mirror of
https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus.git
synced 2026-09-07 08:26:11 +00:00
6f1cfffdd7
* Initial plan * chore(security): harden workflow permissions and pin Docker base image digests Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/sessions/2ddc8f2b-7355-48cf-9a0b-c06df66c3f47 * fix(security): restore permissions: {} on publish + release-candidate workflows These two release-publishing workflows had permissions: {} (the strictest valid form) before PR #1454, which replaced it with permissions: read-all. Every job in both files already declares its own permissions block, so the workflow-level default is only the safety net for future jobs added without one — read-all weakens that net for no benefit. Restore {} and the explanatory comment. Scorecard's TokenPermissions check accepts both forms, so this preserves U9 compliance. * fix(security): narrow permissions: read-all to contents: read on 13 workflows PR #1454 added permissions: read-all to 13 workflows that previously had no top-level permissions block. read-all is Scorecard-compliant but unnecessarily broad — every job in scope only needs contents:read at the workflow level (job-level blocks already grant the writes that any job actually performs). Snapshot of every job in the 13 workflows confirms contents:read is sufficient: - ci.yml: quality/tests/scope-parity have explicit contents:read job blocks; save-pr-meta uses upload-artifact only (no token scopes needed); ci-status is pure shell. - ci-e2e.yml, ci-quality.yml, ci-scope-parity.yml, ci-tests.yml: all jobs do checkout + npm + tsc/vitest/playwright/upload-artifact only; no API token scopes required. - claude.yml, codeql.yml, dependency-review.yml, docker.yml, gitleaks.yml, pr-labeler.yml, trivy.yml, workflow-lint.yml: all jobs already declare their own job-level blocks (security-events:write, pull-requests:write, packages:write, etc.) so the workflow-level default does not gate them. zizmor (--min-severity high) is clean on the resulting tree. Pre-existing medium findings (secrets-inherit, artipacked) are in unrelated workflows and untouched by this commit. scorecard.yml also uses read-all but pre-existed PR #1454 and is deferred to a follow-up PR per the plan's scope boundary. --------- Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Gergő Magyar <gergomagyar@icloud.com>
85 lines
2.7 KiB
YAML
85 lines
2.7 KiB
YAML
name: Workflow Lint
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# Lints .github/workflows/** for both:
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# - actionlint: YAML syntax, expression typing, shellcheck inside `run:`
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# blocks, unknown contexts, deprecated runner labels.
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# - zizmor: security misconfigurations — unpinned actions, dangerous
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# `${{ }}` interpolation, missing per-job permissions, etc.
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#
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# Scoped to PRs that touch .github/** only — keeps off the typical PR
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# critical path.
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on:
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pull_request:
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branches: [main]
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paths:
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- '.github/**'
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permissions:
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contents: read
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concurrency:
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group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
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cancel-in-progress: true
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jobs:
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actionlint:
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name: actionlint
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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timeout-minutes: 5
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permissions:
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contents: read
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steps:
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- name: Checkout
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uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
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with:
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persist-credentials: false
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# Pinned to v2.1.2. Verify SHA via:
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# gh api repos/raven-actions/actionlint/git/refs/tags/v2.1.2
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# The action wraps the upstream `rhysd/actionlint` binary and emits
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# GitHub-annotation-formatted findings on PRs.
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- name: Run actionlint
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uses: raven-actions/actionlint@205b530c5d9fa8f44ae9ed59f341a0db994aa6f8 # v2.1.2
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with:
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fail-on-error: true
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zizmor:
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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timeout-minutes: 10
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permissions:
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contents: read
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security-events: write
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steps:
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- name: Checkout
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uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
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with:
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persist-credentials: false
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- name: Setup Python
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uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6
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with:
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python-version: '3.12'
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- name: Install zizmor
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# Pinned — resolves to whatever's latest on PyPI otherwise.
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# Bump via Dependabot pip ecosystem (see .github/dependabot.yml).
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run: pipx install zizmor==1.24.1
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# Initial threshold: medium. High+ findings fail the job; medium findings
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# appear in the Security tab without blocking. Tune after first run.
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# Per-rule exemptions for pre-existing intentional patterns live in
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# .github/zizmor.yml (each carries a documented mitigation).
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- name: Run zizmor
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run: zizmor --config .github/zizmor.yml --format sarif --min-severity medium . > zizmor.sarif
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continue-on-error: true
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- name: Upload SARIF
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uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@e46ed2cbd01164d986452f91f178727624ae40d7 # v4.35.3
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with:
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sarif_file: zizmor.sarif
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category: zizmor
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- name: Fail on high+ findings
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run: zizmor --config .github/zizmor.yml --min-severity high .
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