mirror of
https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus.git
synced 2026-09-07 08:26:11 +00:00
6f1cfffdd7
* Initial plan * chore(security): harden workflow permissions and pin Docker base image digests Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/sessions/2ddc8f2b-7355-48cf-9a0b-c06df66c3f47 * fix(security): restore permissions: {} on publish + release-candidate workflows These two release-publishing workflows had permissions: {} (the strictest valid form) before PR #1454, which replaced it with permissions: read-all. Every job in both files already declares its own permissions block, so the workflow-level default is only the safety net for future jobs added without one — read-all weakens that net for no benefit. Restore {} and the explanatory comment. Scorecard's TokenPermissions check accepts both forms, so this preserves U9 compliance. * fix(security): narrow permissions: read-all to contents: read on 13 workflows PR #1454 added permissions: read-all to 13 workflows that previously had no top-level permissions block. read-all is Scorecard-compliant but unnecessarily broad — every job in scope only needs contents:read at the workflow level (job-level blocks already grant the writes that any job actually performs). Snapshot of every job in the 13 workflows confirms contents:read is sufficient: - ci.yml: quality/tests/scope-parity have explicit contents:read job blocks; save-pr-meta uses upload-artifact only (no token scopes needed); ci-status is pure shell. - ci-e2e.yml, ci-quality.yml, ci-scope-parity.yml, ci-tests.yml: all jobs do checkout + npm + tsc/vitest/playwright/upload-artifact only; no API token scopes required. - claude.yml, codeql.yml, dependency-review.yml, docker.yml, gitleaks.yml, pr-labeler.yml, trivy.yml, workflow-lint.yml: all jobs already declare their own job-level blocks (security-events:write, pull-requests:write, packages:write, etc.) so the workflow-level default does not gate them. zizmor (--min-severity high) is clean on the resulting tree. Pre-existing medium findings (secrets-inherit, artipacked) are in unrelated workflows and untouched by this commit. scorecard.yml also uses read-all but pre-existed PR #1454 and is deferred to a follow-up PR per the plan's scope boundary. --------- Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Gergő Magyar <gergomagyar@icloud.com>
48 lines
1.5 KiB
YAML
48 lines
1.5 KiB
YAML
name: Gitleaks
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# Deterministic in-CI secret scanning. Defense-in-depth on top of GitHub's
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# native secret-scanning push protection (which is a repo Settings toggle —
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# see SECURITY.md for the recommended admin action).
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#
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# PR runs scan the diff (fast); main pushes scan full history.
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on:
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pull_request:
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branches: [main]
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push:
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branches: [main]
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permissions:
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contents: read
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concurrency:
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group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
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cancel-in-progress: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
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jobs:
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gitleaks:
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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timeout-minutes: 10
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permissions:
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contents: read
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pull-requests: write
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steps:
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- name: Checkout
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uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
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with:
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# Full history needed for the on-push full-history scan; on PRs the
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# action diffs against the base ref so the cost is bounded by the PR.
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fetch-depth: 0
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# Don't bake the token into the cloned .git/config; downstream
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# steps (and Gitleaks itself) don't need it for repo operations.
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persist-credentials: false
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# No GITLEAKS_LICENSE secret is required for OSS / public-repo usage.
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# If this repo becomes private, the action will require a license key.
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- name: Gitleaks
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uses: gitleaks/gitleaks-action@ff98106e4c7b2bc287b24eaf42907196329070c7 # v2.3.9
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env:
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GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
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GITLEAKS_ENABLE_UPLOAD_ARTIFACT: true
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GITLEAKS_ENABLE_SUMMARY: true
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