ci(security): add automated security and vulnerability scans (#1297)

* ci(security): add CodeQL SAST workflow for JS/TS and Python CodeQL analyzes both languages on PR, main push, and weekly schedule. Findings upload to the Security tab as SARIF. Advisory only on introduction; promote to required check after baseline triage. Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U1) * ci(security): add Dependency Review PR gate Blocks PRs introducing high+ severity dependency vulnerabilities. Posts inline summary comment on failure. Required-check candidate after one week of clean runs. Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U2) * ci(security): add Gitleaks secret scanning PR runs scan the diff; main pushes scan full history. Defense-in-depth on top of GitHub native push protection (documented as a recommended Settings toggle in SECURITY.md). Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U3) * ci(security): add OpenSSF Scorecard workflow Weekly + on main push. SARIF uploads to Security tab; public badge URL resolves after first scheduled run lands. Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U4) * ci(security): add zizmor workflow lint Lints .github/workflows/** for known Actions security misconfigurations (unpinned actions, dangerous interpolation, missing permissions). Triggered only on PRs touching .github/**. Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U5) * ci(security): add Trivy container image scanning Builds Dockerfile.cli and Dockerfile.web, then scans images for HIGH/CRITICAL CVEs. Findings record-only on Security tab; not PR-blocking. Weekly schedule + main push for freshness. Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U6) * docs(security): add SECURITY.md policy and Scorecard badge Vulnerability disclosure policy points to GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting. Documents in-CI scans landed in this branch and recommended admin actions for forks. Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md (U7) * fix(review): apply autofix feedback - CodeQL paths-ignore: replace brace expansion (parser.{c,js}) with two explicit entries — CodeQL uses .gitignore-style globs that do NOT support brace expansion, so the original pattern matched no files. - Trivy: pin aquasecurity/trivy-action from @master to @0.28.0 — mutable refs are a supply-chain risk and are exactly what zizmor (added in this same plan) is meant to flag. ce-code-review run: /tmp/compound-engineering/ce-code-review/20260503-104259-279c3bc4/ * docs(review): record residual review findings ce-code-review autofix run flagged three downstream-resolver items that are not blockers but should land before promoting any of the new security workflows to required PR checks. Source: /tmp/compound-engineering/ce-code-review/20260503-104259-279c3bc4/ * fix(ci-security): address all zizmor + dependency-review violations Resolves all GitHub Advanced Security findings on PR #1297: - Add 'persist-credentials: false' to actions/checkout in 5 workflows (codeql, dependency-review, gitleaks, trivy, workflow-lint). Prevents the GITHUB_TOKEN from persisting in .git/config for downstream steps to read. Scorecard already had it. - Pin every net-new third-party Action to a commit SHA (was: major-tag refs flagged by zizmor as 'unpinned action reference'): github/codeql-action -> v3.35.3 (0daab03) actions/dependency-review-action -> v4.9.0 (2031cfc) gitleaks/gitleaks-action -> v2.3.9 (ff98106) ossf/scorecard-action -> v2.4.3 (4eaacf0) docker/build-push-action -> v6.19.2 (10e90e3) - Bump aquasecurity/trivy-action 0.28.0 -> 0.36.0 (ed142fd). Versions < 0.35.0 are flagged by GHSA-69fq-xp46-6x23 (briefly compromised supply chain). Caught by Dependency Review on the introducing PR. - Pin pipx-installed zizmor to 1.24.1 (was unpinned 'pipx install zizmor' resolving to latest at run time). Removes the now-stale residual-findings doc since every item it recorded is resolved on this branch. * fix(ci-security): clear remaining zizmor findings After landing the new security workflows, zizmor reported 5 high+ findings against pre-existing workflows (none introduced by this PR's new files, all introduced by zizmor's wider scope). Resolved per research at docs.zizmor.sh and PyO3/maturin issue #2425: Real fixes (cache-poisoning): - publish.yml + release-candidate.yml: add 'package-manager-cache: false' to actions/setup-node. setup-node v5+ enables caching by default when a packageManager field is present in package.json; explicit opt-out keeps release installs hermetic and clears the audit. Cost: ~30s slower per release run. Documented exemptions (dangerous-triggers, .github/zizmor.yml): - ci-report.yml: workflow_run is REQUIRED to post sticky comments on fork PRs (forks have read-only GITHUB_TOKEN on pull_request). - claude.yml: pull_request_target is required by claude-code-action to access secrets and post fork-PR review comments. PR checkouts pin fork HEAD SHA to mitigate TOCTOU. - pr-labeler.yml: pull_request_target on the autolabel job needs pull-requests:write. release-drafter runs with dry-run:true and reads config from the BASE ref only. Each exemption carries the documented mitigation in zizmor.yml. workflow-lint.yml now passes --config to both the SARIF and the gate invocations. Local 'zizmor --config .github/zizmor.yml --min-severity high .' reports: No findings to report. Good job!
2026-10-29 06:32:28 +00:00 · 2026-05-04 08:21:53 +01:00 · 2026-05-04 08:21:53 +01:00 · b6bbede07b
commit b6bbede07b
parent e2b0b7a27f
11 changed files with 452 additions and 4 deletions
--- a/.github/workflows/codeql.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/codeql.yml
@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+name: CodeQL
+
+# Static analysis (SAST) for TypeScript/JavaScript and Python sources.
+# Findings upload to the GitHub Security tab as SARIF.
+#
+# Advisory only on first introduction — see docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md.
+# Promote to a required check after baseline triage (operator decision).
+
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [main]
+    paths-ignore: ['**.md', 'docs/**', 'LICENSE']
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+  schedule:
+    # Weekly Monday 06:00 UTC — catches advisories newly published against
+    # already-merged code without waiting for the next PR.
+    - cron: '0 6 * * 1'
+
+concurrency:
+  group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
+  cancel-in-progress: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
+
+jobs:
+  analyze:
+    name: Analyze (${{ matrix.language }})
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 60
+    permissions:
+      actions: read
+      contents: read
+      # security-events:write is what enables SARIF upload to the Security tab.
+      security-events: write
+
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        language: [javascript-typescript, python]
+
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
+        with:
+          # Don't leave GITHUB_TOKEN in .git/config for downstream steps to read.
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Initialize CodeQL
+        uses: github/codeql-action/init@0daab03d71ff584ef619d027a3fd9146679c5d84 # v3.35.3
+        with:
+          languages: ${{ matrix.language }}
+          queries: security-and-quality
+          # Exclude generated/vendored code; tune after first-run signal.
+          # gitnexus/vendor/ holds tree-sitter-proto sources (regenerated, not authored).
+          # CodeQL path filters use .gitignore-style globs and do NOT support
+          # brace expansion — list each generated parser file separately.
+          config: |
+            paths-ignore:
+              - '**/dist/**'
+              - '**/node_modules/**'
+              - 'gitnexus/vendor/**'
+              - 'gitnexus/src/core/parsing/**/parser.c'
+              - 'gitnexus/src/core/parsing/**/parser.js'
+
+      - name: Perform CodeQL Analysis
+        uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@0daab03d71ff584ef619d027a3fd9146679c5d84 # v3.35.3
+        with:
+          category: '/language:${{ matrix.language }}'
--- a/.github/workflows/dependency-review.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/dependency-review.yml
@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+name: Dependency Review
+
+# Blocks PRs that introduce dependencies with high/critical known vulnerabilities.
+# Reads the dependency graph diff between PR head and base.
+#
+# This is a required-check candidate after one week of clean runs
+# (operator decision — see docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md).
+
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [main]
+
+concurrency:
+  group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
+jobs:
+  review:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 10
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      # pull-requests:write enables the inline summary comment on failure.
+      pull-requests: write
+
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Dependency Review
+        uses: actions/dependency-review-action@2031cfc080254a8a887f58cffee85186f0e49e48 # v4.9.0
+        with:
+          fail-on-severity: high
+          comment-summary-in-pr: on-failure
--- a/.github/workflows/gitleaks.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/gitleaks.yml
@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+name: Gitleaks
+
+# Deterministic in-CI secret scanning. Defense-in-depth on top of GitHub's
+# native secret-scanning push protection (which is a repo Settings toggle —
+# see SECURITY.md for the recommended admin action).
+#
+# PR runs scan the diff (fast); main pushes scan full history.
+
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [main]
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+
+concurrency:
+  group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
+  cancel-in-progress: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
+
+jobs:
+  gitleaks:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 10
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      pull-requests: write
+
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
+        with:
+          # Full history needed for the on-push full-history scan; on PRs the
+          # action diffs against the base ref so the cost is bounded by the PR.
+          fetch-depth: 0
+          # Don't bake the token into the cloned .git/config; downstream
+          # steps (and Gitleaks itself) don't need it for repo operations.
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      # No GITLEAKS_LICENSE secret is required for OSS / public-repo usage.
+      # If this repo becomes private, the action will require a license key.
+      - name: Gitleaks
+        uses: gitleaks/gitleaks-action@ff98106e4c7b2bc287b24eaf42907196329070c7 # v2.3.9
+        env:
+          GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          GITLEAKS_ENABLE_UPLOAD_ARTIFACT: true
+          GITLEAKS_ENABLE_SUMMARY: true
--- a/.github/workflows/publish.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/publish.yml
@ -37,8 +37,12 @@ jobs:
        with:
          node-version: 20
          registry-url: https://registry.npmjs.org
-          cache: npm
-          cache-dependency-path: gitnexus/package-lock.json
+          # Hermetic install for the published artifact — no cache carry-over
+          # from non-tag contexts. setup-node v5+ caches by default when a
+          # packageManager field is present in package.json, so the explicit
+          # opt-out is required to clear the zizmor cache-poisoning audit.
+          # ~30s slower per release; runs rarely.
+          package-manager-cache: false
      - name: Build gitnexus-shared
        run: npm install && npm run build
        working-directory: gitnexus-shared
--- a/.github/workflows/release-candidate.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/release-candidate.yml
@ -137,8 +137,11 @@ jobs:
        with:
          node-version: 20
          registry-url: https://registry.npmjs.org
-          cache: npm
-          cache-dependency-path: gitnexus/package-lock.json
+          # Hermetic install — release-candidate produces shipped artifacts.
+          # setup-node v5+ caches by default when a packageManager field is
+          # present in package.json; explicit opt-out is required to clear
+          # the zizmor cache-poisoning audit. See cache-poisoning audit.
+          package-manager-cache: false

      - name: Build gitnexus-shared
        run: npm install && npm run build
--- a/.github/workflows/scorecard.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/scorecard.yml
@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+name: Scorecard
+
+# OpenSSF Scorecard supply-chain posture check. Runs weekly + on main push +
+# branch_protection_rule changes. SARIF uploads to the Security tab; the public
+# badge URL resolves once the first scheduled run lands (see README badge wiring).
+
+on:
+  branch_protection_rule:
+  schedule:
+    - cron: '0 7 * * 1'
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+concurrency:
+  group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
+  cancel-in-progress: false
+
+permissions: read-all
+
+jobs:
+  analysis:
+    name: Scorecard analysis
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 30
+    permissions:
+      # Needed to upload SARIF results to the Security tab.
+      security-events: write
+      # Needed for the publish_results badge flow (OIDC).
+      id-token: write
+      contents: read
+      actions: read
+
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Run Scorecard
+        uses: ossf/scorecard-action@4eaacf0543bb3f2c246792bd56e8cdeffafb205a # v2.4.3
+        with:
+          results_file: results.sarif
+          results_format: sarif
+          # publish_results enables the public Scorecard badge.
+          publish_results: true
+
+      - name: Upload artifact
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
+        with:
+          name: SARIF file
+          path: results.sarif
+          retention-days: 5
+
+      - name: Upload to Security tab
+        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@0daab03d71ff584ef619d027a3fd9146679c5d84 # v3.35.3
+        with:
+          sarif_file: results.sarif
--- a/.github/workflows/trivy.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/trivy.yml
@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+name: Trivy Image Scan
+
+# Builds Dockerfile.cli and Dockerfile.web, then scans the resulting images
+# for OS-package and language-package CVEs at HIGH/CRITICAL severity.
+# Findings upload to the Security tab; record-only (does not block merges).
+#
+# NOT triggered on PRs — image builds are slow and base-image CVE churn
+# shouldn't gate feature delivery.
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+  schedule:
+    - cron: '0 8 * * 1'
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+concurrency:
+  group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
+  cancel-in-progress: false
+
+jobs:
+  scan:
+    name: Trivy (${{ matrix.image.name }})
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 30
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      security-events: write
+
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        image:
+          - { dockerfile: Dockerfile.cli, name: gitnexus-cli }
+          - { dockerfile: Dockerfile.web, name: gitnexus-web }
+
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Setup Buildx
+        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@4d04d5d9486b7bd6fa91e7baf45bbb4f8b9deedd # v4.0.0
+
+      - name: Build image (load locally for scan)
+        uses: docker/build-push-action@10e90e3645eae34f1e60eeb005ba3a3d33f178e8 # v6.19.2
+        with:
+          context: .
+          file: ${{ matrix.image.dockerfile }}
+          load: true
+          push: false
+          tags: scan-target:${{ matrix.image.name }}
+
+      # aquasecurity/trivy-action versions < 0.35.0 are flagged by
+      # GHSA-69fq-xp46-6x23 (briefly compromised supply chain). Pinned to
+      # v0.36.0 (post-incident clean release) by commit SHA.
+      - name: Run Trivy
+        uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@ed142fd0673e97e23eac54620cfb913e5ce36c25 # v0.36.0
+        with:
+          image-ref: scan-target:${{ matrix.image.name }}
+          format: sarif
+          output: trivy-${{ matrix.image.name }}.sarif
+          severity: HIGH,CRITICAL
+          # Hides CVEs with no available fix in the base image.
+          ignore-unfixed: true
+          exit-code: '0'
+
+      - name: Upload to Security tab
+        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@0daab03d71ff584ef619d027a3fd9146679c5d84 # v3.35.3
+        with:
+          sarif_file: trivy-${{ matrix.image.name }}.sarif
+          category: trivy-${{ matrix.image.name }}
--- a/.github/workflows/workflow-lint.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/workflow-lint.yml
@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+name: Workflow Lint (zizmor)
+
+# Lints .github/workflows/** for known GitHub Actions security misconfigurations:
+# unpinned Actions, dangerous ${{ ... }} interpolation in run: blocks,
+# missing per-job permissions:, etc.
+#
+# Scoped to PRs that touch .github/** only — keeps off the typical PR critical path.
+
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [main]
+    paths:
+      - '.github/**'
+
+concurrency:
+  group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
+jobs:
+  zizmor:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 10
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      security-events: write
+
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Setup Python
+        uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6
+        with:
+          python-version: '3.12'
+
+      - name: Install zizmor
+        # Pinned — resolves to whatever's latest on PyPI otherwise.
+        # Bump via Dependabot pip ecosystem (see .github/dependabot.yml).
+        run: pipx install zizmor==1.24.1
+
+      # Initial threshold: medium. High+ findings fail the job; medium findings
+      # appear in the Security tab without blocking. Tune after first run.
+      # Per-rule exemptions for pre-existing intentional patterns live in
+      # .github/zizmor.yml (each carries a documented mitigation).
+      - name: Run zizmor
+        run: zizmor --config .github/zizmor.yml --format sarif --min-severity medium . > zizmor.sarif
+        continue-on-error: true
+
+      - name: Upload SARIF
+        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@0daab03d71ff584ef619d027a3fd9146679c5d84 # v3.35.3
+        with:
+          sarif_file: zizmor.sarif
+          category: zizmor
+
+      - name: Fail on high+ findings
+        run: zizmor --config .github/zizmor.yml --min-severity high .
--- a/.github/zizmor.yml
+++ b/.github/zizmor.yml
@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# zizmor config — pre-existing intentional patterns flagged on initial introduction.
+# Each ignore below has a documented mitigation. Re-evaluate when the source workflow changes.
+#
+# To run zizmor locally with this config:
+#   zizmor --config .github/zizmor.yml .
+
+rules:
+  dangerous-triggers:
+    ignore:
+      # workflow_run is REQUIRED to post sticky comments on fork PRs — the
+      # default-branch privileged token isn't accessible from `pull_request`
+      # on a fork. Mitigated by: read-only `actions:read` + `contents:read`
+      # for artifact download; `pull-requests:write` is the only write scope;
+      # no checkout of fork code occurs. Header comment in the file documents.
+      - ci-report.yml
+
+      # pull_request_target needed by claude-code-action to access secrets
+      # and post review comments on fork PRs. Mitigated by: PR checkouts pin
+      # the fork's HEAD SHA (not the branch ref) to prevent TOCTOU races,
+      # and claude-code-action sandboxes execution. Header comment documents.
+      - claude.yml
+
+      # pull_request_target on the autolabel job needs `pull-requests:write`
+      # to apply labels. Mitigated by: release-drafter runs with `dry-run:
+      # true`, reads only `.github/release-drafter.yml` from the BASE ref,
+      # and the validate-title job (which runs untrusted `pull_request`
+      # context) holds no write permissions. Header comment documents.
+      - pr-labeler.yml
+
+  # Note: cache-poisoning is NOT exempted. The two prior findings in
+  # publish.yml and release-candidate.yml were fixed structurally by
+  # dropping `cache: npm` from those workflows (matches the pattern used
+  # by PyO3/maturin for the same audit). See the commit that added this
+  # file for the rationale.
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@ -18,6 +18,9 @@
  <a href="https://polyformproject.org/licenses/noncommercial/1.0.0/">
    <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/License-PolyForm%20Noncommercial-blue.svg" alt="License: PolyForm Noncommercial"/>
  </a>
+  <a href="https://securityscorecards.dev/viewer/?uri=github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus">
+    <img src="https://api.securityscorecards.dev/projects/github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/badge" alt="OpenSSF Scorecard"/>
+  </a>

  <p><strong>Enterprise (SaaS & Self-hosted)</strong> - <a href="https://akonlabs.com">akonlabs.com</a></p>

--- a/SECURITY.md
+++ b/SECURITY.md
@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+# Security Policy
+
+## Supported Versions
+
+GitNexus is developed on `main`. Security fixes are applied to the latest released minor on npm (`gitnexus`) and to the published Docker images (`Dockerfile.cli`, `Dockerfile.web`). Older minors are not back-patched.
+
+## Reporting a Vulnerability
+
+**Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security reports.**
+
+Use **GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting** for this repository:
+
+→ https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/security/advisories/new
+
+Please include:
+
+- A description of the issue and its potential impact
+- Steps to reproduce (a minimal repro repo or commit hash if possible)
+- The affected version(s) — `npm view gitnexus version`, image digest, or commit SHA
+- Any suggested mitigation
+
+### What to expect
+
+- **Acknowledgement:** best-effort within 5 business days, subject to maintainer capacity.
+- **Triage:** we will confirm whether the report is in scope, request clarifications if needed, and propose a fix timeline.
+- **Disclosure:** coordinated. We will agree on a disclosure date with you before publishing an advisory.
+
+### Scope
+
+In scope:
+
+- The `gitnexus` CLI and MCP server (`gitnexus/`)
+- The `gitnexus-web` thin client (`gitnexus-web/`)
+- The `gitnexus-shared` types package (`gitnexus-shared/`)
+- The published Docker images (`Dockerfile.cli`, `Dockerfile.web`)
+- GitHub Actions workflows in `.github/workflows/`
+
+Out of scope:
+
+- Vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies that we have no influence over (please report upstream; if a viable mitigation exists at the GitNexus layer, that's in scope).
+- Issues requiring physical access to a developer machine or a compromised local environment.
+- Theoretical attacks without a practical exploit against a default GitNexus deployment.
+
+## Recommended Hardening for Forks and Self-Hosted Deployments
+
+If you fork GitNexus or self-host it, we recommend enabling the following in your repository's **Settings → Code security and analysis**:
+
+- **Private vulnerability reporting** — the channel described above.
+- **Dependabot alerts** — alerts on advisories affecting your dependencies.
+- **Dependabot security updates** — automated PRs for security patches (this repo's `.github/dependabot.yml` already covers version updates).
+- **Secret scanning** and **Push protection** — blocks pushes that introduce known secret patterns. Defense-in-depth on top of the in-CI Gitleaks scan documented below.
+- **Code scanning** — surfaces SARIF results from CodeQL, Trivy, Scorecard, and zizmor in one place.
+
+## Automated Scans Running in CI
+
+This repository runs the following scans automatically. Findings appear under the repository's **Security → Code scanning** tab.
+
+| Scan | Tool | Trigger | Action on finding |
+|------|------|---------|-------------------|
+| Static analysis (JS/TS, Python) | [CodeQL](https://github.com/github/codeql-action) | PR, `main` push, weekly | Advisory (Security tab) |
+| Dependency vulnerabilities (PR diff) | [`dependency-review-action`](https://github.com/actions/dependency-review-action) | PR | **Blocks PR** at `high+` severity |
+| Secret scanning | [Gitleaks](https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks-action) | PR, `main` push | **Blocks PR** on default rules |
+| Supply-chain posture | [OpenSSF Scorecard](https://github.com/ossf/scorecard-action) | Weekly, `main` push | Advisory (Security tab + public badge) |
+| Workflow lint | [zizmor](https://github.com/woodruffw/zizmor) | PR (touching `.github/**`) | **Blocks PR** at `high+` severity |
+| Container image scan | [Trivy](https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy-action) | Weekly, `main` push | Advisory (Security tab) |
+
+Dependency version updates are managed separately by Dependabot — see `.github/dependabot.yml`.