mirror of
https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus.git
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4 commits
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Copilot
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6f1cfffdd7
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fix(security): Harden CI permissions (#1454)
* Initial plan * chore(security): harden workflow permissions and pin Docker base image digests Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/sessions/2ddc8f2b-7355-48cf-9a0b-c06df66c3f47 * fix(security): restore permissions: {} on publish + release-candidate workflows These two release-publishing workflows had permissions: {} (the strictest valid form) before PR #1454, which replaced it with permissions: read-all. Every job in both files already declares its own permissions block, so the workflow-level default is only the safety net for future jobs added without one — read-all weakens that net for no benefit. Restore {} and the explanatory comment. Scorecard's TokenPermissions check accepts both forms, so this preserves U9 compliance. * fix(security): narrow permissions: read-all to contents: read on 13 workflows PR #1454 added permissions: read-all to 13 workflows that previously had no top-level permissions block. read-all is Scorecard-compliant but unnecessarily broad — every job in scope only needs contents:read at the workflow level (job-level blocks already grant the writes that any job actually performs). Snapshot of every job in the 13 workflows confirms contents:read is sufficient: - ci.yml: quality/tests/scope-parity have explicit contents:read job blocks; save-pr-meta uses upload-artifact only (no token scopes needed); ci-status is pure shell. - ci-e2e.yml, ci-quality.yml, ci-scope-parity.yml, ci-tests.yml: all jobs do checkout + npm + tsc/vitest/playwright/upload-artifact only; no API token scopes required. - claude.yml, codeql.yml, dependency-review.yml, docker.yml, gitleaks.yml, pr-labeler.yml, trivy.yml, workflow-lint.yml: all jobs already declare their own job-level blocks (security-events:write, pull-requests:write, packages:write, etc.) so the workflow-level default does not gate them. zizmor (--min-severity high) is clean on the resulting tree. Pre-existing medium findings (secrets-inherit, artipacked) are in unrelated workflows and untouched by this commit. scorecard.yml also uses read-all but pre-existed PR #1454 and is deferred to a follow-up PR per the plan's scope boundary. --------- Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Gergő Magyar <gergomagyar@icloud.com> |
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Gergő Magyar
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b5627f27d8
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ci: add fork-safe PR autofix pipeline (#1446)
* ci: add fork-safe PR autofix pipeline
Two-workflow split posts prettier + eslint --fix output as inline
review-comment suggestions on PRs (including fork PRs) without running
fork-controlled ESLint plugins under a privileged token.
- pr-autofix.yml: untrusted, runs lint:fix/format with permissions: {},
uploads diff artifact. paths-ignore on lockfiles/snapshots/dist to
avoid reviewdog 406 on >3k-line diffs.
- pr-autofix-publish.yml: trusted workflow_run consumer. Validates every
metadata.json field with regex allowlists before exporting to
GITHUB_OUTPUT (closes head_ref newline-injection vector). Concurrency
keyed on PR number with fork fallback to head-repo+branch. Reviewdog
pinned to v0.21.0. Sticky comment posts only when patch is non-empty
(no noise on clean PRs); body carries a fenced gitnexus-autofix JSON
block under a stable HTML marker for agent parsing. gh API calls go
through a small retry helper for transient 5xx.
Branch protection should enable merge queue + 'require branches up to
date' to handle PR freshness; chinthakagodawita/autoupdate is dropped
(unmaintained since 2023).
* ci(autofix): close zizmor template-injection findings
Move fork-controlled values (head.ref, head.repo.full_name, head.sha,
pr.number, github.repository) into the step's env: block instead of
interpolating them with `${{ }}` directly into the bash run body. The
job has permissions:{} today so this is defence-in-depth, but a future
scope grant on the untrusted half would otherwise turn a malicious
branch name into shell injection.
Add pr-autofix-publish.yml to the documented dangerous-triggers ignore
list — workflow_run is required to post sticky comments on fork PRs
and the file's structural defences (no fork checkout, allowlist on
metadata.json, base_repo equality check) match the existing
ci-report.yml exemption.
* ci(autofix): close remaining review findings
- Add an actionlint job to workflow-lint.yml. Catches YAML syntax,
expression typing, shellcheck-inside-run, and deprecated runner
labels on every .github/** PR — closes the gap that let pr-autofix's
YAML literal-block bug reach review on this branch.
- pr-autofix-publish.yml emits a `gitnexus/autofix` Check Run on the
PR head SHA: conclusion `success` for clean, `neutral` (with
distinct output titles) for suggestions-posted vs.
skipped-too-large. Stable name lets agents read the outcome via
`gh pr checks` without parsing the sticky comment.
- Document the autofix signal contract in CONTRIBUTING.md — sticky
marker, fenced gitnexus-autofix JSON schema, Check Run name. One
source of truth so the marker / schema fields don't drift across
the workflow files and consumers.
* ci: fix actionlint/shellcheck findings on PR #1446
Closes the actionlint warnings the new lint job (workflow-lint.yml's
actionlint runner) surfaced once it was wired into CI. Mostly
shellcheck-style cleanups across three workflows.
pr-autofix-publish.yml
- SC2170: `[ "${{ steps.meta.outputs.changed_lines }}" -gt 3000 ]`
interpolates a literal string into bash, breaking shellcheck's
arithmetic-comparison parse. Move `changed_lines` through env: as
`CHANGED_LINES` and reference as `$CHANGED_LINES` inside bash.
ci-report.yml (Read PR metadata step)
- SC2002 ×2: `cat file | tr` -> `tr < file`.
- SC2129: three consecutive `>> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"` redirects collapsed
into one `{ ...; } >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"` group.
ci-report.yml (Build report step)
- SC2162 ×2: `read VAR1 VAR2` -> `read -r VAR1 VAR2` so backslashes
in test-results.json output aren't mangled.
- SC2034: drop unused `SUITES` aggregate. The per-framework suite
counts (CLI_SU, WEB_SU) are now read into `_` placeholders since
the report doesn't surface them anywhere.
release-candidate.yml
- SC2129 ×2: collapse consecutive `>> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"` redirects in
the rc-version computation step and the tag-push step into one
grouped block each.
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dependabot[bot]
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c8683d58fc
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chore(deps): bump github/codeql-action from 3.35.3 to 4.35.3 (#1390)
Bumps [github/codeql-action](https://github.com/github/codeql-action) from 3.35.3 to 4.35.3.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](
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Gergő Magyar
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342721f06d
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ci(security): add automated security and vulnerability scans (#1297)
* ci(security): add CodeQL SAST workflow for JS/TS and Python
CodeQL analyzes both languages on PR, main push, and weekly schedule.
Findings upload to the Security tab as SARIF. Advisory only on
introduction; promote to required check after baseline triage.
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U1)
* ci(security): add Dependency Review PR gate
Blocks PRs introducing high+ severity dependency vulnerabilities.
Posts inline summary comment on failure. Required-check candidate
after one week of clean runs.
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U2)
* ci(security): add Gitleaks secret scanning
PR runs scan the diff; main pushes scan full history.
Defense-in-depth on top of GitHub native push protection
(documented as a recommended Settings toggle in SECURITY.md).
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U3)
* ci(security): add OpenSSF Scorecard workflow
Weekly + on main push. SARIF uploads to Security tab; public
badge URL resolves after first scheduled run lands.
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U4)
* ci(security): add zizmor workflow lint
Lints .github/workflows/** for known Actions security misconfigurations
(unpinned actions, dangerous interpolation, missing permissions).
Triggered only on PRs touching .github/**.
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U5)
* ci(security): add Trivy container image scanning
Builds Dockerfile.cli and Dockerfile.web, then scans images for
HIGH/CRITICAL CVEs. Findings record-only on Security tab; not
PR-blocking. Weekly schedule + main push for freshness.
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U6)
* docs(security): add SECURITY.md policy and Scorecard badge
Vulnerability disclosure policy points to GitHub Private Vulnerability
Reporting. Documents in-CI scans landed in this branch and recommended
admin actions for forks.
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U7)
* fix(review): apply autofix feedback
- CodeQL paths-ignore: replace brace expansion (parser.{c,js}) with two
explicit entries — CodeQL uses .gitignore-style globs that do NOT support
brace expansion, so the original pattern matched no files.
- Trivy: pin aquasecurity/trivy-action from @master to @0.28.0 — mutable
refs are a supply-chain risk and are exactly what zizmor (added in this
same plan) is meant to flag.
ce-code-review run: /tmp/compound-engineering/ce-code-review/20260503-104259-279c3bc4/
* docs(review): record residual review findings
ce-code-review autofix run flagged three downstream-resolver items
that are not blockers but should land before promoting any of the new
security workflows to required PR checks.
Source: /tmp/compound-engineering/ce-code-review/20260503-104259-279c3bc4/
* fix(ci-security): address all zizmor + dependency-review violations
Resolves all GitHub Advanced Security findings on PR #1297:
- Add 'persist-credentials: false' to actions/checkout in 5 workflows
(codeql, dependency-review, gitleaks, trivy, workflow-lint). Prevents
the GITHUB_TOKEN from persisting in .git/config for downstream steps
to read. Scorecard already had it.
- Pin every net-new third-party Action to a commit SHA (was: major-tag
refs flagged by zizmor as 'unpinned action reference'):
github/codeql-action -> v3.35.3 (0daab03)
actions/dependency-review-action -> v4.9.0 (2031cfc)
gitleaks/gitleaks-action -> v2.3.9 (ff98106)
ossf/scorecard-action -> v2.4.3 (4eaacf0)
docker/build-push-action -> v6.19.2 (10e90e3)
- Bump aquasecurity/trivy-action 0.28.0 -> 0.36.0 (ed142fd). Versions
< 0.35.0 are flagged by GHSA-69fq-xp46-6x23 (briefly compromised
supply chain). Caught by Dependency Review on the introducing PR.
- Pin pipx-installed zizmor to 1.24.1 (was unpinned 'pipx install
zizmor' resolving to latest at run time).
Removes the now-stale residual-findings doc since every item it
recorded is resolved on this branch.
* fix(ci-security): clear remaining zizmor findings
After landing the new security workflows, zizmor reported 5 high+
findings against pre-existing workflows (none introduced by this PR's
new files, all introduced by zizmor's wider scope). Resolved per
research at docs.zizmor.sh and PyO3/maturin issue #2425:
Real fixes (cache-poisoning):
- publish.yml + release-candidate.yml: add 'package-manager-cache:
false' to actions/setup-node. setup-node v5+ enables caching by
default when a packageManager field is present in package.json;
explicit opt-out keeps release installs hermetic and clears the
audit. Cost: ~30s slower per release run.
Documented exemptions (dangerous-triggers, .github/zizmor.yml):
- ci-report.yml: workflow_run is REQUIRED to post sticky comments
on fork PRs (forks have read-only GITHUB_TOKEN on pull_request).
- claude.yml: pull_request_target is required by claude-code-action
to access secrets and post fork-PR review comments. PR checkouts
pin fork HEAD SHA to mitigate TOCTOU.
- pr-labeler.yml: pull_request_target on the autolabel job needs
pull-requests:write. release-drafter runs with dry-run:true and
reads config from the BASE ref only.
Each exemption carries the documented mitigation in zizmor.yml.
workflow-lint.yml now passes --config to both the SARIF and the
gate invocations.
Local 'zizmor --config .github/zizmor.yml --min-severity high .'
reports: No findings to report. Good job!
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