6 commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Gergő Magyar	94f67d79d5	fix(analyze): make incremental analyze skip the derived layers it can reuse (#3016) (#3102) ... * fix(analyze): make incremental analyze skip the derived layers it can reuse (#3016) A warm incremental run only ever wrote a handful of files, but it still paid for the whole graph on the way out: Leiden ran over every node, flow extraction re-derived every process, and all FTS indexes were dropped and rebuilt from scratch. On a small edit that tail dominated the run, which is why "incremental" did not feel incremental. Reuse what the previous run already derived when the write plan allows it. The pipeline holds back community detection and flow extraction whenever the persisted metadata says this run is a candidate for a surgical write; the DB keeps its Community/Process rows instead of a wipe-and-rewrite; and the FTS sweep is narrowed to the indexes the run actually has to touch. The bet is placed before the pipeline and settled after it. Any plan that turns out to need a freshly derived layer — full rebuild, escalated write, or an incremental diff with deleted files — runs the held-back phases through `runDeferredDerivedPhases`, against the same graph and phase outputs, so its output is identical to never having skipped them. Correctness details worth naming, since each one silently loses data if got wrong: - The MEMBER_OF / STEP_IN_PROCESS edges of the changed files are snapshotted before the DETACH DELETE and reattached after the subgraph load. Both endpoints are matched by explicit label: `labels(n)[0]` over an unlabelled match returns an empty string on this engine, which produced a snapshot that restored nothing. - The FTS narrowing unions three sets — what the writeback deletes (a DB probe, because a symbol the edit removed is in no fresh graph but is still a row), what it inserts (the fresh graph), and what is missing right now (else a prior escalation's dropped indexes would never come back). An unreadable index catalog withdraws the narrowing entirely. - Deletions disqualify reuse outright: persisted derived rows can reference nodes this run removes, and nothing short of re-deriving can tell which. Covered by the existing incremental suites, including the incremental-equals-force byte-equivalence test and the #2589 drop-before-delete ordering test, plus unit tests for the new helpers. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(analyze): address #3102 review on derived reuse and FTS narrowing Re-run Leiden/flows unless the file-hash diff is empty, restore ENTRY_POINT_OF on the preserve path, always drop class_fts before Spring synthetic Class DML, and reject seeded duplicate phase names. Prettier and exact FTS drop-ordering assertions unblock CI and pin the #2589/#3016 contract. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * refactor(analyze): reuse FileHashDiff for derived-layer preserve Drop the count DTO, share phase-name uniqueness, and remove the File FTS sentinel that Class already makes unreachable. Refs #3102 Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * style(analyze): prettier-wrap shouldPreservePersistedDerivedGraph quality / format failed on the Pick<FileHashDiff> signature wrapping. Refs #3102 Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Gergo Magyar <gergomagyar0@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>	2026-08-30 17:07:57 +00:00
Gergő Magyar	5cfa402346	fix(fts): keep binary payloads out of the description column, confine an unbuildable index to its own table (#2919) ... * fix(fts): keep binary payloads out of the indexed description column Issue #2889 reports embedded binary and serialized data reaching LadybugDB through `description`. The vector is real, but not for the reason the report gives, and the detector that was supposed to stop it cannot see it. Every file enters the pipeline through a lossy `utf-8` decode — the CSV emitter's own content cache reads with `fs.readFile(path, 'utf-8')`, and so does the parse worker. An invalid byte sequence therefore never survives as invalid bytes; it is replaced with U+FFFD. `isBinaryContent` counted control bytes and DEL only, and charCode 0xFFFD is neither, so a wholly corrupt payload scored as clean text: on a real repro, a Vue/JS file carrying a class file constant pool produced the description `用户服务 handles 数据 <7×U+FFFD>MethCw` and the detector returned false. Counting U+FFFD toward the existing 10% threshold is what makes the function see the case it exists for. A legitimate source file carries no replacement characters at all unless it was mis-decoded, and a handful still score far under the bar. `formatFtsDescription` then gates on it. `content` has always been gated inside `extractContent`; `description` never was, so a symbol whose doc comment is really a slice of an embedded payload had that payload copied verbatim into an FTS-indexed column. Empty string rather than a sentinel: unlike `content`, a description has no reader that needs to be told why it is missing. This does not address the `Failed calling LOWER: Invalid UTF-8` build error itself. That error cannot originate in this layer — every value handed to COPY is encoded from a JS string, which is always well-formed UTF-8. The two other gaps the issue names are a no-op and dead code respectively; see the pull request for the evidence. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017oEY2i74d1HLa5FuGVuPiT * fix(fts): confine an unbuildable index to its own table One untokenizable row cost far more than its own table's index. `createSearchFTSIndexes` let the first rejection leave the loop, and by then `dropFTSIndex` had already run for that table — so the failing table ended with no index, and every table after it in `FTS_INDEXES` order was never reached. On a fresh build, or on the incremental path where `dropSearchFTSIndexes` clears all of them up front, those later tables ended with no index either. `verifySearchFTSIndexes` never ran to report it, because the throw skipped it. That is the mechanism behind the multi-table degradation in #2889: the report lists Function, Method, Property and Variable as failing together, which is loop control flow, not four independent bad rows. It also explains why `--repair-fts` felt useless — repair runs the same loop, so it stopped at the same table and left everything after it unbuilt, then failed with a list of missing indexes and no reason attached. Each index now builds inside its own try/catch and the run continues, so the damage stops at the table that actually holds the bad row and repair can recover everything else. Failures are returned rather than thrown so the caller sees all of them instead of the first: `buildSearchIndexesOrDegrade` names every failing table with its raw LadybugDB message, and repair appends those reasons to the missing-index error. The aggregate failure class is computed per failure, with integrity winning. Classification checks capability signatures first, so folding the messages into one string would have let an untokenizable row mask a genuinely broken write and downgrade an abort into a degrade. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017oEY2i74d1HLa5FuGVuPiT * refactor(fts): verify before reporting, and fold the derivable state away Cleanup pass over the two #2889 commits. No behaviour change except the verification ordering, which was a real placement error. `buildSearchIndexesOrDegrade` reported build failures and returned BEFORE `verifySearchFTSIndexes` ran. A partial build is exactly when "the other tables are fine" needs proving rather than asserting, and a stale name+content-only index succeeds at build time while leaving description search broken (#2299). Verification now always runs, and a table that failed to build is subtracted from the missing list so it is reported once, with its reason, instead of twice. `FtsIndexBuildFailure.failureClass` was `classifyFtsBuildError(error)` stored beside the string it derives from — two fields that had to agree, and a test about loop isolation that broke if classification rules changed. Classify at the one place that asks. `describeFtsIndexBuildFailures` becomes `summarizeFtsIndexBuildFailures` and owns the whole sentence, including the denominator only this module knows. Analyze and `--repair-fts` were rendering the same failure two different ways. `isBinaryContent` drops the `slice` for a bounded loop and folds the U+FFFD arm into the existing predicate — the two arms had identical bodies over provably disjoint conditions. Measured on this box: 349ns vs 388ns per 200 character description, and it skips a SlicedString allocation past 1000 characters. Its doc moves onto the exported function whose contract changed. Tests: three isolation tests collapse into one (same setup, three channels), the duplicate capability-class test folds into the existing single-rejection test, the two integration tests become one graph covering both emission branches, and the CJK unit case goes — an equality check on one code point cannot be reached by a CJK character, so it could not fail. `afterEach` uses `resetAllMocks` so every mock's `...Once` queue is drained, not just one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017oEY2i74d1HLa5FuGVuPiT --------- Co-authored-by: Gergo Magyar <gergomagyar0@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-10 21:16:11 +01:00
Gergő Magyar	e69d3c49c4	fix(analyze): gate FTS-indexed DML before the incremental writeback (#2841) (#2854) ... * fix(lbug): never report a drop that could not happen, and gate FTS-indexed DML `CALL DROP_FTS_INDEX` is itself an FTS-extension function, so with the extension unloaded it fails with `Catalog exception: function DROP_FTS_INDEX is not defined`. `isBenignDropFtsIndexError` classifies that as "nothing to drop" — correct when the index does not exist, wrong when it does: the drop silently no-ops and the next write to that table dies at bind time with an engine message that never mentions FTS (#2841). The classifier stays pure (a message cannot tell you whether an index is live). Instead `dropFTSIndex` settles liveness with a catalog read on the ERROR path only and raises an FTS-named, remedy-bearing error when the index is present but undroppable. Adds `ensureFtsRowDmlSafe`, the FTS twin of `ensureEmbeddingRowDmlSafe` (#2623): catalog first, load FTS with the analyze policy only when an index actually gates DML. LadybugDB refuses that DML at BIND time — a DETACH DELETE matching zero rows fails exactly as hard as one matching thousands — and the indexes cannot be cleared in place, so a verdict is the only useful answer. Both gates now share one `SHOW_INDEXES` read via `readIndexCatalogRows`, so adding the FTS check costs no extra catalog round-trip. Refs #2841 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CxokkpfssUCxvBwRZMtRCB * fix(analyze): escalate instead of crashing when FTS blocks incremental DML The incremental writeback decided its write plan without ever asking whether row-level DML was legal. On a DB carrying FTS indexes with an unloadable FTS extension, `deleteNodesForFiles` then died mid-writeback: Binder exception: Trying to delete from an index on table File but its extension is not loaded. with no mention of FTS anywhere in the run — the only install-capable load happened in Phase 3, long after the writes (#2841). The incremental branch now reads the index catalog once and derives both extension verdicts before any DML. When FTS (or VECTOR) blocks in-place writes, the run falls through to the existing wipe-and-bulk-COPY escalation — the same answer #2623 gave for VECTOR, and the only one available, since the indexes cannot be dropped without the extension. Every blocked extension is named in the reason log, not just the first one checked: a DB can carry both a vector index and FTS indexes, and reporting half the cause is how this failure stayed mis-diagnosed. Refs #2841 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CxokkpfssUCxvBwRZMtRCB * test(analyze): cover the FTS DML gate, both-blocked escalation, and the drop guard New `incremental-index-extension-dml-gate.test.ts` drives the real `runFullAnalysis` against a real mini-repo and a real LadybugDB: - a DB carrying FTS indexes with FTS made unloadable escalates to a full DB write, names FTS in the log, ends with zero FTS indexes, and still has the newly committed content in the graph (pre-fix: Binder exception, exit 1); - FTS available keeps the surgical plan and the indexes; - a DB that never carried FTS indexes is not escalated (the catalog-first check must not tax FTS-less machines); - FTS and VECTOR both blocked produce ONE escalation naming both. `drop-fts-index-error-classification.test.ts` gains the two `dropFTSIndex` cases the #2841 guard turns on: live index + unloaded extension rejects with an FTS-named error, absent index still resolves. The existing classifier assertions are unchanged — it stays pure. The CLI e2e reproduces the reporter's exact journey (analyze with the extension, remove it, touch a file, analyze again) and asserts exit 0 plus an FTS-named reason. It skips visibly when the seeded extension cannot load on the host, so it can never report a false red about the fix. Mutation-verified: reverting the run-analyze gate fails the first scenario; reverting the dropFTSIndex guard fails the live-index case. Refs #2841 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CxokkpfssUCxvBwRZMtRCB * fix(lbug): make every catalog-gated path fail closed, and classify the drop remedy Review findings on #2854 (two-engine, 17 lanes). H3 — `ftsIndexExistsInCatalog` returned `false` when the catalog could not be read, i.e. "index absent", so `dropFTSIndex` swallowed the error and the caller proceeded as if the index were gone. That is the #2841 symptom the guard exists to make loud, and it contradicted the contract `readIndexCatalogRows` states two functions above. It now fails closed. §6.A — `ensureFtsRowDmlSafe` keyed on `index_type === 'FTS'`, which answers `undefined === 'FTS'` → false → *no gate* for a row whose shape cannot be read: fail-open, in the gate whose only job is preventing an unsafe write, while the VECTOR twin fails closed on the same input. Now only a positively-identified non-FTS index is waved through. Deliberately NOT the twin's `!== 'HASH'`: that is safe there only because it is scoped to the embedding table first, and this gate is table-agnostic — `!== 'HASH'` would let the HNSW index gate FTS DML. §5.A — `undefined` was overloaded: "caller passed nothing" and "caller tried and could not prove anything" shared one value, so a failed shared read silently became three reads and the two gates could decide from different snapshots. The failed snapshot is now representable (`INDEX_CATALOG_UNREADABLE`), leaving one unambiguous `??` in `resolveGateRows`. §5.B — both gates regained the unconditional null-connection precondition the refactor moved into the reader. §5.G — the throw's remedy now routes through `diagnoseExtensionLoad`, like `--repair-fts` and `ftsDegradedWarning`, so a missing runtime dependency is not told to reinstall. The message stays path-free (#2374/#2375). The dead positional row fallbacks are kept and marked `LADYBUGDB-CONTRACT`: removing them would turn a proven-inert hedge into a fail-open gate if a future engine returns unnamed tuples. Refs #2841 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CxokkpfssUCxvBwRZMtRCB * fix(analyze): never undo an explicit wipe, stage extension-forced rebuilds, report honestly Review findings on #2854 (two-engine, 17 lanes). H1 (P1, both engines) — `analyze --drop-embeddings` was silently reverted. The `--drop-embeddings` → `force` conversion sits inside the `embeddingCheckpoint` branch, so without a checkpoint the run stays incremental and reaches the gate; the flag then *deliberately* leaves `cachedEmbeddings` empty, which is exactly the rescue's trigger, so every row the operator asked to destroy was read back and restored, exit 0. Widening the rescue from `!embeddingRowDmlSafe` to `extensionForcedRebuild` moved that latent bug onto the dominant path, because every analyzed DB carries FTS indexes. Guarded on the flag itself — NOT on `shouldLoadCache`, which is false in the meta-under-reports case the rescue exists for and would have deleted the safeguard while fixing the wipe. The `--drop-embeddings --embeddings` variant is covered by the same guard. H2 — an extension-forced escalation wiped the LIVE index in place: `buildPath` was frozen ~440 lines earlier while the run was still classified incremental, so an interrupt or ENOSPC left no complete index, where main failed at bind time with it intact. Extension-forced rebuilds now build into a staging file and publish via the existing atomic swap; size-forced ones stay in place, since that trigger is the repo's own churn rather than a machine condition. H5 — the escalation log asserted a vector index "exists" and that the store "carries FTS indexes" in exactly the case the catalog read proved nothing, while the only truthful signal went to stderr rather than the IPC log. It now emits a distinct unreadable-catalog cause, and "this index carries" (which pointed at the vector index just named) reads "the graph store carries". §5.D — the write-set cause was dropped whenever an extension cause co-occurred; causes are appended now, not selected between. §5.C — after an FTS-forced rebuild stamped lastCommit, a plain rerun on the same commit hit the alreadyUpToDate fast path before Phase 3, so the CLI's "install … then rerun" advice could never restore FTS. The fast path is now bypassed when meta records FTS unavailable and the extension can load again, keyed on the persisted capabilities stamp rather than new state. §5.F (skip the escalation for a zero-change commit) is deliberately NOT implemented: `deleteSpringAutoConfigurationSyntheticClasses` and `deleteSpringAopEvidenceNodes` run unconditionally on the surgical branch and bind against FTS-indexed `Class`/`CodeElement`, and a zero-row DETACH DELETE fails at bind time exactly as hard as a large one — so the skip would restore the original crash. Refs #2841 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CxokkpfssUCxvBwRZMtRCB * perf(search): read the index catalog once per drop sweep, and state the real contract Review findings on #2854. H4 — on a machine where FTS cannot load and the DB carries no FTS index, the gate correctly returned early without loading the extension, but the surgical path still ran the full 20-entry drop sweep: every `CALL DROP_FTS_INDEX` raised "function DROP_FTS_INDEX is not defined", and the new liveness guard then fired a fresh catalog read per table — 20 reads every run, forever, for exactly the offline/load-only population, contradicting the "healthy path costs nothing" claim shipped with the guard. The sweep now reads the catalog once and skips entirely when no FTS-typed index exists. An unreadable catalog runs the sweep, so an unprovable catalog never skips real work. H8 — the docstring still promised `dropFTSIndex` "tolerates" an unloadable extension. Post-#2854 a live index plus an unloadable extension throws, and safety rests on caller ordering discipline rather than the type system — which is what would have talked the next caller out of that ordering. GUARDRAILS — the "switching to a full DB write" sign described exactly one trigger (write set >~50%). Since #2623 and #2841 an unloadable extension escalates regardless of write-set size; documented with its recovery steps. Refs #2841 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CxokkpfssUCxvBwRZMtRCB * test(analyze): cover the wipe guard, the staged rebuild, and the fail-closed branches Review findings on #2854. H1/H2 mutation-verified: removing `!options.dropEmbeddings` fails the new drop-embeddings case ("expected true to be false"); disabling the staging upgrade fails the staging case ("expected 0 to be greater than 0"), so both assert behaviour rather than describe it. Gate suite (7 cases): `--drop-embeddings` under an FTS-forced escalation ends at zero embedding rows and logs no "Preserving"; the escalation is one-shot — a third run on a healthy host returns to surgery and rebuilds every FTS index; an extension-forced rebuild is observed building into `lbug.staging.*` and leaves none behind; the rescue complement still preserves un-stamped rows when no wipe was requested; the never-built case now asserts the commit reached the graph. H6 — the both-blocked case hard-asserted `createVectorIndex()` while the suite probed FTS only, so it went red on any FTS-yes/VECTOR-no host. VECTOR is probed now and gates only that case, with a GITNEXUS_REQUIRE_VECTOR hard-fail. H7 — the fail-closed branches had no coverage although the VECTOR twin's test and interception technique were ready to copy: `ensureFtsRowDmlSafe` under an unreadable catalog now proves it routes to the load, and `dropFTSIndex` proves it rejects rather than silently tolerating. Plus a redaction case that forces a real path-bearing load failure — under policy `never` the assertion would have been vacuous, since that reason carries no path. §5.E/§6.B — the suite is registered in the cross-platform matrix (its sibling was; it wasn't, and GITNEXUS_REQUIRE_VECTOR is set only on that job) and moved into the sequential lbug-db project per TESTING.md:68, verified not to drop it from the sharded ubuntu job. A Windows shard weight is added as a labelled estimate — the 8s floor would skew the split it exists to protect. Refs #2841 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CxokkpfssUCxvBwRZMtRCB * refactor(analyze): make the FTS gate's fast path cheap, its claims provable, and its remedies classified Cleanup review of the #2841 work (four parallel angles: reuse, simplification, efficiency, altitude). Behaviour-preserving except where the previous behaviour was wrong. Correctness the review caught: - The fast-path probe keyed on `capabilities.fts.status === 'unavailable'`, which collapses "extension unavailable" and "index build failed". A deterministic build failure (an un-tokenizable row, #2544) therefore bypassed `alreadyUpToDate` on EVERY subsequent run, re-analyzed the whole repo, failed the same way, and restamped — a permanent loop where the run used to be one `stat`. Phase 3 already computes the discriminator; it is now persisted as `fts.skipReason` and the probe only runs for `extension-unavailable`. Metas written before this carry no field and keep today's behaviour. - `dropSearchFTSIndexes` skipped its sweep when no row read `index_type === 'FTS'`, while `ensureFtsRowDmlSafe` treats an unreadable type as "might be FTS". Opposite polarity, under a comment claiming they matched: a row-shape change would let the gate wave the surgical plan through while the sweep dropped nothing, putting DELETEs back on tables carrying live FTS indexes — #2589 again. The sweep now decides per configured index on identity, which is also strictly more precise. Its old justification (leftover indexes under other names) was unreachable — the loop only ever drops configured entries. - `dropFTSIndex` threw "FTS index X on table Y exists" on the one path where the catalog could not be read — a fabricated claim, on a DB the same run had just shown carries no FTS index. Presence is now `present | absent | unverifiable` and the message says which. - The remedy was hand-written for three of the four load-failure classes, discarding `missingFileRemedy`/`corruptFileRemedy`, so a corrupt extension file was told to retry an install — the misdirection #2383 fixed. Both the drop error and the escalation log now use the classified remedy. Cost, measured on a 391 MB index (cold open ~1 s, SHOW_INDEXES ~4 ms): - The probe opened the live index WRITABLE on the millisecond fast path, dragging in schema DDL, the cross-process write lock, sidecar reclaim and a CHECKPOINT on close. It is read-only now. That also closes an install trap: `doInitLbug`'s pre-load resolves the env policy on the writable branch, so an operator following our own `GITNEXUS_LBUG_EXTENSION_INSTALL=auto` advice paid a forked 15 s installer on every up-to-date run (memoized per process; the CLI is a fresh process each time). The read-only branch pins `load-only`. - A failed staged rebuild orphaned a full index-sized copy until the next lock sweep; the failure path now reclaims it. - The sweep re-read a catalog the run already held, defeating the invariant the snapshot type exists to enforce. Structure: row-shape accessors have one home, so the LADYBUGDB-CONTRACT grep claim is true by construction; staging now applies to both escalation causes, since recoverability is a property of the wipe-then-COPY plan, not of the trigger; `getExtensionCapability`/`getFtsCapability` replace hand-spelled lookups where the seam allows. Two lookups in run-analyze.ts deliberately keep the exported `getExtensionCapabilities()` form: the #2383 tests stub that export, and an ESM module mock does not intercept a helper's internal call — routing through it silently degraded the classified remedy to generic text. Recorded in-comment. Not taken, deliberately: extracting the escalation message and replacing the snapshot protocol with a connection-scoped catalog memo (both sound, both restructure code this PR just stabilised — they belong in their own change); an extension registry (premature at two instances, and the FTS/VECTOR polarity difference is exactly what it would have to parameterize back out). Refs #2841 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CxokkpfssUCxvBwRZMtRCB * test(analyze): pin both sides of the degraded-FTS fast-path bypass `healDegradedFts` (§5.C) had zero coverage — three separate review angles flagged it, and the cleanup pass then found it sat one conjunct away from a permanent full-re-analyze loop. Both sides are pinned now: - it re-analyzes past `alreadyUpToDate` when the stored meta says FTS is degraded and the extension loads again: run 1 analyzes with loads blocked (asserting the precondition — `status: 'unavailable'`, `skipReason: 'extension-unavailable'` — rather than assuming it), then a same-commit clean-tree rerun rebuilds every FTS index without a file changing; - it stands down when the degradation was a BUILD failure: the stored `skipReason` is rewritten to 'build-failed' and the rerun must take the fast path, because that rebuild would fail identically on every run forever. The build-failed state is reached by rewriting the stamped discriminator, not by provoking a real tokenizer failure: a genuine one needs a stored row the native tokenizer rejects (#2544/#2546), which is neither portable across the CI matrix nor deterministic, and §5.C reads only that field. Also folds the first escalation case into the one-shot case. The claim that it was fully subsumed did not hold on audit: `logs` containing 'FTS' was unique as expected, but so was the duplicate-File-node row count — every other reader goes through a Map keyed by path, which collapses a stale twin an appending rebuild would leave. Both assertions moved rather than one being dropped. Net suite runtime goes UP (two cycles removed, four added), against the cross-platform-matrix argument that motivated the dedup — recorded here because the shard weight is an estimate pending a real Windows measurement. Refs #2841 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CxokkpfssUCxvBwRZMtRCB * test(search): keep the whole-module adapter mock in step with the row accessors The cleanup pass moved the LadybugDB row-shape reads behind named accessors so the column contract has one home. `fts-indexes.test.ts` mocks the entire adapter module with a hand-written factory, which still exposed only the three exports the file imported before — so `verifySearchFTSIndexes` failed with "No `indexRowName` export is defined on the mock" while production was fine. The added accessors mirror the real implementations rather than returning stubs. A stub would have read `undefined` out of every catalog row and let the suite pass for the wrong reason — the failure mode a whole-module mock invites whenever the module under test grows an import. Refs #2841 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CxokkpfssUCxvBwRZMtRCB * revert(analyze): drop the degraded-FTS auto-heal, fix the advice it existed to justify §5.C's complaint was that the CLI tells users to "install the extension … then rerun" when a rerun lands on the up-to-date fast path and rebuilds nothing. The answer shipped for it was a probe that bypasses that fast path. Four independent problems later, the sentence is cheaper to fix than to make true: - it could not tell "extension was missing" from "index build failed" without a stamped discriminator, so a deterministic build failure (#2544/#2546) re-analyzed the entire repo on every invocation, forever, where the run used to be one `stat`; - it opened the live index on the millisecond fast path — writable at first, dragging in DDL, the cross-process lock and a CHECKPOINT (~1 s on a 391 MB index), and even read-only it is a full open; - `doInitLbug`'s pre-load resolves the env policy, so an operator following our own `GITNEXUS_LBUG_EXTENSION_INSTALL=auto` advice paid a forked 15 s installer per up-to-date run; - and it turns the fast path into a full re-analysis whenever an index authored where FTS was unavailable is later read where it loads — a legitimate, common state, and the invariant `analyzer-identity-cli.test.ts` pins. So: no probe. The degraded-search warning now points at `gitnexus analyze --repair-fts`, which rebuilds the search indexes without re-parsing the repo, instead of "then rerun". One line, no new failure modes, and it is what the issue actually asked for. `capabilities.fts.skipReason` stays in the meta stamp: it costs three lines, makes the two degradation causes distinguishable for support, and is what any future correct answer here would key on. Also gates the H2 staging assertion on the production predicate. It asserted staging unconditionally while the upgrade requires `posixSwap || windowsSwapOk`, and `windowsSwapOk` is opt-in (#2614) — so it failed on the Windows matrix for a reason unrelated to #2841. Registering this suite cross-platform is what exposed it; the assertion now mirrors the condition it is testing. Refs #2841 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CxokkpfssUCxvBwRZMtRCB * fix(analyze): never stage around a damaged index — escalate in place when the catalog is unreadable CI caught this on ubuntu and macOS: `analyze-wal-checkpoint-failure` stopped failing, which is worse than it sounds. That test plants a directory at `.gitnexus/lbug.wal.checkpoint` so the auto-checkpoint's rename target is blocked, and asserts analyze exits non-zero with the `--wal-checkpoint-threshold` hint. But LadybugDB cannot open that path at all, so `CALL SHOW_INDEXES()` now fails with `IO exception: … Is a directory`. The catalog read returns UNREADABLE, both DML gates correctly fail closed, both extension loads fail with the same IO error, and the run escalates — and since the escalation stages, it built a fresh index at `lbug.staging.<uuid>`, swapped it in, and exited 0. The blocked path was never touched. The run "succeeded" while the damage sat untouched on disk, waiting to break the next in-place writeback. So the staging upgrade is now conditional on the catalog having been READ. Staging exists to protect a healthy live index from a machine-level cause (an extension that will not load); it must not be used to route around a damaged one. When we are escalating out of ignorance, build in place so the underlying IO fault lands on the failure path where the operator gets a diagnosis. Verified against the real CLI, not just the suite: with a directory planted at the checkpoint path, analyze now exits 1 and prints `gitnexus analyze --wal-checkpoint-threshold 67108864`. The healthy extension-forced case still stages (gate suite 6/6). Refs #2841 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CxokkpfssUCxvBwRZMtRCB --------- Co-authored-by: Gergo Magyar <gergomagyar0@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-07 09:44:44 +01:00
Gergő Magyar	4d7a0a69ed	fix(analyze): degrade FTS search instead of aborting analyze on index-build failure (#2548) ... * fix(analyze): degrade FTS search instead of aborting analyze on index-build failure createSearchFTSIndexes re-tokenizes every stored row on every analyze run (full or incremental). A native LadybugDB tokenizer error on a single pre-existing row (e.g. "Failed calling LOWER: Invalid UTF-8") previously propagated uncaught out of run-analyze.ts's main FTS phase, discarding an otherwise-successful run's graph/embeddings work every time analyze ran thereafter. Add buildSearchIndexesOrDegrade(), which catches build/verify failures and lets analyze finish with keyword search degraded for that run instead — mirroring the existing sibling degrade path for a missing FTS extension. The dedicated --repair-fts path is untouched and still fails loudly. Fixes #2544, #2546. * fix(analyze): keep capabilities.fts/ftsSkipped honest when index build degrades ftsSkipped and capabilities.fts.status were keyed only on ftsAvailable (extension loaded), which the new degrade path leaves true even when the index build itself failed. Track that outcome in ftsReady and use it for both, and update run-analyze-fts-repair.test.ts's coverage of this path from asserting the old throw to asserting the new degrade contract (ftsSkipped, log message, meta.json capabilities.fts.status).	2026-07-18 08:44:09 +01:00
Parafee41	a7df8f861a	fix(search): make FTS stemmer configurable (#2307)	2026-06-29 05:13:31 +01:00
Gergő Magyar	576e81442e	fix(search): index description field for FTS so doc comments are keyword-searchable (#2300) ... * fix(search): index description column for FTS so doc comments are keyword-searchable Closes #2299. descriptionExtractor (#2286) populates the `description` column for every symbol table, but FTS only indexed name+content on 5 tables, so doc-comment keywords (Javadoc/KDoc/godoc/Rust ///) were invisible to BM25 keyword search. - Add `description` to the Function/Class/Method/Interface FTS indexes (File has no description column, left as name+content). - Add FTS indexes for the remaining EMBEDDABLE_LABELS symbol tables (Struct, Enum, Trait, Impl, Macro, Namespace, Constructor, TypeAlias, Typedef, Const, Property, Record, Union, Static, Variable). - createSearchFTSIndexes now drops-then-creates each index so the schema change reaches existing DBs on incremental re-analyze and --repair-fts (createFTSIndex is idempotent-by-name and would otherwise skip stale indexes). Tests: fts-schema column-subset + coverage guards; drop-before-create order; e2e doc-comment keyword search (Java class + Rust struct found by description-only terms). bm25-search assertions derive from FTS_INDEXES. * fix(review): apply autofix feedback - Guard the --repair-fts path on FTS-extension availability before createSearchFTSIndexes drops-then-creates indexes (P1 regression: without the gate, an unavailable extension could drop existing indexes then fail to recreate them, leaving the DB index-less). Mirrors the analyze path's ftsAvailable gate and fails loudly first. - Add a re-analyze upgrade integration test: seed an old name+content-only DB (no Struct index), run the real createSearchFTSIndexes(), and assert description keyword search + the previously un-indexed Struct now resolve. Proves drop-then-create upgrades a live stale index end-to-end. * fix(ci): add loadFTSExtension to --repair-fts test mocks The R3 review fix added a loadFTSExtension availability gate to the --repair-fts path, but run-analyze-fts-repair.test.ts mocked the lbug adapter without that export, so both repair tests threw `No "loadFTSExtension" export`. Add loadFTSExtension to the two mocks (returning true to preserve their original intent) and add a dedicated test proving the guard fails loudly — and does NOT drop any index — when the extension is unavailable. * test(fts): run fts-description-search in the sequential lbug-db project It was the only FTS-index-creating integration test left in the parallel `default` vitest project; every other ftsIndexes-using test (search-core, search-pool, augmentation, …) runs in the `lbug-db` project, which forces fileParallelism: false to avoid LadybugDB native mmap file-lock conflicts in parallel forks (Windows). Add it to the lbug-db include list and the default exclude list to match the convention and remove the flake risk. * test(ci): fail loudly when FTS extension is unavailable, never silently skip FTS-dependent lbug integration suites (search-core, search-pool, augmentation, fts-description-search, …) self-skip via ctx.skip() when the LadybugDB FTS extension can't load, emitting only a console.warn while the job stays green. That means a broken/missing FTS extension in CI would make these integration tests silently vanish with no signal — false confidence. withTestLbugDB now honors GITNEXUS_REQUIRE_FTS=1: when set and the extension is unavailable, setup() throws instead of skipping, so the suite fails loudly. The CI test jobs (ubuntu coverage + windows/macOS cross-platform) set the flag; local/offline runs leave it unset and keep skipping gracefully. (Verified the extension currently loads on all three runners, so this is a guard against regression, not a behavior change today.) * test(ci): run fts-description-search on macOS/Windows cross-platform jobs The new FTS description-search suite was registered in the sequential lbug-db vitest project (ubuntu/coverage) but absent from LBUG_NATIVE, so the macOS/Windows platform-sensitive jobs (which run only the explicit ALL_CROSS_PLATFORM allowlist via run-cross-platform.ts) never executed it. The GITNEXUS_REQUIRE_FTS=1 hardening on those jobs guarded the old FTS fixtures but not the new 20-index/description path. Add the suite to LBUG_NATIVE so the new path is validated cross-platform too. Refs #2299. * fix(search): verify FTS indexes cover description, not just queryability verifySearchFTSIndexes probed each index with QUERY_FTS_INDEX and treated 'queryable' as 'present'. A stale name+content-only index left on a pre-#2299 DB stays queryable yet silently misses the description column, so verification would pass green while doc-comment search stayed broken. Switch to a single CALL SHOW_INDEXES() that exposes property_names per index, and report an index as missing when it is absent OR does not cover its configured columns. Return contract (string[] of table.indexName) is unchanged, so both run-analyze.ts call sites are untouched. The per-index string interpolation is gone, so the now-dead safeIdentifier helper is removed. The real caller of the live function in tests is bm25-search.test.ts (the repair test mocks verifySearchFTSIndexes wholesale); its two probe-shaped cases are rewritten to feed SHOW_INDEXES rows and now assert column coverage, plus an absent-index case. Refs #2299. * test(search): assert description search via the public query surface The #2299 integration suite only exercised the searchFTSFromLbug helper. Add a third block that drives the public LocalBackend.callTool('query') path — which resolves the repo via the registry and routes BM25 through the pool adapter (a different connection context than the core-adapter helper) — and asserts a description-only keyword returns the seeded class. Reuses the existing description-only SEED and production FTS_INDEXES; partial-mocks repo-manager so listRegisteredRepos points at the test DB while cleanupOldKuzuFiles and the rest stay real. Refs #2299. * test(search): make lbug-core-adapter FTS gate honor GITNEXUS_REQUIRE_FTS lbug-core-adapter.test.ts has its own per-test FTS gate (skipUnlessFtsAvailable) that called ctx.skip() whenever the extension could not load — bypassing the GITNEXUS_REQUIRE_FTS=1 hardening that withTestLbugDB already honors. Since this file is in LBUG_NATIVE it runs on the ubuntu/macOS/windows jobs that all set GITNEXUS_REQUIRE_FTS=1, so an FTS regression on a runner would have let these FTS-primitive tests silently vanish from a green run — the exact gap #2299's test-infra hardening set out to close. Make the helper mirror withTestLbugDB: when GITNEXUS_REQUIRE_FTS=1 and the extension is unavailable, throw (hard fail) instead of skipping. Offline/local runs (no env var) still skip gracefully. Refs #2299.	2026-06-25 14:21:44 +01:00