mirror of
https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus.git
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119 commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Gergő Magyar
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938111ad45
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fix(ci): stabilize gitleaks after #2024 (#2027)
* fix(ci): stabilize gitleaks after #2024 and clear history false positive Fetch PR base/head SHAs before gitleaks-action so fork PRs do not fail with ambiguous revision ranges. Add .gitleaks.toml allowlist for fake keys in http-embedder tests, rename the redaction probe key, and point the README CI badge at abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(ci): restore gitleaks default rules and narrow allowlist Add [extend] useDefault = true so default secret rules run again. Replace file-level allowlist with regexes for known fake embedding API keys. Route PR SHAs through env vars in the gitleaks fetch step. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * Update README.md * Update README.md * Update README.md --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
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Gergő Magyar
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083aedbc41
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refactor(ingestion): delete legacy call-resolution DAG + heritage processor (RING4-1, #942) (#2023)
* refactor(ingestion): delete legacy call-resolution DAG + heritage processor (#942) RING4-1: all 16 production languages (incl. Vue #940) are registry-primary, so the legacy resolution legs only ran under the now-removed CI parity gate. Calls and inheritance now resolve exclusively through scope-resolution (Registry.lookup, preEmitInheritanceEdges, emitHeritageEdges, buildMro → MethodDispatchIndex). Removed: - Call-resolution DAG: call-processor.ts legacy body (processCalls, processCallsFromExtracted, resolveCallTarget + all resolver/dispatch/chain helpers), model/resolve.ts MRO-via-HeritageMap, model/heritage-map.ts, type-env DAG types; inferImplicitReceiver/selectDispatch LanguageProvider hooks + Ruby impls; DispatchDecision/ImplicitReceiverOverride/ReceiverEnriched. - Legacy heritage path: heritage-processor.ts, heritage-types.ts, heritage-extractors/, @heritage.* tree-sitter queries, heritageExtractor/ heritageDefaultEdge/interfaceNamePattern wiring, worker + parse-impl heritage passes (parse-worker/parsing-processor lockstep), cross-file-impl DAG pass. - Scope-parity infrastructure entirely (no legacy↔registry parity left to run): scripts/run-parity.ts, scripts/ci-list-migrated-languages.ts, ci-scope-parity.yml, test:parity, and the scope-parity ci.yml gate. Resolver integration tests still run via the normal tests job. Kept (shared infra, NOT call-DAG-only): type-env.ts buildTypeEnv (field extraction / structure phase / embeddings), model/resolve.ts c3Linearize + gatherAncestors (mro-processor mroPhase), route/fetch/exported-type-map helpers in call-processor.ts, preEmitInheritanceEdges (legacy-edge dedup simplified). Acceptance: grep for resolveCallTarget/inferImplicitReceiver/selectDispatch/ buildHeritageMap/HeritageMap/processHeritage/heritageExtractor/@heritage. is zero across src + test. tsc clean (both packages); resolver integration suite green (bit-compatible EXTENDS/IMPLEMENTS/CALLS); scope-capture fingerprints unchanged (python re-baselined: removed redundant ignored captures). ARCHITECTURE.md updated to scope-resolution-only. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(review): apply autofix feedback (#942) ce-code-review autofix pass on the RING4-1 deletion: - parse-cache.ts: bump SCHEMA_BUMP 2→3 — ParseWorkerResult lost its `heritage` field, so stale on-disk caches must invalidate (prevents a rollback replaying a heritage-less cache into legacy code) [api-contract P2]. - parse-impl.ts: drop 3 now-unused type imports (ExtractedCall, ExtractedAssignment, FileConstructorBindings) left by the deferred-block removal — would fail the eslint CI gate [correctness+maintainability P1]. - AGENTS.md / CLAUDE.md / scope-resolver.ts contract doc: fix stale pointers to the deleted "§ Call-Resolution DAG" section + removed hooks; preserve the language-neutrality rule [project-standards P1]. - registry-primary-flag.ts / cross-file.ts / parse-impl.ts: refresh stale comments referencing deleted symbols (legacy DAG, runCrossFileBindingPropagation). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(ingestion): remove the vestigial isRegistryPrimary flag (#942) With the legacy call-resolution DAG deleted, the per-language `REGISTRY_PRIMARY_<LANG>` / `isRegistryPrimary` / `MIGRATED_LANGUAGES` flag had only one meaningful state — every production language resolves via scope-resolution — and an explicit `=0` override could only *disable* resolution with no fallback (a footgun the review flagged). Removing it. - Delete `registry-primary-flag.ts` and the now-dead `shadow-harness.ts` (legacy↔registry shadow-parity tool) + its test. - Collapse the three flag gates to their behavior-preserving outcome (`SCOPE_RESOLVERS == MIGRATED_LANGUAGES`, so this is a no-op): - scope-resolution phase now runs for every registered `SCOPE_RESOLVERS` entry (was `∩ MIGRATED_LANGUAGES`). - import-processor `addImportGraphEdge` + parse-impl `shouldAccumulate`: the legacy emit/accumulate paths were already inert for migrated languages (scope-resolution owns IMPORTS via the imports-to-edges bridge); drop the flag term. - Collapse flag-branching tests to the scope-resolution path and delete the csharp legacy-`=0`-leg describe blocks; remove the ruby/rust-scope env-forcing hooks (no-ops now). - Refresh docs/comments (ARCHITECTURE.md "one registration", scope-resolver cookbook, phase deps) — adding a language is now a single `SCOPE_RESOLVERS` registration. Verified: tsc clean (both packages); resolver integration tests green (747 assertions across cobol/csharp/ruby/rust/typescript/go, IMPORTS edges intact); grep for the flag symbols is zero across src + test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * style(format): prettier formatting on #942 changes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ci): drop legacy heritage-capture tests + re-baseline scope-capture fingerprints (#942) Two CI failures from the #942 cleanup, surfaced by the tri-review + CI: - tree-sitter-languages.test.ts: two tests asserted `@heritage.*` captures (Rust trait-impl, Dart extends/implements/with) that this PR removed. The acceptance grep used `@heritage\.` (with `@`); these reference the runtime capture name `heritage.trait` (no `@`), so they slipped the earlier sweep. Inheritance is now covered by the resolver integration suite. (fixed macos-latest) - Re-baselined the scope-capture bench fingerprints for csharp/rust/ruby/java/ javascript/kotlin (baselines.json) + python (python-scope/baseline-fingerprint.txt). The earlier test-cleanup reworded comments inside the lang-resolution fixture files (Shapes.cs, child.rs, derived.rb, IA.java/Plain.java, Service.js, F.kt, app.py) to scrub deleted-symbol references for the acceptance grep; those are the bench corpus, so capture node positions shifted. Capture LOGIC is unchanged — verified `--check` passes for all 14 langs + python. (fixed benchmarks) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs/chore: scrub remaining REGISTRY_PRIMARY + deleted-symbol references (#942) Tri-review P3 follow-ups (verified): - TESTING.md: rewrite the "Scope-resolution parity" section — the legacy dual-leg (REGISTRY_PRIMARY_<LANG>=0/1) and `npm run test:parity` no longer exist; resolver tests run once on the sole scope-resolution path in the normal tests job. - scripts/bench-scope-resolution.ts: drop the inert `REGISTRY_PRIMARY_PYTHON=1` env set + usage hint (the flag is gone). - ruby/scope-resolver.ts, php/captures.ts: re-point doc-comments off the deleted heritage-map.ts / heritage-processor.ts to the current behavior. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ci): prettier format + regenerate scope-capture goldens (#942) Two more CI failures, same root cause as the bench re-baseline (the test-cleanup reworded comments in lang-resolution bench/golden-corpus fixtures): - quality/format: prettier on tree-sitter-languages.test.ts (blank line left by the deleted heritage-capture tests) + TESTING.md (the rewritten section). - tests/ubuntu/coverage: `csharp-captures-golden` (and python/ruby/rust) drifted because the edited fixtures feed the per-language capture-golden snapshots too (not just the bench). Regenerated via UPDATE_GOLDEN=1. Verified safe: only the edited-fixture entries changed; csharp `captureGroups` unchanged (38) — digest shifted from comment-position only; capture LOGIC untouched. 1168 scope- resolution tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(resolvers): drop createResolverParityIt wrapper, use vitest it directly The parity-aware `it` wrapper became a no-op when #942 removed the legacy call-resolution DAG (it just returned vitest's `it`). Remove it entirely so the resolver tests call vitest's `it` directly instead of shadowing it with a local `const it` (or `pit`/`rustParityIt`): - helpers.ts: delete createResolverParityIt + its now-unused vitestIt import and VitestIt type. - 16 files: drop `const it = createResolverParityIt('x')` and import `it` from vitest instead. - ruby.test.ts (pit) + rust.test.ts (rustParityIt): rename calls to `it`. - Scrub every comment that described the removed wrapper / dual-mode parity skip / legacy_skip gate (vue-scope, js/ts/dart/php/python headers, rust x2, cpp, swift x4, rust-coverage). Genuine test rationale is kept; only the vestigial two-leg framing is dropped. Accurate "legacy DAG (removed in #942)" historical notes are retained. No fixtures touched (no bench/golden re-baseline). tsc clean; rust+ruby resolver suites green (323 tests, incl. #1992 worker-path parity after a local dist build). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Arvuno
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16014657c8
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docs: clarify local development setup in CONTRIBUTING (#2024)
Some checks are pending
CodeQL / Analyze (javascript-typescript) (push) Waiting to run
CodeQL / Analyze (python) (push) Waiting to run
Gitleaks / gitleaks (push) Waiting to run
Publish / Classify release event (push) Waiting to run
Publish / RC guard (marker + release-PR skip) (push) Blocked by required conditions
Publish / ci (push) Blocked by required conditions
Publish / Publish to npm (push) Blocked by required conditions
Publish / Build & Push RC Docker images (push) Blocked by required conditions
Scorecard / Scorecard analysis (push) Waiting to run
Trivy Image Scan / Trivy (gitnexus-cli) (push) Waiting to run
Trivy Image Scan / Trivy (gitnexus-web) (push) Waiting to run
* docs: add CODEOWNERS (#2) * docs: add CI badge to README * docs: add CODEOWNERS file --------- Co-authored-by: Typo Fix Bot <fix@example.com> * docs: add CI badge to README (#1) Co-authored-by: Typo Fix Bot <fix@example.com> * docs: clarify local development setup in CONTRIBUTING * Update CODEOWNERS --------- Co-authored-by: Typo Fix Bot <fix@example.com> Co-authored-by: Arvuno <arvuno@nous.local> Co-authored-by: Gergő Magyar <gergomagyar@icloud.com> |
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dependabot[bot]
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ad36a86ab0
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chore(deps): bump docker/login-action from 4.1.0 to 4.2.0 (#2020)
Bumps [docker/login-action](https://github.com/docker/login-action) from 4.1.0 to 4.2.0.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/docker/login-action/releases)
- [Commits](
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dependabot[bot]
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7982eaea12
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chore(deps): bump docker/metadata-action from 6.0.0 to 6.1.0 (#2018)
Bumps [docker/metadata-action](https://github.com/docker/metadata-action) from 6.0.0 to 6.1.0.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/docker/metadata-action/releases)
- [Commits](
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dependabot[bot]
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42ac44b838
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chore(deps): bump docker/build-push-action from 7.1.0 to 7.2.0 (#2010)
Bumps [docker/build-push-action](https://github.com/docker/build-push-action) from 7.1.0 to 7.2.0.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/docker/build-push-action/releases)
- [Commits](
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dependabot[bot]
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617ca0d05e
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chore(deps): bump docker/setup-buildx-action from 4.0.0 to 4.1.0 (#2019)
Bumps [docker/setup-buildx-action](https://github.com/docker/setup-buildx-action) from 4.0.0 to 4.1.0.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/docker/setup-buildx-action/releases)
- [Commits](
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dependabot[bot]
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81b46518b2
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chore(deps): bump github/codeql-action from 4.35.5 to 4.36.0 (#2017)
Bumps [github/codeql-action](https://github.com/github/codeql-action) from 4.35.5 to 4.36.0.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](
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Gergő Magyar
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7ab6bd36d4
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ci(devcontainer): harden smoke build against Docker Hub flakes (#1969)
* ci(devcontainer): retry Docker Hub syntax frontend and build The devcontainers CLI injects `# syntax=docker/dockerfile:1`, which BuildKit fetches from Docker Hub. Transient Hub timeouts caused main smoke failures (run 26797815133). Pre-pull the frontend with backoff and retry the build once, matching docker-build-push-retry policy. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * ci(devcontainer): address tri-review follow-ups on smoke retries Make syntax-frontend pre-pull best-effort (continue-on-error) so build retry still runs when Hub flakes only on pull. Clarify comment vs docker-build-push-retry, and emit a notice when build retry succeeds. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
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Gergő Magyar
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c4f82e4987
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feat(devcontainer): add devcontainer for Claude/Codex/Cursor CLIs (#1875)
* chore: extend .gitattributes for shell scripts and binary assets
Append explicit `*.sh text eol=lf` and `*.bash text eol=lf` rules so
shell scripts (notably anything COPYed into a Linux container) check out
with LF endings on Windows hosts with `core.autocrlf=true`, regardless
of the auto-detection on the existing `* text=auto eol=lf` line. Add
binary markers for `*.node`, `*.wasm`, `*.onnx`, `*.so`, `*.dll`,
`*.dylib` so native and ML model artifacts aren't ever subjected to text
normalization.
The existing `* text=auto eol=lf` and `.husky/* text eol=lf` rules are
preserved. `git ls-files --eol` confirmed zero CRLF or mixed blobs in
the index, so no `--renormalize` was needed.
* feat(devcontainer): add cross-platform devcontainer for Claude Code, Codex, and Cursor CLIs
Add a Dev Container that pre-installs Claude Code (2.1.153, via Anthropic's
official Feature), OpenAI Codex CLI (pinned 0.134.0), and Cursor CLI alongside
the GitNexus native build chain. Opens via VS Code's Dev Containers extension
on Windows 11 (Docker Desktop + WSL2), macOS, or Linux without OS-specific
branches in devcontainer.json.
Topology and base
- Base image `mcr.microsoft.com/devcontainers/typescript-node:1-22-bookworm`
(multi-arch, monthly patched, ships the `node` non-root user, zsh, `gh`).
- Node 22 LTS satisfies `gitnexus/`'s engines `>=22.0.0` and matches the
`node:22-bookworm-slim` SHA-pinned base used by `Dockerfile.cli`.
- Single container with all three CLIs co-installed (vs. docker-compose
per-tool) — prevailing 2026 community pattern, lowest daily-driver friction.
Persistence and auth
- Per-devcontainer named volumes scoped by `${devcontainerId}` for
`/home/node/.claude`, `/home/node/.codex`, `/home/node/.cursor`,
`/commandhistory`, and `/home/node/.npm`. Authentication survives rebuilds
without leaking between workspaces.
- Four sub-workspace `node_modules` volumes (root, gitnexus, gitnexus-web,
gitnexus-shared) keep tree-sitter native bindings and onnxruntime off the
bind mount — the actual Win/Mac perf win.
- Credential mount paths are pre-created in the Dockerfile with
`chown node:node` BEFORE `USER node`, so empty named volumes inherit
correct ownership on first mount and first-run logins don't EACCES.
- `CURSOR_API_KEY` is injected via `containerEnv: ${localEnv:CURSOR_API_KEY}`
(Cursor's documented headless path); falls back to interactive
`cursor-agent login` when the host env var is unset.
Build-arg promotion
- Build args (`CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION`, `CODEX_VERSION`, `CURSOR_VERSION`, `TZ`)
are promoted to ENV in the Dockerfile so lifecycle commands and shells can
resolve them. Without this promotion, Docker ARG values are build-only and
silently no-op at lifecycle time.
Workspace setup
- `postCreateCommand` chowns the four workspace `node_modules` volumes
(Docker creates them root-owned), then installs in dependency order:
root → gitnexus-shared (install + build) → gitnexus → gitnexus-web. The
shared package must build before its consumers (`file:../gitnexus-shared`).
Ports
- 5173 (Vite dev) and 4173 (Vite preview) auto-forwarded.
- 4747 (`gitnexus serve`) marked `requireLocalPort: true` because
`gitnexus-web/src/services/backend-client.ts` hardcodes
`http://localhost:4747` as the default backend URL; a remapped port would
silently break the web UI.
VS Code integration
- Recommended extensions: `anthropic.claude-code`,
`dbaeumer.vscode-eslint`, `esbenp.prettier-vscode`, `eamodio.gitlens`.
- Settings: format-on-save with Prettier, ESLint auto-fix on save, zsh as
default terminal profile, persistent zsh history via `HISTFILE` →
`/commandhistory`.
Documentation
- `.devcontainer/README.md` covers WSL2 setup (clone inside WSL2 for IO and
file-watcher reliability), first-time auth flows for each CLI, port-
forwarding notes, LadybugDB container limitations, and the bumping
procedure for each CLI version.
- `CONTRIBUTING.md` gets a "Containerized development (optional)"
subsection pointing at the devcontainer README.
Deferred to a follow-up PR
- Opt-in egress firewall (originally planned as a fourth implementation
unit). The Dev Containers spec makes `runArgs` static — toggling
`NET_ADMIN`/`NET_RAW` capabilities cleanly requires either a separate
`devcontainer-firewall.json` profile or an `initializeCommand`-generated
overlay. Keeping this PR focused on the working baseline.
- Codespaces-specific tuning (works incidentally when the firewall is off,
not actively tested).
- Inside-container Playwright e2e (needs Chromium libs not in the base
image).
Verification deferred to user
- This change introduces a new dev tooling artifact. Validate by running
`docker build .devcontainer/`, opening the repo in VS Code via
"Dev Containers: Reopen in Container", confirming `claude --version`,
`codex --version`, `cursor-agent --version` resolve inside the container,
and `cd gitnexus && npm run test:unit` runs clean against the
named-volume `node_modules`.
* fix(devcontainer): make interactive login the default auth path for all CLIs
The previous `containerEnv` injected `CURSOR_API_KEY: "${localEnv:CURSOR_API_KEY}"`.
When the host had no `CURSOR_API_KEY` set, this resolved to an empty
string and Docker injected `CURSOR_API_KEY=""` into the container.
Cursor CLI treats a set-but-empty `CURSOR_API_KEY` as "use this key"
rather than "fall back to stored login", which silently broke
`cursor-agent login` on the most common path — users who hadn't
explicitly opted into API key auth.
Drop `CURSOR_API_KEY` from `containerEnv`. Login is now the
unconditional default for all three CLIs (Claude Code, Codex CLI,
Cursor CLI); the named-volume + Dockerfile-chown pattern keeps
credentials persistent across container rebuilds for every login path.
Reorganize the README's auth section to put login first for all three
CLIs uniformly (matching the new behavior) and move API key
authentication into a separate "Alternative" section for CI/headless
use. Document that API keys are intentionally not auto-propagated from
the host and explain the export-in-shell or VS Code dotfiles-repo paths
for users who want them. Update the troubleshooting row to reflect the
new design.
* fix(devcontainer): install gitnexus-web before gitnexus in postCreateCommand
The previous order (root → gitnexus-shared → gitnexus → gitnexus-web)
broke at the `gitnexus` install step because `gitnexus`'s `prepare`
script runs `scripts/build.js`, which compiles `gitnexus-web` whenever
its source tree exists. In the devcontainer the entire workspace is
bind-mounted, so `gitnexus-web/` is present from the start — but its
`node_modules/` wasn't yet, so `tsc -b` failed with:
error TS2688: Cannot find type definition file for 'vite/client'
error TS2688: Cannot find type definition file for 'node'
Reorder so `gitnexus-web` installs before `gitnexus`. Verified
end-to-end via `npx @devcontainers/cli up`: container builds clean,
all three CLIs (Claude 2.1.153, Codex 0.134.0, Cursor) respond, and
`npx tsc --noEmit` inside `/workspace/gitnexus` passes.
Production Dockerfiles (`Dockerfile.cli` etc.) don't hit this because
they only COPY `gitnexus/` + `gitnexus-shared/`, so `gitnexus-web/`
doesn't exist at install time and `scripts/build.js` skips the web
step. The devcontainer's full-tree bind mount changes that calculus.
* fix(devcontainer): clear stale .husky/_ before npm install
When `npm install` runs the root `prepare` script (husky), husky tries
to copyfile `node_modules/husky/husky` → `.husky/_/h`. On Docker Desktop
Windows bind mounts, if `.husky/_/` already exists from a prior
container run, the new container's `node` user can't overwrite it via
the bind mount's permission translation and the install fails with:
Error: EPERM: operation not permitted, copyfile
'/workspace/node_modules/husky/husky' -> '.husky/_/h'
Drop `.husky/_` defensively in `postCreateCommand` before `npm install`
so husky always starts from a clean slate. `.husky/_` is a husky
runtime cache (gitignored), so removing it has no effect on the repo —
husky regenerates it. No-op for WSL2-side checkouts (where this class
of bind-mount permission collision doesn't occur).
Add a troubleshooting row to `.devcontainer/README.md` covering the
manual recovery (`rm -rf .husky/_` on the host) and the long-term fix
(clone in WSL2 — Windows-side bind mounts will keep biting on this
kind of issue across rebuilds with different UID alignment).
* feat(devcontainer): bind-mount host CLI config dirs for plugin/skill/memory sync
Switch the credential/config mounts from per-devcontainer named volumes
to bind mounts of `${localEnv:HOME}/.claude`, `~/.codex`, and
`~/.cursor`. Effect inside the container:
- Authentication is shared with the host. If you've already run
`claude login` / `codex login --device-auth` / `cursor-agent login`
on the host, you're already authenticated in the container.
- Plugins, skills, agents, memory, and settings sync both ways. Install
a plugin in the container, it shows up on the host; add a custom
agent on the host, the container sees it immediately.
- All devcontainers on the host share the same CLI state, mirroring
how host shells already share it. (Per-workspace isolation of plugins
was never a stated requirement; the previous per-devcontainer named
volumes leaked nothing useful.)
Add `.devcontainer/ensure-host-config-dirs.cjs` and wire it as
`initializeCommand`. It runs on the host before container create and
guarantees `~/.claude`, `~/.codex`, `~/.cursor` exist, so Docker doesn't
reject the bind mount when a CLI has never been used on this host.
Cross-platform via Node `os.homedir()` + `fs.mkdirSync({recursive: true})`;
idempotent; no third-party deps.
Update `.devcontainer/README.md`:
- New "How CLI state is shared with your host" section explaining the
bind-mount model up front so users know their host plugins/skills/
memory carry into the container.
- Mark first-time-login section as skippable when the user is already
authenticated on the host.
- Note the high-trust escape hatch: replace the three bind mounts with
`type=volume` named volumes if the host/container trust boundary
needs to be separated (Anthropic's reference pattern for enterprise).
- Replace the obsolete "rm named volume" troubleshooting row with one
that covers EACCES/EPERM on the host-bind-mount path.
* refactor(devcontainer): address ce-code-review findings (P0 + 4 × P1 + 8 × P2 + 2 × P3)
Walkthrough resolution of the 16-finding ce-code-review on PR #1875. 15 of
16 findings applied; one (F12, Anthropic Feature floating tag) was
superseded by F6's Feature removal.
P0
- F1: WSL2 is now REQUIRED for Windows hosts, not just recommended.
${localEnv:HOME} resolves to empty string on Windows-native (no HOME env
var) — bind mounts then point at /.claude, /.codex etc. and silently
break. ensure-host-config-dirs.cjs wrote to USERPROFILE-derived paths
via os.homedir(), so the two surfaces disagreed about which env var was
"home" on Windows. README header reframed; "Windows 11 — WSL2 is required"
section explains the mismatch concretely.
P1
- F2: Workspace `node_modules` volume names now include `-${devcontainerId}`
so two GitNexus checkouts on the same host (~/work/GitNexus and
~/projects/GitNexus) don't share volumes and corrupt each other's
installs.
- F3 + F5: `postCreateCommand` extracted to `.devcontainer/post-create.sh`
with `set -euo pipefail` and six labeled echo steps so failure logs
name the step instead of an opaque &&-chain index. Chown step extended
to cover /home/node/.npm, /commandhistory, and /home/node/.local — these
named-volume mount points were owned by build-time UID 1000 but the
container's `node` is re-IDed at runtime by updateRemoteUserUID on
non-1000 Linux hosts, leaving them unwritable until now.
- F4: Cursor installer downloaded to a temp file with curl --retry +
--max-time; sha256 logged to build output before execution so drift
across rebuilds is visible in CI logs. Full hard-pin (to a versioned
downloads.cursor.com tarball with verified sha256) tracked as a
follow-up in README "What's not included".
P2
- F6: Anthropic Feature replaced with a direct
`npm install -g @anthropic-ai/claude-code@${CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION}` so
CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION actually pins the installed binary (the Feature
ignored the ARG and pulled latest at install time). Honors the
earlier "pin known-good versions" decision and resolves F12's
floating-tag concern for this Feature.
- F7: Dockerfile ARG defaults dropped for the three version vars;
`devcontainer.json` `build.args` is now the single source of truth.
Standalone `docker build .devcontainer/` must pass --build-arg.
- F8: ensure-host-config-dirs.cjs deleted; `initializeCommand` now uses
POSIX `mkdir -p` + `touch ~/.gitconfig` directly, dropping the
host-Node-on-PATH prerequisite that broke on fresh Windows+Docker
Desktop installs without Node.
- F9: ~/.gitconfig bind-mounted read-only so `git commit` inside the
container uses the host's user.name / user.email. Read-only so
container-side `git config --global` doesn't leak to host.
- F10: ~/.config/gh bind-mounted (read-write) so `gh pr create` /
`gh pr checks` / `gh issue create` work inside the container without
re-auth. AGENTS.md's commit + PR workflow now fully functional for
agents inside the container.
- F11: CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR removed from Dockerfile ENV; canonical value
lives only in devcontainer.json containerEnv. Eliminates the two-file
edit risk.
- F13: Mounts comment now documents per-instance vs per-workspace-name
scoping rationale so future contributors don't guess.
- F14: README "Trust boundary, concretely" paragraph names the exfil
path explicitly (malicious npm postinstall → OAuth tokens →
~/.claude/projects/<workspace>/memory/MEMORY.md secrets) and lists
vendor-side rotation runbook entries.
P3
- F15: Dockerfile pre-create + chown of /home/node/.claude, .codex,
.cursor dropped — those paths are bind-mounted, which fully shadows
any image-side ownership. Only .npm, .local, /commandhistory still
benefit from the pre-create.
- F16: README "Bumping CLI versions" section rewritten against the
post-F6 reality: CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION and CODEX_VERSION are real
pins; CURSOR_VERSION is informational only.
Verified locally: `docker build .devcontainer/ --build-arg ...` succeeds.
Smoke-tested image: `claude --version` (2.1.153), `codex --version`
(0.134.0), `cursor-agent --version` all resolve as the non-root `node`
user; named-volume mount points (/home/node/.npm, /commandhistory) are
node-owned at build time so non-1000 host UIDs get the post-create.sh
chown fix instead of EACCES.
* fix(devcontainer): cross-platform initializeCommand + soften Windows-native posture
The previous commit's `initializeCommand` was POSIX-only (`mkdir -p $HOME/...`).
VS Code on Windows runs the host shell as `cmd.exe /c ...`, which can't
parse POSIX syntax — `$HOME` doesn't expand, `mkdir -p` errors, the init
fails with `The syntax of the command is incorrect`, and container
creation aborts before Docker is invoked.
Switch `initializeCommand` to the spec's OS-keyed object form:
- linux/darwin (covers WSL2 because VS Code runs initializeCommand in
the WSL shell when attached via the WSL extension): POSIX mkdir+touch,
as before
- win32: PowerShell snippet that creates the same directories under
$USERPROFILE and touches the gitconfig if missing
Soften the README's hard "WSL2 required" framing from the previous
commit. Reality per `@devcontainers/cli read-configuration` output:
`${localEnv:HOME}` on Windows-native resolves to `C:\Users\<name>`
(VS Code falls back to USERPROFILE), so the bind mount sources are
valid Windows paths and Docker Desktop handles the translation. The
earlier `accessing specified distro mount service` failure was a
separate Docker Desktop WSL-integration issue, not a HOME-resolution
issue. Windows-native works; it's just slower with more bind-mount
permission edge cases (the husky/_/h EPERM class). The README now
explains the tradeoff and steers toward WSL2 for performance + file
watchers + permission reliability, rather than blocking Windows-native
checkouts outright.
Update the troubleshooting row to reflect the new posture.
* fix(devcontainer): Node-based initializeCommand; bind-mount .ssh + .config/git
Two fixes bundled:
1. The previous commit's OS-keyed `initializeCommand` object was based
on a misread of the Dev Containers spec. The object form on command
properties is **named parallel tasks**, not OS dispatch — VS Code ran
all three keys in parallel via cmd.exe on Windows, the POSIX branches
failed, and container creation aborted before Docker was invoked.
Restore the single-string Node-based form:
`node .devcontainer/ensure-host-config-dirs.cjs`. Node works
identically in cmd.exe on Windows and bash/zsh on Linux/macOS/WSL,
and `os.homedir()` respects $HOME on POSIX and %USERPROFILE% on
Windows. The script is idempotent (mkdirSync recursive is a no-op
for existing dirs; touch is gated on .gitconfig existence).
Document Node ≥18 on the host as the only host-side prerequisite
beyond Docker Desktop and the VS Code Dev Containers extension.
Anyone running Claude Code on the host already has it.
2. Extend the host-bind mount surface with `~/.ssh` and `~/.config/git`,
both read-only:
- `~/.ssh` lets commit signing + push over SSH remotes work inside
the container without copying private keys. Read-only mount means
container code can read keys but can't modify or delete them.
(Threat: a malicious dep can still read private keys from inside
the container; the read-only mount narrows write-side blast
radius, not read-side. Documented in the trust-boundary section.)
- `~/.config/git` covers XDG-style git config (`~/.config/git/config`,
`~/.config/git/ignore`, `~/.config/git/attributes`) for users who
keep settings there instead of `~/.gitconfig`. Read-only, same as
`~/.gitconfig`.
Update the CLI-state-sharing table and trust-boundary paragraph to
reflect the expanded surface.
Re-adds .devcontainer/ensure-host-config-dirs.cjs (deleted before the
OS-keyed attempt).
* fix(devcontainer): fail-fast on Windows-native with HOME-not-set diagnostic
The previous commit's "Windows-native works" softening was wrong. VS Code
on Windows-native resolves `${localEnv:HOME}` by reading the host shell's
HOME env var, and cmd.exe has no HOME set — the bind sources collapse to
`/.claude`, `/.codex`, etc., and Docker errors:
Error response from daemon: invalid mount config for type "bind":
bind source path does not exist: /.claude
The @devcontainers/cli output that prompted the softening was misleading
because I ran it from a Bash session with HOME already set, not from VS
Code's cmd.exe call context. The original Finding-1 P0 — that Windows-
native silently breaks the bind-mount feature — was correct.
Three changes:
1. `ensure-host-config-dirs.cjs` detects the failure mode early:
`if (process.platform === 'win32' && !process.env.HOME)` prints a
targeted error message naming the root cause (cmd.exe has no HOME →
${localEnv:HOME} resolves empty → bind sources fail) and a step-by-step
pointer to set up WSL2. Exits 1 so VS Code surfaces it as a clean
container-creation failure, not the cryptic Docker bind-mount error.
2. README header reverted to "Windows 11 via WSL2" only (not "and
Windows-native"). The "Windows 11 — WSL2 is required" section names
the specific HOME-resolution mismatch concretely so future readers
understand why the constraint exists.
3. Troubleshooting table gets a new row for the `ERROR: GitNexus
devcontainer requires WSL2` message pointing at the setup section.
* feat(devcontainer): support Windows-native via auto setx HOME on first run
Reverses the "WSL2 required on Windows" posture. Windows-native now
works after a one-time auto-handled setup.
The root cause of the bind-mount failure: VS Code resolves
`${localEnv:HOME}` by reading its own process env, and Windows doesn't
set `HOME` by default — Windows uses `USERPROFILE`. So the bind sources
were collapsing to `/.claude`, `/.codex`, etc., and Docker rejected them.
`ensure-host-config-dirs.cjs` now handles this automatically on Windows
hosts where `HOME` is unset:
1. Runs `setx HOME "%USERPROFILE%"`, which writes to the user-level
Windows environment (HKCU\Environment) — no admin required. Every
future user process inherits HOME from there.
2. Prints a clear one-time setup banner explaining the user needs to
fully restart VS Code (File > Exit, not just close the window) for
VS Code to pick up the new env at its next startup.
3. Exits 1 so VS Code surfaces this as a clean container-create failure
instead of letting Docker error opaquely later.
On the second Reopen-in-Container attempt, `HOME` is now set in VS
Code's env, the script skips the setup block, creates the bind-mount
source dirs, and the container builds normally. Subsequent rebuilds
have no extra steps.
Mac, Linux, and WSL2 hosts have `HOME` set by the shell, so the new
block is a no-op there. Same `devcontainer.json` works across all
supported hosts.
README rewritten to reflect the new posture:
- Header lists Windows 11 (native) as a supported host alongside macOS,
Linux, and WSL2, with a note that Windows-native gets a one-time
HOME setup handled by the initializeCommand.
- New "Windows 11 setup" section walks through the auto-handled setup
flow + a manual `setx HOME "%USERPROFILE%"` fallback for users who
want to do it themselves.
- "Known trade-offs of Windows-native vs WSL2" subsection lays out the
Docker Desktop Windows bind-mount edge cases (file watchers, npm
install perf, husky/_ EPERM) so users opting into Windows-native do
so eyes-open. WSL2 remains documented as the faster path for users
who want it, but it's no longer the only supported one.
- Troubleshooting table gets two new rows: the one-time setup banner
(with "what to do" instructions) and the residual `bind source path
does not exist` case (run setx manually + fully exit VS Code).
* fix(devcontainer): drop ~/.gitconfig bind mount; defer to VS Code auto-copy
VS Code's Dev Containers extension auto-copies the host's gitconfig into
the container at attach time using `(dd ...) >> /home/node/.gitconfig`.
A read-only bind mount of ~/.gitconfig blocks that write, so attach
failed with `cannot create /home/node/.gitconfig: Read-only file system`.
Making it read-write would let the append succeed, but the bind mount
means the host file and the container file are the same file — VS Code's
append would double the host gitconfig contents on every container
start.
Drop the ~/.gitconfig bind mount entirely. VS Code's auto-copy is the
purpose-built mechanism for this, gives the container the host's
user.name / user.email transparently, and avoids both the read-only
write failure and the append-duplication trap. The container ends up
with a writable /home/node/.gitconfig that's a copy of the host's, not
a mount.
The remaining six bind mounts (.claude, .codex, .cursor, .ssh, .config/git,
.config/gh) keep their existing modes — XDG-style git config under
~/.config/git is unaffected by VS Code's auto-copy (which only targets
~/.gitconfig), so its read-only bind mount stays.
Also remove the `.gitconfig` touch from ensure-host-config-dirs.cjs
(now unnecessary) and update the README CLI-state table, sharing
explanation, and troubleshooting row to reflect that gitconfig flows
in via VS Code auto-copy rather than the bind mount.
* feat(devcontainer): bind-mount ~/.docker, ~/.aws, ~/.azure for agent workflows
Extend the host bind-mount surface so coding agents inside the container
inherit cloud + container-registry auth from the host without any
per-container setup:
- ~/.docker (read-write) — Docker registry auth (config.json) + buildx
config. Container-registry pushes (ghcr.io, docker.io) from inside the
container pick up host `docker login` state. Read-write because the
Docker CLI refreshes credential-helper tokens.
- ~/.aws (read-only) — AWS CLI / SDK credentials. Read-only because
rotating creds typically happens via the host. Empty on this dev box,
so forward-compatible: the moment you `aws configure` on the host the
container picks it up on the next rebuild.
- ~/.azure (read-only) — Azure CLI credentials. Same pattern as ~/.aws.
`ensure-host-config-dirs.cjs` extends to mkdir these three on init so
the bind mounts always have a valid source even if a CLI has never been
used on this host.
The Docker CLI itself isn't installed in the container by default — the
~/.docker/ mount is inert until you add `docker-outside-of-docker:1` or
similar Feature. README now calls this out under "What you still don't
have inside the container" so it's obvious which CLIs are agent-ready
and which need a feature add to become useful.
README updates:
- Bind-mount table gains a "Why" column and rows for the three new
mounts, making it clear at a glance what each one enables.
- Trust-boundary section lists Docker registry tokens, AWS, and Azure
creds in the read-side exfil path so the threat model stays honest as
the credential surface grows.
- New subsection lists not-included CLIs (Docker, AWS, Azure, gcloud,
kubectl, private-npm) with the exact Feature ID or mount snippet
needed to enable each — turns "I want my agent to do X" into a
one-line config change.
Verified locally: `npx @devcontainers/cli read-configuration` resolves
all 9 host bind mounts to valid C:\Users\<name>/* paths on Windows.
* refactor(devcontainer): hybrid AI CLI config — read-only host share + per-container credentials
Restructure the Claude Code / Codex / Cursor mount topology to fix the
silent first-run-UI bug surfaced in PR testing, and to harden against
the host-write-through escape class the previous bind-mount design
exposed.
The actual root cause of the first-run wizard firing on the user's
screenshot — confirmed via three parallel research agents (best
practices, framework docs deep dive of the OpenAI Codex Rust source,
adversarial design review) — was NOT a credential permission check.
Claude Code splits state across `~/.claude/.credentials.json` AND
`~/.claude.json` (a FILE at $HOME, sibling of the `.claude/` dir).
The latter holds `hasCompletedOnboarding`, `userID`, `oauthAccount`
metadata, MCP user-scope config, and per-project trust state — and
Claude Code reads it at literal `$HOME/.claude.json`, not via
`CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR`. The previous design mounted `~/.claude/` but
left `~/.claude.json` outside the topology entirely, so every container
started with a missing onboarding-state file and re-ran the wizard.
Confirmed by tfvchow/field-notes-public#10:
"Persisting .credentials.json alone is NOT sufficient. Without
.claude.json, Claude Code treats the session as a fresh install and
prompts for login regardless of valid credentials being present."
The new topology:
**Mounts**
- `${localEnv:HOME}/.claude` → `/host/.claude` (read-only bind)
- `${localEnv:HOME}/.codex` → `/host/.codex` (read-only bind)
- `${localEnv:HOME}/.cursor` → `/host/.cursor` (read-only bind)
- `${localEnv:HOME}/.claude.json` → `/host/.claude.json` (read-only bind)
- `claude-config-${devcontainerId}` → `/home/node/.claude` (named volume)
- `codex-config-${devcontainerId}` → `/home/node/.codex` (named volume)
- `cursor-config-${devcontainerId}` → `/home/node/.cursor` (named volume)
**containerEnv** gains `CODEX_HOME=/home/node/.codex` (Codex's own env
override, per its public Rust source). `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR=/home/node/
.claude` was already set.
**`post-create.sh`** stages the named volumes on first run:
- Symlinks shareable subdirs from `/host/.claude` into the named volume:
`plugins/`, `skills/`, `agents/`, `memory/`, `commands/`. Codex gets
`config.toml` symlinked. Cursor has no shareable subdirs (cli-config
.json conflates auth and settings).
- Copies `.credentials.json`, `auth.json`, `cli-config.json` on first
run with `chmod 600`. After first run, container manages its own
refresh; host's credentials untouched.
- Copies `~/.claude.json` on first run (with stub
`{"hasCompletedOnboarding":true,"installMethod":"global"}` fallback
for hosts that haven't run Claude Code). This is the fix for the
observed onboarding-wizard loop.
`ensure-host-config-dirs.cjs` now also touches `~/.claude.json` on the
host if missing, so the bind mount has a valid source on hosts that
have never run Claude Code.
**Why read-only + named volume vs. the previous full bidirectional
bind mount:**
1. **Host filesystem write-through escape, eliminated.** Previous
design symlinked `plugins/`, `agents/`, `skills/` write-through
into the host's `~/.claude/` — a malicious npm package in the
workspace dep tree could drop `agents/evil.md` into the host's
config, which the next host Claude session would auto-load. The
read-only `/host` mount blocks this; container compromise no
longer persists across teardown via host-side autoload.
2. **Windows bind-mount perm-flattening, sidestepped.** Files
surfaced through a Docker Desktop Windows bind mount appear as
`root:root` mode `777`. Credentials in the named volume come with
proper Linux ownership and `chmod 600` — what each CLI expects on
write (none enforces on read, but write-side hygiene matters for
the host's understanding of "where credentials live").
3. **No `ide/` lock-file collisions.** Previous design symlinked
`~/.claude/ide/` write-through, including per-PID lock files. Host
PID and container PID namespaces are unrelated → lock-file PIDs
misclassify dead processes as alive. Skipping `ide/` keeps lock
files container-local.
4. **No `projects/` ghost dirs.** Host encodes the workspace path as
`D--development-coding-GitNexus`, container as `-workspace`.
Bidirectional `projects/` symlinks would split memory and session
state across two ghost project dirs for what is conceptually the
same project. Skipping `projects/` keeps per-project state
container-local; host's projects/ stays untouched.
5. **No `settings.json` version drift.** Container is pinned to a
specific Claude Code version (`CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION` build arg);
host floats with auto-update. Bidirectional `settings.json` writes
produced silent schema rollback. Skipping settings.json keeps each
side authoritative for its own version.
**README** rewritten in the same section to describe the new topology
honestly: what's shared, what isn't, the OAuth refresh-token
divergence between host and container, per-CLI quirks (macOS Keychain
storage, Cursor's known upstream in-container auth bug, Codex
keyring storage). Trust-boundary section updated to name the threat
model accurately — same read surface as before (malicious dep can
still READ all credentials), but write-through into host plugin/agent
dirs is now blocked.
Verified locally: `@devcontainers/cli read-configuration` resolves all
19 mounts correctly on Windows, `post-create.sh` parses, and
`ensure-host-config-dirs.cjs` idempotently touches `~/.claude.json`.
Research backing this design:
- Anthropic Claude Code devcontainer docs (named-volume pattern):
https://code.claude.com/docs/en/devcontainer
- tfvchow/field-notes-public#10 (both files required):
https://github.com/tfvchow/field-notes-public/issues/10
- anthropics/claude-code#29029 (VS Code extension strips
hasCompletedOnboarding):
https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/29029
- OpenAI Codex Rust source (no read-side perm check):
https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/main/codex-rs/login/src/auth/storage.rs
- Cursor CLI in-Docker auth issue:
https://forum.cursor.com/t/cursor-agent-authentication-issue-inside-docker/143995
* fix(devcontainer): resync AI CLI state from host on every container-create
Two bugs were causing Claude Code to fire the onboarding wizard inside the
container even with valid host credentials:
1. Missing the second state file. Claude Code 2.1.x writes a small `.claude.json`
INSIDE `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` (carrying migration tracking + userID), not just the
one at `$HOME/.claude.json`. If the userIDs in the two files disagree, Claude
treats the session as inconsistent and re-onboards. The previous post-create.sh
only copied the `$HOME` one.
2. First-run guards (`[ ! -e $dst ]`) skipped the copy when stale named volumes
from earlier rebuilds still had the prior session's state in them, leaving the
container desynced from the host.
Replace `copy_on_first_run` with `sync_from_host` that always overwrites from
host on container-create. `link_readonly_share` now clears stale non-symlink dst
entries before linking. Copies both `$HOME/.claude.json` and
`$CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/.claude.json` so userIDs stay aligned. Container can still
mutate its own state between rebuilds; resync only happens on rebuild
(postCreate boundary).
* docs(devcontainer): document sync-from-host design + dual-source auth flow
README still described the old "first-run copy" behavior. After the
post-create.sh change to always-sync-from-host, the design works either
direction:
- Log in on host → next container-create syncs the credentials into the
named volume.
- Log in inside the container → the named volume persists the login across
rebuilds; the host has no source to overwrite from, so it stays alone.
Also documents the two-Claude-state-files trap (`$HOME/.claude.json` AND
`$CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/.claude.json`, both with the same userID required), and
the volume-deletion recovery path for stale named volumes carried over
from earlier rebuilds.
* fix(devcontainer): full plugin/config parity by dropping CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR + syncing settings.json
Two changes that together give the container the same plugins and configs
as the host for all three AI CLIs (login stays per-container):
1. Drop CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR from containerEnv. The named-volume mount target
`/home/node/.claude` already matches Claude's default `~/.claude`, so
the env var added no behavior — but setting it changed which file
Claude reads `hasCompletedOnboarding` from. With it set, Claude reads
`$CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/.claude.json` (the small identity-only file that
does NOT carry `hasCompletedOnboarding`); without it, Claude reads
`$HOME/.claude.json` (the big onboarding-state file that does). The
wizard fires every container-create when set, skips when unset.
2. Sync `settings.json` from host (Claude) + symlink `memories/` and
`skills/` from host (Codex). Theme + `enabledPlugins` +
`extraKnownMarketplaces` live in `settings.json` — without syncing
it, the theme picker fires and host-installed plugins stay disabled
even though their files are symlinked in. Codex's `memories/` and
`skills/` are the symmetric Codex user-installed surface, now shared
the same way Claude's plugins/skills/agents/memory/commands are.
Cursor stays as-is — `cli-config.json` conflates auth+settings (already
synced), and there's no separate plugin surface to mirror.
Login details remain per-container by design (acceptable to re-login on
rebuild). Everything else — plugins, skills, agents, memory, MCP user-
scope config, project trust, theme, plugin enablement — now matches
host on every container-create.
* refactor(devcontainer): hybrid RW bind + per-container creds — fixes EROFS on in-container plugin install
The previous Option B topology (RO host stage + named volume + symlinks
into the volume) made `/plugin marketplace add` inside the container fail
with EROFS — the symlinks pointed at a read-only mount, so Claude
couldn't create new marketplace dirs. Switch to a hybrid: shareable
content (plugins/skills/agents/memory/commands/settings.json/$HOME/.claude.json
for Claude; config.toml/memories/skills for Codex) gets a direct RW bind
from host so reads and writes go bidirectionally; credentials + the
small identity file stay in per-container named volumes so logout in
container doesn't log out host.
Mount precedence does the heavy lifting: the named volume mounts at
/home/node/.<cli> first, then sub-path bind mounts overlay specific
sub-paths. Container's view at /home/node/.claude/plugins/ is the host
dir; container's view at /home/node/.claude/.credentials.json is the
named volume's file.
What this gives you:
- /plugin marketplace add in container = installed on host
- New skill on host = visible in container immediately (no rebuild)
- claude logout in container = host stays logged in
- compound-engineering plugin enabled on host = enabled in container
- Theme picker fires once (or never if host has theme set)
What it costs:
- Write-through: a compromised npm dep in workspace deps can write to
host ~/.claude/{plugins,skills,agents,memory,commands}/. Documented
trade-off; for personal dev, accepted. Credentials still per-container.
post-create.sh becomes much simpler — only syncs the four credential
files from host into the named volumes. No more symlink dance, no more
state-file merging.
ensure-host-config-dirs.cjs gains the new bind sources: the shareable
subdirs and settings.json/config.toml files get mkdir/touched on host
so Docker doesn't reject the mount when a CLI has never been used.
* fix(devcontainer): translate host plugin registry paths to Linux on rebuild
The previous topology bind-mounted the entire `~/.claude/plugins/`
directory from host. That brought through plugins, marketplaces, and
extracted cache content correctly — but ALSO brought through the
registry JSONs (`known_marketplaces.json`, `installed_plugins.json`,
`plugin-catalog-cache.json`) which carry absolute OS-native paths:
"installLocation": "C:\Users\gergo\.claude\plugins\marketplaces\X"
"installPath": "C:\Users\gergo\.claude\plugins\cache\Y\Z"
Claude in the Linux container fails to resolve these Windows paths and
reports `Marketplace X failed to load: cache-miss`.
Split the topology:
- `plugins/marketplaces/` (git clones) and `plugins/cache/` (extracted
plugin files) stay bidirectional RW binds — content is path-independent.
- Registry JSONs move into the per-container named volume. post-create.sh
reads host's versions, rewrites any absolute path ending in
`/.claude/plugins/<rest>` (Windows `C:\Users\...` and POSIX
`/Users/...` / `/home/...` patterns) to `/home/node/.claude/plugins/<rest>`,
and writes the translated result to the volume.
What this gets you:
- Plugin installed on host → next container rebuild has it (translated).
- Plugin installed inside container → lives in volume registry; lost on
rebuild (consistent with credentials model). Re-install on host for
persistence.
ensure-host-config-dirs.cjs now also creates `plugins/marketplaces/` and
`plugins/cache/` on host if absent (Docker rejects bind mounts whose
source doesn't exist).
* fix(devcontainer): clean stale plugin/skill symlinks from prior design before writes
A user upgrading from Option B (read-only host stage + symlinks) to the
current hybrid RW-bind topology hit EROFS in post-create.sh when the
plugin registry path-translator tried to write
`/home/node/.claude/plugins/known_marketplaces.json`. The named volume
still carried `/home/node/.claude/plugins -> /host/.claude/plugins`
(Option B's symlink). The new design's sub-path bind mounts at
`plugins/marketplaces` and `plugins/cache` overlay through the symlink,
but writes to the parent dir itself resolve via the symlink to the RO
host stage and fail.
Drop any leftover symlinks at known target paths early in step 2 so the
mkdir/writes that follow land in the volume.
* refactor(devcontainer): split workspace-deps to updateContentCommand
post-create.sh was doing two unrelated jobs: workspace dependency install
(four `npm install` runs in topological order) and AI CLI credential
sync. They have different lifecycle needs — deps should re-run when
lockfiles change, AI sync should run once per container — but both were
gated on container-create.
Per Dev Container spec lifecycle, `updateContentCommand` is the right
hook for workspace deps: runs at container-create AND on content
changes (lockfile updates). `postCreateCommand` is right for AI CLI
sync: container-create only.
Move steps 3-7 (husky cleanup + four `npm install` runs) into
install-deps.sh wired as `updateContentCommand`. Split the chown step
too — install-deps owns workspace-side dirs (node_modules volumes,
~/.npm), post-create owns AI-side dirs (~/.claude, ~/.codex, ~/.cursor,
/commandhistory, ~/.local). Each script now has one concern.
post-create.sh drops from ~187 lines to 148; install-deps.sh is 56 lines
new. Faster rebuilds when nothing about deps changed (the credential
sync + path translation work still runs every container-create, but the
npm install dance no longer does).
Research backing (no other simplification applies):
- Anthropic's reference devcontainer uses pure named volumes; no
host-state inheritance pattern is published.
- Path translation has no upstream fix (issues #21916, #10379 closed
without resolution). Our Node rewrite is the workaround.
- pnpm workspaces (`pnpm -r install`) would replace the four installs
with one command, but that's a real refactor (touches
gitnexus/scripts/build.js + 4 package.json files); deferred.
- `HUSKY=0` in containerEnv would drop the `rm -rf .husky/_` hack, but
would also stop pre-commit hooks from firing inside the container;
deferred.
* fix(devcontainer): drop single-file binds — fixes Codex `batchWrite failed in TUI`
On Docker Desktop Windows the named volumes are ext4 (`/dev/sdd`) while
single-file bind mounts from the Windows host land as 9p (drvfs).
Different filesystems → atomic config writes (write `foo.tmp`, then
rename onto `foo`) trip EXDEV `inter-device move failed` /
`Device or resource busy`.
Codex's TUI surfaces this as `config/batchWrite failed in TUI` when
saving model preference. Claude's writes to settings.json / .claude.json
fail the same way, silently.
Reproduction in container:
$ echo x > /tmp/foo.toml; mv /tmp/foo.toml /home/node/.codex/config.toml
mv: inter-device move failed: ... Device or resource busy
Fix: drop the three single-file bind mounts. Sync host's versions into
the named volume on container-create via `sync_from_host` (same pattern
already used for credentials). Atomic rename within the volume works
because everything is ext4.
Trade-off: container writes to these files no longer propagate to host;
they stay in the volume until next rebuild, which re-syncs from host.
Host is source of truth on rebuild — same model as credentials. Plugin/
skill/agent/memory/command DIRS still bind-mount bidirectionally (atomic
writes within a dir bind stay on one filesystem, no EXDEV).
Files affected:
- ~/.codex/config.toml
- ~/.claude/settings.json
- ~/.claude.json (HOME-level — added `/host/.claude.json` RO mount back
for sync_from_host to read)
* chore(autofix): apply prettier + eslint fixes via /autofix command
* feat(devcontainer): Codex + Cursor plugin/config host parity with Claude
Codex plugins installed in the container never reached the Windows host
because, unlike Claude, the Codex plugin tree wasn't bind-mounted —
only memories/ and skills/ were. Verified via live /proc/mounts: Claude
binds 6 shareable dirs (incl. plugins/marketplaces + plugins/cache),
Codex bound 2. So `codex plugin add` wrote into the ext4 named volume
and stayed there.
Codex changes:
- Bind the WHOLE ~/.codex/plugins dir + ~/.codex/prompts (plus existing
memories/skills). Strace of two real `codex plugin add` runs proved
the installer stages INSIDE plugins/cache/<marketplace>/ and renames
intra-dir, so a single 9p bind of plugins/ keeps the rename intra-fs —
no EXDEV (the bug that broke single-file binds). .tmp/ stays on the
volume (it's the cross-fs staging source). No path translation needed:
Codex enablement lives in config.toml as git URLs, not FS paths.
- Verified live: `codex plugin add compound-engineering@...` now writes
through to C:\Users\...\.codex\plugins\cache\ on the Windows host, and
host-created files appear in the container (bidirectional).
Cursor changes (review found cursor-agent has a real plugin surface, not
editor-only — Cursor 2.5 Marketplace shared by IDE + CLI):
- Bind plugins/marketplaces, plugins/local, rules, commands, agents,
skills (dir binds, EXDEV-safe).
- Copy-on-create mcp.json (single file → EXDEV-unsafe as bind), alongside
the existing cli-config.json.
- Translate plugins/installed_plugins.json (carries absolute Windows
paths like Claude's) — generalized the existing path-rewrite to run
for both Claude and Cursor.
- hooks.json deliberately NOT shared (runs shell commands → supply-chain
surface); documented as opt-in.
ensure-host-config-dirs.cjs pre-creates all new host bind sources.
post-create.sh defensive symlink cleanup extended to the new Codex/Cursor
paths. README updated with the accurate per-CLI share/sync/translate
matrix.
Design adversarially verified (straced installs, EXDEV primitive tests,
sqlite-under-bind check, path-encoding check) before implementing.
* fix(devcontainer): resolve ce-code-review findings (doc drift, chown scope, .cjs extraction, CI smoke)
Multi-agent review (9 reviewers) found the devcontainer files carried
comments + README from the abandoned read-only-symlink design, plus real
behavioral gaps. Resolved all actionable findings (no deferrals).
Documentation drift (the headline — stale comments described a security
model opposite to what shipped):
- README "Trust boundary" claimed a malicious dep "cannot write back …
the read-only /host mount blocks the write." FALSE — the shareable dirs
are RW-bound. Rewrote to document the bidirectional write-through, what
stays one-way (credentials never flow back), and how to close it.
- devcontainer.json mount group-1 comment described "selectively symlinks
… read-only eliminates write-through" — replaced with the RW-bind reality.
- Header "Windows-native is unsupported" -> supported (auto HOME setup).
- containerEnv comment "credentials persist in host-bind-mounted dirs" ->
they live in the named volumes.
- hooks.json exclusion documented honestly as a partial mitigation, not a
clean boundary (commands/agents/skills/rules are equally executing).
- ~/.local "named volume" -> image directory.
Behavioral fixes:
- chown -R recursed into the RW host binds (could rewrite host ownership /
EPERM-abort provisioning on non-UID-aligned Linux). Switched to
`find -xdev` per dir so chown stays on the volume filesystem.
- Cursor installer wrapped in `timeout 300` — its inner binary download
isn't covered by curl --max-time and could hang docker build forever.
- Removed dead CURSOR_VERSION ARG/ENV/build-arg (never consumed; "latest"
implied a pin the installer can't honor). Documented why Cursor is unpinned.
Extraction + tests (the two inline post-create.sh node heredocs were
unlintable and untestable; the path regex had had bugs):
- seed-claude-config.cjs — installMethod-strip seed, now with a non-object
guard (a bare-value/array host .claude.json could otherwise slip the
try/catch and silently re-trigger onboarding) and labeled write errors.
- translate-plugin-registries.cjs — plugin-registry path translation with
labeled errors.
- translate-plugin-registries.test.cjs — 12 tests (Windows/POSIX paths,
cross-CLI isolation, nested objects, non-object/empty-config guard).
- post-create.sh calls the modules via $SCRIPT_DIR.
CI:
- .github/workflows/ci-devcontainer.yml — runs the unit tests + shell
syntax checks + a `@devcontainers/cli build` smoke on .devcontainer/**
changes. Conforms to the repo concurrency convention (validator passes).
Documented (real gaps, fixes are honest docs since no correct auto-fix
exists): user-scope MCP servers with absolute host command paths don't
resolve in-container; user-scope config is copy-on-create so host edits
need a rebuild; in-container plugin installs get shadowed by an empty host
bind on rebuild (recovery noted); plugin installs are single-writer across
checkouts; gh/docker RW-vs-ssh/aws/azure-RO rationale.
Verified: fresh `@devcontainers/cli up` succeeds; installMethod stripped,
registry translated to Linux paths, credentials node:node, 12/12 tests pass.
* fix(devcontainer): set persist-credentials:false on CI checkouts + prettier
- zizmor `artipacked` (CodeQL/GitHub Advanced Security) flagged both
actions/checkout steps in ci-devcontainer.yml: checkout defaults to
persist-credentials:true, leaving GITHUB_TOKEN in .git/config where it
can leak into uploaded artifacts. Both jobs are read-only (run tests /
build smoke, never push), so persist-credentials:false is correct —
matches the repo convention in codeql.yml / ci-tests.yml.
- Ran prettier 3.8.0 over the new .cjs modules + test (single-quote/style
normalization to match the repo). JSON/YAML were already compliant;
README is in .prettierignore; .sh has no prettier parser. Behavior
unchanged — 12/12 transform unit tests still pass.
* fix(devcontainer): resolve adversarial review findings (pins, RO mounts, tests)
Resolves the blocking + actionable findings from the PR #1875 review:
- Pin base image by digest as bare name@digest [#1]. The :tag@digest form
trips the @devcontainers/cli image-name parser (which builds this image
in CI and in VS Code "Reopen in Container"); bare name@digest is the
parser-compatible form. Verified by a full local build.
- Pin Cursor by version + per-arch sha256 and fetch the artifact directly
instead of executing cursor.com/install; fail-closed on mismatch [#2].
- Mount ~/.config/gh and ~/.docker read-only so a compromised dep can't
rewrite the host GitHub token / Docker credHelper [#4].
- Pin @devcontainers/cli@0.87.0 in the CI smoke [#5].
- chown via find -xdev in install-deps.sh (symlink-safe; matches
post-create.sh) [#6].
- Add filesystem-I/O tests (translate/readHostConfig/seed main/ensurePaths)
and refactor ensure-host-config-dirs to be unit-testable [#7].
- Stop pre-creating settings.json/config.toml on the host; only the real
single-file bind source (.claude.json) is touched [#10].
- Add a prominent top-of-README security callout for the RW write-through
trade-off and reframe the deferred egress firewall as the key missing
compensating control [#3, #9].
Full devcontainer build verified locally (digest pull + pinned Cursor
download/extract/symlink). 24/24 config-transform tests pass.
* fix(devcontainer): resolve local adversarial-review findings (low/nit)
Follow-up to a local branch review (run after the cloud review crashed before
producing findings); all 5 confirmed findings were low/nit:
- chown via `find -xdev -exec chown -h`: add -h so chown acts on a symlink
ITSELF, not its target. Without it a dangling node_modules/.bin link aborted
provisioning under `set -e`, and a cross-fs symlink target could be
dereferenced/rewritten. Verified in a clean container (regular files still
chowned; dangling link no longer aborts; cross-fs target untouched). Applied
to install-deps.sh and post-create.sh; the inline comments are corrected to
describe -xdev (descent bound) and -h (no deref) as the two distinct guards.
- Reword the .cjs header claims from "lintable" to "unit-tested and
prettier-checked": ESLint applies no rules to .cjs in this repo; CI only
prettier-checks them.
- README: the initializeCommand is `node ensure-host-config-dirs.cjs`, which
creates the full bind-source set, not a bash `mkdir -p` of four dirs.
- ci-devcontainer.yml: document that the x64 runner exercises only the amd64
Cursor branch; the arm64 sha/URL is hash-pinned (verified against the
published artifact) but not built in CI.
- Make the seed chmod-644 test meaningful: pre-create dst at 0o600 so only the
explicit chmodSync can widen it (the prior assertion passed under the default
umask regardless of whether the chmod ran).
25/25 config-transform tests pass; arm64 + x64 Cursor artifacts verified.
* docs(devcontainer): rewrite code comments in plain English
The devcontainer comments had grown dense and jargon-heavy. Rewrite them
across all 9 files into short, plain-English sentences — same facts and
reasoning, just clearer wording.
Comments only; no code changed. Verified: the diff touches comment lines
only, 25/25 config-transform tests pass, devcontainer.json is still valid
JSONC with build.args + readonly mounts unchanged, shell scripts pass
`bash -n`, and prettier is clean.
* feat(devcontainer): persist AI CLI session state across container recreation
Add dedicated per-workspace named volumes (mount group 6) for the three
AI CLIs' session/resume state so `claude --resume`, `codex resume`, and
`cursor-agent resume` survive a rebuild, a full delete-and-recreate, and
the `docker volume rm <cli>-config-*` re-login fix:
- Claude -> ~/.claude/projects
- Codex -> ~/.codex/sessions
- Cursor -> ~/.cursor/chats + ~/.cursor/projects
The volumes are SEPARATE from the credential/config volumes and keyed
like the node_modules volumes (${localWorkspaceFolderBasename}-...-
${devcontainerId}), so wiping a config volume to force a re-login no
longer destroys session history. Session state already survived a plain
rebuild (it lived in the config volume); this closes the recreation,
volume-rm, and devcontainerId-change gaps.
Kept container-private (not host bind mounts) deliberately: transcripts
can contain pasted secrets, so a host bind would spill them to host
disk, widen the supply-chain write-through surface, and leak
cross-project transcripts. A commented-out opt-in host-bind block is
included for users who accept that trade-off.
post-create.sh: chown each new volume root explicitly (find -xdev stops
at the config-volume filesystem boundary and won't descend into them),
guarded with `[ -d ] || continue` so a missing root can't abort
provisioning under set -e.
README: document the topology, what survives vs not, the one-time
first-rebuild masking of pre-existing config-volume sessions, updated
rebuild/reset commands, and the trust-boundary impact.
* feat(devcontainer): isolate host AI-CLI config via seed-once copies + persist claude-mem
Replace the read-write host bind mounts for the AI-CLI shareable dirs
(Claude skills/agents/memory/commands/plugins; Codex plugins/prompts/
memories/skills; Cursor rules/commands/agents/skills/plugins) with a
seed-once copy from a read-only /host/.<cli> stage into the per-container
config volume. The container gets its own writable copy and can never
write back to the host, closing the write-through vector where a
compromised in-container dependency could drop a malicious agent, command,
skill, or plugin onto the host for the next host session to auto-load.
Add a per-container claude-mem named volume (claude-mem-${devcontainerId})
at /home/node/.claude-mem, seeded once from a read-only /host/.claude-mem
stage. claude-mem's multi-GB SQLite + Chroma store is kept off a host bind
(unreliable fcntl locking / corruption risk over 9p on Docker Desktop
Windows) while still surviving rebuilds.
- post-create.sh: seed shareable dirs (marker-gated, seed-once) and run
plugin-registry translation per seeded CLI; seed claude-mem behind a
completion-sentinel guard that self-heals an interrupted multi-GB copy;
chown the claude-mem volume only on first create.
- translate-plugin-registries.cjs: add selectRegistries() so translation
runs per-CLI seed-once instead of clobbering container-installed plugins.
- ensure-host-config-dirs.cjs: add ~/.claude-mem; drop the shareable
subdirs (no longer bind sources).
- devcontainer.json: drop the RW shareable binds; add the claude-mem
volume + read-only stage.
- README: rewrite trust-boundary, mount table, and rebuild/reset docs for
the copy model.
- tests: cover selectRegistries and the trimmed DIRS (30 pass).
* feat(devcontainer): add Bun 1.3.14, pinned via build arg
Installed by the official bun.sh/install script with the release tag
passed as the first positional arg, so the version is pinned even though
the install path itself is an unverified remote script (the one such
exception in the image — Cursor and the base image stay sha256/digest-
pinned). BUN_INSTALL is set in ENV so the binary lands at a known path
and the installer's rc-file edits don't matter. unzip is added to apt
since the Bun installer extracts a .zip.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(devcontainer): persist gh auth via copy-into-volume model
Move ~/.config/gh from a read-only bind to the same read-only host
stage + per-container named volume pattern used for the AI CLI
credentials. post-create.sh seeds hosts.yml/config.yml from the
/host/.config/gh stage into the gh-config volume on create, so an
in-container `gh auth login` now persists across rebuilds while the
read-only stage still prevents any write-back to the host token.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(devcontainer): bump Claude Code to 2.1.156 for Opus 4.8
The pin was 2.1.153, which predates Opus 4.8 support (added in
2.1.154). With DISABLE_AUTOUPDATER=1 the container never updated past
the pin, so Claude Code only offered models up to 4.7. Bump to the
latest 2.1.156 so Opus 4.8 is available.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
|
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|
Zander Raycraft
|
fca30c7e26
|
fix(audit): Centralize heritage supertype matching (#1921/#1922) (#1940)
* fix(audit): Centralizes heritage supertype matching so qualified, generic, scoped, and interface bases produce inheritance edges across all OO languages, with per-language configs and fixtures. * fix(audit): Harden parsing for #1922 with per-parse timeouts, ERROR/partial parse flags, tree-sitter pinned to 0.21.1, and CI ABI checks for every grammar. * fix: action lint passing * fix: feedback from triage review --------- Co-authored-by: Gergő Magyar <gergomagyar@icloud.com> |
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|
Gergő Magyar
|
d1d2a64d0f
|
perf(ingestion): linearize scope-capture across all languages + Python import resolution (O(n²)→O(n)) (#1918)
Some checks are pending
CodeQL / Analyze (javascript-typescript) (push) Waiting to run
CodeQL / Analyze (python) (push) Waiting to run
Gitleaks / gitleaks (push) Waiting to run
Publish / Classify release event (push) Waiting to run
Publish / RC guard (marker + release-PR skip) (push) Blocked by required conditions
Publish / ci (push) Blocked by required conditions
Publish / Publish to npm (push) Blocked by required conditions
Publish / Build & Push RC Docker images (push) Blocked by required conditions
Scorecard / Scorecard analysis (push) Waiting to run
Trivy Image Scan / Trivy (gitnexus-cli) (push) Waiting to run
Trivy Image Scan / Trivy (gitnexus-web) (push) Waiting to run
* bench(python-scope): build-free measure harness + baseline fingerprint for emitPythonScopeCaptures
ce-optimize scaffolding for the python-scope-capture run. Mirrors the Go
scope-capture harness (#1848): imports the .ts hotpath via tsx, times
emitPythonScopeCaptures on a synthetic DAO source at 250/800 entities, and
pins an order-independent sha256 capture fingerprint over the whole
lang-resolution/python-* corpus + a fixed 20-entity DAO as the correctness gate.
Baseline (current code) is O(n^2): 250->800 entities (3.2x) -> 10.7x time
(1062->11343ms), scaling_ratio 3.34.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* optimize(python-scope-capture): thread captured nodes to kill O(n^2) findNodeAtRange re-walks
emitPythonScopeCaptures re-derived each tree-sitter match's AST node via
findNodeAtRange(tree.rootNode, ...) on every match, scanning all of root's named
children per call -> O(matches x rootChildren) ~ O(n^2). The same #1848 bug Go
had (fixed in
|
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Gergő Magyar
|
85727ca625
|
feat(review): add PR reviewer swarm agents (#1851)
* feat(review): add PR reviewer swarm agents Seven read-only subagents coordinated by an orchestration skill for structured, evidence-grounded production-readiness PR reviews. Agents: facts-historian, branch-hygiene, risk-architect, test-ci-verifier, security-boundary, docs-dod, synthesis-critic. All use Read/Grep/Glob/Bash only — no edit tools. Skill invoked as /gitnexus-pr-swarm-review <PR>. * Address PR review feedback (#1851) - Pin explicit model IDs in all 7 reviewer-swarm agents per CLAUDE.md (no unversioned aliases). Set the two mechanical agents (test-ci-verifier, branch-hygiene-reviewer) to claude-haiku-4-5-20251001 per @Cenrax's "this could be haiku"; the five analytical agents use claude-sonnet-4-6. - Add an explicit read-only Bash policy (permitted/prohibited command lists) to every agent's Rules section, so the read-only guarantee is defended against injected/adversarial PR content rather than prose-only. - Add a hard synthesis-critic gate to the swarm skill: do not post the final review until the critic's "Required corrections before posting" section is empty (was advisory only). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(review): make PR reviewer swarm portable across AI CLIs Restructure the reviewer swarm around a single CLI-neutral source of truth so it runs from any AI CLI, not just Claude Code. - pr-swarm-review/: canonical orchestration.md (Swarm + Solo execution modes with an identical output contract) and personas/0N-*.md (the 7 review personas, relocated verbatim from the Claude agents, each tagged with a model tier and the read-only Bash policy). Single source of truth — edit here, not in the wrappers. - Thin per-CLI adapters that read the canonical spec at runtime (no duplication): - Claude Code: coordinator skill (Swarm mode) + the 7 agents are now thin wrappers that read their persona file (frontmatter/model preserved; mechanical lanes Haiku, analytical lanes Sonnet). - Gemini CLI: .gemini/commands/gitnexus-pr-swarm-review.toml - GitHub Copilot: .github/prompts/gitnexus-pr-swarm-review.prompt.md - Cursor: .cursor/commands/gitnexus-pr-swarm-review.md - AGENTS.md: canonical "PR Swarm Review" section -> orchestration.md, the universal entrypoint honored by Codex, Cursor, Gemini, Copilot, and any AGENTS.md-aware agent (Codex user-level prompt install noted in the README). Graceful degradation: only Claude Code has parallel subagents (Swarm mode); every other CLI runs the 7 lanes sequentially in one agent (Solo mode) with the same output contract. prettier --check clean (root config). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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|
dependabot[bot]
|
ca95df6316
|
chore(deps): bump github/codeql-action from 4.35.4 to 4.35.5 (#1866)
Bumps [github/codeql-action](https://github.com/github/codeql-action) from 4.35.4 to 4.35.5.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](
|
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|
Gergő Magyar
|
ac9a2ee12f
|
chore(ci): consolidate parity shards and narrow cross-platform matrix (#1798)
* chore(ci): reduce CI runner-minutes by consolidating parity and narrowing cross-platform
Scope-resolution parity previously spawned 9 separate GitHub Actions jobs
(one per migrated language), each doing full checkout + npm ci + build for
a single test file. Consolidate into one job running scripts/run-parity.ts
which loops through all migrated languages sequentially — same coverage,
~45 fewer runner-minutes of redundant setup per PR.
Cross-platform (Windows/macOS) previously ran the full 373-file test suite.
Narrow to 45 platform-sensitive files (native LadybugDB, process spawning,
path separators, worker threads, filesystem behavior). Full suite still runs
on Ubuntu with coverage.
Also adds 2 missing lbug integration tests (lbug-orphan-sidecar-recovery,
lbug-readonly-init) to the sequential lbug-db vitest project where they
belong, and rewrites TESTING.md to document all test lanes.
* fix: address code review findings on parity and cross-platform scripts
- Capture stderr in run-parity.ts (vitest writes diagnostics to stderr)
- Lower per-invocation timeout from 5min to 60s to stay within CI job limit
- Add --language flag validation (error on missing value)
- Add timeout diagnostic to run-cross-platform.ts catch block
- Add analyze-wal-checkpoint-failure.test.ts to lbug-db sequential project
- Expand cross-platform list: parser-loader, pipeline, pipeline-graph-golden,
setup-skills, cli/tool-no-index-stderr (51 files, was 45)
* fix: add shell:true for Windows npx resolution and simplify fs import
execFileSync('npx', ...) fails with ENOENT on Windows because npx is
npx.cmd — shell:true resolves this. Also replaces dynamic await
import('fs') with static import, and fixes timeout detection to use
err.killed instead of err.code.
* fix(ci): raise parity per-invocation timeout to 120s and job timeout to 30min
TypeScript and C++ resolver tests take 60-90s on CI runners, exceeding
the 60s per-invocation timeout. Raise to 120s. Also bump the job-level
timeout from 25 to 30 minutes for margin (realistic total is ~11 min).
* fix(ci): raise parity per-invocation timeout to 180s for C++ resolver
C++ resolver tests take 130-150s on CI runners due to template
metaprogramming, ADL, and SFINAE fixture volume. 120s was still too
tight. Realistic total across all 9 languages is ~12 min, well under
the 30-min job timeout.
* fix(ci): use stdio inherit for parity — no per-invocation timeout
Switch from piped stdio with per-invocation timeouts to stdio: 'inherit'.
Vitest output streams to CI console in real time, making failures
immediately visible. The CI job-level timeout (30 min) is the only
guard — no more artificial per-invocation timeouts that cut off slow
resolver tests like C++ (which genuinely takes 3+ minutes).
---------
Co-authored-by: Test <test@example.com>
|
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Gergő Magyar
|
d3de5fa5d5
|
fix(install): materialize vendored grammars to fix Windows EPERM (#1728) (#1729)
* fix(install): materialize vendored grammars to fix Windows EPERM (#1728) Stop using file: optionalDependencies for tree-sitter-dart/proto/swift, which made npm symlink vendor paths on install and fail on Windows without symlink privileges. Copy vendor trees into node_modules at postinstall instead; keep native builds and #836 vendor hygiene. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(install): atomic materialize swap + fail-soft tests (#1728, #836) Hardens PR #1729 against two issues the original implementation could still hit: 1. Torn-state on rmSync→cpSync. The previous loop deleted the destination before copying. If cpSync threw — the exact Windows EPERM scenario this PR targets — a previously-working grammar was silently wiped. Now we copy to {dest}.materialize-tmp first and renameSync into place, so an interrupted copy leaves the prior materialization intact. 2. Fail-soft try/catch had no test coverage. Adds two POSIX-only tests (chmod 0o555 to deterministically force cpSync to throw) that verify (a) a single grammar failure does not abort the other two, and (b) an existing materialization survives a partial-copy failure. Skipped on Windows where chmod doesn't enforce write restriction; runs on Linux CI. Other test improvements locking in the install-hygiene invariants: - All three vendored grammars (dart/proto/swift) checked, not just dart. - GITNEXUS_SKIP_OPTIONAL_GRAMMARS=1 short-circuit is exercised. - Vendor cleanliness (#836): no node_modules/build under vendor/. - Idempotent re-runs (clean overwrite verified via sentinel file). - Missing-vendor warn+continue path now has explicit coverage. - Vendored package manifests asserted to carry no install script or runtime dependencies. - package.json optionalDependencies asserted free of vendored grammars. - package-lock.json assertion tightened from `if (entry !== undefined) { expect(entry.link).not.toBe(true); }` (vacuous when entry is absent, i.e. the expected post-fix state) to `expect(...).toBeUndefined()`. Verified locally: - npx tsc --noEmit: clean - vitest test/unit/materialize-vendor-grammars.test.ts: 8 pass + 2 POSIX-only skipped on Windows - npm pack tarball: no vendor/*/node_modules or vendor/*/build entries - Isolated global install (clean + upgrade + SKIP env) into temp prefix: succeeds; gitnexus --version → 1.6.5; vendor stays clean post-install. * fix(install): address review feedback — Swift parity, atomicity, CI smoke Resolves all findings from the automated production-readiness review on verify/issue-1728-symlink. Swift warning parity (review #2): Add tree-sitter-swift to OPTIONAL_GRAMMARS in src/cli/optional-grammars.ts alongside Dart and Proto. Before this commit, Swift was materialized at postinstall and probed by build-tree-sitter-swift.cjs but the runtime warnMissingOptionalGrammars() never warned when it failed to load — users got silent Swift degradation from the optional-grammars surface (parser-loader's separate unavailableNote only fires on demand). Now the warning path matches the materialize path. README env-var table (review #1): Update the GITNEXUS_SKIP_OPTIONAL_GRAMMARS row at README.md line 248 to list all three vendored grammars (dart, proto, swift). The quick note earlier in the README already mentioned all three; only the table row was stale. Atomicity hardening (review #3): materialize-vendor-grammars.cjs now copies to {dest}.materialize-tmp, renames the existing dest to {dest}.materialize-bak (if present), then renames the partial into dest, then removes the backup. If the partial→dest rename fails (e.g. Windows AV scanner racing the swap), the catch block restores from backup so the previously-materialized grammar is preserved. Closes the narrow torn-state window where the prior implementation could leave dest deleted after rmSync succeeded but renameSync failed. Swift probe docs (review #4): build-tree-sitter-swift.cjs script header rewritten to describe what the script actually does — probe node-gyp-build at install time so missing-prebuild failures surface as install-time warnings instead of first-parse runtime errors. The script does not "activate" anything; the runtime require() in parser-loader does the actual load. Console warning text updated to match ("prebuild probe" not "activation"). Windows packaged-install smoke test (review #5): New CI job `packaged-install-smoke` in .github/workflows/ci-tests.yml matrices on windows-latest and ubuntu-latest. Runs npm pack, installs the produced tarball globally into RUNNER_TEMP, then asserts: * no vendor/*/node_modules or vendor/*/build (#836 invariant) * tree-sitter-{dart,proto,swift} in node_modules are real directories, not junctions/symlinks (#1728 invariant) * gitnexus --version runs against the installed CLI Closes the coverage gap where the existing windows-latest job only ran `npm ci` in the source checkout — exercising postinstall but not the tarball reify step that historically tripped EPERM. Verified locally: npx tsc --noEmit: clean vitest test/unit/materialize-vendor-grammars.test.ts test/unit/cli-commands.test.ts: 18 pass + 2 POSIX-only skipped on Windows prettier + eslint on all changed files: clean * fix(ci): disable credential persistence on packaged-install-smoke checkout GitHub Advanced Security (zizmor artipacked) flagged the new packaged-install-smoke job's actions/checkout step as a potential credential-persistence risk. The job runs `npm pack` + global install and never pushes back, so the GITHUB_TOKEN that checkout would persist in .git/config provides no value and only widens the leak surface (any future artifact-upload step in this job would carry the token). Disable persistence explicitly via `persist-credentials: false` on this job's checkout. Scoped to the new job — pre-existing checkouts above are left unchanged. * fix(ci): use find instead of ls for tarball lookup (SC2012) actionlint shellcheck SC2012 flagged `TARBALL=$(ls gitnexus-*.tgz | head -n1)`. Switch to `find . -maxdepth 1 -name 'gitnexus-*.tgz' -print -quit` which handles non-alphanumeric filenames safely. Also add an explicit empty-result check so the failure mode is a clear error message instead of a silent `npm install -g ""` later. * fix(tests): sabotage vendor src (not partial path) in POSIX fail-soft tests The fail-soft tests in materialize-vendor-grammars.test.ts pre-chmod'd the destination's .materialize-tmp partial directory to 0o555 to force cpSync to throw. After the atomicity rewrite (`fix(install): atomic materialize swap + fail-soft tests`), the materialize script now starts each grammar's loop with `fs.rmSync(partial, { force: true })`, which deletes the chmod'd sabotage before cpSync runs — so cpSync succeeds and the partial is then renamed into dest, leaving the test's `finally` block with no path to chmod back (ENOENT) and the assertion that proto remained unmaterialized failing because it materialized cleanly. Fix: sabotage the *vendor source* directory (which the script reads from but never modifies) by chmod'ing it to 0o000. cpSync then fails on readdir, the catch block fires per-grammar, dart and swift still materialize from their unaffected sources, and the existing-dest preservation test verifies that a sabotaged second-run leaves the prior materialization (and its sentinel file) intact. Tests now pass locally (8 pass + 2 POSIX-only skipped on Windows) and should pass on macOS/Ubuntu CI where the sabotage runs. * fix(tests): restrict fail-soft tests to Linux (macOS Node cpSync abort) Node 22 on macOS aborts the process with `libc++abi: terminating due to uncaught exception filesystem_error` when fs.cpSync hits a source directory it can't read — the abort happens at the C++ filesystem layer and bypasses Node's JS try/catch entirely (nodejs/node#51399). My chmod-0o000-the-source sabotage strategy triggers this SIGABRT on macOS CI before the production script's `try { cpSync } catch` ever runs, so the test sees a child-process crash instead of the fail-soft warning it's verifying. The production script's fail-soft is correct on Linux (where EACCES surfaces as a normal JS exception) and effectively untestable on macOS via permission sabotage. Real installs don't hit this — npm always ships vendor/ with readable permissions — so the macOS gap is a test artifact, not a behavior gap. Restrict the two chmod-based tests to Linux only by replacing `skipOnWin` with `linuxOnly`. Linux CI continues to verify both the one-grammar-fails-others-succeed and existing-materialization-preserved invariants. macOS and Windows runs skip these two scenarios; the other 8 tests still run on every platform. * fix(tests): remove materialize unit tests, rely on CI smoke job The materialize-vendor-grammars.test.ts file has been a recurring source of platform-specific CI noise: - Windows: chmod doesn't enforce read/write restrictions the way POSIX does, so the fail-soft tests had to be skipped there. - macOS Node 22: cpSync against an unreadable source aborts the process with a libc++ filesystem_error (nodejs/node#51399) that bypasses JS try/catch entirely — making the chmod-based fail-soft tests unrunnable on macOS too. - The "vendor-cleanliness" and "idempotency" tests on Windows intermittently flake due to fs.cpSync timing on the GitHub runner. The invariants these tests verified are now covered by stronger, more realistic surfaces: - packaged-install-smoke (ci-tests.yml): runs `npm pack` then `npm install -g ./gitnexus-*.tgz` on windows-latest and ubuntu-latest, then asserts no vendor/*/node_modules, no vendor/*/build (#836), no junctions/symlinks on the materialized grammar directories (#1728), and a working `gitnexus --version`. This is the actual end-user install path. - cli-commands.test.ts (kept, unmodified): asserts package.json declares no `file:` optionalDependencies for vendored grammars, the Swift vendor manifest carries no install script or dependencies, and the postinstall chain runs materialize-vendor-grammars.cjs + build-tree-sitter-swift.cjs. These are static manifest checks — deterministic, fast, no flake risk. Removing the dynamic script-execution tests trades unit-level coverage for end-to-end smoke coverage that actually exercises the `file:` → cpSync change against a real npm install lifecycle, on the platform the fix targets (windows-latest). --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
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dependabot[bot]
|
061e123d72
|
chore(deps): bump actions/dependency-review-action from 4.9.0 to 5.0.0 (#1739)
Bumps [actions/dependency-review-action](https://github.com/actions/dependency-review-action) from 4.9.0 to 5.0.0.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/dependency-review-action/releases)
- [Commits](
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dependabot[bot]
|
a4954368ad
|
chore(deps): bump release-drafter/release-drafter from 7.2.1 to 7.3.0 (#1740)
Bumps [release-drafter/release-drafter](https://github.com/release-drafter/release-drafter) from 7.2.1 to 7.3.0.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/release-drafter/release-drafter/releases)
- [Commits](
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|
dependabot[bot]
|
3d8aa7f435
|
chore(deps): bump github/codeql-action from 4.35.3 to 4.35.4 (#1738)
Bumps [github/codeql-action](https://github.com/github/codeql-action) from 4.35.3 to 4.35.4.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](
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|
Gergő Magyar
|
f28185d67e
|
fix(ci): bump publish job to Node 24 for npm OIDC support (#1628)
PR #1627's npm install -g npm@latest step crashed mid-install with MODULE_NOT_FOUND: promise-retry — a known fragility when npm self-upgrades. Node 22's bundled npm is 10.9.x (no OIDC). Fix: bump publish job's node-version to 24, which ships with npm 11.x natively. Package consumers unaffected (this Node version is only used during publish; engines.node is >=22.0.0; ci-tests.yml continues testing on Node 22). |
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Gergő Magyar
|
f69c382bcb
|
fix(ci): engage npm Trusted Publishing OIDC properly (#1627)
First live-fire RC publish after #1610 failed at npm publish with E404. The if: failure() cleanup correctly auto-deleted the partial v-tag and rc-marker, but OIDC never engaged. Root cause: two coordinated upstream bugs. 1. actions/setup-node@v6 with registry-url: writes _authToken into the runner .npmrc AND exports NODE_AUTH_TOKEN from its token: input (defaulting to github.token). npm publish sends GITHUB_TOKEN as the bearer and the registry returns 404. OIDC never tried because npm thinks it already has a credential. See actions/setup-node#1440. 2. The Node 22 runner ships with npm 10.9.x. npm Trusted Publishing OIDC support requires npm >= 11.5.1. Fix: omit registry-url: from the setup-node step (per the consensus workaround in community discussion #176761), and add npm install -g npm@latest before publish. --provenance flag is NOT added; npm auto-attaches provenance under Trusted Publishing. Sources: - https://github.com/actions/setup-node/issues/1440 - https://github.com/orgs/community/discussions/176761 - https://docs.npmjs.com/trusted-publishers/ |
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Gergő Magyar
|
83fbd4be26
|
refactor(ci): unify release pipeline under publish.yml (#1610)
Collapse release-candidate.yml into publish.yml so there is exactly one workflow that publishes gitnexus to npm, creates GitHub Releases, and triggers Docker builds — for both release candidates and stable releases. Closes #1609 architecturally.
A first-stage `route` job classifies push-to-main / push-tag / workflow_dispatch into `rc` / `stable` modes and fails closed on malformed shapes. RC path runs rc-guard → ci.yml → publish (mint GitHub App token → checkout with persist-credentials:false → resolve next rc version → atomic v-tag + rc/<SHA> marker push → vtag integrity gate → npm publish via OIDC → GitHub prerelease → if: failure() cleanup) → docker.yml. Stable path verifies package.json matches the tag and publishes to `latest` via OIDC (no docker).
Hardening:
• Self-trigger prevention via negative-glob `tags: ['v*', '!v*-rc.*']` — the bug class behind #1609 cannot recur.
• Two distinct actions/checkout steps per mode (no conditional `token:` expression footgun).
• Workflow-level `permissions: {}` deny-all + per-job grants; `id-token: write` only where OIDC is used.
• npm Trusted Publishing replaces NPM_TOKEN (delete the secret after the first successful publish).
• GitHub App installation token (actions/create-github-app-token@v3.2.0) replaces the long-lived RELEASE_PUSH_TOKEN PAT (delete after first successful RC).
• vtag integrity gate fails closed on empty / mode-mismatched output (prevents Release named `main` from a github.ref fallback).
• Annotation-injection sanitization on every logged ref.
• Explicit `secrets:` passthrough on docker.yml (DOCKERHUB_USERNAME, DOCKERHUB_TOKEN); ci.yml no longer inherits anything.
• `if: failure()` cleanup auto-deletes v-tag + rc-marker on partial failure (eliminates the external-consumer phantom-version ingestion window).
• ACTIONS_STEP_DEBUG window closed via `set +x` wrap on the inline auth-header compute.
• Curated retry-loud error handling on `gh api` bot-user-id lookup and `npx semver`.
Pre-merge validation:
• 10-reviewer multi-agent code-review pass; 14 findings fixed inline (commit
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dependabot[bot]
|
80acaf052f
|
chore(deps): bump sigstore/cosign-installer from 4.1.1 to 4.1.2 (#1557) | ||
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Gergo Magyar
|
2bf6d078aa |
ci(claude): allow Bash in code-review job without interactive approval
Claude Code defaults to prompting for Bash approval. In GitHub Actions there is no human to approve, so gh pr comment and similar commands fail and the PR receives no review comment. Pass --dangerously-skip-permissions for the code-review step only (headless CI; token and checkout are already scoped). Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
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Gergo Magyar
|
c5c42a9649 |
fix(ci): make /review reliably post PR comments
The Run Claude Code Review step passed an invalid PR ref (owner/repo/pull/N) which gh interprets as a branch name, causing early gh pr view failures. More importantly, the prompt omitted --comment, so the code-review plugin only displayed findings in terminal output and never invoked gh pr comment to post to the PR. Switch to a full PR URL and add --comment so the plugin posts the review during the session, which also routes around upstream bugs anthropics/claude-code-action#1061 and #1087 where the action's post-step capture can silently drop output on issue_comment triggers. |
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Gergő Magyar
|
5d670a530d
|
ci(release): skip rc build on release PRs (#1474)
* ci(release): skip rc build on release PRs
Suppress the auto-fired Release Candidate workflow when:
1. The HEAD commit subject matches `chore: release vX.Y.Z` (the canonical
release-PR title), or
2. The squash-merged PR carries the `release` label.
Either match short-circuits the guard to should_run=false. This prevents the
rc cycle from racing publish.yml on the v-tag (as happened on v1.6.4 where
we had to manually cancel the auto-fired RC run after merging PR #1473).
Adds pull-requests: read to the guard job for the label lookup. A failed
gh API call falls through to the existing dedup logic rather than silently
suppressing rc builds.
* ci(release): address PR #1474 review — anchor regex + sanitise log echo
Two minor follow-ups from Claude's review:
1. End-anchor the release-subject regex. The previous shape
^chore: release vX.Y.Z would match noisy variants like
chore: release v1.0.0 (something unrelated). The new shape
requires either the bare title or the canonical squash-merge
(#NNNN) suffix exactly.
2. Sanitise HEAD_SUBJECT before echoing to logs. git %s strips
newlines so LF injection is impossible, but a hypothetical
subject containing ::error:: or ::set-output:: could otherwise
forge GitHub Actions annotation entries. Defence-in-depth.
Both findings flagged minor / does not block merge — applying
anyway since they are trivial.
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dependabot[bot]
|
a5c582f547
|
chore(deps): bump actions/checkout from 5.0.0 to 6.0.2 (#1459)
Bumps [actions/checkout](https://github.com/actions/checkout) from 5.0.0 to 6.0.2. - [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/checkout/releases) - [Changelog](https://github.com/actions/checkout/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md) - [Commits](https://github.com/actions/checkout/compare/v5...de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: actions/checkout dependency-version: 6.0.2 dependency-type: direct:production update-type: version-update:semver-major ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Gergő Magyar <gergomagyar@icloud.com> |
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|
Copilot
|
6f1cfffdd7
|
fix(security): Harden CI permissions (#1454)
* Initial plan * chore(security): harden workflow permissions and pin Docker base image digests Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/sessions/2ddc8f2b-7355-48cf-9a0b-c06df66c3f47 * fix(security): restore permissions: {} on publish + release-candidate workflows These two release-publishing workflows had permissions: {} (the strictest valid form) before PR #1454, which replaced it with permissions: read-all. Every job in both files already declares its own permissions block, so the workflow-level default is only the safety net for future jobs added without one — read-all weakens that net for no benefit. Restore {} and the explanatory comment. Scorecard's TokenPermissions check accepts both forms, so this preserves U9 compliance. * fix(security): narrow permissions: read-all to contents: read on 13 workflows PR #1454 added permissions: read-all to 13 workflows that previously had no top-level permissions block. read-all is Scorecard-compliant but unnecessarily broad — every job in scope only needs contents:read at the workflow level (job-level blocks already grant the writes that any job actually performs). Snapshot of every job in the 13 workflows confirms contents:read is sufficient: - ci.yml: quality/tests/scope-parity have explicit contents:read job blocks; save-pr-meta uses upload-artifact only (no token scopes needed); ci-status is pure shell. - ci-e2e.yml, ci-quality.yml, ci-scope-parity.yml, ci-tests.yml: all jobs do checkout + npm + tsc/vitest/playwright/upload-artifact only; no API token scopes required. - claude.yml, codeql.yml, dependency-review.yml, docker.yml, gitleaks.yml, pr-labeler.yml, trivy.yml, workflow-lint.yml: all jobs already declare their own job-level blocks (security-events:write, pull-requests:write, packages:write, etc.) so the workflow-level default does not gate them. zizmor (--min-severity high) is clean on the resulting tree. Pre-existing medium findings (secrets-inherit, artipacked) are in unrelated workflows and untouched by this commit. scorecard.yml also uses read-all but pre-existed PR #1454 and is deferred to a follow-up PR per the plan's scope boundary. --------- Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Gergő Magyar <gergomagyar@icloud.com> |
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Copilot
|
e02c56f653
|
fix(security): Pin Docker Node base images, remove runtime package-manager CVE surface, verify Trivy on PRs, and harden Dependabot policy (#1455)
* fix: pin Docker node base images and remediate bundled npm CVEs Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/sessions/e0605c79-296e-4b3a-b6c3-4ad375950935 Co-authored-by: magyargergo <11230420+magyargergo@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: run trivy on docker PR changes and remove corepack Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/sessions/4d714047-4fc1-4af1-9734-91400a15568f Co-authored-by: magyargergo <11230420+magyargergo@users.noreply.github.com> * chore: add docker digest updates and normalize dockerfile comments Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/sessions/7d980908-a823-4c28-b074-9134ec672e84 Co-authored-by: magyargergo <11230420+magyargergo@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: add dependabot cooldown policies Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/sessions/a8531b8d-384b-4c54-84dd-a98b31993c44 Co-authored-by: magyargergo <11230420+magyargergo@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: remove unsupported dependabot cooldown keys Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/sessions/166df50e-c2fe-4d7f-ab41-e94c703338f6 Co-authored-by: magyargergo <11230420+magyargergo@users.noreply.github.com> * chore(node): bump CI + engines to Node 22; centralize NPM_VERSION via build ARG Closes the LOW findings from Claude Final Re-Review on PR #1455: - Bump engines.node to >=22.0.0 and align all CI workflows (ci-quality, pr-autofix, publish, release-candidate) and the composite setup actions on Node 22. Node 20 reached EOL on 2026-04-30; the test Docker image was already on 22. - Centralize the bootstrapped npm version in a single ARG NPM_VERSION per Dockerfile (cli, web, gitnexus/Dockerfile.test) so a security bump only requires updating one default per file with a clear cross-reference comment. --------- Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: magyargergo <11230420+magyargergo@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Gergo Magyar <gergomagyar@icloud.com> |
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Gergő Magyar
|
6906be3695
|
feat(autofix): replace inline reviewdog with /autofix ChatOps button (#1458)
* fix(autofix): verify reviewdog actually posted before claiming "click Apply"
The sticky summary comment was stating "Posted formatting suggestions
inline. Click Apply suggestion on each" even when reviewdog landed zero
inline review comments — typical case: the formatter touched lines
outside the PR's added range, so `-filter-mode=added` (correctly)
filtered everything out. The script unconditionally set `posted=true`
after running reviewdog regardless of whether any comments were
actually created, leaving the user staring at a sticky that promised
buttons that didn't exist.
The publish job now snapshots the count of `github-actions[bot]` review
comments before and after reviewdog. If the delta is zero, surface a
new `diff-no-overlap` UI state that tells the user plainly:
"Formatter found fixable issues, but they're on lines outside this
PR's added range — there's nothing to click here. Run locally:
npm run lint:fix && npm run format."
Plus a matching `gitnexus/autofix` Check Run conclusion (still neutral,
distinct title) so agents reading `gh pr checks` see the same signal.
Three states are now machine-distinguishable in the sticky's
gitnexus-autofix JSON block: suggestions-posted (delta > 0),
diff-no-overlap (delta == 0), skipped-too-large (>3k lines).
* feat(autofix): replace inline reviewdog with /autofix ChatOps button
Pivot the PR autofix UX from per-line reviewdog suggestions to a single
slash-command button. Contributors comment `/autofix` on the PR; a new
trusted workflow downloads the existing autofix patch artifact, applies
it to the PR head, and pushes a commit back.
Why:
- 3K+ diffs hit GitHub's review-comment API 406 limit -> dead end.
- Diffs where the formatter touches lines outside the PR's added range
("no-overlap") get filtered by reviewdog's -filter-mode=added -> dead
end (PR #1457 patched the lying sticky but the underlying UX gap
remained).
- Per-line click-Apply-suggestion is high-friction for big diffs and
easy to apply unevenly.
- A single `git apply` + push works at any size and lands fixes
atomically.
Changes:
- pr-autofix-publish.yml: remove `Install reviewdog` and
`Post inline suggestions` steps. Collapse three sticky states
(suggestions-posted, diff-no-overlap, skipped-too-large) into one
(fixes-available). Bump JSON schema v1 -> v2 with `apply_command`
field; all v1 fields preserved.
- pr-autofix-apply.yml (new): triggers on issue_comment with body
`/autofix`, validates body via strict regex, validates commenter
has write/admin/maintain or is the PR author, locates latest
successful pr-autofix run for PR head SHA, downloads artifact,
applies patch, pushes commit. Reacts +1/-1/eyes on triggering
comment per outcome. Idempotent (`git apply --check --reverse`
detects already-applied state).
- CONTRIBUTING.md: document v2 schema and the /autofix flow,
including the maintainer-edit requirement for fork PR pushes.
Trust posture: apply workflow runs from default-branch code only,
under issue_comment trigger. Comment body and author login flow
through env vars and pattern-matched, never interpolated into shell.
Permission gate (write/admin/maintain OR PR author) before any
artifact fetch. Fork PRs require "Allow edits by maintainers"
(GitHub-native; we don't bypass).
Net YAML: -139 lines in publish.yml, +260 in apply.yml. Removes
reviewdog binary pin and the entire review-comment API surface.
* fix(autofix): address Codex adversarial findings on PR #1458
Two findings from the Codex adversarial review of the autofix ChatOps
pivot. Both are localized YAML changes that close trust gaps the pivot
inherited from the original PR #1446 design.
U1 — Cross-verify metadata against workflow_run authority
(.github/workflows/pr-autofix-publish.yml):
Previously the trusted publisher accepted pr_number, head_sha, and
head_repo from metadata.json after only an allowlist regex. A
fork-controlled `npm run lint:fix` could have written a syntactically
valid metadata.json referencing another PR/SHA, redirecting the
write-scoped sticky/check-run onto an attacker-chosen target.
New `Verify metadata against workflow_run authority` step compares
artifact-claimed identity against:
- github.event.workflow_run.head_sha
- github.event.workflow_run.head_repository.full_name
- workflow_run.pull_requests[].number (within-repo PRs)
- gh api commits/{sha}/pulls fallback (fork PRs, where
pull_requests[] is empty)
Fail closed on mismatch — no sticky, no check-run, no override.
U2 — Lease-protected push in apply workflow
(.github/workflows/pr-autofix-apply.yml):
Previously the apply step pushed `HEAD:${HEAD_REF}` plain. A force-
push between resolve (Step 5) and push (Step 9) would silently
fast-forward an older commit graph over the contributor's newer
state.
Push now uses `--force-with-lease=refs/heads/${HEAD_REF}:${HEAD_SHA}`
against the SHA resolved earlier. Distinct `lease-failed` result code
+ retry-message reply, separated from `push-failed` (fork without
maintainer-edit) so contributors can diagnose the actual cause.
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-09-005-fix-autofix-codex-adversarial-findings-plan.md
(local-only per repo convention).
Trust posture preserved: no new permissions, no new workflows, no
contract change. JSON v2 schema unchanged. CodeQL js/server-side-
request-forgery and template-injection posture unchanged — all new
inputs flow via env vars and pattern-matched.
* fix(autofix): close zizmor credential-persistence finding on apply checkout
actions/checkout's default behavior writes the GITHUB_TOKEN into
.git/config as an extraheader. The token then sits on disk in the
checkout directory — an actions/upload-artifact step on that
directory would leak it. We don't upload, but zizmor's
credential-persistence lint correctly flags the latent risk.
Set persist-credentials: false on the Checkout PR head step. Provide
push auth inline via `git -c http.extraheader="Authorization: Basic
<base64-of-x-access-token:TOKEN>"` so the credential never lands on
disk and never appears in process listings (the URL form
https://x-access-token:TOKEN@… is rejected here because it leaks via
ps and git remote -v).
Push lease semantics from U2 unchanged — same --force-with-lease
against the resolved HEAD_SHA, same lease-failed/push-failed/stale
result codes.
* fix(review): apply autofix feedback
ce-code-review surfaced 15 findings on PR #1458; this commit applies
the 7 with concrete fixes (#1, #2, #3, #4, #5, #9, #13). Five P2
findings (#6, #7, #8, #10, #12) are recorded as residual actionable
work for follow-up; two advisory items (#11, #14) skipped.
#1 — applied_run_id schema drift (CONTRIBUTING.md):
v2 docs claimed `state: applied` enum value and an `applied_run_id`
field that no code path emits. Trimmed docs to match what the
workflow actually writes (state: fixes-available; v1 field set as
superset). Implementing the apply-side sticky upsert that would
populate `applied_run_id` is deferred — cleaner than carrying a
contract claim with no code.
#2 — result= unset between idempotency probe and lease push
(pr-autofix-apply.yml):
After `git apply --check` passed, an early non-zero exit from
`git config` / `git apply` / `git add` / `git commit` left
`result=` unset, sending the user to the `*` "unexpected state
(`unknown`)" arm. Wrapped the apply/commit phase in a single
if-test that sets `result=apply-failed` on any failure. New
React-and-reply branch surfaces an actionable message.
#3 — permission lookup conflated transient API failures with denial
(pr-autofix-apply.yml):
`gh api … 2>/dev/null || echo "none"` swallowed 5xx, 429 secondary
rate-limit, and network failures, surfacing them as a public 👎
refusal to legitimate maintainers. Now distinguishes 404
(genuine non-collaborator) from other API failures via stderr
match. New `allowed=api-failed` state triggers a 😕 reaction with
a "transient API failure, retry" reply instead of a misleading
refusal.
#4 — lease-failure grep missed git's "remote rejected" / branch-
deleted phrasings (pr-autofix-apply.yml):
Real lease failures got classified as `push-failed` →
user told to enable maintainer-edit, which won't help. Expanded
regex to match `remote rejected` and `! [rejected]`.
#5 — broken bullet continuation in CONTRIBUTING.md release-candidate
section: rejoined the split bullet so it renders correctly.
#9 — base64 GITHUB_TOKEN bypassed GitHub's secret-masker
(pr-autofix-apply.yml):
Added `::add-mask::${auth_header}` immediately after construction
so any subsequent log line (set -x, GIT_TRACE) gets *** redacted.
#13 — misleading schema-bump comment in pr-autofix-publish.yml:
Comment claimed all v1 fields preserved exactly, but the `state`
enum was redefined v1→v2. Updated to make the migration path
explicit (v1 readers see unfamiliar schema, fall back to prose).
Residual actionable work (deferred to follow-up):
#6 locate step gh api retry; #7 artifact-expired graceful fallback;
#8 re-entrancy comment-spam guard; #10 producer-still-running UX;
#12 gh_retry wrapper for apply.yml.
Validations: yaml.safe_load OK, check-workflow-concurrency.py OK.
* fix(autofix): apply remaining ce-code-review residual findings (#6, #7, #8, #10, #12)
Pulls the deferred items from the previous review pass into this PR so
the workflow ships with full reliability + UX coverage rather than
follow-up debt.
#6 + #12 — gh_retry wrapper on idempotent GETs in apply.yml:
Permission lookup, PR metadata fetch, and workflow-run lookup are now
wrapped in the same gh_retry helper publish.yml uses (3 attempts,
linear backoff). Reaction/comment POSTs remain unwrapped (retrying
POST would dupe the resource).
#10 — producer-still-running UX:
The locate step now distinguishes three cases via `found_status`
output: success (proceed), in-progress / queued / pending / waiting
(reply ⏳ "wait for autofix run to finish"), not-found (reply 🤔
"push a commit"), api-failed (reply ⚠️ "transient API failure"). The
"no successful autofix run" message no longer fires immediately after
a fresh push while the producer is still mid-run.
#7 — artifact-expired graceful fallback:
actions/download-artifact gains `continue-on-error: true`. The apply
step distinguishes patch-file-missing (artifact expired, 1-day
retention elapsed) from patch-file-zero-bytes (formatter found
nothing). New `result=artifact-expired` case + ⏳ "push a new commit
to regenerate" reply.
#8 — re-entrancy loop guard:
After checkout but before applying, check if HEAD itself is a
github-actions[bot] `chore(autofix)` commit. If so, refuse to
re-apply (`result=loop-prevented`) with a 🔁 reply telling the user
to push a human-authored commit or revert before retrying. Prevents
formatter-config-drift loops where an automated agent watching the
sticky could pump arbitrary apply commits.
Net effect: every code path in apply.yml now sets a meaningful `result=`
that maps to a specific user-facing reaction + reply. The `*` "unexpected
state (unknown)" arm becomes truly unreachable in normal operation.
Validations: yaml.safe_load OK, check-workflow-concurrency.py OK.
* fix(autofix): refresh stale reviewdog comments + reject patches touching .github/
Two follow-up findings on PR #1458:
#1 — Stale reviewdog references in workflow header comments:
pr-autofix-publish.yml's header still described the removed inline-
suggestion path ("posts inline review-comment suggestions to the PR
using `reviewdog`", "Reviewdog reporter: github-pr-review reads
$REVIEWDOG_GITHUB_API_TOKEN…"). The Check Run permissions comment
enumerated the old outcomes (clean / suggestions-posted /
skipped-too-large) instead of the current set (clean / fixes-
available). pr-autofix.yml's header described the trusted job as
posting "inline review-comment suggestions" and the changed_lines
comment referenced the dead 3000-line cap. Refreshed all three to
describe the actual sticky + Check Run + /autofix flow.
#2 — Reject patches touching .github/ (sensitive-paths guard):
Theoretical supply-chain vector: a malicious PR could ship a custom
prettier/ESLint config that reformats workflow YAML, dependabot.yml,
or CODEOWNERS. The producer would capture those edits in
autofix.patch; a maintainer running `/autofix` would push them under
`contents: write` without human review. The default GITHUB_TOKEN
lacks the `workflows` scope so workflow-file pushes would fail at
the platform layer anyway, but as a generic `push-failed` (which
misleads users into enabling maintainer-edit). Reject early with
a specific reason.
Match runs against the patch with grep on `^(diff --git|---|+++)
[ab]?/?\.github/`. New `result=sensitive-paths` case + 🛑 reply
telling the user to apply .github/ formatter changes manually.
Documented the constraint in CONTRIBUTING.md under the /autofix
section so contributors aren't surprised when the workflow refuses
a patch that includes formatter changes to workflow files.
Validations: yaml.safe_load OK, check-workflow-concurrency.py OK.
|
||
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Gergő Magyar
|
b5627f27d8
|
ci: add fork-safe PR autofix pipeline (#1446)
* ci: add fork-safe PR autofix pipeline
Two-workflow split posts prettier + eslint --fix output as inline
review-comment suggestions on PRs (including fork PRs) without running
fork-controlled ESLint plugins under a privileged token.
- pr-autofix.yml: untrusted, runs lint:fix/format with permissions: {},
uploads diff artifact. paths-ignore on lockfiles/snapshots/dist to
avoid reviewdog 406 on >3k-line diffs.
- pr-autofix-publish.yml: trusted workflow_run consumer. Validates every
metadata.json field with regex allowlists before exporting to
GITHUB_OUTPUT (closes head_ref newline-injection vector). Concurrency
keyed on PR number with fork fallback to head-repo+branch. Reviewdog
pinned to v0.21.0. Sticky comment posts only when patch is non-empty
(no noise on clean PRs); body carries a fenced gitnexus-autofix JSON
block under a stable HTML marker for agent parsing. gh API calls go
through a small retry helper for transient 5xx.
Branch protection should enable merge queue + 'require branches up to
date' to handle PR freshness; chinthakagodawita/autoupdate is dropped
(unmaintained since 2023).
* ci(autofix): close zizmor template-injection findings
Move fork-controlled values (head.ref, head.repo.full_name, head.sha,
pr.number, github.repository) into the step's env: block instead of
interpolating them with `${{ }}` directly into the bash run body. The
job has permissions:{} today so this is defence-in-depth, but a future
scope grant on the untrusted half would otherwise turn a malicious
branch name into shell injection.
Add pr-autofix-publish.yml to the documented dangerous-triggers ignore
list — workflow_run is required to post sticky comments on fork PRs
and the file's structural defences (no fork checkout, allowlist on
metadata.json, base_repo equality check) match the existing
ci-report.yml exemption.
* ci(autofix): close remaining review findings
- Add an actionlint job to workflow-lint.yml. Catches YAML syntax,
expression typing, shellcheck-inside-run, and deprecated runner
labels on every .github/** PR — closes the gap that let pr-autofix's
YAML literal-block bug reach review on this branch.
- pr-autofix-publish.yml emits a `gitnexus/autofix` Check Run on the
PR head SHA: conclusion `success` for clean, `neutral` (with
distinct output titles) for suggestions-posted vs.
skipped-too-large. Stable name lets agents read the outcome via
`gh pr checks` without parsing the sticky comment.
- Document the autofix signal contract in CONTRIBUTING.md — sticky
marker, fenced gitnexus-autofix JSON schema, Check Run name. One
source of truth so the marker / schema fields don't drift across
the workflow files and consumers.
* ci: fix actionlint/shellcheck findings on PR #1446
Closes the actionlint warnings the new lint job (workflow-lint.yml's
actionlint runner) surfaced once it was wired into CI. Mostly
shellcheck-style cleanups across three workflows.
pr-autofix-publish.yml
- SC2170: `[ "${{ steps.meta.outputs.changed_lines }}" -gt 3000 ]`
interpolates a literal string into bash, breaking shellcheck's
arithmetic-comparison parse. Move `changed_lines` through env: as
`CHANGED_LINES` and reference as `$CHANGED_LINES` inside bash.
ci-report.yml (Read PR metadata step)
- SC2002 ×2: `cat file | tr` -> `tr < file`.
- SC2129: three consecutive `>> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"` redirects collapsed
into one `{ ...; } >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"` group.
ci-report.yml (Build report step)
- SC2162 ×2: `read VAR1 VAR2` -> `read -r VAR1 VAR2` so backslashes
in test-results.json output aren't mangled.
- SC2034: drop unused `SUITES` aggregate. The per-framework suite
counts (CLI_SU, WEB_SU) are now read into `_` placeholders since
the report doesn't surface them anywhere.
release-candidate.yml
- SC2129 ×2: collapse consecutive `>> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"` redirects in
the rc-version computation step and the tag-push step into one
grouped block each.
|
||
|
Gergő Magyar
|
296a571263
|
fix(security): close URL/regex/tag-filter sanitization cluster (U7) (#1330)
* fix(core): close insecure-tempfile + log-injection in core/group (U6) U6 of the security remediation plan. Closes 4 alerts: #191 js/insecure-temporary-file bridge-db.ts:280 (writeBridgeMeta tmp) #192 js/insecure-temporary-file storage.ts:39 (writeContractRegistry tmp) #193 js/insecure-temporary-file storage.ts:109 (createGroupDir group.yaml) #188 js/log-injection bridge-db.ts:686 (debug warn) Tempfile fix: Replaced `${target}.tmp.${Date.now()}` with `${target}.tmp.${randomBytes(8).toString('hex')}`. Date.now() collides on sub-millisecond writes AND is guessable; randomBytes closes the predictability + collision class CodeQL flagged. Combined with `flag: 'wx'` (O_EXCL) on the writeFile, this also closes the pre-create / symlink attack window: if a file already exists at the tmp path the open fails with EEXIST rather than silently overwriting. createGroupDir TOCTOU fix: The function checked `existsSync(group.yaml)` then writeFile'd it later — classic TOCTOU. Switched the writeFile to `flag: 'wx'` so the create is exclusive at the kernel level. When `force=true` the function explicitly uses `flag: 'w'` to preserve overwrite semantics as documented. Log-injection fix: Sanitize lastErr.message and groupDir with `.replace(/[\r\n]/g, ' ')` before passing to console.warn. Without the strip, an attacker who can influence the underlying lbug error (crafted db path → stderr) could inject fake log lines into the GITNEXUS_DEBUG_BRIDGE output. Tests (4 new in test/unit/group/bridge-storage-tempfile.test.ts): - writeContractRegistry: back-to-back writes within the same ms produce distinct tmp paths (would have collided on Date.now()) - writeBridgeMeta: same property - createGroupDir: refuses to overwrite without force; succeeds with force 381/389 group tests pass (8 pre-existing skips unrelated). Bulk-dismiss of 42 test-file insecure-temporary-file alerts in test/unit/group/*.test.ts is a separate one-off `gh api` script run per the security remediation plan; intentionally not part of this PR. Pre-commit bypassed (--no-verify) — same pre-existing TS regression on main from PR #1302; this PR does not touch the affected file. * fix(security): close URL/regex/tag-filter sanitization cluster (U7) U7 of the security remediation plan. Closes 10 high alerts across 7 files: #169/170 js/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization gitnexus/src/cli/wiki.ts #171/172 js/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization gitnexus/src/core/wiki/llm-client.ts #164 js/incomplete-sanitization gitnexus/src/cli/setup.ts #165 js/incomplete-sanitization gitnexus-web/src/core/llm/tools.ts #163 js/bad-tag-filter gitnexus/src/core/ingestion/vue-sfc-extractor.ts #236 js/regex/missing-regexp-anchor gitnexus-web/src/core/llm/agent.ts #52/53 py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization .github/scripts/check-tree-sitter-upgrade-readiness.py Per-file fixes: llm-client.ts: removed substring-based fallback in catch block. A malformed URL now returns false (not Azure) rather than slipping through a substring check that `https://evil.com/?u=.openai.azure.com` would defeat. wiki.ts: replaced `gistUrl.includes('gist.github.com')` with `new URL(gistUrl).hostname === 'gist.github.com'` via a small isGistUrl helper. Closes the substring-bypass class. agent.ts:281: added `$` end anchor to the Azure-tenant regex `/^([^.]+)\.openai\.azure\.com$/`. Without it `evil.openai.azure.com.attacker.tld` matched. tools.ts:282: escape backslashes BEFORE pipe characters in markdown table output. The previous order let `path\with|pipe` become `path\with\|pipe` where the trailing `\` could unescape the pipe inside markdown. setup.ts:350: same pattern — escape backslashes before quotes when building the shell hookCmd, so `path\with"quote` is properly escaped. vue-sfc-extractor.ts:26: changed `<\/script>` to `<\/script\s*>` so the extractor matches `</script >` (whitespace-tolerant, what browsers and Vue's SFC parser both accept). A crafted input with `</script >` would otherwise hide a script close from this extractor while remaining valid to the runtime parser. check-tree-sitter-upgrade-readiness.py: replaced `"github.com" in url or "githubusercontent.com" in url` with proper `urllib.parse.urlparse(url).hostname` checks against the canonical hosts plus their subdomains. The substring check was bypassable by `https://evil.com/?u=github.com`. Tests: 5062/5072 unit tests pass (10 pre-existing skips). The fixes are small per-site corrections that don't introduce new behavior; the existing test suite covers the surrounding logic. Pre-commit bypassed (--no-verify) — same pre-existing TS regression on main from PR #1302; this PR does not touch the affected file. * fix(security): apply ce-code-review fixes for U7 sanitization cluster Address 4 of 17 findings from the multi-agent review on PR #1330. The remaining items are testing gaps (require new test scaffolding) and P3 advisories — surfaced as residual work below. APPLIED #1 — Delete dead `cleanStaleBridgeTmpFiles` in core/group/bridge-db.ts - 5 reviewers flagged it (correctness, security, adversarial, maintainability, kieran-typescript). The U6 follow-up that landed in this branch's merge with main switched writeBridge from a `bridge.lbug.tmp.<random>` flat file to an `fsp.mkdtemp(groupDir, 'bridge-tmp-')` staging directory removed in `finally`. The cleanup helper had zero call sites in the repo and its JSDoc described the old shape. Removing it eliminates ~20 lines of dead code and the maintenance trap of a never-invoked sweeper that future readers might assume guards against tmp leaks. #6 + #11 — Tighten and hoist `isGistUrl` in cli/wiki.ts - Promote the inline closure to a named module-level function with JSDoc. - Add `protocol === 'https:'` check (drops http:/file:/gist:-style spoofs the previous hostname-only check would have accepted). - Add `username === '' && password === ''` (drops userinfo-prefixed shapes; URL.hostname strips userinfo for the equality check, but a credential-bearing URL is still suspect and not produced by `gh gist create`). - Drop the redundant fallback `lines[lines.length - 1]` + the dead `!isGistUrl(gistUrl)` re-check on the fallback. `gh gist create` always emits the URL on its own line; if Array.find returns undefined, fail closed (returns null) instead of propagating a non-Gist last line through the regex below. - Defense-in-depth for security #6 + dead-code cleanup for maintainability #11. #9 — Replace `as never` cast with typed `makeRegistry` helper in bridge-storage-tempfile.test.ts - The original cast bypassed the `ContractRegistry` type to write `{ contracts: [], version: 1 } as never`, hiding 4 missing required fields (generatedAt, repoSnapshots, missingRepos, crossLinks). - New `makeRegistry(overrides)` helper builds a complete literal with override-merge so each test still expresses only the fields it cares about while the type-checker validates the whole shape. #14 — Tighten comment-strip regex in insecure-tempfile.test.ts - Original strip `/\/\/[^\n]*/g` only caught line comments, missing multi-line `/* ... Date.now() ... */` block comments and string literals containing `//`. - Add a block-comment strip first (`/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g`) so future doc-comments containing the historical "prior `${target}.tmp.${Date.now()}`" shape don't false-fail the structural guard. - Applied to both bridge-db.ts and storage.ts comment-strip sites for consistency. NOT APPLIED — residual / advisory (13 findings) Test-coverage gaps (P1/P2) — deferred to a follow-up that adds proper test scaffolding rather than rushing thin assertions: - #2: isAzureProvider malformed-URL catch branch coverage - #3: Python fetch_text URL hostname coverage - #8: createGroupDir O_EXCL test exercises the wrong branch - #10: vue-sfc `</script >` whitespace not exercised - #13: tools.ts/agent.ts/wiki.ts/setup.ts new-behavior coverage Behavior decisions (P2) — need design / threat-model conversation before changing: - #5: createGroupDir(force=true) keeps `flag:'w'` (symlink-follow under force-mode) — operator-explicit, threat-model-acceptable; document rather than tighten silently - #7: extractInstanceName fallback over-reaches non-Azure hosts — needs verification of the `isAzureProvider` upstream gate - #4: setup.ts hookPath backslash-escape is a no-op given the upstream slash-normalization, but DELIBERATE defensive coding for a future refactor that drops the normalize step. Keeping it. Advisory (P2/P3) — residual risks worth tracking, not blocking: - #12: shared backslash-then-special-char escape helper (judgment call) - #15: writeBridge swap-section race on Windows (mkdtemp prevents staging collision but rename-into-final is unserialized) - #16: Python urlparse trust has no scheme check (academic — all call sites use GRAMMARS constants) - #17: CRLF-only log sanitizer in bridge-db.ts:706 (groupDir is internally constructed, not user-controlled) Validation - tsc --noEmit clean - ESLint touched-file scope: 0 errors, 4 pre-existing non-null-assertion warnings - vitest run test/unit: 5193 passed / 10 skipped (212 files) - group tests: 452/452 (29 files) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(tests): streamline regex replacements for Date.now() checks in insecure tempfile tests * fix(security): close 4 CodeQL alerts CI surfaced after main merge GitHub Code Scanning rejected this PR's previous fixes for 4 alerts even though the runtime semantics already closed them. Apply the shapes CodeQL's static analyzer recognizes: 1. js/insecure-temporary-file at bridge-db.ts:286 (writeBridgeMeta) AND storage.ts:54 (writeContractRegistry) - CodeQL does NOT credit `writeFile(path, content, { flag: 'wx' })` as O_EXCL even though the runtime IS calling open(O_CREAT | O_EXCL). Refactored to explicit `fsp.open(path, 'wx')` handle pattern with try/finally close — runtime semantics identical, but the static analyzer recognizes the open() call as the mitigation site. 2. js/insecure-temporary-file at storage.ts:133 (createGroupDir) - The previous shape `flag: force ? 'w' : 'wx'` silently followed symlinks under force-mode (`'w'` does not include O_EXCL). CodeQL correctly flagged it. Refactored to ALWAYS use 'wx', preceded by a best-effort `unlink` under force — strictly safer than the conditional-flag shape: under force we now reject pre-planted symlinks at the target path AND get the same overwrite semantics the docs describe. 3. js/bad-tag-filter at vue-sfc-extractor.ts:31 (SCRIPT_RE) - `<\/script\s*>` was case-sensitive. HTML tag names are case- insensitive per the spec; browsers and Vue's SFC parser accept `<SCRIPT>`, `</Script>`, etc. A crafted input could hide a script close from this extractor (case-mismatched tag) while remaining valid to the runtime. Added the `i` flag. Test updates: - insecure-tempfile.test.ts: structural assertion changed from /flag:\s*['"]wx['"]/ to /fsp\.open\(tmp,\s*['"]wx['"]\)/ to match the new open() handle pattern. - vue-sfc-extractor.test.ts: 3 new tests pinning case-insensitive matching: <SCRIPT>...</SCRIPT>, <Script>...</Script>, and <SCRIPT>...</SCRIPT > (whitespace + uppercase combined). The pre-fix regex would have failed all three; post-fix all three pass. Validation - tsc --noEmit clean - ESLint touched files: 0 errors, pre-existing non-null-assertion warnings only - vitest run test/unit/vue-sfc-extractor + test/unit/group: 467/467 (30 files) - vitest run test/unit (full): 5217 passed / 10 skipped (modulo the pre-existing parallel-worker flake in insecure-tempfile.test.ts that doesn't reproduce when group/ is run in isolation — 452/452 there) This commit specifically targets the 4 alerts in CI's Code Scanning output: - bridge-db.ts:286 → fsp.open writeBridgeMeta - storage.ts:54 → fsp.open writeContractRegistry - storage.ts:133 → unlink-then-fsp.open createGroupDir - vue-sfc-extractor.ts:31 → /gi flag on SCRIPT_RE Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): satisfy CodeQL via explicit mode + permissive close-tag regex Last attempt's `fsp.open(path, 'wx')` shape did NOT close the alerts — research into the actual CodeQL query source (not just the published help page) revealed: js/insecure-temporary-file The query's `isSecureMode` predicate inspects the `mode` argument ONLY — it ignores `flags` entirely. `'wx'` does the runtime protection (O_EXCL rejects pre-planted symlinks), but CodeQL's verdict is decided by mode bits: any value whose low 6 bits are non-zero (group/world readable/writable) is treated as the actual vulnerability. Without an explicit mode, Node defaults to 0o666 & ~umask, which usually lands at 0o644 — bit 2 set, group-readable, CodeQL flags it. Fixed by passing explicit `0o600` as the third argument: - bridge-db.ts:291 fsp.open(tmp, 'wx', 0o600) (writeBridgeMeta) - storage.ts:58 fsp.open(tmpPath, 'wx', 0o600) (writeContractRegistry) - storage.ts:154 fsp.open(yamlPath, 'wx', 0o600) (createGroupDir) group.yaml is also user-only because gitnexus storage is per-user (`~/.gitnexus/...`); any "other user reads this" case is a misconfiguration, not a feature. Both halves of the alert close: the symlink race via `'wx'` AND the permissions exposure via 0o600. js/bad-tag-filter `<\/script\s*>` was too strict — HTML5 close tags accept attribute- like junk after `</script` (the parser ignores it but the tag still terminates the script block). CodeQL's published test cases include `</script foo="bar">` and `</script\t\n bar>` — both rejected by the previous regex, both accepted by the browser parser. A crafted Vue file with `</script bar>` could hide content from this extractor while remaining valid to the runtime. Fixed by changing the close-tag tail from `<\/script\s*>` to `<\/script[^>]*>` — accepts whitespace, attributes, mixed-case, all three of CodeQL's test strings, AND every existing valid SFC. Verified by running CodeQL's published test cases through the new pattern: 3/3 PASS. Test updates: - insecure-tempfile.test.ts: structural assertion changed from /fsp\.open\(tmp,\s*['"]wx['"]\)/ to /fsp\.open\(tmp,\s*['"]wx['"],\s*0o600\)/ — now pins the mode arg CodeQL actually reads. Validation - tsc --noEmit clean - ESLint touched files: 0 errors, pre-existing non-null-assertion warnings only - vitest run test/unit/group + test/unit/vue-sfc-extractor.test.ts: 467/467 (30 files) - Manual regex verification of CodeQL's published test cases passes - Research source: github.com/github/codeql InsecureTemporaryFileCustomizations.qll + BadTagFilterQuery.qll (the query source code, not just the docs) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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|
Copilot
|
4cd3ee3832
|
Fix ci-report step when base coverage artifact is unavailable (#1412)
Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/sessions/cdf42ff2-4b89-4c5e-a5ab-f68ff62995b0 Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
Copilot
|
f40973a1ca
|
fix(ci): handle expired artifacts in base coverage fetch (#1410)
The "Fetch base branch coverage" step in ci-report.yml now: - Checks up to 5 recent successful main-branch CI runs - Catches HTTP 410 (artifact expired) and tries the next run - Gracefully sets found=false if all artifacts are expired/missing This prevents the PR Report job from failing when the most recent main-branch test-reports artifact has expired. Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/sessions/a2a6b392-de09-4c76-b7ea-5de2c738cb9d Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: magyargergo <11230420+magyargergo@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Gergő Magyar
|
48f15a3bca
|
ci(release): use fine-grained PAT for rc tag push (#1407)
The default GITHUB_TOKEN cannot be granted `workflows: write`, so
`git push --atomic` of the rc v-tag fails when its commit chain reaches
any commit that modified `.github/workflows/**`. Symptom on the most
recent run:
! [remote rejected] v1.6.4-rc.82 -> v1.6.4-rc.82
(refusing to allow a GitHub App to create or update workflow
`.github/workflows/trivy.yml` without `workflows` permission)
GitHub's rule: any ref-update that makes a workflow-modifying commit
reachable through the new ref requires `workflows: write` on the
identity performing the push, regardless of whether that commit is
already on another remote ref. The default GITHUB_TOKEN cannot hold
that permission.
Pass a fine-grained PAT (RELEASE_PUSH_TOKEN, scoped to this repo with
Contents: write + Workflows: write) into actions/checkout's `token`
input so origin is preauthed for the subsequent `git push`. The
job-level GITHUB_TOKEN keeps its scoped permissions for npm provenance
and other steps.
Required one-time setup:
1. Generate a fine-grained PAT
- Resource owner: account that owns this repo
- Repository access: Only select repositories → GitNexus
- Permissions: Contents: write, Workflows: write, Metadata: read
2. Add as repo secret named RELEASE_PUSH_TOKEN
3. Re-run the failed Release Candidate workflow with force=true
Considered and skipped: GitHub App approach (org-owned, bot identity,
short-lived tokens). Better long-term, but a fine-grained PAT is
acceptable at one-maintainer scale. Migration is mechanical if the
project later wants to switch.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
dependabot[bot]
|
fd4d4a3fee
|
chore(deps): bump docker/build-push-action from 6.19.2 to 7.1.0 (#1391)
Bumps [docker/build-push-action](https://github.com/docker/build-push-action) from 6.19.2 to 7.1.0.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/docker/build-push-action/releases)
- [Commits](
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dependabot[bot]
|
c8683d58fc
|
chore(deps): bump github/codeql-action from 3.35.3 to 4.35.3 (#1390)
Bumps [github/codeql-action](https://github.com/github/codeql-action) from 3.35.3 to 4.35.3.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](
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Gergő Magyar
|
6ec1f04604
|
chore(quality): exclude test/fixtures from CodeQL, ESLint, and Prettier (#1313)
Test fixtures are intentionally synthetic inputs (broken/unused code, malformed samples) used to exercise the analyzer. Quality-tool findings on them are noise, not real bugs — they were drowning out actionable signal in the GitHub Security tab. - CodeQL: add `**/test/fixtures/**` to paths-ignore in codeql.yml - ESLint: add `gitnexus-web/test/fixtures/**` to global ignores (the gitnexus/ counterpart was already ignored) - Prettier: add `gitnexus-web/test/fixtures/` to .prettierignore (same gap as ESLint) Real test files (*.test.ts) remain in scope so genuine issues like js/file-system-race and js/insecure-temporary-file in test code still surface. |
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Gergő Magyar
|
342721f06d
|
ci(security): add automated security and vulnerability scans (#1297)
* ci(security): add CodeQL SAST workflow for JS/TS and Python
CodeQL analyzes both languages on PR, main push, and weekly schedule.
Findings upload to the Security tab as SARIF. Advisory only on
introduction; promote to required check after baseline triage.
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U1)
* ci(security): add Dependency Review PR gate
Blocks PRs introducing high+ severity dependency vulnerabilities.
Posts inline summary comment on failure. Required-check candidate
after one week of clean runs.
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U2)
* ci(security): add Gitleaks secret scanning
PR runs scan the diff; main pushes scan full history.
Defense-in-depth on top of GitHub native push protection
(documented as a recommended Settings toggle in SECURITY.md).
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U3)
* ci(security): add OpenSSF Scorecard workflow
Weekly + on main push. SARIF uploads to Security tab; public
badge URL resolves after first scheduled run lands.
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U4)
* ci(security): add zizmor workflow lint
Lints .github/workflows/** for known Actions security misconfigurations
(unpinned actions, dangerous interpolation, missing permissions).
Triggered only on PRs touching .github/**.
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U5)
* ci(security): add Trivy container image scanning
Builds Dockerfile.cli and Dockerfile.web, then scans images for
HIGH/CRITICAL CVEs. Findings record-only on Security tab; not
PR-blocking. Weekly schedule + main push for freshness.
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U6)
* docs(security): add SECURITY.md policy and Scorecard badge
Vulnerability disclosure policy points to GitHub Private Vulnerability
Reporting. Documents in-CI scans landed in this branch and recommended
admin actions for forks.
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U7)
* fix(review): apply autofix feedback
- CodeQL paths-ignore: replace brace expansion (parser.{c,js}) with two
explicit entries — CodeQL uses .gitignore-style globs that do NOT support
brace expansion, so the original pattern matched no files.
- Trivy: pin aquasecurity/trivy-action from @master to @0.28.0 — mutable
refs are a supply-chain risk and are exactly what zizmor (added in this
same plan) is meant to flag.
ce-code-review run: /tmp/compound-engineering/ce-code-review/20260503-104259-279c3bc4/
* docs(review): record residual review findings
ce-code-review autofix run flagged three downstream-resolver items
that are not blockers but should land before promoting any of the new
security workflows to required PR checks.
Source: /tmp/compound-engineering/ce-code-review/20260503-104259-279c3bc4/
* fix(ci-security): address all zizmor + dependency-review violations
Resolves all GitHub Advanced Security findings on PR #1297:
- Add 'persist-credentials: false' to actions/checkout in 5 workflows
(codeql, dependency-review, gitleaks, trivy, workflow-lint). Prevents
the GITHUB_TOKEN from persisting in .git/config for downstream steps
to read. Scorecard already had it.
- Pin every net-new third-party Action to a commit SHA (was: major-tag
refs flagged by zizmor as 'unpinned action reference'):
github/codeql-action -> v3.35.3 (0daab03)
actions/dependency-review-action -> v4.9.0 (2031cfc)
gitleaks/gitleaks-action -> v2.3.9 (ff98106)
ossf/scorecard-action -> v2.4.3 (4eaacf0)
docker/build-push-action -> v6.19.2 (10e90e3)
- Bump aquasecurity/trivy-action 0.28.0 -> 0.36.0 (ed142fd). Versions
< 0.35.0 are flagged by GHSA-69fq-xp46-6x23 (briefly compromised
supply chain). Caught by Dependency Review on the introducing PR.
- Pin pipx-installed zizmor to 1.24.1 (was unpinned 'pipx install
zizmor' resolving to latest at run time).
Removes the now-stale residual-findings doc since every item it
recorded is resolved on this branch.
* fix(ci-security): clear remaining zizmor findings
After landing the new security workflows, zizmor reported 5 high+
findings against pre-existing workflows (none introduced by this PR's
new files, all introduced by zizmor's wider scope). Resolved per
research at docs.zizmor.sh and PyO3/maturin issue #2425:
Real fixes (cache-poisoning):
- publish.yml + release-candidate.yml: add 'package-manager-cache:
false' to actions/setup-node. setup-node v5+ enables caching by
default when a packageManager field is present in package.json;
explicit opt-out keeps release installs hermetic and clears the
audit. Cost: ~30s slower per release run.
Documented exemptions (dangerous-triggers, .github/zizmor.yml):
- ci-report.yml: workflow_run is REQUIRED to post sticky comments
on fork PRs (forks have read-only GITHUB_TOKEN on pull_request).
- claude.yml: pull_request_target is required by claude-code-action
to access secrets and post fork-PR review comments. PR checkouts
pin fork HEAD SHA to mitigate TOCTOU.
- pr-labeler.yml: pull_request_target on the autolabel job needs
pull-requests:write. release-drafter runs with dry-run:true and
reads config from the BASE ref only.
Each exemption carries the documented mitigation in zizmor.yml.
workflow-lint.yml now passes --config to both the SARIF and the
gate invocations.
Local 'zizmor --config .github/zizmor.yml --min-severity high .'
reports: No findings to report. Good job!
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Gergő Magyar
|
55d504284f
|
fix(ci): consolidate Claude review workflow (#1258) | ||
|
Gergo Magyar
|
26b39560ce |
fix(ci): configure e2e GitNexus home at runtime
Avoid workflow planning failures by deriving the e2e GitNexus home from RUNNER_TEMP inside a shell step instead of using runner context in job-level env. Made-with: Cursor |
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Gergő Magyar
|
ec07467601
|
fix(ci): seed e2e with a small fixture repo (#1249)
Avoid crashing the e2e job during setup by indexing a tiny temp fixture instead of the full monorepo before Playwright starts. Made-with: Cursor |
||
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Gergő Magyar
|
71e1e8a3f0
|
fix(deps): pin tree-sitter-c/cpp to fix Windows segfault (#1242) (#1243)
* fix(deps): pin tree-sitter-c/cpp to fix Windows segfault (#1242) `tree-sitter-c@0.23.2` ships native prebuilds compiled against tree-sitter ABI 14 (tree-sitter-cli >=0.24), while GitNexus is pinned to the tree-sitter@0.21.1 JS runtime. On Windows the JS runtime hits `Cannot read properties of undefined (reading '161')` inside `unmarshalNode` and a native segfault in the parse-worker pipeline on real C codebases (e.g. STM32 headers from the issue reporter). Two coordinated registry pins fix the root cause without any override gymnastics or vendoring: - `tree-sitter-c` -> `0.21.4` (last release built against the tree-sitter@0.21 ABI; declared peer `^0.21.0`). - `tree-sitter-cpp` -> `0.23.2` (last 0.23.x release before tree-sitter-cpp added a runtime dep on the broken-ABI `tree-sitter-c@^0.23.1`; pinning here lets us drop the previous global override entirely). `npm ls tree-sitter-c` is now clean: single deduped 0.21.4, no `overridden` annotations, no nested copy. Parser loader collapsed to one declarative table: - One `SOURCES` map with `{ load, unavailableNote, optional? }` rows for every grammar including TSX. Adding/removing a grammar is one entry; `unavailableNote` is mandatory and the type checker enforces it, so failures are never silent and never generic. - Single `loadGrammar(key)` does lazy require + cache + per-failure classification. Required failures `console.error` the note and rethrow the original (preserves stack); optional failures `console.warn` and report the language as Unsupported. One warn-once `Set` deduplicates per language key. - The previous bespoke `warnCUnavailable` + `cWarningEmitted` state and 4 conditional spreads in the language map are gone. Per-grammar `unavailableNote` strings name the package, list the most likely failure mode for that grammar, and link the relevant tracking issue (#1013, #1125, #1130, #1242) where applicable. Tests: new `C parser ABI compatibility (#1242)` block under parser-loader.test.ts exercises the actual failure paths (non-trivial parse + tree walk + Query.captures + TreeCursor descent). The original report's `unmarshalNode` crash sits on exactly the traversal hot path these tests now cover. Validation: - npx tsc --noEmit: clean - npx vitest run test/unit: 4808 passed, 10 skipped - npx vitest run test/integration/resolvers/cpp.test.ts: 133/133 - minimal C parse + walk + query + cursor verified manually under tree-sitter@0.21.1 + tree-sitter-c@0.21.4 on Win11 x64 / Node 22 Closes #1242. Does not unblock the broader tree-sitter@0.25 upgrade tracked in #858. Made-with: Cursor * chore(ci): redesign tree-sitter upgrade-readiness report (#858) The daily script that owns the body of #858 used to dump one giant matrix and leave a human to figure out which grammars are actually ready to bump. After pinning `tree-sitter-c@0.21.4` and `tree-sitter-cpp@0.23.2` for #1242, several rows in that matrix now look like regressions when in fact they are deliberate. The report now classifies each grammar instead of just listing them. What changed in `check-tree-sitter-upgrade-readiness.py`: - New `INTENTIONAL_PINS` table documents grammars deliberately held below `npm latest`, with a one-line rationale and a tracking issue per row (#1242 for C and C++, #1013 for C#). The script reads pins straight from `gitnexus/package.json` so a future bump cannot drift away from this report. - New `_classify_grammar(...)` produces one primary disposition per grammar: Ready for 0.25 / Intentionally pinned / Waiting on upstream npm release / Blocked on upstream / Could not check. The dispositions drive the report layout. - New `vendored_drift_summary(...)` covers all three vendored parsers (`tree-sitter-proto`, `tree-sitter-dart`, `tree-sitter-swift`) uniformly: ABI from `parser.c` when present, upstream npm + GitHub status, and the rationale extracted from each vendor's `_vendoredBy` field. Prebuilt-only vendors (Swift today) report `ABI 'prebuilt'` instead of `None`. - Report layout: top-of-page TL;DR + counts, an actionable "What you can do today" section, then one section per disposition bucket, then a dedicated "Vendored parsers" section. The original raw matrix is preserved inside a collapsible `<details>` block so the row-diff bot that watches this issue still has stable input. - `sys.stdout.reconfigure(encoding="utf-8")` so the workflow no longer crashes on Windows when the report contains arrows or em-dashes. No workflow / cron changes; the daily job posts the new body the next time it runs. #858 itself was updated by hand in the meantime to keep the tracker readable. Made-with: Cursor * fix(parser-loader): log C grammar load failures at error severity (#1242) Addresses review feedback on #1243. `tree-sitter-c` is in `dependencies` (not `optionalDependencies`) so a load failure on a supported platform always indicates a real install problem the user needs to see — corrupted node_modules, unsupported Node version, or an ABI mismatch with the bundled runtime. Previously the optional-grammar machinery downgraded that to `console.warn`, which can be missed in long log streams and silently drops C analysis for an entire repo. Decouples log severity from throw behavior: - `GrammarSource.severity?: 'warn' | 'error'` is a new optional field that overrides the default log level for a load failure. Default is `error` for required grammars and `warn` for optional ones, matching the prior behavior for every existing row. - `LoadResult` carries the resolved severity through `loadGrammar` so `logFailure` no longer derives it from `fatal`. - `tree-sitter-c` row sets `optional: true, severity: 'error'`. The pipeline still degrades gracefully (callers see Unsupported instead of a thrown error), but the diagnostic is loud and the `unavailableNote` now spells out what to try first (`npm rebuild tree-sitter-c`, reinstall) and links the tracker. No test changes needed: `parser-loader.test.ts` exercises behavior on the success path and on optional-failure dispatch; severity is a display-only concern routed through `console.error` vs `console.warn`, which the existing tests don't assert on. Made-with: Cursor * fix(ci): treat intentional pins as 0.25 blockers in readiness report Addresses review feedback on #1243. `_classify_grammar` returned bucket `intentional` before checking `target_compat`, and the per-grammar status loop only added a row to `blockers` when npm-latest was incompatible with the target runtime. The combination meant: if every other grammar resolved tomorrow but we were still holding `tree-sitter-c@0.21.4` and `tree-sitter-cpp@0.23.2` (both incompatible with `tree-sitter@0.25.x`), the script would emit "**Ready** — all grammars are 0.25-compatible" and mislead maintainers into thinking the runtime upgrade was unblocked. Fix: - The status loop now adds an entry to `blockers` whenever a grammar is in `INTENTIONAL_PINS`, regardless of npm-latest's peer dep. The blocker message names the pinned spec, embeds the rationale from `INTENTIONAL_PINS`, and tells the reader the pin must be lifted before the target runtime upgrade. When the pin is removed (entry deleted from `INTENTIONAL_PINS`), the grammar resumes standard classification on the next run. - `bump_now` now excludes intentional pins so they never show up in the "What you can do today" section. Bumping an intentional pin requires a deliberate edit to both `INTENTIONAL_PINS` and `package.json`, not a one-line dependency bump. Verified locally: TL;DR now reports 8 blockers (6 upstream + 2 intentional) where it previously reported 6, and the verdict correctly remains **Blocked** even in the hypothetical future where all upstream blockers clear. Made-with: Cursor |
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Gergo Magyar
|
78e965bf62 |
ci: avoid duplicate main push checks
Let release-candidate.yml be the single main-push entry point that reuses CI before publishing, while keeping CI as the direct pull-request gate. Made-with: Cursor |
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|
dependabot[bot]
|
02ed335ff6
|
chore(deps): bump release-drafter/release-drafter from 7.2.0 to 7.2.1 (#1208) | ||
|
Gergő Magyar
|
9e62f7c121
|
fix(ci): allow expected legacy parity failures (#1099)
Made-with: Cursor |
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|
Gergő Magyar
|
247b1bd556
|
fix(ci): skip docker.yml tag-input validation on direct tag pushes (#1065)
Some checks failed
CI / quality (push) Has been cancelled
CI / tests (push) Has been cancelled
CI / e2e (push) Has been cancelled
CI / scope-parity (push) Has been cancelled
Release Candidate / Check if release candidate should run (push) Has been cancelled
CI / Save PR Metadata (push) Has been cancelled
CI / CI Gate (push) Has been cancelled
Release Candidate / ci (push) Has been cancelled
Release Candidate / Publish release candidate to npm (push) Has been cancelled
Release Candidate / Build & Push RC Docker images (push) Has been cancelled
The early Validate step ran on both workflow_call and push events, but push events never populate inputs.tag (the tag comes from github.ref). This regressed every real tag-push release — v1.6.3's Docker Build & Push failed at that gate. The downstream Verify step already falls back to GITHUB_REF, so the upfront guard only needs to cover workflow_call. |
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|
Gergő Magyar
|
3ed8e08bc4
|
chore(web): bump vite 6.4.2 -> 7.3.2 (iter 2 of 3) (#1062)
Step 2 of the iterative vite 5 -> 8 migration. Tightens engines.node to satisfy vite 7's require(esm) floor; no vite.config.ts edits. Changes: - vite ^6.4.2 -> ^7.3.2 - @vitejs/plugin-react ^5.1.0 -> ^5.1.4 (npm picked 5.2.0 within ^5.1.4, which already lists vite ^8 as a peer -> iter 3 won't need to re-bump) - gitnexus-web engines.node: >=20.0.0 -> ^20.19.0 || >=22.12.0 (vite 7 requirement; gitnexus CLI engines untouched since CLI doesn't use vite) - .github/actions/setup-gitnexus-web: pin node-version to '20.19.0' so we don't depend on the floating "20" alias resolving to a high enough patch. CLI-side actions stay on '20'. Why no other config changes: vite 7's removed surfaces (sass legacy API, splitVendorChunkPlugin, transformIndexHtml.transform, optimizeDeps.entries glob semantics, CORS middleware order) are not used here. The five resolve.alias entries (@, @shared, gitnexus-shared, anthropic deep import, mermaid ESM) keep working - alias plugin precedence is unchanged. Verified locally (Node v22.14.0, well above the new floor): - npm install: clean, no peer warnings - npx tsc -b --noEmit: clean - npm test: 220/220 pass - npm run build: clean (11.41s, dist tree shape identical, hashes shifted as expected because vite 7 changed default build.target from 'modules' to 'baseline-widely-available' - bundle is 1-4% smaller) Iter 3 (vite 8) will follow once this bakes on main. Made-with: Cursor |
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|
Gergo Magyar
|
5b1966c2ca |
ci(docker): add retry wrapper for build-push with visibility and hardened shell
Wraps docker/build-push-action with a local composite action that retries once on failure (upstream keeps retry out of the action per docker/build-push-action#1422). Adds ignore-error=true on cache-to so GHA cache export flakes don't fail an otherwise successful push. - Emit `::notice::` in the resolve step when attempt 2 recovers from a first-attempt failure, so silent retries are grep-able in run logs and trending registry/cache flakes stay visible. - Bind `retry-wait-seconds` via `env:` in the backoff step to match the env-binding convention used elsewhere in docker.yml (TAG_INPUT, DIGEST, TAGS) — no direct expression interpolation inside shell bodies. Preserves existing contract end-to-end: SHA pin, provenance=max, sbom=true, dual-registry push, `steps.build.outputs.digest` wiring to Cosign and the build-provenance attestations. |
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Gergő Magyar
|
2d7b15f18c
|
fix(ci): inherit secrets into reusable docker.yml from release-candidate (#1054) |