: it compares the destination against the exact inode
// whose bytes were fsynced.
//
// On Linux both paths are /proc/self/fd/<fd>/<name>, so the publish is anchored
// to the held parent descriptors exactly like every other operation.
// link(2) BUGS: "On NFS filesystems, the return code may be wrong in case the NFS
// server performs the link creation and dies before it can say so. Use stat(2) to
// find out if the link got created." open(2) NOTES gives the remedy this
// implements: on a reported failure, stat the source and see whether its link
// count reached 2. A false positive would need someone to have hardlinked a
// 16-random-byte name inside a directory we hold open — and validateCommittedPlan
// still proves the destination is the exact temporary inode afterwards.
function linkCreatedDespiteError(sourcePath) {
try {
return fs.statSync(sourcePath, { bigint: true }).nlink === 2n;
} catch {
return false;
}
}
function linkNoReplace(sourcePath, destinationPath) {
try {
fs.linkSync(sourcePath, destinationPath);
} catch (error) {
// Callers treat "destination taken" as a distinct outcome, not a failure.
if (error?.code === 'EEXIST') return false;
if (!linkCreatedDespiteError(sourcePath)) {
// FAT, Coda, and some SMB/FUSE/virtiofs mounts have no hardlinks at all.
// Git falls back to rename here, but git can afford to lose collision
// detection because its objects are content-addressed; a plan destination
// is a plain name, so a replacing rename would silently clobber whatever
// is already there. Refuse loudly instead.
if (error?.code === 'EPERM' || error?.code === 'ENOTSUP' || error?.code === 'EMLINK') {
throw new Error(
`Generated-plan publication requires hard links, which this filesystem refused (${error.code}); refusing to fall back to a replacing rename`,
);
}
throw error;
}
}
try {
fs.unlinkSync(sourcePath);
} catch {
// The link succeeded, so the plan IS published. A temporary name left behind
// is a stray file, not an unpublished plan: reporting it as a failure would
// be a lie, and rolling back would unpublish a plan that is already live.
}
return true;
}
// A directory holder is anything that owns a verified chain: a plan-parent
// handle, a ref's parent directory, or an absence guard. Two arrays describe it,
// both root-first and the same length — `chain` records each element's expected
// path and dev/ino/mode, and `descriptors` holds an open descriptor on each.
//
// Holding those descriptors is load-bearing rather than decorative. dev/ino/mode
// is unique only among *live* inodes: an inode number freed by an rmdir is handed
// straight back to the next mkdir, so a replacement directory can reproduce a
// recorded identity exactly. An open descriptor pins the inode, so the number
// cannot be recycled for as long as the holder exists.
function verifyPinnedDescriptors(holder) {
const { chain, descriptors } = holder;
if (!Array.isArray(descriptors) || descriptors.length !== chain.length) {
throw new Error('Generated-plan parent chain is missing the descriptors that pin it');
}
chain.forEach((item, index) => {
const pinned = fs.fstatSync(descriptors[index], { bigint: true });
if (!pinned.isDirectory() || stableDirectoryIdentity(pinned) !== item.identity) {
throw new Error('Generated-plan parent descriptor changed during the write');
}
});
}
function verifyLexicalChain(holder) {
for (const item of holder.chain) {
let lexical;
try {
lexical = fs.lstatSync(item.expectedPath, { bigint: true });
} catch (error) {
if (error?.code !== 'ENOENT' && error?.code !== 'ENOTDIR') throw error;
// A parent renamed out from under us is a mismatch, not a missing file:
// reporting the raw ENOENT would leak an unrelated-looking error out of a
// check whose whole job is to say the chain no longer holds.
throw new Error('Generated-plan lexical parent no longer matches its directory descriptor');
}
if (
lexical.isSymbolicLink() ||
!lexical.isDirectory() ||
stableDirectoryIdentity(lexical) !== item.identity
) {
throw new Error('Generated-plan lexical parent no longer matches its directory descriptor');
}
}
}
// The whole platform seam, in five methods. Everything else an operation does is
// identical on both platforms and lives in the shared functions below.
//
// Only two things actually differ: how a name becomes a path, and what guard
// wraps the operation that uses it.
//
// Linux ANCHORS. /proc/self/fd/<fd>/<name> starts the walk at the inode the
// descriptor holds, so a parent renamed away cannot be traversed at all and the
// guard is a no-op — there is nothing left to verify.
//
// macOS VERIFIES. It resolves lexically, so before and after every operation it
// proves that each element of the path chain still names the exact inode being
// held for it. That DETECTS a swapped parent and aborts; it does not make the
// swap impossible. A swap landing inside the window is caught by the trailing
// check, after the fact, rather than being unreachable. The check runs after a
// failure too, because a verdict observed through a chain that has since changed
// is not a verdict.
const LINUX_ANCHORING = {
childPath(dirHandle, childName) {
return descriptorPath(dirHandle.fd, childName);
},
verified(holders, run) {
return run();
},
descriptorMatchesChild(fd, expectedPath) {
return fs.realpathSync.native(descriptorPath(fd)) === expectedPath;
},
parentStillResolves(parentHandle) {
return fs.realpathSync.native(descriptorPath(parentHandle.fd)) === parentHandle.expectedPath;
},
verifyAbsentChild(guard) {
if (absentChildIsPresent(guard.ref)) {
throw new Error(`${guard.repoPath} appeared before evidence materialization completed`);
}
},
};
const DARWIN_ANCHORING = {
childPath(dirHandle, childName) {
return path.join(dirHandle.expectedPath, childName);
},
verified(holders, run) {
const list = Array.isArray(holders) ? holders : [holders];
const proveChain = () => {
for (const holder of list) {
verifyPinnedDescriptors(holder);
verifyLexicalChain(holder);
}
};
proveChain();
let value;
try {
value = run();
} catch (error) {
proveChain();
throw error;
}
proveChain();
return value;
},
descriptorMatchesChild(fd, _expectedPath, childStat) {
// There is no live fd-to-path oracle on macOS (F_GETPATH is a name-cache
// snapshot, not an anchor), so escape is decided the other way round: the
// name was just resolved under a verified chain, and the descriptor opened
// from it counts only if it is that same inode.
const opened = fs.fstatSync(fd, { bigint: true });
return (
opened.isDirectory() && stableDirectoryIdentity(opened) === stableDirectoryIdentity(childStat)
);
},
parentStillResolves(parentHandle) {
// Both halves are needed: a directory renamed away keeps its inode, so the
// descriptors alone still match and only the lexical half notices it moved.
try {
verifyPinnedDescriptors(parentHandle);
verifyLexicalChain(parentHandle);
} catch {
return false;
}
return true;
},
verifyAbsentChild(guard) {
let present;
try {
present = DARWIN_ANCHORING.verified(guard.handle, () => absentChildIsPresent(guard.ref));
} catch (error) {
// A chain that no longer holds makes the absence verdict meaningless, and
// the caller reports that as the anchor changing rather than as a stray
// parent-descriptor error. Linux cannot reach this: its guard is a no-op.
throw new Error(
`Absence anchor changed for ${guard.repoPath}: ${
error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)
}`,
);
}
if (present) {
throw new Error(`${guard.repoPath} appeared before evidence materialization completed`);
}
},
};
const ANCHORING_BACKENDS = new Map([
['linux', LINUX_ANCHORING],
['darwin', DARWIN_ANCHORING],
]);
function anchoringBackend() {
const backend = ANCHORING_BACKENDS.get(process.platform);
if (!backend) {
// requireDescriptorAnchoring normally refuses first; this is the same answer
// from the other side, so an unsupported platform can never fall through to
// whichever backend happened to be the ternary's default.
throw new Error(
`No generated-plan anchoring backend for ${process.platform}; refusing an unanchored write`,
);
}
return backend;
}
// Open, fstat, compare, close on mismatch. The descriptor never escapes this
// function unless it refers to the inode the caller already verified by name, so
// a lexical open that landed anywhere else cannot be used by accident. On Linux
// the comparison passes trivially — the /proc walk already resolved from the
// held parent — and costs one fstat to keep the guarantee structural rather than
// dependent on which backend is in play.
function adoptVerifiedFile(ref, expectedStat, flags) {
const fd = openVerifiedFile(ref.path, flags);
let opened;
try {
opened = fs.fstatSync(fd, { bigint: true });
} catch (error) {
fs.closeSync(fd);
throw error;
}
if (stableFileIdentity(opened) !== stableFileIdentity(expectedStat)) {
fs.closeSync(fd);
return null;
}
return fd;
}
function absentChildIsPresent(ref) {
try {
fs.lstatSync(ref.path, { bigint: true });
} catch (error) {
if (error?.code === 'ENOENT') return false;
throw error;
}
return true;
}
// The operations. Each is the same on both platforms; only the guard differs.
function lstatChild(ref) {
return anchoringBackend().verified(ref.dir, () => fs.lstatSync(ref.path, { bigint: true }));
}
function openChildRead(ref, flags, expectedStat) {
return anchoringBackend().verified(ref.dir, () => {
const fd = adoptVerifiedFile(ref, expectedStat, flags);
if (fd === null) {
throw new Error(`${ref.name} was replaced between its verified stat and its no-follow open`);
}
return fd;
});
}
function createChild(ref, flags, mode) {
// O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_NOFOLLOW is atomic at the leaf, so the only thing the guard
// has to cover is which directory the leaf landed in.
return anchoringBackend().verified(ref.dir, () => openVerifiedFile(ref.path, flags, mode));
}
function mkdirChild(ref, mode) {
anchoringBackend().verified(ref.dir, () => fs.mkdirSync(ref.path, { mode }));
}
function publishNoReplace(sourceRef, destinationRef) {
return anchoringBackend().verified([sourceRef.dir, destinationRef.dir], () =>
linkNoReplace(sourceRef.path, destinationRef.path),
);
}
// The single place a name becomes a path, and therefore the right place to
// enforce that a name is one ordinary component.
//
// A trailing separator is the sharp edge here, not a tidiness concern:
// open(path, O_NOFOLLOW) FOLLOWS a symlink when path ends in "/" — the trap
// behind CVE-2026-39822 / golang/go#79005, which let os.Root escape its own
// root. path.join preserves that trailing slash, so a component carrying one
// would turn every no-follow open in this file into a following one.
// normalizeRepoPath already rejects such components upstream; this is the
// chokepoint that makes it true for every caller, including the generated
// temporary and vault names that never pass through it.
function anchoredChild(dirHandle, childName) {
if (
typeof childName !== 'string' ||
childName === '' ||
childName === '.' ||
childName === '..' ||
childName.includes('/') ||
childName.includes('\\') ||
childName.includes('\0')
) {
throw new Error(`Refusing to resolve ${JSON.stringify(childName)} as a single path component`);
}
return {
dir: dirHandle,
name: childName,
path: anchoringBackend().childPath(dirHandle, childName),
};
}
function lstatAnchoredOptional(ref) {
try {
return lstatChild(ref);
} catch (error) {
if (error?.code === 'ENOENT' || error?.code === 'ENOTDIR') return null;
throw error;
}
}
function openPlanParent(
repo,
parentComponents,
{ createMissing = true, purpose = 'Generated-plan' } = {},
) {
requireDescriptorAnchoring();
// Root-first and index-aligned with `chain`: verifyPinnedDescriptors relies on
// that, and the descriptors are what pin each recorded inode against reuse.
const descriptors = [];
try {
let currentFd = openVerifiedDirectory(repo, ANCHORED_DIRECTORY_FLAGS);
descriptors.push(currentFd);
const rootStat = fs.fstatSync(currentFd, { bigint: true });
const chain = [{ expectedPath: repo, identity: stableDirectoryIdentity(rootStat) }];
let currentHandle = { fd: currentFd, expectedPath: repo, chain, descriptors };
const traversed = [];
for (const component of parentComponents) {
traversed.push(component);
const child = anchoredChild(currentHandle, component);
let childStat;
let created = false;
try {
childStat = lstatChild(child);
} catch (error) {
if (error?.code !== 'ENOENT' && error?.code !== 'ENOTDIR') throw error;
if (!createMissing) {
throw new Error(`${purpose} parent does not exist: ${traversed.join('/')}`);
}
mkdirChild(child, 0o755);
childStat = lstatChild(child);
created = true;
}
if (childStat.isSymbolicLink() || !childStat.isDirectory()) {
throw new Error(`${purpose} parent is not a real directory: ${traversed.join('/')}`);
}
const parentFd = currentFd;
const childFd = openVerifiedDirectory(child.path, ANCHORED_DIRECTORY_FLAGS);
descriptors.push(childFd);
currentFd = childFd;
if (created) {
fs.fsyncSync(childFd);
fs.fsyncSync(parentFd);
}
const expected = path.join(repo, ...traversed);
if (!anchoringBackend().descriptorMatchesChild(currentFd, expected, childStat)) {
throw new Error(`${purpose} parent escaped the repository: ${traversed.join('/')}`);
}
const openedStat = fs.fstatSync(currentFd, { bigint: true });
chain.push({ expectedPath: expected, identity: stableDirectoryIdentity(openedStat) });
currentHandle = { fd: currentFd, expectedPath: expected, chain, descriptors };
}
return {
descriptors,
fd: currentFd,
expectedPath: path.join(repo, ...parentComponents),
chain,
};
} catch (error) {
closeDescriptors(descriptors);
throw error;
}
}
function closeDescriptors(descriptors) {
for (const fd of [...descriptors].reverse()) {
try {
fs.closeSync(fd);
} catch {
// Preserve the primary write result/error.
}
}
}
// A handle's identity IS its chain leaf's identity. Storing it twice meant two
// fstats a line apart and a re-stamp helper to keep them agreeing; deriving it
// removes both.
function handleIdentity(handle) {
return handle.chain[handle.chain.length - 1].identity;
}
function resolveGitDirectory(repo) {
const result = git(repo, ['rev-parse', '--absolute-git-dir']);
return fs.realpathSync.native(decodeUtf8(result.stdout, 'Git administrative directory').trim());
}
function openBackupVault(repo, { createMissing = true } = {}) {
const gitDirectory = resolveGitDirectory(repo);
const handle = openPlanParent(gitDirectory, ['gitnexus-plan-backups'], {
createMissing,
purpose: 'Git-admin backup vault',
});
fs.fchmodSync(handle.fd, 0o700);
fs.fsyncSync(handle.fd);
// mode is part of every directory identity, so hardening the vault changes the
// identity the chain recorded for it; without this the next verification would
// reject the directory it just hardened.
handle.chain[handle.chain.length - 1].identity = stableDirectoryIdentity(
fs.fstatSync(handle.fd, { bigint: true }),
);
return { ...handle, gitDirectory };
}
function validatePlanParent(parentHandle) {
const descriptorStat = fs.fstatSync(parentHandle.fd, { bigint: true });
if (
!descriptorStat.isDirectory() ||
stableDirectoryIdentity(descriptorStat) !== handleIdentity(parentHandle)
) {
throw new Error('Generated-plan parent descriptor changed during the write');
}
if (!anchoringBackend().parentStillResolves(parentHandle)) {
throw new Error('Generated-plan parent moved or was replaced during the write');
}
// Both halves come from the shared helpers rather than being restated here: an
// earlier hand-copy of the lexical loop lost verifyLexicalChain's ENOENT/ENOTDIR
// translation, so a renamed parent could surface a raw errno from a function
// with a dozen call sites.
verifyPinnedDescriptors(parentHandle);
verifyLexicalChain(parentHandle);
}
function inspectPlanDestination(
finalRef,
{ replace, expectedIdentity, mustBeAbsent = false } = {},
) {
let stat;
try {
stat = lstatChild(finalRef);
} catch (error) {
if (error?.code === 'ENOENT') {
if (expectedIdentity) throw new Error('Generated plan disappeared during the write');
return null;
}
throw error;
}
if (stat.isSymbolicLink() || !stat.isFile()) {
throw new Error('Generated-plan destination must be a regular file, never a symlink');
}
if (mustBeAbsent) throw new Error('Generated plan appeared during the write');
const identity = statIdentity(stat);
if (!replace)
throw new Error('Generated plan already exists; use --replace only for Deepen mode');
if (expectedIdentity && identity !== expectedIdentity) {
throw new Error('Generated plan changed during the write');
}
return stat;
}
function openExistingPlanDestination(finalRef, replace) {
const stat = inspectPlanDestination(finalRef, { replace });
if (stat === null) {
if (replace) throw new Error('Deepen mode requires an existing generated plan to replace');
return { fd: undefined, identity: null, stableIdentity: null };
}
const identity = statIdentity(stat);
const fd = openChildRead(finalRef, VERIFIED_READ_FLAGS, stat);
try {
const opened = fs.fstatSync(fd, { bigint: true });
if (!opened.isFile() || statIdentity(opened) !== identity) {
throw new Error('Generated plan changed while its no-follow descriptor was opened');
}
return { fd, identity, stableIdentity: stableFileIdentity(opened) };
} catch (error) {
fs.closeSync(fd);
throw error;
}
}
function validateOpenPlanDestination(destination) {
if (destination.fd === undefined) return;
const opened = fs.fstatSync(destination.fd, { bigint: true });
if (!opened.isFile() || statIdentity(opened) !== destination.identity) {
throw new Error('Generated plan changed through its open descriptor');
}
}
function writeAll(fd, contents) {
let offset = 0;
while (offset < contents.length) {
const written = fs.writeSync(fd, contents, offset, contents.length - offset);
if (written <= 0) throw new Error('Generated-plan write made no progress');
offset += written;
}
}
function hashOpenFile(fd, label) {
const before = fs.fstatSync(fd, { bigint: true });
if (!before.isFile()) throw new Error(`${label} is no longer a regular file`);
const hash = createHash('sha256');
const buffer = Buffer.allocUnsafe(1024 * 1024);
let position = 0;
for (;;) {
const count = fs.readSync(fd, buffer, 0, buffer.length, position);
if (count === 0) break;
hash.update(buffer.subarray(0, count));
position += count;
}
const after = fs.fstatSync(fd, { bigint: true });
assertStableIdentity(before, after, label);
return {
digest: `sha256:${hash.digest('hex')}`,
identity: stableFileIdentity(after),
size: after.size,
};
}
function validateCommittedPlan(finalRef, tempFd, expectedTemp, testHooks) {
const before = lstatChild(finalRef);
if (
before.isSymbolicLink() ||
!before.isFile() ||
stableFileIdentity(before) !== expectedTemp.identity
) {
throw new Error('Generated-plan destination failed its first post-write identity check');
}
const finalFd = openChildRead(finalRef, VERIFIED_READ_FLAGS, before);
try {
const opened = fs.fstatSync(finalFd, { bigint: true });
if (!opened.isFile() || stableFileIdentity(opened) !== expectedTemp.identity) {
throw new Error('Generated-plan destination changed while its no-follow descriptor opened');
}
testHooks?.afterFinalOpen?.({ fd: finalFd, finalPath: finalRef.path });
const committedViaTemp = hashOpenFile(tempFd, 'generated-plan committed file');
const committedViaPath = hashOpenFile(finalFd, 'generated-plan destination descriptor');
const after = lstatChild(finalRef);
const openedAfter = fs.fstatSync(finalFd, { bigint: true });
if (
after.isSymbolicLink() ||
!after.isFile() ||
stableFileIdentity(after) !== expectedTemp.identity ||
stableFileIdentity(openedAfter) !== expectedTemp.identity ||
committedViaTemp.identity !== expectedTemp.identity ||
committedViaPath.identity !== expectedTemp.identity ||
committedViaTemp.digest !== expectedTemp.digest ||
committedViaPath.digest !== expectedTemp.digest
) {
throw new Error('Generated-plan destination failed post-write verification');
}
} finally {
fs.closeSync(finalFd);
}
}
function copyOpenFile(sourceFd, destinationFd, label) {
const before = fs.fstatSync(sourceFd, { bigint: true });
if (!before.isFile()) throw new Error(`${label} source is no longer a regular file`);
const buffer = Buffer.allocUnsafe(1024 * 1024);
let position = 0;
for (;;) {
const count = fs.readSync(sourceFd, buffer, 0, buffer.length, position);
if (count === 0) break;
writeAll(destinationFd, buffer.subarray(0, count));
position += count;
}
const after = fs.fstatSync(sourceFd, { bigint: true });
assertStableIdentity(before, after, `${label} source`);
return after;
}
function openVerifiedAnchoredFile(ref, label, knownStat) {
const before = knownStat ?? lstatChild(ref);
if (before.isSymbolicLink() || !before.isFile()) {
throw new Error(`${label} is not a regular no-follow file`);
}
const fd = openChildRead(ref, VERIFIED_READ_FLAGS, before);
try {
const opened = fs.fstatSync(fd, { bigint: true });
if (!opened.isFile() || stableFileIdentity(opened) !== stableFileIdentity(before)) {
throw new Error(`${label} changed while its descriptor opened`);
}
const layer = hashOpenFile(fd, label);
const after = lstatChild(ref);
if (after.isSymbolicLink() || !after.isFile() || stableFileIdentity(after) !== layer.identity) {
throw new Error(`${label} changed after verification`);
}
return { fd, layer };
} catch (error) {
fs.closeSync(fd);
throw error;
}
}
export function readPlanSafely({ repo: repoInput, generatedPlanPath, testHooks } = {}) {
const repo = assertRepository(repoInput);
const generatedPlan = normalizeGeneratedPlanReadPath(generatedPlanPath);
const components = generatedPlan.split('/');
const finalName = components.pop();
const parentHandle = openPlanParent(repo, components, {
createMissing: false,
purpose: 'Loaded-plan',
});
let fd;
try {
validatePlanParent(parentHandle);
const finalRef = anchoredChild(parentHandle, finalName);
let before;
try {
before = lstatChild(finalRef);
} catch (error) {
if (error?.code === 'ENOENT' || error?.code === 'ENOTDIR') {
throw new Error(`Loaded plan does not exist: ${generatedPlan}`);
}
throw error;
}
if (before.isSymbolicLink() || !before.isFile()) {
throw new Error('Loaded plan must be a regular file, never a symlink');
}
fd = openChildRead(finalRef, VERIFIED_READ_FLAGS, before);
const opened = fs.fstatSync(fd, { bigint: true });
if (!opened.isFile() || statIdentity(opened) !== statIdentity(before)) {
throw new Error('Loaded plan changed while its no-follow descriptor opened');
}
testHooks?.afterPlanOpen?.({ fd, finalPath: finalRef.path });
const chunks = [];
let total = 0;
const buffer = Buffer.allocUnsafe(64 * 1024);
for (;;) {
const count = fs.readSync(fd, buffer, 0, buffer.length, null);
if (count === 0) break;
total += count;
if (total > MAX_PLAN_BYTES) throw new Error(`Loaded plan exceeds ${MAX_PLAN_BYTES} bytes`);
chunks.push(Buffer.from(buffer.subarray(0, count)));
}
const contents = Buffer.concat(chunks, total);
decodeUtf8(contents, 'loaded plan');
const after = fs.fstatSync(fd, { bigint: true });
assertStableIdentity(opened, after, 'loaded plan');
const pathAfter = lstatChild(finalRef);
if (
pathAfter.isSymbolicLink() ||
!pathAfter.isFile() ||
statIdentity(pathAfter) !== statIdentity(after)
) {
throw new Error('Loaded plan changed before its receipt was produced');
}
validatePlanParent(parentHandle);
return {
generated_plan_path: generatedPlan,
bytes_read: contents.length,
plan_digest: sha256(contents),
plan_bytes_base64: contents.toString('base64'),
};
} finally {
if (fd !== undefined) fs.closeSync(fd);
closeDescriptors(parentHandle.descriptors);
}
}
function artifactGitPath(name) {
return `gitnexus-plan-backups/${name}`;
}
function verifyVaultArtifactFromFreshRoot(repo, name, expectedLayer) {
const freshVault = openBackupVault(repo, { createMissing: false });
try {
validatePlanParent(freshVault);
const opened = openVerifiedAnchoredFile(
anchoredChild(freshVault, name),
`Git-admin artifact ${artifactGitPath(name)}`,
);
try {
if (
opened.layer.identity !== expectedLayer.identity ||
opened.layer.digest !== expectedLayer.digest
) {
throw new Error(
`Git-admin artifact changed before fresh-root verification: ${artifactGitPath(name)}`,
);
}
} finally {
fs.closeSync(opened.fd);
}
} finally {
closeDescriptors(freshVault.descriptors);
}
}
function createVaultCopyFromFd(repo, vault, sourceFd, role) {
validatePlanParent(vault);
const name = `.gitnexus-plan-${role}-${process.pid}-${randomBytes(16).toString('hex')}.bak`;
const artifact = anchoredChild(vault, name);
const destinationFd = createChild(artifact, VERIFIED_CREATE_FLAGS, 0o600);
let destination;
try {
const sourceStat = copyOpenFile(sourceFd, destinationFd, role);
fs.fchmodSync(destinationFd, Number(sourceStat.mode & 0o777n));
fs.fsyncSync(destinationFd);
const source = hashOpenFile(sourceFd, role);
destination = hashOpenFile(destinationFd, `${role} vault copy`);
if (source.size !== destination.size || source.digest !== destination.digest) {
throw new Error(`${role} vault copy does not match its held source descriptor`);
}
const pathStat = lstatChild(artifact);
if (
pathStat.isSymbolicLink() ||
!pathStat.isFile() ||
stableFileIdentity(pathStat) !== destination.identity
) {
throw new Error(`${role} vault path changed during preservation`);
}
fs.fsyncSync(vault.fd);
} finally {
fs.closeSync(destinationFd);
}
verifyVaultArtifactFromFreshRoot(repo, name, destination);
return { role, gitPath: artifactGitPath(name), layer: destination };
}
function createVaultCopyFromBytes(repo, vault, contents, role) {
validatePlanParent(vault);
const name = `.gitnexus-plan-${role}-${process.pid}-${randomBytes(16).toString('hex')}.bak`;
const artifact = anchoredChild(vault, name);
const fd = createChild(artifact, VERIFIED_CREATE_FLAGS, 0o600);
let layer;
try {
writeAll(fd, contents);
fs.fchmodSync(fd, 0o644);
fs.fsyncSync(fd);
layer = hashOpenFile(fd, `${role} vault copy`);
if (layer.size !== BigInt(contents.length) || layer.digest !== sha256(contents)) {
throw new Error(`${role} vault copy does not match the intended plan bytes`);
}
const pathStat = lstatChild(artifact);
if (
pathStat.isSymbolicLink() ||
!pathStat.isFile() ||
stableFileIdentity(pathStat) !== layer.identity
) {
throw new Error(`${role} vault path changed during preservation`);
}
fs.fsyncSync(vault.fd);
} finally {
fs.closeSync(fd);
}
verifyVaultArtifactFromFreshRoot(repo, name, layer);
return { role, gitPath: artifactGitPath(name), layer };
}
function movePathToVault(repo, sourceHandle, sourceName, vault, role) {
const source = anchoredChild(sourceHandle, sourceName);
if (!lstatAnchoredOptional(source)) return null;
const name = `.gitnexus-plan-${role}-${process.pid}-${randomBytes(16).toString('hex')}.bak`;
const destination = anchoredChild(vault, name);
const moved = publishNoReplace(source, destination);
if (!moved) throw new Error(`${role} preservation destination unexpectedly exists`);
fs.fsyncSync(sourceHandle.fd);
if (vault.fd !== sourceHandle.fd) fs.fsyncSync(vault.fd);
const sourceAfter = lstatAnchoredOptional(source);
const destinationAfter = lstatAnchoredOptional(destination);
if (sourceAfter || !destinationAfter) {
throw new Error(`${role} could not be atomically moved into the Git-admin vault`);
}
const opened = openVerifiedAnchoredFile(
destination,
`${role} Git-admin artifact`,
destinationAfter,
);
verifyVaultArtifactFromFreshRoot(repo, name, opened.layer);
return { role, gitPath: artifactGitPath(name), layer: opened.layer, fd: opened.fd };
}
function formatPreservedArtifacts(artifacts) {
if (artifacts.length === 0) return '';
return `; preserved Git-admin artifacts: ${artifacts
.map((artifact) => `${artifact.role}=git-path:${artifact.gitPath}`)
.join(', ')}`;
}
export function writePlanSafely({
repo: repoInput,
generatedPlanPath,
contents: inputContents,
replace = false,
expectedPlanPath,
expectedPlanDigest,
testHooks,
} = {}) {
const shouldReplace = requireBoolean(replace, 'replace');
if (!Buffer.isBuffer(inputContents) && typeof inputContents !== 'string') {
throw new Error('contents must be a string or Buffer');
}
let expectedDigest;
if (shouldReplace) {
expectedDigest = normalizeSha256Digest(
expectedPlanDigest,
'expectedPlanDigest from the read-plan receipt',
);
} else if (expectedPlanPath !== undefined || expectedPlanDigest !== undefined) {
throw new Error('expectedPlanPath and expectedPlanDigest are valid only when replace is true');
}
const repo = assertRepository(repoInput);
const generatedPlan = normalizeGeneratedPlanWritePath(generatedPlanPath);
if (shouldReplace) {
const receiptPath = normalizeGeneratedPlanWritePath(
requireString(expectedPlanPath, 'expectedPlanPath from the read-plan receipt'),
);
if (receiptPath !== generatedPlan) {
throw new Error(
'expectedPlanPath from the read-plan receipt must exactly match generatedPlanPath',
);
}
}
const contents = Buffer.isBuffer(inputContents)
? Buffer.from(inputContents)
: Buffer.from(inputContents, 'utf8');
decodeUtf8(contents, 'generated plan');
if (contents.length > MAX_PLAN_BYTES) {
throw new Error(`Generated plan exceeds ${MAX_PLAN_BYTES} bytes`);
}
const components = generatedPlan.split('/');
const finalName = components.pop();
let parentHandle;
let vaultHandle;
let tempRef;
let tempName;
let tempFd;
let finalRef;
let expectedTemp;
let originalDestination;
let priorBackup;
const preservedArtifacts = [];
try {
parentHandle = openPlanParent(repo, components);
vaultHandle = openBackupVault(repo);
const parentDevice = fs.fstatSync(parentHandle.fd, { bigint: true }).dev;
const vaultDevice = fs.fstatSync(vaultHandle.fd, { bigint: true }).dev;
if (parentDevice !== vaultDevice) {
throw new Error(
'Generated-plan parent and Git-admin backup vault must share a filesystem for atomic publication',
);
}
testHooks?.afterParentOpen?.({ fd: parentHandle.fd, path: parentHandle.expectedPath });
validatePlanParent(parentHandle);
validatePlanParent(vaultHandle);
finalRef = anchoredChild(parentHandle, finalName);
originalDestination = openExistingPlanDestination(finalRef, shouldReplace);
tempName = `.gitnexus-plan-${process.pid}-${randomBytes(16).toString('hex')}.tmp`;
tempRef = anchoredChild(parentHandle, tempName);
tempFd = createChild(tempRef, VERIFIED_CREATE_FLAGS, 0o600);
writeAll(tempFd, contents);
fs.fchmodSync(tempFd, 0o644);
fs.fsyncSync(tempFd);
expectedTemp = hashOpenFile(tempFd, 'generated-plan temporary file');
if (expectedTemp.size !== BigInt(contents.length) || expectedTemp.digest !== sha256(contents)) {
throw new Error('Generated-plan temporary file failed verification');
}
testHooks?.beforeRename?.({
fd: parentHandle.fd,
path: parentHandle.expectedPath,
tempPath: tempRef.path,
});
validatePlanParent(parentHandle);
validatePlanParent(vaultHandle);
validateOpenPlanDestination(originalDestination);
const tempPathStat = lstatChild(tempRef);
const currentTemp = hashOpenFile(tempFd, 'generated-plan temporary file');
if (
tempPathStat.isSymbolicLink() ||
!tempPathStat.isFile() ||
stableFileIdentity(tempPathStat) !== expectedTemp.identity ||
currentTemp.identity !== expectedTemp.identity ||
currentTemp.digest !== expectedTemp.digest
) {
throw new Error('Generated-plan temporary path or content changed before rename');
}
if (shouldReplace) {
testHooks?.beforeBackupMove?.({ fd: parentHandle.fd, finalPath: finalRef.path });
const originalLayer = hashOpenFile(originalDestination.fd, 'prior generated plan');
if (originalLayer.digest !== expectedDigest) {
throw new Error(
'Generated plan no longer matches the exact digest from the read-plan receipt',
);
}
validatePlanParent(parentHandle);
validateOpenPlanDestination(originalDestination);
inspectPlanDestination(finalRef, {
replace: true,
expectedIdentity: originalDestination.identity,
});
priorBackup = movePathToVault(repo, parentHandle, finalName, vaultHandle, 'prior-plan');
if (!priorBackup) {
throw new Error('Existing generated plan disappeared before preservation');
}
preservedArtifacts.push(priorBackup);
if (
priorBackup.layer.identity !== originalDestination.stableIdentity ||
priorBackup.layer.digest !== originalLayer.digest
) {
preservedArtifacts.push(
createVaultCopyFromFd(repo, vaultHandle, originalDestination.fd, 'expected-prior-plan'),
);
throw new Error('Destination raced while the prior plan was moved into preservation');
}
if (lstatAnchoredOptional(finalRef)) {
throw new Error('Destination reappeared after the prior plan was preserved');
}
}
testHooks?.beforePublication?.({
fd: parentHandle.fd,
finalPath: finalRef.path,
tempPath: tempRef.path,
replace: shouldReplace,
});
validatePlanParent(parentHandle);
validatePlanParent(vaultHandle);
const finalTempPathStat = lstatChild(tempRef);
const finalTemp = hashOpenFile(tempFd, 'generated-plan temporary file');
if (
finalTempPathStat.isSymbolicLink() ||
!finalTempPathStat.isFile() ||
stableFileIdentity(finalTempPathStat) !== expectedTemp.identity ||
finalTemp.identity !== expectedTemp.identity ||
finalTemp.digest !== expectedTemp.digest
) {
throw new Error('Generated-plan temporary path or content changed at publication');
}
// link() reports the race itself; re-deriving that verdict from a later pair
// of stats would be both slower and weaker.
if (!publishNoReplace(tempRef, finalRef)) {
throw new Error('Generated-plan publication was refused because the destination raced');
}
// link() creates a directory entry, so it needs the parent fsync that rename
// needed: the file's own bytes were fsynced through tempFd before this point,
// and this makes the name that now reaches them durable too. Skipping it is
// the step write-file-atomic omits and maildir, git and atomicwrites all
// mandate.
//
// Honest limitation: on macOS fsync is not a write barrier — the durable
// primitive there is fcntl(F_FULLFSYNC), which Node does not expose. A
// macOS plan write is therefore as durable as fsync makes it and no more.
fs.fsyncSync(parentHandle.fd);
testHooks?.afterPublication?.({ fd: parentHandle.fd, finalPath: finalRef.path });
validatePlanParent(parentHandle);
validatePlanParent(vaultHandle);
validateCommittedPlan(finalRef, tempFd, expectedTemp, testHooks);
const receipt = { generated_plan_path: generatedPlan, bytes_written: contents.length };
if (priorBackup) receipt.prior_plan_backup_git_path = priorBackup.gitPath;
return receipt;
} catch (error) {
const preservationErrors = [];
let intendedPreserved = preservedArtifacts.some(
(artifact) =>
expectedTemp &&
artifact.layer.identity === expectedTemp.identity &&
artifact.layer.digest === expectedTemp.digest,
);
if (parentHandle && vaultHandle && tempName) {
try {
const movedTemp = movePathToVault(
repo,
parentHandle,
tempName,
vaultHandle,
'unpublished-plan',
);
if (movedTemp) {
preservedArtifacts.push(movedTemp);
intendedPreserved =
Boolean(expectedTemp) &&
movedTemp.layer.identity === expectedTemp.identity &&
movedTemp.layer.digest === expectedTemp.digest;
fs.closeSync(movedTemp.fd);
}
} catch (preservationError) {
preservationErrors.push(preservationError);
}
}
if (vaultHandle && expectedTemp && !intendedPreserved) {
try {
preservedArtifacts.push(
createVaultCopyFromBytes(repo, vaultHandle, contents, 'intended-plan'),
);
} catch (preservationError) {
preservationErrors.push(preservationError);
}
}
if (vaultHandle && originalDestination?.fd !== undefined) {
try {
const originalLayer = hashOpenFile(originalDestination.fd, 'prior generated plan');
const priorPreserved = preservedArtifacts.some(
(artifact) => artifact.layer.digest === originalLayer.digest,
);
if (!priorPreserved) {
preservedArtifacts.push(
createVaultCopyFromFd(repo, vaultHandle, originalDestination.fd, 'expected-prior-plan'),
);
}
} catch (preservationError) {
preservationErrors.push(preservationError);
}
}
const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
const artifactSummary = formatPreservedArtifacts(preservedArtifacts);
const preservationSummary =
preservationErrors.length === 0
? ''
: `; preservation failures: ${preservationErrors
.map((failure) => (failure instanceof Error ? failure.message : String(failure)))
.join(' | ')}`;
if (error?.code === 'EACCES' || error?.code === 'EPERM' || error?.code === 'EROFS') {
throw new Error(
`Cannot safely write generated plan: checkout is read-only or its parent is not writable (${error.code})${artifactSummary}${preservationSummary}`,
);
}
throw new Error(`${message}${artifactSummary}${preservationSummary}`);
} finally {
if (priorBackup?.fd !== undefined) {
try {
fs.closeSync(priorBackup.fd);
} catch {
// Preserve the primary write result/error.
}
}
if (originalDestination?.fd !== undefined) {
try {
fs.closeSync(originalDestination.fd);
} catch {
// Preserve the primary write result/error.
}
}
if (tempFd !== undefined) {
try {
fs.closeSync(tempFd);
} catch {
// Preserve the primary write result/error.
}
}
if (vaultHandle) closeDescriptors(vaultHandle.descriptors);
if (parentHandle) closeDescriptors(parentHandle.descriptors);
}
}
export function snapshotEvidence({
repo: repoInput,
generatedPlanPath,
citedPaths = [],
testHooks,
} = {}) {
if (!Array.isArray(citedPaths) || citedPaths.some((entry) => typeof entry !== 'string')) {
throw new Error('citedPaths must be an array of strings');
}
const repo = assertRepository(repoInput);
const generatedPlan = normalizeGeneratedPlanWritePath(generatedPlanPath);
const normalizedCitations = new Set(
citedPaths.map((citedPath) => normalizeRepoPath(citedPath, 'cited path')),
);
const initialHead = git(repo, ['rev-parse', '--verify', 'HEAD']).stdout;
const head = decodeUtf8(initialHead, 'HEAD commit').trim();
if (!/^[0-9a-f]{40,64}$/.test(head)) throw new Error('HEAD did not resolve to a full object ID');
const initialDirty = readDirtySnapshot(repo);
const initialIndex = git(repo, ['ls-files', '--stage', '-z']).stdout;
const indexGuard = captureControlFile(resolveAdministrativePath(repo, 'index'), 'Git index');
const headGuards = captureHeadGuards(repo);
const dirty = initialDirty.records;
const mutationGuards = [];
// Per-snapshot walk state: `absenceCache` owns every descriptor an absence
// anchor holds, deduplicated by repo-relative prefix and closed exactly once
// below; `guardedDirectories` keeps parent guarding to one stat per directory.
const absenceCache = new Map();
const walkState = { absenceCache, guardedDirectories: new Set() };
try {
testHooks?.afterAnchorCapture?.({ headCommit: head });
for (const citedPath of [...normalizedCitations]) {
const status = dirty.get(citedPath);
if (status?.rename_from) normalizedCitations.add(status.rename_from);
if (status?.rename_to) normalizedCitations.add(status.rename_to);
}
const neededPaths = new Set([...dirty.keys(), ...normalizedCitations]);
const layers = loadGitLayers(repo, neededPaths, head, initialIndex);
testHooks?.afterGitLayerLoad?.({ headCommit: head });
const globalEntries = [...dirty.values()]
.filter((record) => record.path !== generatedPlan)
.map((record) =>
materializeRecord(repo, record, layers, mutationGuards, testHooks, walkState),
);
const citedEntries = [...normalizedCitations].sort(compareUtf8).map((repoPath) => {
const status = dirty.get(repoPath) ?? {
path: repoPath,
state: 'clean',
rename_from: null,
rename_to: null,
has_untracked: false,
};
const entry = materializeRecord(repo, status, layers, mutationGuards, testHooks, walkState);
const present = Object.values(entry.object_kind).some((kind) => kind !== ABSENT);
if (!present) entry.state = ABSENT;
else if (entry.state === 'clean' && entry.object_kind.untracked !== ABSENT) {
entry.state = 'untracked';
}
return entry;
});
const dirtyBytes = serializeDirtyRecords(globalEntries);
const verifyGuards = () => {
for (const guard of mutationGuards) {
if (guard.type === 'stat') {
const current = fs.lstatSync(guard.absolute, { bigint: true });
if (statIdentity(current) !== guard.identity) {
throw new Error(`${guard.absolute} changed before evidence materialization completed`);
}
} else if (guard.type === 'directory') {
const current = fs.lstatSync(guard.absolute, { bigint: true });
if (!current.isDirectory() || stableDirectoryIdentity(current) !== guard.identity) {
throw new Error(`${guard.absolute} changed before evidence materialization completed`);
}
} else if (guard.type === 'symlink') {
const before = fs.lstatSync(guard.absolute, { bigint: true });
const target = fs.readlinkSync(guard.absolute, { encoding: 'buffer' });
const after = fs.lstatSync(guard.absolute, { bigint: true });
assertStableIdentity(before, after, guard.absolute);
if (statIdentity(after) !== guard.identity || !Buffer.from(target).equals(guard.target)) {
throw new Error(`${guard.absolute} changed before evidence materialization completed`);
}
} else if (guard.type === 'gitlink') {
const current = readOwnGitlinkHead(guard.absolute);
if (current.oid !== guard.oid || current.topLevel !== guard.topLevel) {
throw new Error(`${guard.absolute} changed before evidence materialization completed`);
}
} else if (guard.type === 'absence') {
// statIdentity is a strict superset of stableDirectoryIdentity on the
// same stat, so comparing both could only ever fire together.
const parent = fs.fstatSync(guard.fd, { bigint: true });
if (!parent.isDirectory() || statIdentity(parent) !== guard.parentMutationIdentity) {
throw new Error(`Absence anchor changed for ${guard.repoPath}`);
}
anchoringBackend().verifyAbsentChild(guard);
}
}
for (const guard of headGuards) verifyControlFile(guard);
verifyControlFile(indexGuard);
};
testHooks?.afterMaterialize?.();
verifyGuards();
testHooks?.afterFirstGuardPass?.();
const finalDirty = readDirtySnapshot(repo);
const finalHead = git(repo, ['rev-parse', '--verify', 'HEAD']).stdout;
const finalIndex = git(repo, ['ls-files', '--stage', '-z']).stdout;
if (
!initialDirty.output.equals(finalDirty.output) ||
!initialHead.equals(finalHead) ||
!initialIndex.equals(finalIndex)
) {
throw new Error(
'HEAD, index, or working-tree status changed while evidence was materialized',
);
}
verifyGuards();
return {
schema_version: EVIDENCE_PROVENANCE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
head_commit: head,
generated_plan_path: generatedPlan,
global_dirty_digest: {
algorithm: 'sha256',
canonicalization: EVIDENCE_PROVENANCE_CANONICALIZATION,
value: sha256(dirtyBytes).slice('sha256:'.length),
},
cited_path_manifest: citedEntries,
};
} finally {
// One entry per distinct anchored directory, so one close per descriptor.
for (const handle of absenceCache.values()) {
try {
fs.closeSync(handle.fd);
} catch {
// Preserve the primary snapshot result/error.
}
}
}
}
function parseCli(argv) {
const args = [...argv];
const command = args[0] && !args[0].startsWith('--') ? args.shift() : 'snapshot';
if (!['snapshot', 'read-plan', 'write-plan'].includes(command)) {
throw new Error(`Unsupported command: ${command}`);
}
const allowed = {
snapshot: new Set(['--repo', '--generated-plan', '--cited', '--schema-version']),
'read-plan': new Set(['--repo', '--generated-plan']),
'write-plan': new Set([
'--repo',
'--generated-plan',
'--replace',
'--expected-plan-path',
'--expected-plan-digest',
]),
}[command];
let repo;
let generatedPlanPath;
let schemaVersion = EVIDENCE_PROVENANCE_SCHEMA_VERSION;
let replace = false;
let expectedPlanPath;
let expectedPlanDigest;
const citedPaths = [];
const seen = new Set();
while (args.length > 0) {
const flag = args.shift();
if (typeof flag !== 'string' || !flag.startsWith('--')) {
throw new Error(`Unexpected positional argument: ${flag}`);
}
if (!allowed.has(flag)) throw new Error(`${flag} is not valid for ${command}`);
if (flag === '--replace') {
if (seen.has(flag)) throw new Error(`Duplicate option: ${flag}`);
seen.add(flag);
replace = true;
continue;
}
if (flag !== '--cited' && seen.has(flag)) throw new Error(`Duplicate option: ${flag}`);
seen.add(flag);
const value = args.shift();
if (value === undefined || value.startsWith('--')) throw new Error(`Missing value for ${flag}`);
if (flag === '--repo') repo = value;
else if (flag === '--generated-plan') generatedPlanPath = value;
else if (flag === '--cited') citedPaths.push(value);
else if (flag === '--schema-version') {
if (!/^\d+$/.test(value)) throw new Error('--schema-version must be an integer');
schemaVersion = Number(value);
} else if (flag === '--expected-plan-path') expectedPlanPath = value;
else if (flag === '--expected-plan-digest') expectedPlanDigest = value;
}
if (!repo) throw new Error('--repo is required');
if (!generatedPlanPath) throw new Error('--generated-plan is required');
if (command === 'snapshot' && schemaVersion !== EVIDENCE_PROVENANCE_SCHEMA_VERSION) {
throw new Error(
`Unsupported evidence provenance schema ${schemaVersion}; schema 1 is legacy and must be conservatively re-anchored`,
);
}
if (command === 'write-plan') {
if (replace && (expectedPlanPath === undefined || expectedPlanDigest === undefined)) {
throw new Error(
'--replace requires --expected-plan-path and --expected-plan-digest from read-plan',
);
}
if (!replace && (expectedPlanPath !== undefined || expectedPlanDigest !== undefined)) {
throw new Error('--expected-plan-path and --expected-plan-digest require --replace');
}
}
return {
command,
repo,
generatedPlanPath,
citedPaths,
replace,
expectedPlanPath,
expectedPlanDigest,
};
}
function readStdinBounded() {
const chunks = [];
let total = 0;
const buffer = Buffer.allocUnsafe(64 * 1024);
for (;;) {
const count = fs.readSync(0, buffer, 0, buffer.length, null);
if (count === 0) break;
total += count;
if (total > MAX_PLAN_BYTES) throw new Error(`Generated plan exceeds ${MAX_PLAN_BYTES} bytes`);
chunks.push(Buffer.from(buffer.subarray(0, count)));
}
return Buffer.concat(chunks, total);
}
function main() {
try {
const options = parseCli(process.argv.slice(2));
let result;
if (options.command === 'write-plan') {
result = writePlanSafely({ ...options, contents: readStdinBounded() });
} else if (options.command === 'read-plan') {
result = readPlanSafely(options);
} else {
result = snapshotEvidence(options);
}
process.stdout.write(`${JSON.stringify(result, null, 2)}\n`);
} catch (error) {
process.stderr.write(
`evidence-provenance: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}\n`,
);
process.exitCode = 1;
}
}
const invokedPath = process.argv[1] ? path.resolve(process.argv[1]) : null;
if (invokedPath && invokedPath === fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)) main();