* ci(release): skip rc build on release PRs
Suppress the auto-fired Release Candidate workflow when:
1. The HEAD commit subject matches `chore: release vX.Y.Z` (the canonical
release-PR title), or
2. The squash-merged PR carries the `release` label.
Either match short-circuits the guard to should_run=false. This prevents the
rc cycle from racing publish.yml on the v-tag (as happened on v1.6.4 where
we had to manually cancel the auto-fired RC run after merging PR #1473).
Adds pull-requests: read to the guard job for the label lookup. A failed
gh API call falls through to the existing dedup logic rather than silently
suppressing rc builds.
* ci(release): address PR #1474 review — anchor regex + sanitise log echo
Two minor follow-ups from Claude's review:
1. End-anchor the release-subject regex. The previous shape
^chore: release vX.Y.Z would match noisy variants like
chore: release v1.0.0 (something unrelated). The new shape
requires either the bare title or the canonical squash-merge
(#NNNN) suffix exactly.
2. Sanitise HEAD_SUBJECT before echoing to logs. git %s strips
newlines so LF injection is impossible, but a hypothetical
subject containing ::error:: or ::set-output:: could otherwise
forge GitHub Actions annotation entries. Defence-in-depth.
Both findings flagged minor / does not block merge — applying
anyway since they are trivial.
* fix: pin Docker node base images and remediate bundled npm CVEs
Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/sessions/e0605c79-296e-4b3a-b6c3-4ad375950935
Co-authored-by: magyargergo <11230420+magyargergo@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: run trivy on docker PR changes and remove corepack
Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/sessions/4d714047-4fc1-4af1-9734-91400a15568f
Co-authored-by: magyargergo <11230420+magyargergo@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore: add docker digest updates and normalize dockerfile comments
Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/sessions/7d980908-a823-4c28-b074-9134ec672e84
Co-authored-by: magyargergo <11230420+magyargergo@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: add dependabot cooldown policies
Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/sessions/a8531b8d-384b-4c54-84dd-a98b31993c44
Co-authored-by: magyargergo <11230420+magyargergo@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: remove unsupported dependabot cooldown keys
Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/sessions/166df50e-c2fe-4d7f-ab41-e94c703338f6
Co-authored-by: magyargergo <11230420+magyargergo@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore(node): bump CI + engines to Node 22; centralize NPM_VERSION via build ARG
Closes the LOW findings from Claude Final Re-Review on PR #1455:
- Bump engines.node to >=22.0.0 and align all CI workflows (ci-quality,
pr-autofix, publish, release-candidate) and the composite setup
actions on Node 22. Node 20 reached EOL on 2026-04-30; the test
Docker image was already on 22.
- Centralize the bootstrapped npm version in a single ARG NPM_VERSION
per Dockerfile (cli, web, gitnexus/Dockerfile.test) so a security
bump only requires updating one default per file with a clear
cross-reference comment.
---------
Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: magyargergo <11230420+magyargergo@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Gergo Magyar <gergomagyar@icloud.com>
* ci: add fork-safe PR autofix pipeline
Two-workflow split posts prettier + eslint --fix output as inline
review-comment suggestions on PRs (including fork PRs) without running
fork-controlled ESLint plugins under a privileged token.
- pr-autofix.yml: untrusted, runs lint:fix/format with permissions: {},
uploads diff artifact. paths-ignore on lockfiles/snapshots/dist to
avoid reviewdog 406 on >3k-line diffs.
- pr-autofix-publish.yml: trusted workflow_run consumer. Validates every
metadata.json field with regex allowlists before exporting to
GITHUB_OUTPUT (closes head_ref newline-injection vector). Concurrency
keyed on PR number with fork fallback to head-repo+branch. Reviewdog
pinned to v0.21.0. Sticky comment posts only when patch is non-empty
(no noise on clean PRs); body carries a fenced gitnexus-autofix JSON
block under a stable HTML marker for agent parsing. gh API calls go
through a small retry helper for transient 5xx.
Branch protection should enable merge queue + 'require branches up to
date' to handle PR freshness; chinthakagodawita/autoupdate is dropped
(unmaintained since 2023).
* ci(autofix): close zizmor template-injection findings
Move fork-controlled values (head.ref, head.repo.full_name, head.sha,
pr.number, github.repository) into the step's env: block instead of
interpolating them with `${{ }}` directly into the bash run body. The
job has permissions:{} today so this is defence-in-depth, but a future
scope grant on the untrusted half would otherwise turn a malicious
branch name into shell injection.
Add pr-autofix-publish.yml to the documented dangerous-triggers ignore
list — workflow_run is required to post sticky comments on fork PRs
and the file's structural defences (no fork checkout, allowlist on
metadata.json, base_repo equality check) match the existing
ci-report.yml exemption.
* ci(autofix): close remaining review findings
- Add an actionlint job to workflow-lint.yml. Catches YAML syntax,
expression typing, shellcheck-inside-run, and deprecated runner
labels on every .github/** PR — closes the gap that let pr-autofix's
YAML literal-block bug reach review on this branch.
- pr-autofix-publish.yml emits a `gitnexus/autofix` Check Run on the
PR head SHA: conclusion `success` for clean, `neutral` (with
distinct output titles) for suggestions-posted vs.
skipped-too-large. Stable name lets agents read the outcome via
`gh pr checks` without parsing the sticky comment.
- Document the autofix signal contract in CONTRIBUTING.md — sticky
marker, fenced gitnexus-autofix JSON schema, Check Run name. One
source of truth so the marker / schema fields don't drift across
the workflow files and consumers.
* ci: fix actionlint/shellcheck findings on PR #1446
Closes the actionlint warnings the new lint job (workflow-lint.yml's
actionlint runner) surfaced once it was wired into CI. Mostly
shellcheck-style cleanups across three workflows.
pr-autofix-publish.yml
- SC2170: `[ "${{ steps.meta.outputs.changed_lines }}" -gt 3000 ]`
interpolates a literal string into bash, breaking shellcheck's
arithmetic-comparison parse. Move `changed_lines` through env: as
`CHANGED_LINES` and reference as `$CHANGED_LINES` inside bash.
ci-report.yml (Read PR metadata step)
- SC2002 ×2: `cat file | tr` -> `tr < file`.
- SC2129: three consecutive `>> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"` redirects collapsed
into one `{ ...; } >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"` group.
ci-report.yml (Build report step)
- SC2162 ×2: `read VAR1 VAR2` -> `read -r VAR1 VAR2` so backslashes
in test-results.json output aren't mangled.
- SC2034: drop unused `SUITES` aggregate. The per-framework suite
counts (CLI_SU, WEB_SU) are now read into `_` placeholders since
the report doesn't surface them anywhere.
release-candidate.yml
- SC2129 ×2: collapse consecutive `>> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"` redirects in
the rc-version computation step and the tag-push step into one
grouped block each.
The default GITHUB_TOKEN cannot be granted `workflows: write`, so
`git push --atomic` of the rc v-tag fails when its commit chain reaches
any commit that modified `.github/workflows/**`. Symptom on the most
recent run:
! [remote rejected] v1.6.4-rc.82 -> v1.6.4-rc.82
(refusing to allow a GitHub App to create or update workflow
`.github/workflows/trivy.yml` without `workflows` permission)
GitHub's rule: any ref-update that makes a workflow-modifying commit
reachable through the new ref requires `workflows: write` on the
identity performing the push, regardless of whether that commit is
already on another remote ref. The default GITHUB_TOKEN cannot hold
that permission.
Pass a fine-grained PAT (RELEASE_PUSH_TOKEN, scoped to this repo with
Contents: write + Workflows: write) into actions/checkout's `token`
input so origin is preauthed for the subsequent `git push`. The
job-level GITHUB_TOKEN keeps its scoped permissions for npm provenance
and other steps.
Required one-time setup:
1. Generate a fine-grained PAT
- Resource owner: account that owns this repo
- Repository access: Only select repositories → GitNexus
- Permissions: Contents: write, Workflows: write, Metadata: read
2. Add as repo secret named RELEASE_PUSH_TOKEN
3. Re-run the failed Release Candidate workflow with force=true
Considered and skipped: GitHub App approach (org-owned, bot identity,
short-lived tokens). Better long-term, but a fine-grained PAT is
acceptable at one-maintainer scale. Migration is mechanical if the
project later wants to switch.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* ci(security): add CodeQL SAST workflow for JS/TS and Python
CodeQL analyzes both languages on PR, main push, and weekly schedule.
Findings upload to the Security tab as SARIF. Advisory only on
introduction; promote to required check after baseline triage.
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U1)
* ci(security): add Dependency Review PR gate
Blocks PRs introducing high+ severity dependency vulnerabilities.
Posts inline summary comment on failure. Required-check candidate
after one week of clean runs.
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U2)
* ci(security): add Gitleaks secret scanning
PR runs scan the diff; main pushes scan full history.
Defense-in-depth on top of GitHub native push protection
(documented as a recommended Settings toggle in SECURITY.md).
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U3)
* ci(security): add OpenSSF Scorecard workflow
Weekly + on main push. SARIF uploads to Security tab; public
badge URL resolves after first scheduled run lands.
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U4)
* ci(security): add zizmor workflow lint
Lints .github/workflows/** for known Actions security misconfigurations
(unpinned actions, dangerous interpolation, missing permissions).
Triggered only on PRs touching .github/**.
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U5)
* ci(security): add Trivy container image scanning
Builds Dockerfile.cli and Dockerfile.web, then scans images for
HIGH/CRITICAL CVEs. Findings record-only on Security tab; not
PR-blocking. Weekly schedule + main push for freshness.
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U6)
* docs(security): add SECURITY.md policy and Scorecard badge
Vulnerability disclosure policy points to GitHub Private Vulnerability
Reporting. Documents in-CI scans landed in this branch and recommended
admin actions for forks.
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U7)
* fix(review): apply autofix feedback
- CodeQL paths-ignore: replace brace expansion (parser.{c,js}) with two
explicit entries — CodeQL uses .gitignore-style globs that do NOT support
brace expansion, so the original pattern matched no files.
- Trivy: pin aquasecurity/trivy-action from @master to @0.28.0 — mutable
refs are a supply-chain risk and are exactly what zizmor (added in this
same plan) is meant to flag.
ce-code-review run: /tmp/compound-engineering/ce-code-review/20260503-104259-279c3bc4/
* docs(review): record residual review findings
ce-code-review autofix run flagged three downstream-resolver items
that are not blockers but should land before promoting any of the new
security workflows to required PR checks.
Source: /tmp/compound-engineering/ce-code-review/20260503-104259-279c3bc4/
* fix(ci-security): address all zizmor + dependency-review violations
Resolves all GitHub Advanced Security findings on PR #1297:
- Add 'persist-credentials: false' to actions/checkout in 5 workflows
(codeql, dependency-review, gitleaks, trivy, workflow-lint). Prevents
the GITHUB_TOKEN from persisting in .git/config for downstream steps
to read. Scorecard already had it.
- Pin every net-new third-party Action to a commit SHA (was: major-tag
refs flagged by zizmor as 'unpinned action reference'):
github/codeql-action -> v3.35.3 (0daab03)
actions/dependency-review-action -> v4.9.0 (2031cfc)
gitleaks/gitleaks-action -> v2.3.9 (ff98106)
ossf/scorecard-action -> v2.4.3 (4eaacf0)
docker/build-push-action -> v6.19.2 (10e90e3)
- Bump aquasecurity/trivy-action 0.28.0 -> 0.36.0 (ed142fd). Versions
< 0.35.0 are flagged by GHSA-69fq-xp46-6x23 (briefly compromised
supply chain). Caught by Dependency Review on the introducing PR.
- Pin pipx-installed zizmor to 1.24.1 (was unpinned 'pipx install
zizmor' resolving to latest at run time).
Removes the now-stale residual-findings doc since every item it
recorded is resolved on this branch.
* fix(ci-security): clear remaining zizmor findings
After landing the new security workflows, zizmor reported 5 high+
findings against pre-existing workflows (none introduced by this PR's
new files, all introduced by zizmor's wider scope). Resolved per
research at docs.zizmor.sh and PyO3/maturin issue #2425:
Real fixes (cache-poisoning):
- publish.yml + release-candidate.yml: add 'package-manager-cache:
false' to actions/setup-node. setup-node v5+ enables caching by
default when a packageManager field is present in package.json;
explicit opt-out keeps release installs hermetic and clears the
audit. Cost: ~30s slower per release run.
Documented exemptions (dangerous-triggers, .github/zizmor.yml):
- ci-report.yml: workflow_run is REQUIRED to post sticky comments
on fork PRs (forks have read-only GITHUB_TOKEN on pull_request).
- claude.yml: pull_request_target is required by claude-code-action
to access secrets and post fork-PR review comments. PR checkouts
pin fork HEAD SHA to mitigate TOCTOU.
- pr-labeler.yml: pull_request_target on the autolabel job needs
pull-requests:write. release-drafter runs with dry-run:true and
reads config from the BASE ref only.
Each exemption carries the documented mitigation in zizmor.yml.
workflow-lint.yml now passes --config to both the SARIF and the
gate invocations.
Local 'zizmor --config .github/zizmor.yml --min-severity high .'
reports: No findings to report. Good job!
* Initial plan
* fix: guard docker job and add tag validation in docker.yml
- Add `&& needs.publish.outputs.vtag != ''` to the `docker` job's
`if:` in release-candidate.yml so it is skipped when publish
produces no vtag, preventing an opaque buildx "tag is needed" error.
- Add an early "Validate tag input" step in docker.yml that fails fast
with a clear ::error:: message when inputs.tag is empty, covering
direct workflow_call invocations that bypass the release-candidate
guard.
Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/sessions/b9afe2df-85ea-4a87-bf30-77f0e945a64d
Co-authored-by: magyargergo <11230420+magyargergo@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: scope docker.yml tag validation to workflow_call only
Direct tag-push triggers (on: push, tags: v*) populate the tag from
GITHUB_REF and have inputs.tag empty, so the unconditional validation
step would fail every direct tag-push run. Restrict the new step to
workflow_call invocations, which is the only path where an empty tag
is actually a problem.
Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/sessions/4b7e3bfa-15c0-4186-affa-95cd71e50153
Co-authored-by: magyargergo <11230420+magyargergo@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: magyargergo <11230420+magyargergo@users.noreply.github.com>
* ci: standardize workflow concurrency and automate release-note labeling
Concurrency — prevent racing CI jobs
- Every top-level workflow now declares an explicit concurrency block.
- PR runs cancel-in-progress on supersede; main/push/workflow_call/publish
runs queue instead of cancelling so every commit and every release is
validated end-to-end.
- ci.yml uses a literal `CI-` prefix (not `${{ github.workflow }}`) and a
per-run nested group for workflow_call invocations, avoiding a potential
deadlock with publish.yml and release-candidate.yml callers whose own
concurrency groups could otherwise collide with the called workflow.
- ci-report.yml falls back to `<head-repo>/<head-branch>` for fork PRs
(stable across reruns) instead of the per-run-unique workflow_run.id
which did not actually serialize anything.
- ci-quality.yml enforces the convention: fails CI if any non-reusable
workflow lacks a concurrency block or a reusable workflow declares one.
Release-note automation
- New pr-labeler.yml: amannn/action-semantic-pull-request enforces
conventional-commit PR titles on pull_request (fork-safe, read-only);
release-drafter/release-drafter with disable-releaser: true applies the
matching label under pull_request_target (write-scoped). sync-labels in
.github/release-drafter.yml removes managed autolabels that no longer
match (e.g. when `!` or `BREAKING CHANGE:` is dropped from a PR).
- .github/release.yml (unchanged) continues to map labels to categorized
release-notes sections.
- dependabot.yml added for the github-actions ecosystem so pinned SHAs
auto-refresh on a weekly cadence.
Docs
- CONTRIBUTING.md documents the concurrency convention, the
conventional-commit PR-title rules, and the reusable-workflow exception.
Follow-up to verify before relying on the labeler in anger
- gh api repos/amannn/action-semantic-pull-request/git/refs/tags/v5.5.3
- gh api repos/release-drafter/release-drafter/git/refs/tags/v6.0.0
- Confirm release-drafter reads its config from the base ref (not fork
head) when invoked via pull_request_target.
* ci: address PR review feedback on concurrency and labeler workflows
Two blocking fixes
- pr-labeler.yml: separate concurrency slots for pull_request and
pull_request_target. Previously both triggers shared a single group
with cancel-in-progress: true, so the privileged autolabel run could
cancel the title-validation check mid-run and leave a required status
in a permanent cancelled state.
- pr-labeler.yml autolabel job: add contents: read. release-drafter's
context.config() reads .github/release-drafter.yml from the default
branch via the repo-contents API and 403s without the scope. Job-level
permissions nullify all unlisted scopes so an explicit grant is needed.
Two non-blocking improvements
- Replace the hardcoded reusable-workflow allowlist in ci-quality.yml
with dynamic on:-block parsing. New workflow_call-only workflows no
longer produce false-positive convention failures.
- Implement actual group-key validation. The check now also asserts that
every concurrency.group expression references either ${{ github.workflow }}
or the literal CI- prefix (the documented ci.yml exception).
- Script extracted to .github/scripts/check-workflow-concurrency.py so
it is runnable locally and independently testable.
* feat(ci): add release-candidate publish pipeline
Auto-publishes gitnexus@rc on every merge to main. Version scheme is
canonical semver X.Y.Z-rc.N where the base is the current npm 'latest'
bumped by the 'bump' input (default patch) and N auto-increments by
querying existing rc versions on the registry. First rc for a new base
is rc.1; the counter resets naturally when the base advances after a
stable release.
- Reuses ci.yml via workflow_call so tests must pass before publish
- SHA-pinned actions, per-job permission scoping, provenance enabled
- Guard job dedupes duplicate dispatches against HEAD via v*-rc.* tags
- Docs-only pushes skipped via paths-ignore
- workflow_dispatch inputs: bump (patch/minor/major), force (override guard)
- Publishes under the 'rc' dist-tag so 'latest' is never moved
- Tags commits as v<rc-version> and creates GitHub prereleases
* fix(ci): address release-candidate review feedback
- Sort rc tags by creatordate (handles out-of-order pushes correctly)
- Fail fast on npm registry errors; only fall back to package.json on E404
- Drop unused pull-requests: write permission on the reused CI job
- Add secrets: inherit so any future CI secrets are available to sub-jobs
- Remove unused reltag step output
* fix(ci): address Copilot review comments
- Correct concurrency comment (runs serialize on same ref, not overlap)
- Apply E404-only fallback to 'npm view versions' query, matching the
pattern used for the 'npm view version' query
- README: clarify that docs-only merges don't trigger rc publish
- CONTRIBUTING: drop 'from main' claim for publish.yml; the tag-push
trigger does not enforce branch reachability
* fix(ci): address adversarial review — idempotency, cycle continuity, tag integrity
Codex adversarial review flagged three release-safety issues in the rc
pipeline. Fixes:
1. Cycle continuity (H). Non-patch rc trains no longer collapse back to
patch on the next push. 'bump' input accepts a new 'auto' value
(default) that infers the active rc base from the registry: if any
X.Y.Z-rc.* exists with X.Y.Z > latest, continue that base; otherwise
patch-bump. Explicit patch/minor/major still forces a cycle reset and
now also bypasses the dedup guard so an explicit dispatch on a
tagged HEAD is honored.
2. Idempotency across post-publish failures (H). The guard marker
('rc/<HEAD_SHA>' lightweight tag) and the release tag ('v<RC>'
annotated) are now pushed atomically *before* 'npm publish'. A
publish failure leaves the marker in place and the guard refuses to
re-publish. Added a defensive 'npm view <pkg>@<rc> version' check
before publish to catch registry-level races. Recovery path
documented in CONTRIBUTING.md.
3. Tag ↔ package integrity (M). 'v<RC>' now points at a detached
release commit whose tree contains the rewritten package.json, so
the tag's source archive matches the npm tarball exactly. 'main'
stays pristine; the release commit is reachable only via the tag.
* fix(ci): surface registry errors on defensive version check; drop actions: read
- npm view <pkg>@<rc> version now distinguishes E404 (safe) from network
failures (abort) via the same mktemp+grep pattern used for the other
two npm view calls
- Dropped actions: read on the ci workflow_call — no sub-workflow uses
the Actions API
