GitNexus/.github
Copilot 6f1cfffdd7
fix(security): Harden CI permissions (#1454)
* Initial plan

* chore(security): harden workflow permissions and pin Docker base image digests

Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/sessions/2ddc8f2b-7355-48cf-9a0b-c06df66c3f47

* fix(security): restore permissions: {} on publish + release-candidate workflows

These two release-publishing workflows had permissions: {} (the strictest valid form) before PR #1454, which replaced it with permissions: read-all. Every job in both files already declares its own permissions block, so the workflow-level default is only the safety net for future jobs added without one — read-all weakens that net for no benefit. Restore {} and the explanatory comment.

Scorecard's TokenPermissions check accepts both forms, so this preserves U9 compliance.

* fix(security): narrow permissions: read-all to contents: read on 13 workflows

PR #1454 added permissions: read-all to 13 workflows that previously had no top-level permissions block. read-all is Scorecard-compliant but unnecessarily broad — every job in scope only needs contents:read at the workflow level (job-level blocks already grant the writes that any job actually performs).

Snapshot of every job in the 13 workflows confirms contents:read is sufficient:

- ci.yml: quality/tests/scope-parity have explicit contents:read job blocks; save-pr-meta uses upload-artifact only (no token scopes needed); ci-status is pure shell.
- ci-e2e.yml, ci-quality.yml, ci-scope-parity.yml, ci-tests.yml: all jobs do checkout + npm + tsc/vitest/playwright/upload-artifact only; no API token scopes required.
- claude.yml, codeql.yml, dependency-review.yml, docker.yml, gitleaks.yml, pr-labeler.yml, trivy.yml, workflow-lint.yml: all jobs already declare their own job-level blocks (security-events:write, pull-requests:write, packages:write, etc.) so the workflow-level default does not gate them.

zizmor (--min-severity high) is clean on the resulting tree. Pre-existing medium findings (secrets-inherit, artipacked) are in unrelated workflows and untouched by this commit.

scorecard.yml also uses read-all but pre-existed PR #1454 and is deferred to a follow-up PR per the plan's scope boundary.

---------

Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Gergő Magyar <gergomagyar@icloud.com>
2026-05-09 17:58:22 +01:00
..
actions fix(security): Pin Docker Node base images, remove runtime package-manager CVE surface, verify Trivy on PRs, and harden Dependabot policy (#1455) 2026-05-09 16:55:31 +01:00
ISSUE_TEMPLATE docs: agent development framework, GitHub templates, eval refactor (#479) 2026-03-25 06:48:41 +00:00
scripts fix(security): close URL/regex/tag-filter sanitization cluster (U7) (#1330) 2026-05-08 07:11:29 +01:00
workflows fix(security): Harden CI permissions (#1454) 2026-05-09 17:58:22 +01:00
dependabot.yml fix(security): Pin Docker Node base images, remove runtime package-manager CVE surface, verify Trivy on PRs, and harden Dependabot policy (#1455) 2026-05-09 16:55:31 +01:00
FUNDING.yml process maps and funding.yml 2026-01-28 13:14:16 +05:30
PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md docs: agent development framework, GitHub templates, eval refactor (#479) 2026-03-25 06:48:41 +00:00
release-drafter.yml ci: standardize workflow concurrency and automate release-note labeling (#837) 2026-04-15 13:24:53 +01:00
release.yml feat: configure prettier with pre-commit hook (#563) 2026-03-28 14:58:04 +00:00
zizmor.yml ci: add fork-safe PR autofix pipeline (#1446) 2026-05-09 13:35:04 +01:00