PR #1627's npm install -g npm@latest step crashed mid-install with MODULE_NOT_FOUND: promise-retry — a known fragility when npm self-upgrades. Node 22's bundled npm is 10.9.x (no OIDC). Fix: bump publish job's node-version to 24, which ships with npm 11.x natively. Package consumers unaffected (this Node version is only used during publish; engines.node is >=22.0.0; ci-tests.yml continues testing on Node 22).
First live-fire RC publish after #1610 failed at npm publish with E404. The if: failure() cleanup correctly auto-deleted the partial v-tag and rc-marker, but OIDC never engaged. Root cause: two coordinated upstream bugs.
1. actions/setup-node@v6 with registry-url: writes _authToken into the runner .npmrc AND exports NODE_AUTH_TOKEN from its token: input (defaulting to github.token). npm publish sends GITHUB_TOKEN as the bearer and the registry returns 404. OIDC never tried because npm thinks it already has a credential. See actions/setup-node#1440.
2. The Node 22 runner ships with npm 10.9.x. npm Trusted Publishing OIDC support requires npm >= 11.5.1.
Fix: omit registry-url: from the setup-node step (per the consensus workaround in community discussion #176761), and add npm install -g npm@latest before publish. --provenance flag is NOT added; npm auto-attaches provenance under Trusted Publishing.
Sources:
- https://github.com/actions/setup-node/issues/1440
- https://github.com/orgs/community/discussions/176761
- https://docs.npmjs.com/trusted-publishers/
Collapse release-candidate.yml into publish.yml so there is exactly one workflow that publishes gitnexus to npm, creates GitHub Releases, and triggers Docker builds — for both release candidates and stable releases. Closes#1609 architecturally.
A first-stage `route` job classifies push-to-main / push-tag / workflow_dispatch into `rc` / `stable` modes and fails closed on malformed shapes. RC path runs rc-guard → ci.yml → publish (mint GitHub App token → checkout with persist-credentials:false → resolve next rc version → atomic v-tag + rc/<SHA> marker push → vtag integrity gate → npm publish via OIDC → GitHub prerelease → if: failure() cleanup) → docker.yml. Stable path verifies package.json matches the tag and publishes to `latest` via OIDC (no docker).
Hardening:
• Self-trigger prevention via negative-glob `tags: ['v*', '!v*-rc.*']` — the bug class behind #1609 cannot recur.
• Two distinct actions/checkout steps per mode (no conditional `token:` expression footgun).
• Workflow-level `permissions: {}` deny-all + per-job grants; `id-token: write` only where OIDC is used.
• npm Trusted Publishing replaces NPM_TOKEN (delete the secret after the first successful publish).
• GitHub App installation token (actions/create-github-app-token@v3.2.0) replaces the long-lived RELEASE_PUSH_TOKEN PAT (delete after first successful RC).
• vtag integrity gate fails closed on empty / mode-mismatched output (prevents Release named `main` from a github.ref fallback).
• Annotation-injection sanitization on every logged ref.
• Explicit `secrets:` passthrough on docker.yml (DOCKERHUB_USERNAME, DOCKERHUB_TOKEN); ci.yml no longer inherits anything.
• `if: failure()` cleanup auto-deletes v-tag + rc-marker on partial failure (eliminates the external-consumer phantom-version ingestion window).
• ACTIONS_STEP_DEBUG window closed via `set +x` wrap on the inline auth-header compute.
• Curated retry-loud error handling on `gh api` bot-user-id lookup and `npx semver`.
Pre-merge validation:
• 10-reviewer multi-agent code-review pass; 14 findings fixed inline (commit 820cefae), 6 deferred to follow-ups.
• End-to-end dry-run rehearsal via workflow_dispatch (run 25919563064) validated route classification, rc-guard, App token mint, RC checkout, version resolver, vtag synthetic-regex check, and faithful tarball pack at the bumped version.
• All zizmor findings on the unification commits closed.
• Branch-protection required checks all green.
Post-merge actions:
• After the first successful RC, delete the `NPM_TOKEN` and `RELEASE_PUSH_TOKEN` secrets — they are no longer used.
• The first real RC after merge is the live-fire test for steps dry-run could not exercise (atomic tag push, real npm OIDC handshake, GitHub Release creation, docker.yml under explicit secrets passthrough). The if: failure() cleanup step handles the partial-failure recovery automatically; the Rollback Runbook in CONTRIBUTING.md covers the rare cases auto-cleanup can't reach.
* Initial plan
* chore(security): harden workflow permissions and pin Docker base image digests
Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/sessions/2ddc8f2b-7355-48cf-9a0b-c06df66c3f47
* fix(security): restore permissions: {} on publish + release-candidate workflows
These two release-publishing workflows had permissions: {} (the strictest valid form) before PR #1454, which replaced it with permissions: read-all. Every job in both files already declares its own permissions block, so the workflow-level default is only the safety net for future jobs added without one — read-all weakens that net for no benefit. Restore {} and the explanatory comment.
Scorecard's TokenPermissions check accepts both forms, so this preserves U9 compliance.
* fix(security): narrow permissions: read-all to contents: read on 13 workflows
PR #1454 added permissions: read-all to 13 workflows that previously had no top-level permissions block. read-all is Scorecard-compliant but unnecessarily broad — every job in scope only needs contents:read at the workflow level (job-level blocks already grant the writes that any job actually performs).
Snapshot of every job in the 13 workflows confirms contents:read is sufficient:
- ci.yml: quality/tests/scope-parity have explicit contents:read job blocks; save-pr-meta uses upload-artifact only (no token scopes needed); ci-status is pure shell.
- ci-e2e.yml, ci-quality.yml, ci-scope-parity.yml, ci-tests.yml: all jobs do checkout + npm + tsc/vitest/playwright/upload-artifact only; no API token scopes required.
- claude.yml, codeql.yml, dependency-review.yml, docker.yml, gitleaks.yml, pr-labeler.yml, trivy.yml, workflow-lint.yml: all jobs already declare their own job-level blocks (security-events:write, pull-requests:write, packages:write, etc.) so the workflow-level default does not gate them.
zizmor (--min-severity high) is clean on the resulting tree. Pre-existing medium findings (secrets-inherit, artipacked) are in unrelated workflows and untouched by this commit.
scorecard.yml also uses read-all but pre-existed PR #1454 and is deferred to a follow-up PR per the plan's scope boundary.
---------
Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Gergő Magyar <gergomagyar@icloud.com>
* fix: pin Docker node base images and remediate bundled npm CVEs
Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/sessions/e0605c79-296e-4b3a-b6c3-4ad375950935
Co-authored-by: magyargergo <11230420+magyargergo@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: run trivy on docker PR changes and remove corepack
Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/sessions/4d714047-4fc1-4af1-9734-91400a15568f
Co-authored-by: magyargergo <11230420+magyargergo@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore: add docker digest updates and normalize dockerfile comments
Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/sessions/7d980908-a823-4c28-b074-9134ec672e84
Co-authored-by: magyargergo <11230420+magyargergo@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: add dependabot cooldown policies
Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/sessions/a8531b8d-384b-4c54-84dd-a98b31993c44
Co-authored-by: magyargergo <11230420+magyargergo@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: remove unsupported dependabot cooldown keys
Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/sessions/166df50e-c2fe-4d7f-ab41-e94c703338f6
Co-authored-by: magyargergo <11230420+magyargergo@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore(node): bump CI + engines to Node 22; centralize NPM_VERSION via build ARG
Closes the LOW findings from Claude Final Re-Review on PR #1455:
- Bump engines.node to >=22.0.0 and align all CI workflows (ci-quality,
pr-autofix, publish, release-candidate) and the composite setup
actions on Node 22. Node 20 reached EOL on 2026-04-30; the test
Docker image was already on 22.
- Centralize the bootstrapped npm version in a single ARG NPM_VERSION
per Dockerfile (cli, web, gitnexus/Dockerfile.test) so a security
bump only requires updating one default per file with a clear
cross-reference comment.
---------
Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: magyargergo <11230420+magyargergo@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Gergo Magyar <gergomagyar@icloud.com>
* ci(security): add CodeQL SAST workflow for JS/TS and Python
CodeQL analyzes both languages on PR, main push, and weekly schedule.
Findings upload to the Security tab as SARIF. Advisory only on
introduction; promote to required check after baseline triage.
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U1)
* ci(security): add Dependency Review PR gate
Blocks PRs introducing high+ severity dependency vulnerabilities.
Posts inline summary comment on failure. Required-check candidate
after one week of clean runs.
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U2)
* ci(security): add Gitleaks secret scanning
PR runs scan the diff; main pushes scan full history.
Defense-in-depth on top of GitHub native push protection
(documented as a recommended Settings toggle in SECURITY.md).
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U3)
* ci(security): add OpenSSF Scorecard workflow
Weekly + on main push. SARIF uploads to Security tab; public
badge URL resolves after first scheduled run lands.
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U4)
* ci(security): add zizmor workflow lint
Lints .github/workflows/** for known Actions security misconfigurations
(unpinned actions, dangerous interpolation, missing permissions).
Triggered only on PRs touching .github/**.
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U5)
* ci(security): add Trivy container image scanning
Builds Dockerfile.cli and Dockerfile.web, then scans images for
HIGH/CRITICAL CVEs. Findings record-only on Security tab; not
PR-blocking. Weekly schedule + main push for freshness.
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U6)
* docs(security): add SECURITY.md policy and Scorecard badge
Vulnerability disclosure policy points to GitHub Private Vulnerability
Reporting. Documents in-CI scans landed in this branch and recommended
admin actions for forks.
Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U7)
* fix(review): apply autofix feedback
- CodeQL paths-ignore: replace brace expansion (parser.{c,js}) with two
explicit entries — CodeQL uses .gitignore-style globs that do NOT support
brace expansion, so the original pattern matched no files.
- Trivy: pin aquasecurity/trivy-action from @master to @0.28.0 — mutable
refs are a supply-chain risk and are exactly what zizmor (added in this
same plan) is meant to flag.
ce-code-review run: /tmp/compound-engineering/ce-code-review/20260503-104259-279c3bc4/
* docs(review): record residual review findings
ce-code-review autofix run flagged three downstream-resolver items
that are not blockers but should land before promoting any of the new
security workflows to required PR checks.
Source: /tmp/compound-engineering/ce-code-review/20260503-104259-279c3bc4/
* fix(ci-security): address all zizmor + dependency-review violations
Resolves all GitHub Advanced Security findings on PR #1297:
- Add 'persist-credentials: false' to actions/checkout in 5 workflows
(codeql, dependency-review, gitleaks, trivy, workflow-lint). Prevents
the GITHUB_TOKEN from persisting in .git/config for downstream steps
to read. Scorecard already had it.
- Pin every net-new third-party Action to a commit SHA (was: major-tag
refs flagged by zizmor as 'unpinned action reference'):
github/codeql-action -> v3.35.3 (0daab03)
actions/dependency-review-action -> v4.9.0 (2031cfc)
gitleaks/gitleaks-action -> v2.3.9 (ff98106)
ossf/scorecard-action -> v2.4.3 (4eaacf0)
docker/build-push-action -> v6.19.2 (10e90e3)
- Bump aquasecurity/trivy-action 0.28.0 -> 0.36.0 (ed142fd). Versions
< 0.35.0 are flagged by GHSA-69fq-xp46-6x23 (briefly compromised
supply chain). Caught by Dependency Review on the introducing PR.
- Pin pipx-installed zizmor to 1.24.1 (was unpinned 'pipx install
zizmor' resolving to latest at run time).
Removes the now-stale residual-findings doc since every item it
recorded is resolved on this branch.
* fix(ci-security): clear remaining zizmor findings
After landing the new security workflows, zizmor reported 5 high+
findings against pre-existing workflows (none introduced by this PR's
new files, all introduced by zizmor's wider scope). Resolved per
research at docs.zizmor.sh and PyO3/maturin issue #2425:
Real fixes (cache-poisoning):
- publish.yml + release-candidate.yml: add 'package-manager-cache:
false' to actions/setup-node. setup-node v5+ enables caching by
default when a packageManager field is present in package.json;
explicit opt-out keeps release installs hermetic and clears the
audit. Cost: ~30s slower per release run.
Documented exemptions (dangerous-triggers, .github/zizmor.yml):
- ci-report.yml: workflow_run is REQUIRED to post sticky comments
on fork PRs (forks have read-only GITHUB_TOKEN on pull_request).
- claude.yml: pull_request_target is required by claude-code-action
to access secrets and post fork-PR review comments. PR checkouts
pin fork HEAD SHA to mitigate TOCTOU.
- pr-labeler.yml: pull_request_target on the autolabel job needs
pull-requests:write. release-drafter runs with dry-run:true and
reads config from the BASE ref only.
Each exemption carries the documented mitigation in zizmor.yml.
workflow-lint.yml now passes --config to both the SARIF and the
gate invocations.
Local 'zizmor --config .github/zizmor.yml --min-severity high .'
reports: No findings to report. Good job!
* ci: standardize workflow concurrency and automate release-note labeling
Concurrency — prevent racing CI jobs
- Every top-level workflow now declares an explicit concurrency block.
- PR runs cancel-in-progress on supersede; main/push/workflow_call/publish
runs queue instead of cancelling so every commit and every release is
validated end-to-end.
- ci.yml uses a literal `CI-` prefix (not `${{ github.workflow }}`) and a
per-run nested group for workflow_call invocations, avoiding a potential
deadlock with publish.yml and release-candidate.yml callers whose own
concurrency groups could otherwise collide with the called workflow.
- ci-report.yml falls back to `<head-repo>/<head-branch>` for fork PRs
(stable across reruns) instead of the per-run-unique workflow_run.id
which did not actually serialize anything.
- ci-quality.yml enforces the convention: fails CI if any non-reusable
workflow lacks a concurrency block or a reusable workflow declares one.
Release-note automation
- New pr-labeler.yml: amannn/action-semantic-pull-request enforces
conventional-commit PR titles on pull_request (fork-safe, read-only);
release-drafter/release-drafter with disable-releaser: true applies the
matching label under pull_request_target (write-scoped). sync-labels in
.github/release-drafter.yml removes managed autolabels that no longer
match (e.g. when `!` or `BREAKING CHANGE:` is dropped from a PR).
- .github/release.yml (unchanged) continues to map labels to categorized
release-notes sections.
- dependabot.yml added for the github-actions ecosystem so pinned SHAs
auto-refresh on a weekly cadence.
Docs
- CONTRIBUTING.md documents the concurrency convention, the
conventional-commit PR-title rules, and the reusable-workflow exception.
Follow-up to verify before relying on the labeler in anger
- gh api repos/amannn/action-semantic-pull-request/git/refs/tags/v5.5.3
- gh api repos/release-drafter/release-drafter/git/refs/tags/v6.0.0
- Confirm release-drafter reads its config from the base ref (not fork
head) when invoked via pull_request_target.
* ci: address PR review feedback on concurrency and labeler workflows
Two blocking fixes
- pr-labeler.yml: separate concurrency slots for pull_request and
pull_request_target. Previously both triggers shared a single group
with cancel-in-progress: true, so the privileged autolabel run could
cancel the title-validation check mid-run and leave a required status
in a permanent cancelled state.
- pr-labeler.yml autolabel job: add contents: read. release-drafter's
context.config() reads .github/release-drafter.yml from the default
branch via the repo-contents API and 403s without the scope. Job-level
permissions nullify all unlisted scopes so an explicit grant is needed.
Two non-blocking improvements
- Replace the hardcoded reusable-workflow allowlist in ci-quality.yml
with dynamic on:-block parsing. New workflow_call-only workflows no
longer produce false-positive convention failures.
- Implement actual group-key validation. The check now also asserts that
every concurrency.group expression references either ${{ github.workflow }}
or the literal CI- prefix (the documented ci.yml exception).
- Script extracted to .github/scripts/check-workflow-concurrency.py so
it is runnable locally and independently testable.
* fix(ci): build gitnexus-shared before publish, use CHANGELOG for release notes
The publish workflow was missing the gitnexus-shared build step that
the setup-gitnexus composite action provides. Since PR #536 unified
the ingestion pipeline, gitnexus imports types from gitnexus-shared,
so it must be built first.
Also replaces generate_release_notes with CHANGELOG.md extraction so
GitHub Releases use the reviewed changelog entry instead of a flat
PR title list.
Made-with: Cursor
* fix: bundle gitnexus-shared into CLI dist to fix module resolution
gitnexus-shared was declared as a file: dependency but never published
to npm, causing ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND for users installing gitnexus
globally. The build script now copies gitnexus-shared/dist into
dist/_shared/ and rewrites bare specifiers to relative paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: move gitnexus-shared to devDependencies, use tsc for prepare
gitnexus-shared must remain available for tsc to resolve imports during
development/CI, but is not needed at runtime since it's bundled into
dist/_shared/. Moving it to devDependencies keeps it out of production
installs while allowing compilation. The prepare script now runs plain
tsc (no shared bundling needed for local dev).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Abhigyan Patwari <abhigyan@Abhigyans-MacBook-Air.local>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The publish job failed because npm ci triggers the prepare script (tsc)
before gitnexus-shared types are available. Add the same build step
that the setup-gitnexus composite action uses in CI.
* Initial plan
* fix: add pull-requests write permissions to GitHub Actions workflows
Co-authored-by: magyargergo <11230420+magyargergo@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(ci): remove ineffective job-level permissions from reusable workflow
* fix(ci): pass PR write permission from caller to reusable unit-tests workflow
* fix(ci): harden CI/CD workflows with security fixes and reliability improvements
- Pin all actions to commit SHAs to prevent supply-chain attacks
- Fix shell injection in ci-integration.yml by using env vars instead of direct interpolation
- Scope permissions per-job in publish.yml (was granting pull-requests:write to publish job)
- Restrict claude-code-review to trusted contributors only (OWNER/MEMBER/COLLABORATOR)
- Switch claude-code-review to pull_request_target for fork PR support
- Fix fail-fast: false in ci-unit-tests.yml cross-platform matrix
- Remove duplicate ubuntu-latest from unit test matrix
- Add timeouts to all workflow jobs
- Improve kuzu-db test loop to continue on failure and report per-file errors
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ci): read thresholds from `vitest.config.ts`
---------
Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: magyargergo <11230420+magyargergo@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Gergő Magyar <gergomagyar@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add workflow_call trigger to ci.yml so publish can reuse it as a gate
- Replace minimal publish.yml with hardened pipeline:
- Full CI must pass before publish (typecheck + tests + cross-platform)
- Verify git tag matches package.json version
- Explicit build step + dry-run before real publish
- npm provenance attestation enabled
- Auto-create GitHub Release with generated notes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
